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 Cicero‘s value as a military commentator has traditionally been obscured by 
his reputation as an unmilitary figure.  This focus ignores the considerable quantity – 
and quality – of references to military matters in his writings, as well as the 
engagement demanded by his public profile as a senior senator and advocate during 
the war-torn final decades of the Republic.  As a participant-witness writing as 
events unfolded, he provides unrivalled insight into developing contemporary issues 
from an equally unrivalled civilian/domestic perspective.  Far from precluding 
meaningful discussion, this perspective draws attention to the wider consequences of 
the activities of the army, from their symbolic representation of Rome‘s might to 
their impact on domestic stability and role in imperial expansion. 
 This thesis explores Cicero‘s contribution to the militarized culture of the late 
Republic, bringing together his military-themed comments in the first major study of 
its kind.  Chapter 1 sets the scene with an examination of his military service, 
demonstrating that it met the standards of the day and identifying characteristics of 
his outlook that can be linked directly to his experience.  Chapter 2 investigates his 
engagement with Rome‘s military heritage by way of his use of military exempla, 
specifically the priorities indicated by his choice and description of these figures.  
Chapter 3 presents a similar assessment of his relationships with contemporary 
military figures, noting the effect of their political influence on the interest he took in 
their military responsibilities.  Chapters 4 and 5 assess his theory concerning military 
matters in the domestic and foreign spheres, respectively.  Both highlight the focus 
on ethics which sets Cicero‘s theory apart from that of his contemporaries.  Finally, 
 
iv 
Chapter 6 addresses the tension between civic and military values in the previous 
chapters, contextualizing his pro-civic bias as a reaction to military despotism rather 
than anti-militarism for its own sake. 
 The analysis of these themes confirms Cicero‘s awareness of military matters 
as well as his contemporary authority as a commentator.  It moreover highlights the 
historical value of his remarks as the rhetorical product of a civilian context and an 
alternative discourse about the relationship between the army and the state.  
Although his views are broadly comparable to those of contemporary authors, his 
coverage of associated domestic concerns is not.  The end result is an account of 
military matters which complements conventional military histories and manuals of 
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 Quotations of Cicero are taken from the editions specified in the Oxford Latin 
dictionary except for the following texts: Catilinarians (Dyck 2008); Philippics 
(Ramsey & Manuwald 2010); De re publica, De legibus, De senectute, De amicitia 
(Powell 2006); De finibus (Reynolds 1998); De officiis (Winterbottom 1994); and the 
letters (Shackleton Bailey 1999-2002).   
 Quotations of other ancient authors are taken from the Oxford classical texts 
where available, and the Teubner editions in all other cases except the following: 
Commentariolum petitionis (Shackleton Bailey 2002); Plutarch Cicero (Zeigler 
1964); Quintilian (Russell 2001); Tibullus (Maltby 2002). 
 Full bibliographical details for all editions are provided in the bibliography. 
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Cicero as a military commentator 
 
 At first glance, Cicero seems an unlikely source for information about res 
militaris.  He is remembered as an orator and a man of peace, one who joined an 
army on only three occasions in his life, and whose public career was almost entirely 
spent in the domestic sphere.
1
  In an age of soldiers-turned-statesmen and military 
despotism, he stands out as a conspicuously civilian figure.  Plutarch has Antony 
ridicule his oi)kouri/a and call him a)stra/teutoj (Cic. 41.6), and Livy‘s epitomator 
describes him as a vir nihil minus quam ad bella natus (Per. 3).  A 15
th
-century 
scribe, confronted with a military treatise bearing Cicero‘s name, had no qualms 
about rejecting the attribution: non est Ciceronis sed tamen bonus est.
2
   
 This remark sums up well the assumptions that have shaped modern attitudes 
towards Cicero‘s relevance where military matters are concerned: a well-written 
treatise about political or rhetorical theory might have received the benefit of the 
doubt, but a treatise De re militari raised suspicions of mistaken identity or forgery.  
Although the Ciceronian corpus has long been recognized as a useful source for 
information about legal, social, and political matters (among others) in the late 
Republic, it is rarely used to illuminate the military history of an exceptionally 
violent period.  This is in spite of the insight Cicero provides as a participant-witness 
and the chronological range and sheer quantity of his extant works. 
                                                 
1
 Cf. Planc. 64-6 where he describes his decision to pursue his career under the oculos… acris atque 
acutos of the electorate at Rome. 
2
 Quoted by Reeve 2003, 426.  The treatise is now regarded as the work of ―Modestus‖, drawing on 
Vegetius‘ De re militari.  See Reeve 2003, esp. 417. 
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 His lifetime (106-43 BC)
3
 coincides with the most tumultuous years of the 
late Republic, a period characterized by domestic and foreign warfare which led to 
the destruction of the Republican form of government.  He came of age during (and 
served in) the Social War (91-88) and was a student during the civil wars of the 80s, 
entering the Senate as a quaestor as the Third Mithridatic War began (c.74-63).  His 
suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy as consul in 63 was contemporary with 
Pompey‘s conquest of the east, and his exile in 58 came on the eve of Caesar‘s 
departure for Gaul.  He joined Pompey‘s camp during the Civil War (49-45), 
advocated war against Antony after Caesar‘s assassination (44-43), and was 
proscribed amid renewed stirrings of civil war in December 43.   
 The earliest surviving example of his writing dates from the 80s (the De 
inventione, c. 87-81) and the latest from May/June 43 (Fam. 11.17 to M. Brutus), 
yielding a nominal span of some forty years.  The majority of his output is from the 
late 70s onwards, however, and reflects his involvement in public affairs as a senator: 
so in effect he provides nearly thirty years of commentary.  The nearest 
contemporary author to rival this range is Livy, but we have only the epitomes of his 
books for the first century.  By comparison, the commentaries of Caesar (and his 
continuators) cover a thirteen-year period from 58-45, and Sallust‘s Historiae an 
eleven-year one from 78-67 (his two monographs concern single episodes in 112-105 
and 63-62, respectively).  In terms of bulk as well, Cicero surpasses his 
contemporaries – and all other Latin authors in antiquity.  The corpus as it survives  
numbers fifty-eight speeches, nineteen treatises, and nearly 1000 letters (written both 
by him and to him).  The late Republic cannot be studied without engaging with 
                                                 
3
 All dates are BC unless otherwise stated. 
 
3 
Cicero; it should follow that he is of use for the study of military matters in the late 
Republic as well. 
 His public career gave him a front-row seat during a critical period in the 
development of Roman warfare and attitudes towards war.  He knew the leading 
commanders of the day personally, and saw the effects of military misconduct in the 
provinces while preparing for his prosecution of C. Verres (propr. Sicily 73-71) and 
as governor of Cilicia (51-50).  Instead of being the activity of a unified citizen body, 
war in the late Republic was increasingly dominated by influential, ambitious 
commanders and their partisans.
4
  This freed the less militarily inclined (such as 
Cicero) from needing to participate, but also introduced an element of self-interest to 
foreign policy.  Competition for commands was fierce, driven by both the political 
currency of military gloria and expectations of material gains.  Even provincial 
governors treated their forces like private armies, leading to some truly shocking 
instances of exploitation and self-enrichment at the expense of allies.
5
  War became a 
means of self-aggrandizement as ambitious commanders sought to rival the prestige 
Pompey won for his conquest and settlement of the east (66-61).  Chief among the 
challengers was Caesar, whose conquest of Gaul (58-49, including forays against the 
Germans and Britons in 55 and 54) also bears witness to Rome‘s growing imperial 
                                                 
4
 See esp. Harris 1979, 5, 252. 
5
 The governor enjoyed an exceptional degree of autonomy in his province.  See esp. Brunt 1978, 175; 
Lintott 1999, 94-6; Cicero‘s perception of this is discussed in Chapter 5.  On contemporary concern 
about the conduct of governors, see Badian 1968, 8-10.  The scope for abuse is well illustrated in 
Cicero‘s Verrines.  In addition to numerous misdeeds, Verres is alleged to have boasted that he would 
make three fortunes during his three-year term: one for his own enjoyment, one to reward his 




self-awareness in this period.
6
  The union of ambition and armed force wreaked 
havoc on domestic politics as well, since the Senate was virtually powerless to resist 
a commander with an army at his back.  Sulla‘s march on Rome to challenge Marius‘ 
command of the First Mithridatic War (88) set a new precedent for the use of force at 
home.  The result was civil war.  Caesar‘s crossing of the Rubicon to defend his 
dignitas (49) and Octavian‘s march on Rome to demand the consulship (43) are 
consistent with this model.   
 All of these developments are recorded in Cicero‘s writings, which not only 
chronicle but comment on them.  As an advocate he manipulated the sympathies of 
his audience by appealing to – or assailing – the military records of his subjects.  As 
a senator he participated in and even initiated debates about commands, war, and 
empire.  Military exempla illustrate his arguments in his speeches and treatises, and 
some of his treatises have military men as interlocutors.  Last but not least, his letters 
offer a live narrative of military issues, including private reactions to the campaigns 
of the triumvirs and the perils of civil war.   
 This material has not been explored adequately by scholars, despite its 
importance for our understanding and appreciation of Cicero‘s place in the late 
Republic.  Many aspects of his engagement with military matters have not been 
examined at all, and few studies analyze his remarks in a military context, preferring 
to focus on political, philosophical, or rhetorical themes.  Most research is also 
limited by issues of scope and scale.  To give two recent examples, Steel‘s study of 
Cicero‘s imperial rhetoric does not include his treatises or letters, whereas 
                                                 
6
 On Roman imperialism in this period, see most recently Erskine 2010, esp. 29-32; and discussion 
below, pp. 216-29.  Crassus‘ ill-fated campaign against the Parthians (53) was similarly motivated by 
a desire to rival Pompey and Caesar. 
 
5 
Richardson‘s investigation concentrates exclusively on Cicero‘s use of the terms 
imperium and provincia.
7
  Military historians are a significant exception to both of 
these trends, but the range of their studies rarely permits detailed analysis of political 
or rhetorical context.   
 The aim of this thesis is to bridge these gaps, bringing together Cicero‘s 
military-themed statements and assessing them (and the ideas they represent) 
collectively as military commentary for the first time.  Although it will challenge 
established views about the range of his thought and activity, its purpose is not to be 
revisionist but to complement existing scholarship in the interest of a more nuanced 
understanding of Cicero‘s contribution to military culture in the late Republic.  It will 
demonstrate that he is a viable and valuable commentator in his own right, explore 
his engagement with military matters throughout his life, and investigate the effect of 
his civilian perspective on his attitude towards the army. 
 The analysis will be both thematic and contextual.  Because of the novelty of 
this study, a considerable portion of the discussion will be devoted to surveying 
military material in the corpus, highlighting the range, types, and functions of 
Cicero‘s comments.  However, this will be presented within an argumentative 
framework, thus allowing meaningful conclusions to be drawn about each aspect of 
his engagement with military matters.  The respective arguments will focus on the 
relationship between context and rhetoric, which is the only real means of evaluating 
Cicero‘s commitment to the ideas he espouses.  It must be remembered that his 
words are an imperfect reflection of his actual knowledge and attitude: we can only 
know as much about this as he tells us (or is able to tell us) at any given time.  
                                                 
7
 See Steel 2001 and Richardson 2008, 63-116. 
 
6 
Therefore his silence should not automatically be interpreted as ignorance, nor his 
idealism as naïveté: such readings perpetuate the image of him as an inexperienced 
civilian and do not take generic and political constraints into account.  Conversely, 
recurring themes and expressions that are not obviously dictated by rhetorical 
exigency may indicate ideas that were important to him personally.  This possibility 
will be investigated by comparison with parallel references in the works of 
contemporary authors, which will be used generally as a gauge of current views.  The 
most relevant of these authors are Caesar, Sallust, and Livy; yet it will be noted that 
none of them provides a precise generic match for Cicero‘s speeches, treatises, and 
letters.
8
  This disparity sheds light on the practical effects of the civilian setting of 
most of his writings, which are often more responsible for the form of his 
commentary than his perspective as an individual civilian. 
 Each of the six chapters examines a specific aspect of his engagement with 
military matters.  Chapter 1 addresses his authority as a commentator by evaluating 
his military experience in its historical context.  It shows that his service in the Social 
War (c. 89), his campaigns as governor of Cilicia (51-50), and his activity during the 
Civil War (49-48) conformed to the normal pattern of military service for the time – 
especially for someone who was not a career soldier.  Special attention is paid to his 
success in Cilicia (he won the title of Imperator and famously sought a triumph) as 
evidence of competency in generalship; this interpretation provides valuable context 
for his short-lived command in the Civil War.  The chapter concludes with a 
                                                 
8
 Excluding a handful of letters written to Cicero by Caesar, which are preserved in the Ad familiares 
collection.  See White 2003 for analysis. 
 
7 
consideration of what his service reveals about his military outlook, and how it may 
have affected his attitude towards the army. 
 Building on this foundation, Chapter 2 explores his rhetorical treatment of 
Rome‘s military heritage.  This is manifested in his writings in his use of military 
exempla.  Although the majority of these are used in accordance with rhetorical 
theory (as illustrations of traditional virtues), a significant number deviate from this 
model.  These can be divided into three groups based on function and chronology: 
foreign exempla, which provide an ―other‖ in contrast to Roman virtues and 
supremacy; a second group comprised of the two Scipiones Africani, Cato the Elder, 
and Laelius, who are his only military interlocutors and represent an idealized union 
of learning and public life; and a third group including Marius, Cinna, and Sulla, who 
are invoked to illustrate the threat which unbounded military power posed to 
domestic security.  It is maintained that his manipulation of exempla to serve often 
unmilitary arguments demonstrates his sensitivity to the evocative power of a 
military name – as well as discomfort with what the army had come to represent. 
 Chapter 3 makes a similar inquiry into his relationship with military men in 
his own time.  At issue is his acknowledgement of the military identities of these 
men, as separate from their political identities.  Of course, total separation was 
impossible in the context of the late Republic; but Cicero‘s treatment of these men 
reveals tension between civic and military spheres and raises questions about how he 
ranked the respective areas of activity.  Five distinct types of relationship can be 
discerned, all of which have political overtones: soldiers/veterans; military protégés 
(i.e. political inferiors); military sponsors (i.e. political superiors); military inimici; 
and his brother Quintus.  His apparent preoccupation with political influence is 
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investigated as a product of his civilian perspective and also as evidence that he 
viewed military achievements as secondary to civic ones. 
 The focus shifts from personalities to principles in Chapters 4 and 5, which 
investigate his theoretical engagement with military matters at home and abroad, 
respectively.  This theory provides valuable context to the findings of the previous 
chapters, clarifying his conception of the place of the army in the state.  Both 
chapters survey major themes in his remarks and assess them as evidence of his 
awareness and priorities, integrating existing scholarship where applicable.  The 
major themes in Chapter 4 are justice in warfare, the ideal commander, military 
gloria, and civil war.  These emphasize the importance of the Senate and people as 
the ultimate authority over the army, as well as Rome‘s vulnerability if commanders 
used their influence for ill.  In Chapter 5 the major themes are the governor as a 
commander, the socii as military allies, and empire.  These show an interest in how 
the army promoted national interests abroad, and illuminate Cicero‘s sense of 
Rome‘s place in the world as a major, military power.  The attention to ethics which 
characterizes his theory – and is unrivalled in contemporary literature – is evaluated 
as an indication of overriding civic priorities, and thus as a product of his civilian 
perspective. 
 Chapter 6 concludes the study with an investigation of Cicero‘s ―anti-
militarism‖, as indicated by his characteristic preference for civic values over 
military ones in his discussion of military matters.  This warrants separate 
examination not only because of its implications for his authority as a military 
commentator, but also because it is specifically addressed in two bodies of texts.  
The insight these provide is particularly valuable because it gives the best indication 
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of his personal ideals in a context that best displays the effect of his civilian 
perspective. The first body of texts is a series of explicitly pro- and anti-military 
statements which, when evaluated in context, are seen to express a consistently anti-
military bias oriented around a preoccupation with domestic security.  This is 
examined in light of anti-militarism in contemporary and near-contemporary 
literature, including the militia amoris theme in Augustan poetry.  It is argued that 
Cicero represents one end of a continuum of anti-militarism inspired by fear (and 
eventually weariness) of civil war.  The second body of texts pertains to his self-
constructed identity as a domestic military leader against Catiline (63) and Antony 
(44-43).  His manipulation of his audience‘s sympathies is assessed as a test case for 
the priority he gives to civic leadership traits over strictly military ones elsewhere, 
and as further evidence of the role he accorded to the army in the state.   
  The broad outlines of Cicero‘s military commentary confirm his appreciation 
of the army in its traditional role as a defensive force representing the whole of the 
Republic.  Beyond this, however, a diverse range of short and long term 
considerations make it impossible to sum up his outlook in a single sentence.  The 
value of his commentary lies in how it allows us to observe him engaging with the 
defining issues of the period and attempting to negotiate solutions.  His commentary 
also sheds light on what it meant to be a civilian in a militaristic age.  His narrative is 
not the battle narrative of Caesar, and his theory is not the military science of 
Frontinus or Vegetius.  Rather, he provides a complementary commentary about 
military matters as they were experienced at home and by a civilian – a perspective 
which rarely appears in traditional military commentary. 
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 There are also historical reasons to be interested in Cicero as a military 
commentator.  As Gilliver notes in her study of Roman warfare, very few military 
treatises in Latin have survived.
9
  Vegetius‘ Epitoma rei militaris is the only general 
manual to have survived intact, but because it is a summary of earlier works is not a 
reliable source for period-specific information about the Roman army.  The only 
known Republican treatise is Cato the Elder‘s De re militari (or De disciplina 
militari), which survives as a handful of fragments quoted by later authors (including 
Vegetius).  Although Cicero‘s commentary is generically very different from these 
technical manuals, it is nevertheless important as a secure source of evidence for 
Republican practices.   
 Before commencing the analysis, some important terminology must be 
clarified.  The term ―army‖ is used throughout the thesis to refer to the armed forces 
of the Republic, both specific units (e.g. Caesar‘s army) and in general terms (e.g. the 
Roman army).  It encompasses all of the soldiers, officers, and commanders as a 
cohesive unit engaged for the purpose of waging war.  This definition corresponds to 
Cicero‘s use of the words exercitus and legio, which is his usual way of referring to 
the forces.  For this reason, ―army‖ is preferred to more technical vocabulary which 
is not present in his writings.   
 The same rationale informs the range of ranks that are represented in the 
analysis.  These are limited to soldiers (milites), veterans (veterani), and commanders 
(duces, imperatores) in accordance with the functions that are discussed in the most 
detail by Cicero.  Although he often mentions formal offices when describing an 
                                                 
9
 Gilliver 2001, 10.  Gilliver provides a list of attested Roman military treatises on pp. 173-7. 
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individual‘s career, these references do not illuminate his attitude towards the army 
and are therefore of little use here.
10
   
 The term ―military‖ is used as an adjective, consistent with the Latin 
adjective militaris.  To borrow part of the definition from the OLD, it denotes things 
which are ―of or connected with the army, its customs or activities.‖  Thus it forms 
the base of a number of important phrases in this study, such as military experience, 
military men, military gloria, military theory, and military commentary.  Most of 
these are self explanatory, but one – military matters – warrants further explanation.  
It is derived from the common Latin phrase res militaris, and used in the same way 
to describe issues pertaining to the army.  It should be noted that the singular is the 
normal form, although the English translation is plural.
11
  Perhaps more to the point, 
the singular form is also the one used by Cicero.
12
 
 Finally, ―civilian‖ denotes an unmilitary person or pursuit in contrast with 
military ones.  This meaning is roughly equivalent to the adjective togatus, which 
additionally evokes the peacetime associations of the toga.
13
  However, the term is 
primarily intended to provide an opposite member for ―military‖ which conveys the 
polarization of the two spheres.  Thus, for example, Cicero is a civilian figure 
whereas Caesar is a military one, and Cicero‘s writings yield a civilian perspective to 
complement the military ones of Caesar and Sallust.  ―Civic‖ and ―domestic‖ are 
                                                 
10
 Legatus is deliberately avoided because its military relevance is not always clear.  
11
 See OLD s.v. militaris. 
12
 As far as I am aware, the plural militares only occurs in his writings when it modifies nouns which 
are naturally plural.  See e.g. Font. 42 (studiis militaribus); Cat. 2.13 (signa militaria); Prov. 31 
(urbes... et viae militares); cf. references to tribuni militares (e.g. Inv. 1.87; Clu. 99; Phil. 6.14). 
13
 For an example of the subtlety of togatus, see esp. Cicero‘s self-representation as a togatus dux et 
imperator at Cat. 2.28; 3.23.  On the significance of the toga, see below, n. 522. 
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used interchangeably (with the exception of Chapters 4 and 5) to refer to the 
political/public space in which civilian activity takes place.   
 It may be noted in closing that Cicero was believed to have written a military 
treatise until well into the Middle Ages – contrary to the ancient assessments of him 
as an unmilitary figure which were quoted above.
14
  Reeve has suggested that this 
belief originated from a passage in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, a treatise which was 
attributed to Cicero until the end of the 15
th
 century: Dolus consumitur in pecunia... 
et ceteris rebus de quibus magis idoneo tempore loquemur, si quando de re militari 
aut de administratione re publica scribere velimus.
15
   
 The identification of the treatise on political administration with Cicero‘s De 
re publica (which was well known throughout the Middle Ages) led some people to 
assume that ―Cicero‖ had written a De re militari as well.  Although ultimately 
flawed, the longevity of the belief presents a very different view of Cicero from the 
one that prevails today.  It also shows how receptive scholars were to a Ciceronian 
military treatise, which suggests that on some level he was regarded as a credible 
commentator.  The fact that the authorship of the Rhetorica ad Herennium is now 
better understood does not mean that this view should be rejected. 
                                                 
14
 See esp. Petrarch Fam. 24.4.13 (a letter addressed to Cicero): Tuorum sane [sc. librorum]… quorum 
insignior iactura est hec sunt nomina: rei publice, rei familiaris, rei militaris, de laude philosophie, de 
consolatione, de gloria….    
15
 Rhet. Her. 3.3.  See Reeve 2003, 426.  Reeve prints de administranda re publica, an excellent 
solution to the ungrammatical combination of ablatives in Marx‘s text.  Cf. Cic. Arch. 14; Fam. 




Cicero on the battlefield 
 
A natural starting point for the study of Cicero‘s perception of military 
matters is his own military experience.  Contrary to his enduring reputation as a 
civilian figure, his career was not entirely confined to the domestic realm.  He served 
with an army on three occasions: during the Social War (c. 89), as governor of 
Cilicia (51-50), and at the beginning of the Civil War (48).  Although this experience 
was limited in comparison to that of most public figures in the late Republic, it is 
important nonetheless as evidence of his engagement with military matters on a basic 
level.  Furthermore, because the factors which led him to pursue an unmilitary career 
will have also shaped his perception of the army, an understanding of his experience 
is necessary in order to appreciate his perspective fully.  Accordingly, this chapter 
will trace his military record, evaluating it against ―typical‖ service in first-century 
Rome.  It will also introduce historical and political issues which seem to have had a  
formative influence on his outlook, and which will be recurring themes in subsequent 
chapters. 
It is significant, if not surprising that Cicero‘s military career tends not to be 
treated as such by scholars.  There is no attempt to link the three episodes of his 
service, apart from conjectures that the long interval between the Social War and his 
governorship of Cilicia indicates an aversion to soldiering.
16
  This is partly due to 
                                                 
16
 E.g. Steel 2005, 36: ―it is fair to conclude that whatever happened to Cicero in the army during the 
Social [W]ar convinced him either that he did not want to be a soldier, or that he did not have the 
skills to make a serious mark in the field.‖  Cf. Smith 1966, 20; Shackleton Bailey 1971, 9; Fuhrmann 
1992, 15.  Wood 1988 briefly traces Cicero‘s service in the Social War (p. 46), in Cilicia (pp. 52-3), 
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prevailing attitudes towards Cicero as an unmilitary figure, and partly to the scarcity 
of the evidence.  Cicero is on the whole very quiet about his service.  Allusions to it 
in his writings are often anecdotal, and only tangentially connected to the episodes 
which they describe.  Significantly, apart from the letters from Cilicia, the majority 
of references to his military service are found in his philosophical treatises and late 
speeches.  These recollections are subordinated to the agenda of the work in 
question, and the military content is secondary.  For example, the Cilicians are 
mentioned in De divinatione as people who practise divination (1.2), and in the 
Second Philippic Cicero frames his justification of his conduct in Pompey‘s camp 
with assertions that Rome might have avoided civil war had his advice been heeded 
(§§37-9).  No letters survive from earlier than 68, and political expediency stayed 
Cicero‘s hand for much of 49 and 48.   
Among the other ancient authors, only Plutarch‘s biographies of Cicero and 
his contemporaries address Cicero‘s military experience.
17
  This dearth of source 
material confirms the traditional view of Cicero as an unmilitary figure.  The 
difficulty of reconstructing his experience sheds light on one important aspect of his 
perspective, however: beyond providing epistolary material, the military experience 
seems to have interested Cicero primarily as a source for illustrative parallels in his 
speeches and treatises – and not necessarily in terms of battles and bloodshed.   
 
                                                                                                                                          
and during the Civil War (p. 53), yet states that ―of the seven premier statesmen of the century he was 
the only one without military expertise or experience‖ (p. 54).   
17
 In contrast, Cicero‘s quasi-military suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy (63) and opposition to 
M. Antonius‘ civil war (44-43) are copiously documented by the biographers and historians of the late 
Republic, and figure more prominently in Cicero‘s own writings.  See below, pp. 261-85.   
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Cicero’s military career 
 We begin with a survey of Cicero‘s military career.  His introduction to 
soldiering in the Social War is the least documented of his three episodes of military 
experience.  In essence, we know that he served under Cn. Pompeius Strabo in 89, 
the year of the general‘s consulship; that he was subsequently transferred to the army 
of L. Cornelius Sulla in Campania; and that he was a contubernalis with a L. Tubero.  
When the texts are read closely, however, a more nuanced picture of his activity as a 
recruit emerges. 
 A passage in the Philippics provides critical background, and must be 
examined in full:   
 
Memini colloquia et cum acerrimis hostibus et cum gravissime 
dissidentibus civibus. Cn. Pompeius Sex. f. consul me praesente, cum 
essem tiro in eius exercitu, cum P. Vettio Scatone, duce Marsorum, 
inter bina castra collocutus est: quo quidem memini Sex. Pompeium, 
fratrem consulis, ad colloquium ipsum Roma venire, doctum virum 
atque sapientem. Quem cum Scato salutasset, ―quem te appellem?‖ 
inquit. At ille: ―voluntate hospitem, necessitate hostem.‖  (Phil. 12.27) 
 
The word tiro shows that Cicero‘s service with Strabo was part of his tirocinium, a 
traditional period of military apprenticeship which prepared youths of the upper 
classes for public life.  It was supplemented by a civic counterpart, the so-called 
tirocinium fori, which gave the young men a taste of oratory.
18
  Both training periods 
lasted for one year and were normally undertaken at age sixteen or seventeen, when 
                                                 
18
 See Bonner 1977, 84.  The label tirocinium fori is a modern invention used to differentiate between 
the two forms of apprenticeship.  Although tirocinium and tiro are defined in the TLL as distinctly 
military words, some ancient examples are less clear-cut.  See e.g. Liv. 45.37.3; Suet. Aug. 26.2; Tib. 
54.1; Cal. 10.1; cf. militiae tirocinium at Val. Max. 5.4.2, the only ancient example of the combined 




the young man assumed the toga virilis and his basic schooling was considered to be 
complete.
19
  He would then formally be attached to a mentor, as prominent a figure 
as possible, to learn by observation the arts of the battlefield and the forum.  It is 
unclear whether both types of tirocinium were undertaken by all young men, or in 
which order: at Cael. 11 Cicero suggests that exercitatio ludusque were practised by 
both groups on the Campus Martius, but at Font. 42 he says that studia militaria are 
going out of style among the youth of the day.
20
  His passing reference to being a 
contubernalis with Tubero reveals that the two were also educated together prior to 
their military service: haec ego noui propter omnis necessitudines, quae mihi sunt 
cum L. Tuberone: domi una eruditi, militiae contubernales (Lig. 21).   
 We should therefore see Cicero‘s involvement in the Social War as typical 
behaviour for a young, upper-class Roman with political aspirations.  That he was 
not a simple soldier on the front lines is evident from the passage above, and is also 
consistent with the tirocinium militiae.  These young men were training to become 
officers.  Excellence was rewarded with the rank of military tribune (either by 
election or by the general‘s appointment), an office which frequently led to the 
quaestorship.
21
  Thus the tirocinium militiae was an important introduction to 
                                                 
19
 See Marquardt and Mommsen 1879, 132; Ginestet 1991, 55.  Cicero was 17 in 89.  On the type of 
basic education that was traditionally gained at home, see Bonner 1977, 10-11, citing the example of 
Cato the Elder.  Plut. Cic. 3.2 stresses the brevity of Cicero‘s service: a(/ma de/ toi=j peri\ Mou/kion 
a)ndra/si politikoi=j kai\ prwteu/ousi th=j boulh=j sunw/n, ei)j e)mpeiri/an tw~n no/mon w)felei~to, 
kai/ tina xro/non kai\ stratei/aj mete/sxen u(po\ Su/lla| peri\ to\n Marsiko\n po/lemon. 
20
 Cicero‘s own example suggests that the tirocinium militiae followed the tirocinium fori.  Marrou 
1948, 319 also places the tirocinium fori first, whereas Taylor 1949, 29 and Ginestet 1991, 69 neatly 
sidestep the issue of order.  Marquardt and Mommsen 1879, 132-3 and Bonner 1977, 84 state without 
sources that the tirocinium militiae was only undertaken if the young man aspired to a military career.  
This seems unlikely given that Cicero completed a tirocinium militiae despite a clear inclination 
towards a career in the forum.    
21
 On the responsibilities associated with the military tribunate, see Harris 1979, 13; Lintott 1999, 139-
40.  On the electoral implications of the position, see Smith 1958, 60.  Cf. Cic. Planc. 61.  There is no 
evidence that Cicero was a military tribune at this time. 
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political networking.  Whereas the mentor-figure of the tirocinium fori was usually a 
distinguished family friend, political importance was the consideration for the 
tirocinium militiae.  This may explain why Cicero was attached to Strabo as consul 
and afterward Sulla as consul-elect, rather than his fellow Arpinate C. Marius.  The 
connection with Strabo may in turn – if a relevant inscription can be read this way – 
have brought Cicero into contact with two men who would alter the course of his 
career and life: Strabo‘s son Pompey, and L. Sergius Catilina.
22
   
 Cicero‘s service with Sulla also included access to events away from the 
battlefield.  The two surviving references concern a portent which prompted Sulla‘s 
successful march on a Samnite camp near his headquarters at Nola, also in 89.
23
   
Only one version need be examined: 
 
Nam de angue illo qui Sullae apparuit immolanti utrumque memini et 
Sullam, cum in expeditionem educturus esset, immolavisse et anguem 
ab ara exstitisse eoque die rem praeclare esse gestam non haruspicis 
consilio sed imperatoris. (Div. 2.65; cf. 1.72) 
 
It need not seem strange that a teenage recruit should be allowed to witness a 
sacrifice, or diplomatic negotiations, as above.  Quaestors had a filial relationship 
with their generals (Red. sen. 35; Planc. 28; cf. Div. Caec. 61), and the political 
implications of the tirocinium meant that the young man was very much a part of the 
general‘s entourage.  Although this particular passage reflects the aim of Cicero‘s 
treatise on divination, it is possible that memini actually refers to a first-hand 
                                                 
22
 ILS 8888 mentions both ―Cn. Pompei. Cn. f. Clu.‖ and ―L. Sergi. L. f. Tro.‖ as being with Strabo, 
but it is unclear whether they can be identified as Pompey and Catiline.  Cicero is not mentioned in the 
inscription, but this does not rule out overlap between his time with Strabo and that of the Cn. 
Pompeius and L. Sergius mentioned.  See also Dessau‘s n. ad loc.   
23
 On the dating of Sulla‘s victory, and thus of Cicero‘s service under him see Gabba 1992, 124. 
 
18 
observation, as it may be used in the passage from the Twelfth Philippic.  In any case, 
Cicero‘s recollections of his experience in the Social War reveal a lasting concern 
with the broader duties of generalship, rather than with skirmishes on the front lines.   
 It would be nearly forty years before Cicero found himself in the field again – 
this time as a general.  Such a long period of inactivity was unusual in the late 
Republic: as late as the mid-second century, ten years of military service was 
required in order to be eligible for public office.
24
  Although this was no longer 
rigorously enforced by the first century, some military experience continued to be 
demanded of aspiring magistrates – Cicero is one of only two documented cases of a 
man being elected to office without ten years of service.
25
  In the absence of a formal 
military college, the amount of experience any general had in advance of his 
command was very much up to him.  He was expected to learn on the job or to bring 
capable legates to assist him.
26
       
  Cicero received Cilicia by virtue of Pompey‘s lex de provinciis (52), which 
stipulated that there should be a five-year interval between the holding of a 
magistracy and a provincial command.  A decade previously, he had made a great 
show of declining a province after his consulship (Plut. Cic. 12; Sal. Cat. 26.4; Dio 
37.33); in the new dearth of eligible magistrates, his consular status seems to have 
put him at the top of the allocation list.  Cilicia was designated a consular province in 
                                                 
24
 Polyb. 6.19.2.  Walbank 1957, n. ad loc. notes that the text is corrupt and cites other known terms of 
service which support the figure of ten years in the second century.  Harris 1979, 11-12, discusses the 
precise meaning of the requirement, concluding that ten campaigns was more likely the obligatory 
term. 
25
 Harris 1979, 12 and 257, responding to Wiseman 1971, 143; cf. Taylor 1949, 30 on contemporary 
expectations.  
26
 Gilliver 2001, 9; cf. Goldsworthy 1996, 122 on Rome‘s ―amateur‖ generals and Rosenstein 2007a, 
139-40 on the political and social advantages of this system. 
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any case – indicating that it was considered to be at risk for warfare.
27
  The largest 
province in the east, Cilicia had been the centre of Rome‘s eastern defence since the 
time of Sulla.
28
  Although it was allocated two legions to mobilize against local 
rebellions and invasion from outwith the province, the forces were actually at 
considerably less than this strength when Cicero arrived.
29
  Three cohorts were 
missing, and another five had withdrawn from the main body of the army to an 
independent position on the northern frontier (Fam. 3.6.5; 15.4.2).  Those that were 
present were embittered by their treatment at the hands of Cicero‘s predecessor, Ap. 
Claudius Pulcher (cos. 54), who had only just settled arrears in pay when confronted 
with mutiny in July (Att. 5.14.1).  A previous request for a levy had been blocked by 
senatorial opposition (Fam. 3.3), and Cicero was adamant that locals could not be 
used: neque multi sunt et diffugiunt, qui sunt, metu oblato (Fam. 15.1.5).  His ability 
to defend his province ultimately owed much to effective fighting by C. Cassius 
Longinus, legatus of M. Calpurnius Bibulus (cos. 59), governor of Syria, as well as 
by Bibulus himself.  Crucial auxiliaries were also provided by Deiotarus, King of 
Galatia – such that they doubled Cicero‘s meagre numbers when they arrived.
30
  
Cicero remained with his army for the campaigning season, roughly from August 
                                                 
27
 See Taylor 1949, 31.  Both of Cicero‘s immediate predecessors in the province were hailed as 
imperatores by their armies: the former, P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (procos. 56-53), celebrated a 
triumph in 51, but the latter, Ap. Claudius Pulcher (procos. 52-51), abandoned his pursuit of one when 
he was prosecuted de repetundis (sources at MRR). 
28
 Smith 1958, 23; Syme 1979, esp. 124-5; Sherwin-White 1992, 265.  Stockton 1971, 230 estimates 
the size of the province at 40,000 square miles; see also maps and discussion in Mitchell 1993 (esp. 
Vol. 1 pp. 27-34; Vol. 2 App. 1). On the ethnic and territorial make-up of the province, see Syme 
1979, 122-3.   
29
 Att. 5.15.1: duarum legionum exilium; cf. Fam. 2.10.2; 15.4.14.  Plutarch‘s estimates at Cic. 36 are 
clearly based on their theoretical strength. 
30
 Att. 5.18.2; cf. Att. 6.1.14; Fam. 15.4.5, 7; Phil. 11.34.  Lintott 2008, 262 notes that Cicero, as 
governor, was ultimately responsible for the size of his army and could have levied new recruits from 
the local population. 
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until the end of December 51.
31
  They were mobile for much of this time, moving to 
meet threats and rumoured threats along Cilicia‘s borders.    
 Cicero‘s military activity in Cilicia can be divided into three main campaigns: 
against the Parthians, at Mt Amanus, and at Pindenissum.  His chief concern was the 
Parthians, who seemed to threaten a major war in 51.  He was eager to avoid a 
confrontation, writing en route to his province, Parthus velim quiescat et fortuna nos 
iuvet: nostra praestabimus (Att. 5.9.1).  At first he seemed to get his wish, but in 
mid-September the Parthian crown prince crossed the Euphrates into neighbouring 
Syria cum permagno equitatu (Fam. 15.1.2; cf. Fam. 15.3.1; Att. 5.18.1).  The 
defensive strategy which he adopted was sensible and realistic, and took into account 
both the forces at his disposal and the possibility of siege: 
 
Tuto consedimus, copioso a frumento, Ciliciam prope conspiciente, 
expedito ad mutandum loco, parvo exercitu sed, ut spero, ad 
benevolentiam erga nos consentiente.... Dilectus habetur civium 
Romanorum; frumentum ex agris in loca tuta comportatur. Si fuerit 
occasio, manu, si minus, locis nos defendemus.  (Att. 5.18.2)    
 
The wording of his dispatch to the Senate was equally pragmatic – using the threat 
that amittendae sint omnes eae provinciae quibus vectigalia populi Romani 
continentur to underscore the gravity of the situation, as well as drive home his 
urgent need for reinforcements, quantum ad maximum bellum mittere soletis (Fam. 
15.1.5).  There was talk of sending Caesar or Pompey to take over, but developing 
                                                 
31
 For the dates, see e.g. Att. 5.14 (27 July), where Cicero announces his plans to go straight to his 
army, and Att. 5.20.5 (19 Dec.), where he writes that he is turning the army over to Quintus to take to 
winter quarters.  The chronology of the letters as arranged by Shackleton Bailey is followed 
throughout this thesis.  Rawson 1975, 167 notes that these dates correspond to a summer campaigning 
season, since the Julian calendar reforms were still some years away.  
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tensions between the two dynasts refocussed Senatorial concerns on Rome itself.
32
  
Cicero was largely left to fend for himself, and his praetorian cohort and cavalry 
successfully repulsed a Parthian and Arab joint foray into the province (Fam. 15.4.6; 
cf. Fam. 3.8.10; 2.10.2).  An earlier raid in August had cost him some cavalry (Att. 
5.16.4), and this victory is an indication of improved organization on his part. 
 It was not against the Parthians, however, that he would distinguish himself 
as a commander – although his pursuit of them led to the two battles which defined 
his proconsulship.  Despite maxima itinera to the Syrian border to intercept the 
enemy who was reported to be at Antioch, he arrived to hear that the Parthians had 
been driven back by Bibulus and Cassius.   
 
...tum id quod iam ante statueram vehementer interesse utriusque 
provinciae, pacare Amanum et perpetuum hostem ex eo monte tollere, 
agere perrexi. Cumque me discedere ab eo monte simulassem et alias 
partes Ciliciae petere… distributisque cohortibus et auxiliis, cum aliis 
Q. frater legatus mecum simul, aliis C. Pomptinus legatus, reliquis M. 





In other words, having made the journey, he took the opportunity to suppress some 
local rebels in what Goldsworthy calls a ―punitive action‖ campaign.
34
  For five days 
he assailed the natives, who were taken completely by surprise and routed: multi 
occisi capti, reliqui dissipati (Fam. 2.10.3).  He also razed the settlement to the 
ground.  In return, his army proclaimed him Imperator at Issus.  The symbolism was 
                                                 
32
 See esp. Fam. 8.20.2.  Interestingly, Att. 6.1.14 sounds as though the matter had been decided: erit 
sustentandum quoad Pompeius veniat.   
33
 Fam. 15.4.8; cf. 2.10.2-3.  On the problems with accepting at face value the slightly altered version 
in Att. 5.20, see Wistrand 1979, 7-9.  
34
 Goldsworthy 1996, 95-97, concluding that ―[i]n the relations between these peoples and Rome, the 
impression of power was more important than its reality.‖  Cf. Lintott 1993, 53 on Cicero‘s need to 
keep his hastily-raised force busy.   
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not lost on Cicero, who proudly noted the connection of the place with Alexander the 
Great.
35
  Embolded by his success, he moved on to the town of Pindenissum, which 
he invested for 57 days until it fell on the Saturnalia (Att. 5.20).  The ―enemy‖ here 
were the so-called Free Cilicians (Eleutherocilicium), whom Cicero describes as feri 
homines et acres et omnibus rebus ad defendendum parati (Att. 5.20.5).  Their threat 
to Roman rule cannot otherwise be ascertained, and it is telling that to this day the 
town cannot accurately be placed on a map;
36
 but the prospect of a triumph beckoned 
and Cicero could not resist the military gloria that it would bring him.
37
  To a certain 
extent the idea had been planted in his mind by his M. Caelius Rufus, who wrote to 
him wishing for a war just large enough to win a triumph, but not so large that it 
posed any real danger (Fam. 8.5; cf. 2.10.2).  With the campaigning season over, 
Cicero turned the army over to his brother to take to winter camp, and returned to 
Cilicia proper to attend to the civic responsibilities of his post. 
 In sum, Cicero met the military challenges of his governorship appropriately 
and effectively.  Although his qualifications were questionable, the fact that he was 
clearly expected to manage is significant.  He never acknowledges any assistance 
from his legati, but it should be noted that three of the men were seasoned and able 
commanders: his brother, Quintus, who had served with distinction under Caesar in 
Gaul, and governed Asia for three years; C. Pomptinus, who had helped with the 
                                                 
35
 Att. 5.20.3.  Cf. Fam. 2.10.3; Plut. Cic. 36.  Cicero does not mention the title in his letter to Cato 
(Fam. 15.4), probably to conceal the fact that he had not sent an official report to the Senate until after 
Pindenissum, cf. Fam. 2.10.3.  For alternative interpretations of the omission, see Wistrand 1979, 12.  
36
 It is not depicted in Talbert 2000.  Curiously, it is on the map of Asia Minor included in Shackleton 
Bailey 2001 (Vol. 3), where it is located approximately 100 miles north west of Tarsus; it is unclear 
how this location was determined. 
37
 Pompey seemed to be amenable to it, according to Att. 7.2.5.  Cicero‘s case is evaluated by 
Wistrand 1979, 26-34, who essentially concludes that it was not merited; cf. Beard 2007, 196-9 on the 
risks of generalizing about criteria for awarding triumphs on the basis of Cicero‘s example.  Cicero‘s 
theoretical engagement with triumphs and military gloria is discussed below, pp. 159-68. 
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arrest of Catilinarian conspirators in 63 and celebrated a triumph in 54 for his 
achievements as governor of Transalpine Gaul; and M. Anneius, an experienced 
soldier whom Cicero admired.
38
    
That his resources and not his ability were the source of concern at the time is 
made clear in a letter from Caelius, as news reached Rome about Parthian activity in 
the east.   
 
Ego quidem praecipuum metum, quod ad te attinebat, habui, qui 
scirem quam paratus ab exercitu esses, ne quod hic tumultus dignitati 
tuae periculum adferret. Nam de vita, si paratior ab exercitu esses, 
timuissem; nunc haec exiguitas copiarum recessum, non 
dimicationem mihi tuam praesagiebat. (Fam. 8.10.1)  
 
We need only consider Bibulus‘ fate to see how able – or lucky – Cicero was as a 
general.  When Bibulus engaged the Parthians on the Syrian side of Mt Amanus, he 
lost his entire first cohort, including centurions and a military tribune.
39
   
 This brings us to Cicero‘s third and final experience of military life: in Italy 
and in Pompey‘s camp at the outset of the Civil War.  The episode is not nearly so 
well documented as his activity in Cilicia, and the surviving sources give much scope 
for speculation.
40
  Four letters written from Pompey‘s camp (Att. 11.3; 11.4; 11.4a; 
Fam. 14.6) contain little military material, no doubt owing to the exigencies of the 
political situation.  Plutarch‘s biography supplies some otherwise unknown details, 
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 Little is known about the fourth legatus, a L. Tullius who was recommended to Cicero.  Sources at 
Mitchell 1991, 226.  In Fam. 9.25.1, Cicero claims to be following the precepts set out in Xenophon‘s 
Cyropaedia.  On his attitude towards Quintus as a military man, see below, pp. 124-8. 
39
 Att. 5.20.4; cf. 6.5.3.  Cicero refers disparagingly to Bibulus‘ involvement as an attempt in eodem 
Amano… loreolam in mustaceo quaerere.  Bibulus was awarded a triumph, much to Cicero‘s chagrin 
in light of his own success as well as the fact that Cassius had led the critical fighting in Syria. 
40




which when combined with more plentiful references from Cicero‘s earlier letters 
and later writings, allow a reasonable reconstruction of his time spent under arms.  
 Cicero returned from Cilicia to a Rome that was unquestionably on the brink 
of war.  Already from Athens in mid-October 50, he foresaw tantam dimicationem… 
tantam quanta numquam fuit (Att. 7.1.2; cf. Fam. 16.11.1).  He fully intended to take 
a military role in the incipient conflict: video me castris et certis legionibus 
praefuturum (Fam. 16.12.5).  His determination owed a great deal to the fact that he 
still possessed his proconsular imperium.  It is just possible that this was an 
intentional byproduct of his aspirations for a triumph – certainly Atticus had noted 
the opportunity by December (Att. 7.3.3; cf. 7.7.4) – but on 7 January 49 the Senate 
passed the senatus consultum ultimum, specifically charging consuls, praetors, 
tribunes, and proconsuls to preserve the state (Fam. 16.11.1; Caes. BC 1.5).  Cicero 
was assigned to the ―vital‖ Pompeian base of Capua,
41
 a prominent post, but one in 
which he seems to have managed to be as unobtrusive and non-partisan as possible: 
nullum maius negotium suscipere volui, quo plus apud illum [sc. Caesarem] meae 
litterae cohortationesque ad pacem valerent (Fam. 16.12.5).  He accepted the 
command at the beginning of January,
42
 and towards the end of the month his sphere 
of influence was expanded to include the entire Campanian coast, where he was in 
charge of the levying of recruits for a Pompeian army (Att. 7.11.5).  The results of 
this were disappointing, and Pompey quickly summoned him to Capua to assist with 
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 According to Mitchell 1991, 252 n. 66, with sources.  The nature, and indeed actuality, of Cicero‘s 
Capuan command are explored in depth by Shackleton Bailey 1968, App. 2 and Wistrand 1979, App. 
2.  Shackleton Bailey rejects the Capuan command largely on semantic grounds.  Wistrand accepts the 
Latin as it survives in the MSS, and essentially argues from a ―why not?‖ perspective.  I am inclined 
to agree with Wistrand because his argument fits more easily with the Ciceronian account as a whole.   
42
 Fam. 16.11.3 (12 Jan.): Italiae regiones discriptae sunt… Nos Capuam sumpsimus.  Shackleton 
Bailey 1977a n. ad loc. takes sumpsimus as an epistolary tense, which indicates that Cicero intended 





  However, when it became apparent that fighting was imminent, 
Cicero resigned the post.   
 He later claimed that the command was detrimental to his work for peace 
(e.g. Att. 7.26.2), but a contemporary letter to Pompey reveals his more pressing 
concern about the infamia he would suffer if he were unable to hold the coast, owing 
to inadequate resources: 
 
Quod feci non vitandi oneris causa sed quod videbam teneri illam 
urbem sine exercitu non posse, accidere autem mihi nolebam quod 
doleo viris fortissimis accidisse. (Att. 8.11D.5; cf. Att. 8.3.4-5; 8.12.2).   
 
Chief among these viri fortissimi was certainly L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cos. 54), 
who had recently been forced to surrender to Caesar at Corfinium when 
reinforcements did not materialize: a tactful description of quae Corfini acta essent 
precedes Cicero‘s explanation of his decision to resign the command (Att. 8.11D.3).  
We do not know whether another commander was appointed, but by February 
Pompey was fleeing from Caesar‘s advance, and the following month he quit Italy to 
encamp at Dyrrachium in Greece.  Much of the Senate joined him there (Phil. 13.26, 
28), and after some soul-searching Cicero did as well.  Defying Caesar‘s order that 
no-one was to leave Italy, he sailed fom the Campanian coast in June.
44
  By virtue of 
an earlier meeting with Caesar – at which he could not promise not to advocate for 
Pompey in future – Cicero could no longer pretend neutrality (Att. 9.18.1). 
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 Att. 7.14.2, 25 January.  
44
 See Fam. 14.7 (7 June), written to Terentia while on board ship.  Caesar‘s order, and Cicero‘s 
testing of the waters via Antony are the subject of Att. 10.10.  Wistrand 1979, 163 n. 1 suggests that 
Cicero‘s destination was Thessalonica, where Pompey had summoned the Senate.  
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We are left to infer from the sources that his presence in Pompey‘s camp was 
largely superfluous – and involved very little in the way of military service.  The 
picture that emerges is one of Cicero biding his time advocating peace – and making 
inopportune jokes.
45
  Cato evidently asked him why he had come at all, when he 
might have remained neutral and therefore a valuable mediator in Italy (Plut. Cic. 
38).  The reality of this observation is borne out by Cicero‘s only contemporaneous 
comment on his time in camp: ipse fugi adhuc omne munus, eo magis quod ita nihil 
poterat agi ut mihi et meis rebus aptum esset (Att. 11.4).  He later recounted his 
impressions of the camp in highly disparaging terms: 
 
... primum neque magnas copias neque bellicosas; deinde, extra 
ducem paucosque praeterea (de principibus loquor), reliquos primum 
in ipso bello rapacis, deinde in oratione ita crudelis ut ipsam victoriam 
horrerem. (Fam. 7.3.2) 
 
He goes on to say that he could not convince Pompey to seek peace, or at least delay 
battle, and that as soon as overconfidence from his victory at Dyrrachium in July got 
the better of him, vir ille summus nullus imperator fuit (Fam. 7.3.2).  Cicero was in 
camp when C. Coponius arrived to relay the prophecy he had heard from a rower in 
his squadron, foretelling the imminent bloody defeat and scattering of the Pompeian 
forces (Div. 1.68-9; 2.114).  The battle was Pharsalus, and Plutarch says that Cicero 
was too ill to participate (Cic. 39); but it is hard to imagine Cicero engaging in 
combat against fellow Romans.  As he had written to Atticus while rationalizing his 
lack of involvement in March, me, quem non nulli conservatorem istius urbis 
parentemque esse dixerunt, Getarum et Armenorum et Colchorum copias eam 
                                                 
45
 Phil. 2.37-9.  Plut. Cic. 38 gives a sampling of the jokes. 
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adducere? (Att. 9.10.3).  He accordingly also refused to accept Cato‘s army and fleet, 
even though tradition dictated that he, as the most senior magistrate present, should 
assume command (Plut. Cic. 39.1).  Plutarch records the colourful altercation which 
followed, when Pompey‘s son attempted to kill Cicero for his apparent disloyalty.  It 
remained for Cicero to return to Italy and wait in philosophical retirement at 
Brundisium for Caesar‘s pardon, which he eventually obtained in the following year.   
 Thus ended Cicero‘s military career.  Although he had far less experience 
than many of his peers in the Senate, it is clear that he satisfied the standards 
implicitly in operation in the late Republic.  He completed a tirocinium militiae at the 
normal age, commanded the army in a militarily-significant province, and won the 
title of Imperator for his achievements in the field.  His experience in the Civil War 
is more difficult to reconcile with conventional models; but the conflict was, after all, 
anomalous in its own right.   
 
Quantifying Cicero’s military experience 
 The analysis of Cicero‘s military career illustrates the perils of judging his 
place in Rome‘s militarized culture on the basis of comparison with his more 
experienced contemporaries.  He was not a military man, but neither was he 
completely inexperienced in military matters.  In order to better understand his place 
in contemporary society and culture, it is instructive to evaluate his example against 
that of men whose circumstances were the same as his.  The two most relevant 
groups for comparison are novi homines and orators.  Using ancient documentation 
and modern prosopographical studies, this section will attempt to determine whether 
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Cicero‘s experience was more or less typical in light of his background and career 
choice.  
 We begin with the novi homines.  Although not a technical or legal term, 
novus homo is regularly used in ancient literature to describe men from plebeian 
backgrounds who were the first in their families to hold the consulship.
46
  Cicero 
refers to himself as a novus homo (e.g. Leg. agr. 2.3; cf. Mur. 17) and is advised at 
Comm. pet. 1 to be mindful that novus sum, consulatum peto, Roma est.  Although 
novi homines were not formally excluded from politics, the prejudices of the nobiles, 
who made up the majority of the ruling class, made it extremely difficult for 
someone from an ―obscure‖ background to gain the necessary support to seek 
office.
47
  Military service was a major – if not the main – means of advancement that 
was available to them.
48
  This makes Cicero‘s deliberate avoidance of it seem 
conspicuous and even imprudent,
49
 especially since, as was seen above, the training 
he undertook in his youth is consistent with preparation for a political career.   
 Unfortunately, the surviving sources do not permit a survey of novi homines 
in the Republican period; but a reasonably complete record of consuls can be 
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 See e.g. Caes. BAfr. 57.4;  Liv. 4.3.17; 4.54.6; 22.34.8; 37.57.12; 39.41.2; Vell. 2.128.1; and esp. 
Comm. pet. 4, 11, 14; Cic. Font. 23; Clu. 182; Sest. 136; Planc. 67; Rep. 1.1; Off. 1.138; Fam. 5.18.1.  
It should be noted that novus homo occurs most frequently in Cicero‘s writings.  On the definition of 
the term, see Wiseman 1971, 1 (citing Hellegouarc‘h 1963, 472-83), and most recently Van der Blom 
2010, 35-41.  Burckhardt 1990, 98-9 traces modern debate about the meaning of the terms novus and 
nobilis. 
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 See esp. Wiseman 1971, 3-5, 100-6; cf. Dugan 2005, 7, asserting that the obstacles were very real.  
Hopkins 1983, esp. 36-41, 55-69 argues that succession rates within individual families (i.e. consuls 
whose sons also attained the office) left plenty of vacancies to be filled by newcomers, whether men 
from senatorial families or novi homines.  Nevertheless, a survey of MRR quickly reveals the 
stranglehold which blue-blooded families such as the Metelli, Cornelii, Licinii, and Claudii had on the 
higher magistracies.    
48
 McDonnell 2006, 329 states that it was ―characteristic of the novus homo... that they entered politics 
on the basis of a military reputation.‖  Wiseman 1971 also prioritizes military service.  See esp. pp. 
144-7, detailing two military ―routes to the Senate‖; cf. pp. 173-81 and Harris 1979, 31 on Marius‘ 
example. 
49
 So Smith 1966, 20; Fuhrmann 1992, 15; Steel 2005, 37.    
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constructed.  This offers a convenient and status-appropriate means of gauging 
prevailing practices and thus Cicero‘s conformity with this model.   
 It is a measure of the impediment posed by novitas that Cicero is one of only 
fifteen novi homines known to have held the consulship between 366 (the year the 
leges Liciniae-Sextiae went into effect, requiring one consul to be of plebeian status) 
and 63.  The others are: L. Sextius Lateranus (366), Sp. Carvilius (293, 272), M.‘ 
Acilius Glabrio (191), Cn. Octavius (165), L. Mummius (146), Q. Pompeius (140), 
P. Rupilius (132), M. Perperna (130), C. Marius (107, 104-100, 86), Cn. Mallius 
Maximus (105), C. Flavius Fimbria (104), T. Didius (98), C. Coelius Caldus (94), 
and C. Norbanus (83).  Of these fourteen men, only five are specifically attested in 
the sources as having military experience prior to their consulship, typically as 
praetors.
50
  However, four others were dispatched to major wars during their 
consulships, with great success.
51
  Such results would be extremely fortuitous if these 
men had no prior experience, and so it seems safe to infer that their previous service 
is simply unrecorded.  Of the remaining five men, one negotiated an unauthorized 
peace with his opponents; one suffered a major defeat during his consular campaign; 
and three are not documented in the sources.
52
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 Perperna earned an ovation for quelling a slave revolt while praetor in Sicily (135); Marius was 
military tribune in Numantia (134), engaged in minor military operators as praetor (or propraetor?) in 
Lusitania (114), and served in the Jugurthine War (108); Didius earned a triumph for his activity as 
praetor in Hispania Citerior (100); Caldus served as proconsul of Hispania Citerior at a time when it 
was presumably still a hotspot (c. 98); and Norbanus defended Sicily as praetor during the Social War 
(88-87).  Sources at MRR and Wiseman 1971, 1-3, 209-83.  Many of these men appear in Cicero‘s 
writings as exempla.  See Chapter 2, passim.   
51
 Carvilius triumphed over the Samnites in 293 and Tarentines, et al. in 272; Glabrio defeated 
Antiochus at the battle of Thermopylae in 191; Mummius commanded the Achaean war and sacked 
Corinth in 146; Rupilius was dispatched to a slave revolt in Sicily in 132, and kept on in the province 
as proconsul the following year.   
52
 Pompeius had been dispatched to the Numantine War but made peace with his opponents instead.  
Maximus was defeated and lost most of his army at the battle of Arausio.  Nothing is known about the 
activities of Lateranus, Octavius, and Fimbria.   
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 This breakdown strongly suggests that novi homines who sought the 
consulship were normally veterans of at least one major campaign, and had 
experience commanding an army.  If we assume that the vast majority of novi 
homines who entered politics wished to attain the consulship, this trend can be 
generalized to describe the lesser magistracies as well.  It is a symptom of the 
political disadvantages of novitas that many candidates were well over the minimum 
age stipulated by the cursus honorum when they were elected to the consulship.
53
  In 
any case, it is clear that Cicero was very inexperienced compared to this model; but 
the three consuls whose activities are unknown raise the possibility that he did not set 
a precedent as an unusually unmilitary consul.  A tantalizing hint of such a precedent 
appears at Brut. 129, where Fimbria, whose deeds are not recorded, is described as 
nec rudis in iure civili.  This is significant because jurisprudence and oratory seem to 
have been the main alternative methods by which novi homines sought support in the 
late Republic.
54
   
 A striking passage at the beginning of the Commentariolum petitionis not 
only acknowledges oratory as a valid means of advancement, but even champions it: 
 
Nominis novitatem dicendi gloria maxime sublevabis. Semper ea res 
plurimum dignitatis habuit; non potest qui dignus habetur patronus 
consularium indignus consulatu putari. Quam ob rem quoniam ab hac 
laude proficisceris et quicquid es ex hoc es, ita paratus ad dicendum 
venito quasi in singulis causis iudicium de omni ingenio futurum sit. 
(§2) 
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 See Wiseman 1971, esp. 166-7 for examples including Mallius, Fimbria, and Caldus.  Prior to 
Cicero, the last novus homo to be elected consul suo anno was Q. Pompeius. 
54
 See Wiseman 1971, 178-9; cf. 178, 180-1 for other domestic means of advancement. 
 
31 
The exhortation is very specific to Cicero‘s situation, but this need not preclude 
inquiry into an underlying principle: if a novus homo could win the consulship on the 
strength of his oratorical talent alone, then perhaps his level of military experience 
was less important than history makes it seem.   
 Bearing this in mind, we may now compare Cicero‘s military record to those 
of other orators.  Although the idea of orators as soldiers seems odd at first glance, it 
must be remembered that Rome was a military state and for much of its history 
enforced a rule whereby all candidates for public office must have had ten years of 
military service in order to be eligible.
55
  The highest calling for an orator‘s 
persuasive talents was the Senate, and from there the battlefield.
56
  Accordingly, an 
inquiry into the military experience of orators is not without value.  As previously, 
the surviving sources are not conducive to wide-ranging statistical analysis; but a 
convenient alternative is provided by the Brutus, a treatise which claims to chart the 
decline of oratory at Rome.
57
  Sumner‘s excellent monograph puts career details to 
names which are often mentioned by Cicero only in passing, and provides the 
framework for this analysis.
58
   
 A survey of Sumner‘s prosopography immediately confirms the political 
relevance of oratory: very few of the men mentioned did not hold public office, and 
many of these are Italians referred to in connection with the Social War.
59
  The 
earliest orator mentioned is L. Junius Brutus (cos. 509), and the latest one is C. 
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 See above, nn. 24-5. 
56
 On the importance of military eloquence (viz. adlocutio), see esp. Harmand 1967, 303-13; Gilliver 
2001, 102-3. 
57
 On the political significance of the treatise, see below, n. 463.  It was published in 48, at the 
beginning of Cicero‘s philosophical period following his brief involvement in the Civil War. 
58
 See Sumner 1973, 11-27. 
59
 See esp. Brut. 167-72 = Sumner 1973, R 112-22. 
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Licinius Macer Calvus (no office, died in 47).  In the interest of selecting a sample 
which will most accurately reflect the standards in operation during Cicero‘s life, this 
discussion will focus on Roman orators who were active from c. 100 onward, a 
collection which yields a group of 118 orators.
60
 
 Of these men, less than fifty held at least one military office during their 
careers, whether military tribune, officer, legate, or a command proper.
61
  This small 
number is striking in its own right, but even more so once it is noticed that nearly 
half of them served only in the Social War or one of the civil wars and other 
domestic conflicts (e.g. Spartacus‘ revolt and the war against Catiline and 
Manlius).
62
  We may surmize, then, that the violence of the times accounted for 
much of the service undertaken by orators – a hypothesis which gains some support 
from the number of orators whose careers included many distinctly unmilitary 
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 The sample corresponds to Sumner 1973, R 103-221. 
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 In the order listed by Sumner 1973, with the relevant office(s) identified: M. Antonius Orator 
(procos. Cilicia 101-100); L. Licinius Crassus (cos. Gaul 95); C. Coelius Caldus (procos. Hispania 
Citerior c. 98); L. Marcius Philippus (leg. Sardinia 82); L. Gellius Poplicola (cos. 72 - Spartacus); L. 
Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus (promag. 85-84, cos. 83 – Social War); Cn. Pompeius Strabo (cos. 80 – 
Social War); Cn. Octavius (cos. 87 – civil war); Q. Lucretius Afella (prefect 82 – civil war); Q. 
Sertorius (promag. 82-73 – revolt); C. Aurelius Cotta (procos. Gallia Cisalpina 74); C. Scribonius 
Curio (procos. Macedonia 75-2); M. Livius Drusus (tr.mil. ?); Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio 
Nasica (procos. Syria 49-48; 48-46 – civil war); L. Licinius Lucullus (procos. 73-63 – Mithridatic 
War); M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (leg. 83 – civil war; procos. Macedonia 73-1; Q. Servilius Caepio 
(pr? 91 – Social War; procos. 90 – Social War); Cn. Papirius Carbo (procos. 83 – civil war); L. 
Quinctius (leg./praef.eq. 71); M. Licinius Crassus (leg./prefect 83, 82 – civil war; procos. 71 – 
Spartacus; procos. Syria 54-3); C. Flavius Fimbria (pref.eq. 87; leg. 85); M. Pupius Piso Frugi 
(procos. Spain 71/70-69); L. Manlius Torquatus (procos. 64-3 – Catilinarians); Cn. Pompeius Magnus 
(propr. 83-79 – civil war; procos. 77-71 – pirates; procos. 67-61 – Mithridatic War; procos. 49-48 – 
Civil War); M. Valerius Messalla Niger (tr.mil. bis); Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer (pr. 63 – 
Catilinarians; procos. Gallia Cisalpina 62); Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos (leg. of Pompey 67-3; procos. 
Hispania Citerior 56-55); C. Julius Caesar (leg. (wins civic crown); tr.mil. 72?; procos. Spain 61-60; 
procos. Gaul 58-49; dict. during Civil War); C. Visellius Varro (tr.mil. 80-79); L. Manlius Torquatus 
(tr.mil. ?); C. Valerius Triarius (praef.class. 49-48 – Civil War); M. Calpurnius Bibulus (procos. Syria 
51-50); Ap. Claudius Pulcher (procos. Cilicia 53-51; procos. 49-48 – Civil War); L. Domitius 
Ahenobarbus (procos. 49-48 – Civil War); P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (procos. Cilicia 56-54); L. 
Cornelius Lentulus Crus (procos. Asia 48 – Civil War); T. Postumius (promag./leg. 49 – civil war); 
M. Calidius (leg. 48-47 – Civil war); C. Scribonius Curio (propr. Africa 49 – Civil War); C. Licinius 
Macer Calvus (died in Civil War);  Sources at MRR.   
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 See previous note. 
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offices, such as tribune of the plebs, pontifex, augur, and censor.
63
  Of perhaps 
greater relevance to Cicero‘s case, however, is the fact that many of these orators 
only served in one or two campaigns in the course of their careers.  This conforms 
precisely to his career, and indicates that the extent of his military service was 
entirely normal for an orator in this period.   
 This brief examination of the patterns of military service for novi homines 
and orators has shown that Cicero‘s experience can be described as both typical and 
atypical for his times.  Although this may seem like a meaningless conclusion, it 
must be remembered that not all military men in the late Republic were like Caesar 
or Pompey, and that such comparisons – however automatic to us – are not always 
helpful.  To know where Cicero stands in relation to novi homines and orators 
provides valuable context to the factual outline of his military experience given 
above.  It highlights not only the similarity of his chiefly domestic career with that of 
other like-minded individuals, but also the significance of his political achievements 
as a civilian in a militarized age. 
 
Conclusion: Cicero’s civilian perspective 
 This chapter has examined Cicero‘s military experience as a means of 
establishing his authority as a commentator on res militaris.  It has shown that his 
military career, though limited in comparison to that of many of his peers, 
nevertheless met the basic standards of the day and gave him valuable exposure to 
the practical aspects of military matters.  Perhaps more to the point, it challenges the 
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 See esp. Sumner 1973, R 104, 105, 110, 111, 130, 138, 156, 169, 171, 185.  Of course, many 
military men held these positions too, including most notably Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus; but it 
seems to be more prevalent among orators without extensive military experience. 
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common perception of him as an exclusively civilian figure who had little to do with 
the army.  His service in the Social War corresponds to a traditional tirocinium 
militiae, his governorship of Cilicia demonstrates engagement and competence, and 
his participation in the Civil War shows that his peers acknowledged him as a 
commander.  Although the extent of his experience differs considerably from the 
averages for other consular novi homines, it matches the average for contemporary 
orators exactly, thus confirming that his experience is representative on a 
fundamental level. 
 It is nevertheless clear that he chose to pursue an unmilitary career.  As a 
preface to the following chapters, we may consider here the effects of this choice on 
his perception of military matters.  The long hiatus between his service in the Social 
War and in Cilicia indicates that the former conflict had a profound influence on his 
perspective.  One explanation for this that is surely relevant but rarely acknowledged 
by scholars is his Italian heritage.
64
  It is not difficult to imagine him feeling 
conflicted about participating in the conflict – distress may account for his service 
with Sulla, since in 89-88 Marius was campaigning in the Volscian region, very near 
to his and Cicero‘s hometown of Arpinum.
65
   
   This hypothesis seems to be supported by the eventual course of his military 
and political careers.  His apparent aversion to soldiering is consistent with his 
commitment to peace, as well as with a practical need to be in Rome, where his 
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 Fuhrmann 1992, 14 is an exception. 
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 See esp. Gabba 1992, 124.  There are no indications in the Marian tradition that he was particularly 
attached to his hometown or region, whereas Cicero‘s enduring fondness for Arpinum is well attested.  
See esp. Leg. 2.3.  The town received full citizen rights in 188, but did not become a municipium until 
90. 
 De Blois 2007, 169 notes that the inhabitants of Italy only became inured to warring against each 
other in Sullan times. 
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influence depended on his being in the public eye (esp. Planc. 64-6).  It also 
anticipates a conservative attitude towards the place of the army in the state and the 
value of military activity.  These issues will dominate the discussion in the remaining 
chapters, and are best understood in historical and political context, rather than as the 
product of a flawed outlook.  Cicero lived in a very militarized age and society, but 
the factor which most affects his authority as a commentator is that he also 




Rome’s military heritage in Cicero’s writings 
 
 Cicero‘s writings bear eloquent witness to both Rome‘s military heritage and 
his own pride in it.  Historical generals and their campaigns are often mentioned by 
him, frequently in detail and accompanied by praise.  This is not surprising against 
the backdrop of Rome‘s militarized culture – and the public nature of most of his 
works – but his handling of the relevant themes indicates a rhetorical agenda that was 
not necessarily devoted to inflaming national pride.  Civic issues regularly intrude in 
a way that sometimes seems inappropriate, and appears to suggest an unwillingness 
to engage with the military matters at hand.  This chapter will investigate this 
phenomenon by assessing the form and function of the relevant passages.  In 
particular, it will attempt to identify a conventional mode of reference to Rome‘s 
military heritage and thereby highlight instances where Cicero may be said to be 
promoting his own view of this. 
 The Ciceronian past as defined here encompasses the period from Homeric 
Greece to Cicero‘s quaestorship in 75.  Admission to the Senate signified the 
beginning of his personal involvement with Rome‘s military policy, and a certain 
sense of responsibility (or at least awareness of the potential) can be detected in his 
references to military events after this point.
66
  Conversely, his treatment of military 
men and events in the past reflects his position as an interested but detached 
commentator on bygone events.  Even the Social War and bloodshed of the 80s are 
never described with the same vividness (or personal interest) as conflicts after he 
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  Perhaps more to the point, with the exception of Sulla, the notable 
military men who flourished before 75 had died by the time Cicero wrote about 
them.  Chronological distance and the absence of a political relationship are therefore 
the characteristics which separate past from present in his treament of military 
matters. 
 That said, Cicero was not a historian, and none of his surviving writings are 
purely historical.  A survey of his references to historical military events reveals a 
distinct preference for engaging with individuals rather than their exploits per se.  
Literary context certainly played a role in this – unlike Caesar, Sallust, or Livy, he 
had little scope to indulge in extended military narrative in his writings – but another 
conditioning factor may be identified: the traditional use of exempla (para/deigma) 
to illustrate arguments.  Rhetoricians encouraged comparision with historical figures 
as a source of proof, by means of inductive reasoning from the well known parallel.
68
  
Cicero defined the practice himself as quod rem auctoritate aut casu alicuius 
hominis aut negoti confirmat aut infirmat (Inv. 1.49; cf. Top. 44). The forensic 
applications of such appeals to precedent are obvious; in treatises, too, well chosen 
exempla impart auctoritas and dignitas to the discussion.
69
  The comparison might be 
explicit or implicit, and could refer to any point on the continuum between historical 
fact and extrapolation from the established character of the exemplum.  As Aristotle 
observed, paradeigma&twn de\ ei1dh du&o: e3n me\n ga/r e0stin paradei&gmatov ei]dov 
                                                 
67
 Political expediency no doubt played a role in this, but it is nevertheless difficult not to detect in 
Cicero‘s references to the period (especially to the proscriptions) a willingness to consign these events 
to the past.  See e.g. Off. 2.27-9. 
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 Arist. Rhet. 1.1356b1; Rhet. Her. 4.62; Quint. Inst. 5.11.6 calls it the potentissimum use of simile.  
Cf. Cic. Inv. 2.19 and 2.25, where Cicero discusses how to use exempla in prosecution and defence 
speeches, respectively.  An interesting and humorous glimpse into late Republican usage is given at 
Cic. Acad. 2.13.  See Kelly 2008, 258-9 for modern discussion of exempla as a rhetorical strategy. 
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 Rambaud 1953a, 37, 40; Hallward 1931, 236.   
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to_ le&gein pra&gmata progenome/na, e3n de\ to\ au0to_n poiei=n (Rhet. 2.1393a28-31).  
The sole criterion was that the similarity be appropriate (Rhet. Her. 4.61; Quint. Inst. 
5.11.26). 
 This raises two important questions about Cicero‘s rhetorical practice: why 
did the use of military exempla appeal to him so much, and were they appropriate in 
the context of unmilitary arguments?  As Kelly notes, ―exempla can be manipulated, 
and with difficulty changed, but there is no guarantee the intended reception will 
prevail.‖
70
  Cicero‘s military exempla serve a variety of immediate purposes, 
depending on the exigencies of the present circumstances.  For instance, an allusion 
to L. Aemilius Paulus (cos. II 168)
71
 serves quite a different purpose in a defence 
speech for a military man (Mur. 31) than in a political one advocating war (Cat. 
4.21) or a philosophical treatise praising bravery in the face of death (Tusc. 1.89).   
 Such rhetorical exigencies are responsible for what Rambaud laments as the 
―noble, mais ambiguë‖ position of history in Cicero‘s works: it is ―noble, car elle est 
garante ou conseillère de l‘action; ambiguë, car elle n‘est pas traitée pour elle-
même.‖
72
  Yet the orator‘s chief aim was to persuade, and it is not entirely fair to 
Cicero to be surprised by the almost opportunistic means of his (public) engagement 
with the past.  What is interesting is the value judgement implicit in the comparisons 
with historical examples.  Exempla served an important social function for the 
Romans, on account of their relationship with the mos maiorum.  By providing 
concrete illustrations of virtue (or vice) the exempla functioned as historical arbiters 
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 Kelly 2008, 259. 
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 Figures in this chapter will be identified by consular year.  Sources may be found at MRR and 
Shackleton Bailey 1992, 1995, 1996.  In the case of incomplete or ambiguous nomenclature, the 
identification given by Shackleton Bailey is followed. 
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 Rambaud 1953a, 46.  Rawson 1972, 33 argues that Cicero‘s historical interests are primarily 
antiquarian.   
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of morality, in addition to serving as a reference point for comprehending the Roman 
collective past.
73
  David goes so far as to claim that ―l‘exemplum n‘a d‘autre fonction 
que de fixer pour les contemporains de Cicéron la conformité au comportement 
traditionnel.‖
74
  Such a polarized view is impossible to verify (especially given 
Cicero‘s dominance over the surviving sources of the late Republic) but it provides 
an attractive explanation for the unmilitary capacity in which he deploys military 
exempla.   
 The fact that military figures represent the vast majority of exempla used by 
Cicero is a striking indication of Roman sensitivity to military glory.
75
  It also 
reflects the degree of social regard for the auctoritas resulting from military 
distinction.  In his words, declaratur autem studium bellicae gloriae, quod statuas 
quoque videmus ornatu fere militari (Off. 1.61; cf. Leg. Man. 6).  Unfortunately, no 
formal register of exempla has survived and there is no way to evaluate novelty in his 
choice of comparisons.
76
  The only surviving specifically military collection, from 
Valerius Maximus, is of little use as a model because it discusses only fourteen 
military men in connection with military discipline (2.7).  The fact that Cicero 
mentions most of these examples in more positive military contexts indicates that 
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 Cf. Roller 2004, 8; cf. 4-6, where a four-stage creation process is outlined.  
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 David 1980, 84-5, referring to exempla in Cicero‘s forensic speeches; cf. Hölkescamp 1996.  Van 
der Blom 2010 provides an extensive study of Cicero‘s use of exempla to demonstrate his conformity 
with traditional values and thus merit on the political stage.  Unfortunately, it was published too late 
for me to incorporate it into this discussion.  
75
 Rambaud 1953a, 27-35 lists the historical figures mentioned by Cicero, which fall neatly into 
groups according to the major conflicts of Roman history: the heroes of the early Republic, the Punic 
Wars, From the Conquest of Greece to Scipio Aemilianus, the Gracchi, and the Social War and 
Marius and Sulla.  On his attitude towards military gloria, see below, pp. 159-68. 
76
 Lind 1979, 12 suggests that Cicero used the collections of Valerius Antias (c. first century) for his 
foreign exempla and Coelius Antipater (second century) for the Roman ones.  Neither collection 
survives except in fragments.  Litchfield 1914, 62-3 identifies eleven key books or lists of exempla in 
his study of Roman usage from its beginnings until the early fifth century AD, of which five are lost.  
David 1980, 84, counts some 400 exempla in Cicero‘s speeches, although many of these are near-
contemporary figures and therefore not exempla by my definition. 
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allusions to exempla could refer to any aspect of the figure‘s character or record.  It is 
not known which virtues or vices were normally attached to each exemplum, or 
whether these attributes were fixed.
77
  That some exempla were considered 
inappropriate in certain contexts is suggested by Cicero‘s tendency to refer to remote 
and controversial men only in the treatises, unless they have special relevance to a 
particular speech.  For instance, Horatius Cocles is mentioned only twice, both times 
in treatises (Off. 1.61; Parad. 12), and T. Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus (cos. III 
340) appears in the speeches only at Sul. 32, to draw a parallel between his 
disciplinary zeal and the (allegedly) similar zeal of the Torquatus who was 
prosecuting Cicero‘s client.
78
    
 The exempla are concentrated in the speeches and treatises, consistent with 
the rhetorical demands of these genres compared to letters.  The passages range in 
length from mere mentions of names to extended prosopopoeia in the treatises.  They 
also frequently take the form of lists, which read like an attempt to overwhelm the 
opposition by the sheer volume of precedents adduced (esp. Pis. 58).  Two main 
types of allusion may be identified.  The first comprises the most conventional use of 
exempla, as may be gauged by the conformity of these passages to the rhetorical 
theory outlined above, and also their brevity and formulaic structure, which indicate 
that Cicero was drawing on existing discourse and could rely on his audience to 
supply meaning to the comparison.  The second type is distinguished by specialized 
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 Coudry 2001, 47 notes that M. Furius Camillus is cited for almost every Roman virtue by the 
ancient authors.  Cf. Litchfield 1914, 28-35 and the many exempla for whom multiple virtues or vices 
are adduced. 
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 Cocles is credited in legend with defending the Sublician bridge against Porsenna‘s advance until it 
could be destroyed from the Roman side, and then swimming back across the Tiber.  On his use as an 
exemplum, see Roller 2004.  In 340 Torquatus executed his own son for disobeying orders in the field.  
Berry 1996, n. ad loc. notes that ―later generations looked back uneasily on Torquatus as a model of 
antique severity and patriotism.‖  Cf. Val. Max. 2.7.5.  
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exemplary functions which yield a more subjective citation.  There are three groups 
of these: foreign exempla; P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus and the other 
military interlocutors in the treatises; and Marius, Cinna, and Sulla as exempla whose 
identities were established or refined by Cicero.  The fact that these groups break 
down along chronological lines is noteworthy and reflects, as will be seen, the degree 
of his familiarity with and interest in military men as they approach his own time.   
 
Conventional comparisons 
 It is indicative of flexibility of Ciceronian exempla that the most 
straightforward type is practically ubiquitous in his public writings and encompasses 
military men from all periods of Roman history.  In the speeches, such allusions are 
naturally concentrated in orations concerning military matters (e.g. the Pro lege 
Manilia and the Philippics) and relating to military men.
79
  Dramatic settings and 
subject matter disrupt this practice in the treatises to a certain extent, but military 
exempla are nevertheless abundant.
80
  The amount of detail in the respective passages 
varies widely, but it should be remembered that these men were well known and 
lengthy recapitulations of their records were unnecessary as well as outwith the 
rhetorical scope of Cicero‘s works.  
 This is especially evident in his use of exemplary catalogues, as mentioned 
above.  These catalogues represent his most concise form of comparison, and are 
tantamount to name-dropping.  The most pointed examples occur in the speeches, 
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 Esp. the Verrines, Pro Murena, Pro Archia, Pro Balbo, In Pisonem, and Pro Plancio.  The only 
speeches that do not contain military exempla are Pro Q. Roscio, Pro Tullio, and Pro Marcello. 
80
 The rhetorical treatises tend not to contain many references to military men (De optimo genere 
oratorum and Partitiones oratoriae do not contain any), and De re publica, De senectute and De 
amicitia are set in the second century.  However, the preface to De re publica contains a pointed 
reference to the conflicts of the first century. 
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whereas catalogues in the treatises generally concern fewer figures but provide more 
detail about each.  Only two examples need be cited here, as others will be discussed 
in due course below.  At Parad. 12 the military achievements of Horatius Cocles, 
two of the Decii Mures
81
 (cos. 340; cos. IV 295, respectively), and the brothers Cn. 
Cornelius Scipio Calvus (cos. 222) and P. Cornelius Scipio (cos. 218) are explicitly 
mentioned to support Cicero‘s argument that quid honestum sit, id solum bonum 
esse.  Cocles‘ source of military gloria has already been noted;
82
 the devotiones of 
the Decii led to Roman victories at Vesuvius in the Latin War (340) and Sentinum in 
the Third Samnite War (295), and Cn. and P. Scipio used their bodies to forestall 
Carthaginiensium adventum during the Second Punic War.  The detail provided in 
this passage makes the military context of the comparison clear, but this is not 
always the case.  Compare the list of exempla at Sest. 143: 
 
Qua re imitemur nostros Brutos, Camillos, Ahalas, Decios, Curios, 
Fabricios, Maximos, Scipiones, Lentulos, Aemilios, innumerabilis 
alios qui hanc rem publicam stabiliverunt; quos equidem in deorum 
immortalium coetu ac numero repono. Amemus patriam, pareamus 
senatui, consulamus bonis...   
   
Although this comparison emphasizes Cicero‘s political agenda, it does not obscure 
or detract from the military achievements of the majority of the figures cited.  M. 
Furius Camillus (dict. V 367) repulsed the Gauls from Rome in 390, and the Decii, 
C. Fabricius Luscinus (cos. II 278), M‘. Curius Dentatus (cos. IV 274), Q. Fabius 
Maximus Verrucosus ―Cunctator‖ (cos. V 209), and the Scipiones, were all directly 
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 Litchfield 1914, 46 notes that Cicero is the only ancient author to cite the third Decius (cos. 279) as 
an exemplum, at Fin. 2.60.  His devotio at Asculum during his consulship did not result in a Roman 
victory, but such heavy losses were inflicted on Pyrrhus that it gave rise to the term ―Pyrrhic victory.‖ 
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 See above, n. 78. 
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or indirectly responsible for ending major wars.
83
  The unifying factor rem publicam 
stabiliverunt allows Cicero to superimpose patriotic ideals over military 
accomplishment, thereby manipulating the auctoritas of the military exempla to 
support an argument which need not otherwise concern the army.   
  This strategy may also be observed in the more elaborate citations of military 
exempla.  As Vigourt notes, references to military exempla tend to focus on the 
consequences of victory, or the exemplum‘s attitude towards it, rather than on the 
victory itself.
84
  For Cicero, this entails an emphasis on military accomplishment as a 
concrete manifestation of service to the state, whereby military men are seen as the 
defenders of the Republic.  The effects of the resulting comparisons can be 
condensed into three main types: direct comparisons which praise or blame their 
contemporary subject, the use of battle exploits as illustrations of civic virtue, and 
context-driven historical anecdote.  Although military details are given or implied in 
each type of comparison, they are never the focus of the passage.  This further 
demonstrates the gravity of military auctoritas, which, combined with the artless 
quality of many of the remarks, indicates that these allusions derived their effect 
from commonly held, traditional perceptions of the respective men. 
 The praise-and-blame type of passages occur in a variety of forms, the most 
common of which is positive comparison leading to self-aggrandizement – whether 
for Cicero himself or for his client.  Unsurprisingly, this use of exempla occurs 
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 Fabricius negotiated Pyrrhus‘ withdrawal from Italy after Asculum (279); Curius defeated Pyrrhus 
at Malventum (subsequently renamed Beneventum, 275); and Maximus‘ strategy of avoiding pitched 
battle with Hannibal‘s troops turned the Second Punic War into a war of attrition, eventually allowing 
Scipio Africanus to gain the upper hand.  The Scipiones Africani are discussed below.  The relevance 
of the remaining unmilitary figures is explained by Kaster 2006, n. ad loc. 
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 Vigourt 2001, 127. 
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almost exclusively in the speeches, where personal pleading is to be expected.  The 
exception proves the rule: 
 
Hinc enim illa et apud Graecos exempla, Miltiadem, victorem 
domitoremque Persarum... et Themistoclem, patria quam liberavisset 
pulsum atque proterritum.... vel exilium Camilli, vel offensio 
commemoratur Ahalae, vel invidia Nasicae, vel expulsio Laenatis, vel 
Opimi damnatio, vel fuga Metelli, vel acerbissima Gai Mari clades... 
Nec vero iam meo nomine abstinent. (Rep. 1.5-6) 
  
Such personal rhetoric could only be appropriate in the preface of a treatise.  Cicero 
identifies the circumstance which links him with these military men as calamitates 
clarissimorum virorum iniuriasque iis ab ingratis impositas civibus (Rep. 1.4) – that 
is, his exile in 58-57.  It is a recurring theme which informs the majority of Cicero‘s 
associations of himself with military figures.  The cases of the Greek exempla and 
Marius will be discussed in more detail below but we may note here their distinctly 
military identities as over against the civilian identities of the remaining exempla, 
who, like Cicero in 63, took up arms against men who endangered the state and 
subsequently fell under suspicion themselves.
85
  The appeal to the military figures 
may seem presumptuous, but the shared circumstance of exile, punishment, and 
restoration makes these exemplary comparisons effective.  It also illuminates 
Cicero‘s frame of reference for processing both the injury of exile and the triumph of 
recall.  He claims that M. Atilius Regulus (cos. II 256) was not punished compared to 
him (Pis. 43) – despite a gruesome reference to Regulus‘ punishment at the hands of 
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 C. Servius Ahala assassinated the would-be tyrant Sp. Maelius (439); P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica 
Serapio (cos. 138) led the riot in which Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (tr. pl. 133) was killed (133); P. 
Popilius Laenas (cos. 132) was forced into exile by Gracchus‘ brother Gaius (II tr. pl. 122) for his 
punishment of the followers of Tiberius (123); and L. Opimius (cos. 121) received the first senatus 
consultum ultimum, to put down the violence of C. Gracchus.   
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the Carthaginians, after he returned to them as pledged, having failed to negotiate an 
exchange of prisoners with Rome.
86
  Elsewhere he rejoices that he was called to 
devote himself like the Decii Mures pro salute universae rei publicae (Dom. 64), and 
compares himself especially to Camillus and Q. Metellus Metellus Numidicus (cos. 
109) as fellow exiles.
87
  In a more convoluted comparison Cicero considers himself 
to be better off than P. Valerius Poplicola (cos. IV 504) because his entire house was 
restored by the state and not merely the land (Har. 16).   
 Cicero‘s references to the novitas of Ti. Coruncanius (cos. 280), Curius, 
Fabricius, and Camillus may also be considered as a type of self-aggrandizement.  
These citations are concentrated in the speeches, and frequently take the form of 
catalogues.
88
  Von Ungern-Sternberg has suggested that this emphasis on new men 
among the traditional heroic figures may be a uniquely Ciceronian phenomenon, 
since it is not developed by any other authors.
89
  Cicero‘s natural sympathy toward 
fellow novi homines will be discussed in more detail below, with regard to his 
treatment of Cato and Marius.  It should be noted here, however, that the military 
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  Nec mihi ille M. Regulus... videtur adfectus.  The entire story is told at Off. 3.99-115 passim.  
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 Esp. Dom. 86 (Camillus); Clu. 95; Red. sen. 37; Red. pop. 6, 9, 11; Dom. 82, 87; Sest. 101; Planc. 
89; Leg. 3.26 (Numidicus).  Cf. Coudry 2001, 57 on the concentration of Cicero‘s references to 
Camillus in the years 57-56.  Cicero also cites Q. Servilius Caepio (cos. 106) and P. Rutilius Rufus 
(cos. 105) as examples of exiles.  See Balb. 28, Tusc. 5.14 (Caepio); Font. 38; Balb. 28; Pis. 95; 
Scaur. fr. d; ND 3.80, 86 (Rufus).  Camillus went into voluntary exile after being accused of 
misappropriation of the booty from Veii, Numidicus was banished for refusing to swear to an agrarian 
law of L. Appuleius Saturninus (tr. pl. 100), Caepio was expelled for losing his army due to 
disobedience at Arausio (105), and Rufus went into exile following his conviction (almost certainly 
unjustly) on the charge of extortion. 
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 Mur. 17, Sul. 23, Cael. 39; Planc. 20; Brut. 55; ND 2.165; Sen. 15, 43; Am. 18, 39.  See also 
Berrendonner 2001, 97-116.  It should be noted that Curius, Fabricius, and Camillus are cited 
predominantly in a military context in the treatises, whereas Coruncanius is cited as Pontifex 
Maximus.  L. Caecilius Metellus Caecus (cos. II 247) and P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum (cos. 
II 155) are other examples of Pontifices Maximi whose military background Cicero ignores in the 
treatises.  He uses the office to define the active and happy old age of Metellus and Nasica in the De 
senectute (§§30 and 50, respectively), where he notes Coruncanius‘ justice in that role.  In the De 
domo sua this is in contract to allegedly corrupt pronouncements about Cicero‘s house (§139), and in 
the De legibus it is in connection with pontifical law (2.52; cf. ND 1.115, 3.5). 
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 Von Ungern-Sternberg 2001, 190.  Cf. Berrendonner 2001, 98, 104; Rambaud 1953a, 47. 
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identities of these men are critical to the effect of the resulting comparisons – which 
seem to reflect upon Cicero by proxy.  We may be certain that he includes himself in 
the ranks of Camillos, Fabricios, Curios omnisque eos qui haec ex minimis tanta 
fecerunt (Cael. 39) regardless of the outward context of the remark and its apparent 
lack of relevance to military achievement. 
 A similar technique is used when he alludes to military figures for the benefit 
of his clients.  Significantly, these references are concentrated in defence speeches 
for military men whom he defended.  In the course of his defence of L. Cornelius 
Balbus‘ assumption of citizen rights, Cicero presents a catalogue of imperatores 
quorum vivit immortalis memoria et gloria, whose conquests made it possible for 
people like Balbus to become Roman citizens.
90
  In the Pro Murena, L. Cornelius 
Scipio Asiaticus‘ (cos. 190) decisive victory over Antiochus III of Syria furnishes a 
political counterpoint to the prosecution‘s disregard for victories over eastern 
enemies: L. Licinius Murena had also distinguished himself in the east, and Cicero‘s 
defence rested on the value of his military skill to a state threatened by Catiline and 
his army.  A parallel between Deiotarus‘ loss of part of Galatia to Caesar and 
Asiaticus‘ annexation of Asia is slightly more forced (Deiot. 36), but indicative of 
the light touch required when pleading to Caesar himself.  Cicero makes Deiotarus, 
like Antiochus III, relieved to have a smaller kingdom, while simultaneously 
equating Caesar‘s accomplishment to Asiaticus‘ victory at Magnesia.  A clearer 
analogy is developed in the Pro Plancio, where Cicero challenges the judges at Cn. 
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 Balb. 40: Scipiones, Brutos, Horatios, Cassios, Metellos, et hunc praesentem Cn. Pompeium.  
Specific, recent cases are listed in §50, all concerning military men. 
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Plancius‘ trial de ambitu to consider whether Plancius would even be under suspicion 
if his origins were more illustrious. 
 
... quid potuerit amplius adsequi Plancius, si Cn. Scipionis fuisset 
filius. ... Quis nostrum se dicit M‘. Curio, quis C. Fabricio, quis C. 
Duellio parem, quis <A.> Atilio Calatino, quis Cn. et P. Scipionibus, 
quis Africano, Marcello, Maximo? Tamen eosdem sumus honorum 
gradus quos illi adsecuti.  (Planc. 60-1) 
 
A. Atilius Calatinus was the first dictator to lead an army outside Italy (to Sicily in 
249) and M. Claudius Marcellus (cos. V 208) quelled the revolt at Syracuse (216-
214) – both decisive military firsts.  In the Pro Murena, also a trial de ambitu, Cicero 
cites the victories of Curius, T. Quinctius Flamininus (cos. 198), M. Fulvius Nobilior 
(cos. 189), L. Aemilius Paulus, Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus (cos. 143), and 
L. Mummius (cos. 146) to bolster his argument that generals – such as Murena – are 
of more service to the state than orators.
91
  A similar list is cited in the Pro lege 
Manilia, where the felicitas of Maximus, Marcellus, one of the Scipiones Africani, 
and Marius is explicitly linked to Pompey‘s track record in order to identify him as a 
summus imperator and thus an ideal candidate for the command.
92
  Marius, T. Didius 
(cos. 98), Q. Lutatius Catulus (cos. 102), and P. Licinius Crassus Lusitanicus (cos. 
97) are likewise praised as non litteris homines ad rei militaris scientiam, sed rebus 
gestis ac victoriis eruditos at Font. 43, where Cicero cites a lengthy list of military 
men lost since the Social War to bolster his argument that the next generation – 
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 Mur. 30-31.  Flamininus defeated Philip V of Macedonia at Cynoscephalae in 197; Fulvius defeated 
Aetolians and Cephallenians in 189; Paulus defeated Perseus at Pydna in 168; Macedonicus 
recaptured Macedonia in 146; and Mummius sacked Corinth in 146. 
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 Leg. Man. 47; cf. 28.  The ambiguity of the reference to Scipioni was likely deliberate and meant to 
invoke both Africanus and Aemilianus.  Cf. Kaster 2006, n. to Sest. 143. 
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including his client M. Fonteius – must be preserved at all costs.
93
  The entire 
populus Romanus is brought into Cicero‘s defence of the poet A. Licinius Archias 
when Cicero cites historical pairings of poets and military patrons in his client‘s 
defence.  After mentioning the elder Scipio Africanus, Cato, Maximus, Marcellus, 
and Fulvius, Cicero concludes that eis laudibus certe non solum ipse qui laudatur sed 
etiam populi Romani nomen ornatur (Arch. 22). 
 Not all comparisons with historical military men were positive, however.  
David‘s theory about exempla serving to reinforce the mos maiorum applies 
especially to this type of passage, where the connotations of military discipline 
intensify the effect of the comparison.   C. Verres (propr. Sicily 73-71) and L. 
Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (procos. Macedonia 57-55) bear the brunt of Cicero‘s 
rhetoric in this connection.  Both men are condemned as poor generals, corrupt and 
misguided, and it is clear that their transgressions – while magistrates – particularly 
offended Cicero.
94
  Consider this explicit denunciation of Verres: 
 
... ut sciatis, quoniam plura genera sunt imperatorum, ex quo genere 
iste sit, ne qui diutius in tanta penuria virorum fortium talem 
imperatorem ignorare possit. Non ad Q. Maximi sapientiam neque ad 
illius superioris Africani in re gerunda celeritatem, neque ad huius qui 
postea fuit singulare consilium, neque ad Pauli rationem ac 
disciplinam neque ad C. Mari vim atque virtutem; sed aliud genus 
imperatoris sane diligenter retinendum et conservandum, quaeso, 
cognoscite.  (Ver. 5.25; cf. §14) 
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 Cn. Pompeius Strabo (cos. 89) and Sulla are also mentioned, among legates and praetorios 
homines, belli gerendi peritissimos, respectively.  Strabo‘s service in the Social War, which earned 
him a triumph for ending the conflict in the north, is also mentioned at Leg. Man. 28; Balb. 50; Phil. 
12.27.  Significantly, Cicero never mentions Strabo‘s role in the early years of the civil war; cf. Bulst 
1964, 311-12.  Sulla is discussed below. 
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 Ver. 5.26-31, 80-92, 152.  Pis. 37-40, 47.  On Cicero‘s antagonism towards Verres and Piso as 
misbehaving governors, see below, pp. 187-204 passim. 
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Verres is also contrasted specifically with Marcellus and Aquilius, whose own 
service in Sicily made them excellent parallel cases.  Unlike Verres, Marcellus 
spared public buildings, sent the spoils back to Rome, and was merciful to the 
inhabitants.
95
  Allusions to Aquilius‘ suppression of the Second Servile War (104-
101) underscore the peace which Verres had disrupted (Ver. 5.5, 7; cf. 3.125).  
Verres‘ misconduct is ultimately expressed as an inversion of Marcellus‘ military 
virtue: conferte hanc pacem cum illo bello, huius praetoris adventum cum illius 
imperatoris victoria (Ver. 4.115).   
 Piso is never so comprehensively attacked as an imperator, but his apparent 
lack of interest in seeking a triumph is disparaged with an exceptionally lengthy 
catalogue.    
 
... ter iam homo stultus [sc. Pompeius] triumphavit. Crasse, pudet me 
tui. Quid est quod confecto per te formidolosissimo bello coronam 
illam lauream tibi tanto opere decerni volueris a senatu? P. Servili, Q. 
Metelle, C. Curio, L. Afrani, cur hunc non audistis tam doctum 
hominem, tam eruditum, prius quam in istum errorem induceremini? 
... O stultos Camillos, Curios, Fabricios, Calatinos, Scipiones, 
Marcellos, Maximos! o amentem Paulum, rusticum Marium, nullius 
consili patres horum amborum consulum, qui triumpharint! (Pis. 58) 
 
The contemporary exempla complement the historical ones and reinforce Cicero‘s 
conception of military values: if Piso deserved a triumph, he would have petitioned 
for one, as these men did.
96
  Cicero also uses military figures to mock Piso‘s serious 
bearing: gravis auctor, Calatinus credo aliquis aut Africanus aut Maximus (Pis. 14; 
cf. §39). 
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 Ver. 4.120-3; cf. 1.55; 2.4; 4.130-1; 5.158-69.    
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 On Cicero‘s attitude towards triumphs and military gloria generally, see below, pp. 159-68. 
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 Other negative exempla include Cn. Marcius Coriolanus, Ti. Veturius 
Calvinus and Sp. Postumius Albinus (coss. 334, 321), P. Claudius Pulcher and L. 
Junius Pullus (coss. 249), C. Flaminius (cos. II 217), and Q. Pompeius (cos. 141).  
Cicero never mentions these men in explicit comparison with his peers, but cites 
them as exempla in order to elucidate theoretical arguments.  Coriolanus, Flaminius, 
and Pompeius were reasonably prominent commanders,
97
 but obliterated their 
reputations by turning against Rome, the Senate, and the allies, respectively.  
Accordingly, Cicero asks whether Coriolanus‘ friends ought to have taken up arms 
with him against Rome (Am. 36) and compares his fate to that of Themistocles, who, 
like Coriolanus, was forced into exile by public animosity (Brut. 41-3; Am. 42).  
Flaminius‘ insubordination is not dwelled on so much as his death in battle at 
Trasimene in 217, said to be the result of his neglect of religious duty.
98
  Pompeius is 
invoked to show that an unprincipled man cannot also be virtuous: for dishonouring a 
treaty with the Numantines, Cicero labels him callidus improbus (Fin. 2.54).  Finally, 
the two consular pairings of Pulcher and Pullus, and Calvinus and Albinus, are cited 
as examples of military misconduct with disastrous results for Rome.  Pulcher and 
Pullus both ignored the auspices and subsequently lost their fleets at Drepana in 
249.
99
  Calvinus and Albinus, on the other hand, negotatiated an unauthorized peace 
with the Samnites when they found themselves surrounded at the Caudine Forks in 
321.  As punishment dediti sunt iis [sc. Samnitibus] (Off. 3.109; cf. Sen. 41).  It is 
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 According to tradition, Coriolanus received his name from participation in the Roman conquest or 
Corioli (493); Flaminius was the first to march an army across the River Po (217); and Pompeius was 
Macedonicus‘ successor in the Numantine war. 
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 ND 2.8; Div. 1.77; 2.67, 71.  Cf. Brut. 57; Sen. 11 concerning his attempt to give away land against 
the Senate‘s wishes. 
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 Div. 1.29; 2.20, 71; ND 2.7.  Pulcher infamously had the uncooperative sacred chickens thrown 
overboard ut biberent, quoniam esse nollent (ND 2.7). 
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important to note that although these men are criticized, they are never demonized.  
As Chassignet notes (with regard to Capitolinus and other, unmilitary, exempla), 
negative exempla are defined by their use of otherwise positive attributes.
100
  Military 
misconduct had the potential to put the Republic at risk, and Cicero‘s references to 
these men underscore this threat.  In the reported words of Fabricius, after helping a 
man who was dishonest but an outstanding general to win the consulship, nihil est 
quod mihi gratias agas si malui compilari quam venire (De orat. 2.268).  
 The next type of comparison concerns civic virtue displayed on the 
battlefield.  Regulus, the Decii, and Torquatus Imperiosus are the best examples, and 
typify Cicero‘s perception of military men as defenders of the Republic.  Their 
legendary fidelity, piety, and discipline respectively, were the product of warfare but 
had clear relevance to the mos maiorum in a civilian context.  Cicero uses Regulus to 
illustrate the importance of keeping one‘s word, even to enemies (Off. 1.39; cf. Phil. 
11.9; Fin. 2.65), and recounts the story in detail as a case study in the debate between 
honestas and utilitas in the De officiis (3.99-115 passim).  He also describes the 
devotiones of the three Decii numerous times, praising the act as one performed pro 
salute patriae.
101
  Torquatus, however, is a more controversial exemplum because his 
reputation came at the expense of his own son‘s life.  His military achievements form 
a triad in Cicero‘s references to him: he wrested the torques from the neck of a Gaul 
to gain the name Torquatus, routed the Latins during the Samnite Wars, and executed 
his son for disobeying orders in the field (Fin. 1.23; Off. 3.112).  Yet to the extent 
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 Fin. 5.64; cf. Dom. 64; Fin. 2.61; Div. 1.51; ND 3.15.  
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that he valued ius maiestatis atque imperi more than paternal affection
102
 he is justly 
cited as an exemplum of patriotism.   
 Patriotism is also the theme of the catalogues at Sest. 143 and Rep. 1.1,
103
 
where liberty and the victories of illustrious commanders are attributed to their love 
for their country.  Regulus is also called sapiens (Fin. 5.82-3), as is Maximus (Ver. 
5.25) who is appropriately further praised as consideratus et lentus (Rep. 5.10) and 
callidus (Off. 1.108).  Curius and Fabricius are treated as paragons of integrity, for 
rejecting Pyrrhus‘ gold even though, according to Cicero, they were poor.
104
  
Fabricius is additionally commended as iustus because he sent back to Pyrrhus a 
defector who offered to poison the king (Off. 1.40; 3.16, 86).  It will be noted that 
this type of allusion occurs almost exclusively in the treatises.  Again, context is the 
determining factor, since without a specific impetus such theoretical parallels would 
be inappropriate in a forensic or deliberative speech.   
 Context absolutely controls the last type of the conventional comparisons.  
These take the form of anecdotal or apocryphal information and frequently do not 
involve an explicit comparison.  One exception is at Phil. 5.48, where the Decii, M. 
Valerius Maximus Corvus (cos. VI 299), the elder Africanus, and Flamininus are 
cited as examples of underage consuls in Cicero‘s argument for senatorial sanction of 
the then 19-year-old Octavian.
105
   Although not as specific, a reference to L. 
Calpurnius Piso Frugi (cos. 133) as the author of the first extortion law at Ver. 3.129 
                                                 
102
 Fin. 1.23.  Cf. Fin. 1.35; 2.60; Tusc. 4.49-50; Sul. 32 and Berry 1996, n. ad loc; Val. Max. 2.7.6. 
103
 The opening of Rep. 1.1 is fragmentary, but seems to be a praise of active service to the state.  
Zetzel 1995, n. ad loc. reconstructs the lost opening as ―If they had not preferred virtue to the 
enticements of voluptas and otium...‖  
104
 Rep. 3.6, 40; Parad. 48; Tusc. 3.56.  On the emergence of paupertas as a virtue, see Vigourt 2001, 
125-6. 
105
 Shackleton Bailey 1995 notes that the reading Corvini is a slip by Cicero, and that Corvus is meant.   
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has special relevance in that context because of Piso‘s command during the Sicilian 
slave revolt (135-132).   
 More typically, however, the exemplum is cited to bolster a free-standing 
argument without reference to a contemporary situation.  Cicero never mentions the 
military responsibilities that attended both of L. Quinctius Cincinnatus‘ dictatorships 
(458 and 439), only that he was called ab aratro... ut dictator (Fin. 2.12; cf. Rep. 
2.63; Sen. 56).  Poplicola is mentioned in the De re publica  for his decree that the 
consular lictors should precede each consul in alternate months (2.55), but not for 
leading the resistance against Porsenna or for the triumphs he and his consular 
colleague T. Lucretius Tricipitinus celebrated in 504 for their defeat of the Sabines 
and Veians.  In the De senectute, the unprecedented naval victory of C. Duilius (cos. 
260) over the Carthaginians is explicitly mentioned, but as a preface to the Elder 
Cato‘s recollection of seeing him enjoy the pleasures of dinner parties in his old 
age.
106
     
 As these examples show, this type of allusion is concentrated in the treatises.  
The Brutus and the De divinatione are particularly rich sources, although important 
examples occur elsewhere.  The mention of numerous military men in the Brutus, a 
work devoted entirely to orators, underscores the relationship between military 
service, public life, and eloquence.  Of special note are references to Fabricius‘ 
negotiations with Pyrrhus (§55) and Flamininus‘ careful use of Latin (§109), as well 
as the explicit connection between eloquence and the status of princeps civis for 
Paulus (§80) and Pompeius‘ political advancement sine ulla commendatione 
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 Sen. 44.  Cf. Sen. 11 and the mistaken reference to the role of M. Livius Salinator (cos. II 207) in 
the (re)capturing of Tarentum. 
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maiorum (§96).  The army provides many examples in the De divinatione, as has 
already been seen in the discussion of negative exempla.  We are also told of 
prophecies concerning the devotiones of the Decii (1.51; 2.136), Sulla‘s success at 
Nola (1.72; 2.65), and the fall of Veii (1.100; 2.54, 59).  Although the second book is 
highly critical of prophecy and foreknowledge – in 2.97 Cicero asks whether all the 
soldiers who died at Cannae had the same horoscope – the use of the army as a point 
of reference highlights the link between the security of the Republic and the 
propitious conduct of the commanders.   
 More general themes elucidated by means of military exempla include 
friendship and productivity in old age,
107
 as well as death.  At Tusc. 1.89 Cicero 
gives a catalogue of heroes who met their deaths undaunted and achieved much 
because of it: 
 
Quae quidem si timeretur... non cum Latinis decertans pater Decius, 
cum Etruscis filius, cum Pyrrho nepos se hostium telis obiecissent; 
non uno bello pro patria cadentis Scipiones Hispania vidisset, Paulum 
et Geminum Cannae, Venusia Marcellum, Litana Albinum, Lucani 
Gracchum.  (cf. Tusc. 1.110) 
 
The same exempla also appear at Sen. 75 as men who faced death alacri animo et 
erecto.  Yet the De senectute as a whole is an optimistic reflection on old age, 
whereas Book 1 of the Tusculanae disputationes is an exhortation to despise death.  
The deaths of military exempla are treated in yet another way at ND 3.80, where the 
tragic ends of Cn. and P. Scipio, Marcellus, Paulus, Regulus, Africanus, and Catulus 
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 On friendship: Am. 18, citing Coruncanius and Curius, and consular colleagues Fabricius and Q. 
Aemilius Papus (cos. II 278).  On productivity in old age: Sen. 15, 50, citing Corvus, Nasica 
Corculum, Maximus, Fabricius, Curius, and Coruncanius. 
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are lamented as proof that – contrary to the assertions at ND 2.165 – boni are not 
specially provided for by the gods.
108
  Like the earlier examples, the form of the 
argument is determined by the unmilitary theme of the treatise, even though it 
derives its force from the use of military exempla.  An exceptional instance of this 
sort of adaptation occurs in the preface of the Brutus: 
 
Atque ut post Cannensem illam calamitatem primum Marcelli ad 
Nolam proelio populus se Romanus erexit posteaque prosperae res 
deinceps multae consecutae sunt, sic post rerum nostrarum et 
communium gravissumos casus nihil ante epistulam Bruti mihi 
accidit, quod vellem aut quod aliqua ex parte sollicitudines adlevaret 
meas. (Brut. 12) 
 
The persuasive force of this expression of personal, political relief in military terms 
is present in all of Cicero‘s conventional references to military men.  The army 
provided a ready set of values which was particularly conducive to making 
comparisons concerning patriotism and service to the state.  As the common ground 
between military exempla and civic rhetoric, these themes elevate the unmilitary 
arguments to which they are applied – sometimes to an absurd extent, as above, but 
most often in a credible, dignified, manner.  Just as M‘. Aquilius (cos. 101) bared his 
battle-scarred breast to his judges and secured his acquittal,
109
 so Cicero invokes 
Rome‘s military heroes as exempla in order to secure his victory on the rhetorical 
battlefield.
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 On the boni, see Berry 1996,  n. to Sul. 1.10 boni viri. 
109
 Ver. 5.3; Flac. 98; De orat. 2.124, 195.  On the power of such appeals to one‘s military record, see 




 Having outlined Cicero‘s typical application of military exempla and its 
conformity to rhetorical theory, we may now turn to the more innovative references 
to historical military men.  The first of these concerns foreign generals.  Although 
this may seem like an odd inclusion in a discussion about Rome‘s military heritage, it 
is an important one because Cicero uses these men as foils for Roman achievements 
and values.  Foreign exempla are not nearly as common as Roman ones in his 
writings, largely because of what Rambaud calls ―le chauvinisme romain‖ – that is, 
the habit of giving precedence to domestic examples rather than foreign ones.
110
  
Accordingly, in addition to the Homeric heroes, Cicero refers only to the Greek 
generals Miltiades, Leonidas, Themistocles, Pericles, Alcibiades, and Epaminondas; 
Philip II of Macedon and Alexander the Great; and the Persian kings Darius III and 
Xerxes II.   
 The allusions occur in both the speeches and treatises, but are concentrated in 
the latter, where Cicero was less fearful to display his appreciation of things Greek, 
and where literary context was more conducive to these exempla.  In terms of form, 
the passages with the most military content follow the types of their Roman 
counterparts.  Thus we have Agamemnon invoked in connection with navigating the 
Caicus river region (Flac. 72) and Philip as an example of a foreign conquering king 
(Rep. 3.15).  Miltiades is significantly the first name in the catalogue of military men 
wronged by their countrymen at Rep. 1.5-6; he is linked with his rival Themistocles 
in other passages, since both men were forced into exile when the gratitude of their 
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 Rambaud 1953a, p. 41.  Off. 2.26 suggests that this only applied when the subject matter was 
flattering to Rome: a transition between foreign and Roman examples of bad government is signaled 
by the statement externa libentius in tali re quam domestica recordor. 
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countrymen turned into envy.
111
  The quarrels and battles of the Homeric heroes 
figure prominently in the discussion of irrational emotions in Book 4 of the 
Tusculanae disputationes (esp. §§49-52), and numerous prophecies concerning 
Alexander are recounted in the De divinatione.
112
  
 Where these allusions differ from those to Romans, however, is in their force.  
Foreign exempla occur at the beginning of catalogues (e.g. Rep. 1.5-6; Tusc. 1.110), 
or are followed with a statement about the superior numbers of Roman exempla (esp. 
Fin. 2.62; Tusc 1.117).  Otherness is also echoed in the application of foreign 
exempla to negative arguments, such as Xerxes‘ deployment of his army to obtain 
honey from Hymettus – that is, lusting after pleasure – in a refutation of Epicurean 
ethics (Fin. 2.112; Tusc. 5.20).  In a similar vein, an exchange between Pericles and 
Sophocles about the attractiveness of a young boy is recounted to illustrate the 
importance of context for such remarks (Off. 1.144), and a ―Philippizing‖ oracle 
bribed by Philip is mentioned to illustrate the fallibility of the Delphic oracle (Div. 
1.118; cf. Fin. 2.116).  Both are transgressions which would be embarrassing to 
associate with a Roman precedent, and foreign exempla allow Cicero to make his 
point at arm‘s length.  More importantly, however, military misconduct by foreigners 
had no effect on Rome‘s security, and might possibly assist it, so these comparisons 
do not carry the political or moral weight that the Roman ones do.  Combined with 
the anecdotal nature of many of the details in these passages, this suggests that his 
attention to foreign military men was predicated on assumptions of Roman 
superiority and designed to reinforce this.
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 Sest. 141; Tusc. 4.44.  Miltiades played a key role at Marathon (490) but was exiled following a 
failed campaign against Paros.  Themistocles led the Athenians at Artemisium and Salamis (480) but 
fell under suspicion after the Persian War and was ostracized c. 470. 
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 Cicero‘s use of military exempla as interlocutors, on the other hand, is 
anything but ornamental.  The group is a small one – consisting of only four men – 
and overlaps chronologically with the men just examined.  Yet the fact that Scipio 
Aemilianus (cos. II 134),
113
 his adoptive grandfather P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus 
Maior (cos. II 194), C. Laelius ―Sapiens‖ (cos. 140), and M. Porcius Cato 
―Censorinus‖ (cos. 195; cens. 184) have lengthy speaking roles in the treatises sets 
them apart from the other exempla and warrants separate consideration.
114
  By 
bringing these exempla to life in this way, Cicero is able actively to adapt their 
exemplarity by emphasizing the attributes which serve his rhetorical purpose.  The 
degree of reference to their military identity in the final product sheds light on his 
appreciation of these men as military men as well as upon his perception of the 
relationship between public life and military service. 
 Outwith their speaking roles, these men function in largely the same way as 
the conventional military exempla.  Many passages refer solely to civic attributes, 
however, and the military records of the respective men are treated with differing 
degrees of detail.  Africanus and Aemilianus receive by far the most military 
attention, in passages distributed evenly throughout the speeches and treatises.  
Cicero uses the name ―Scipio‖ as a byword for military valour, and the Scipiones 
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 For the sake of clarity, Africanus Minor shall be referred to by his adopted name Aemilianus, and 
Africanus Maior as Africanus. 
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 They are major characters in the diaologues in the Somnium Scipionis (Rep. 6.9-29), the De re 
publica, the De amicitia, and the De senectute, respectively.  The speeches of P. Rutilius Rufus (cos. 
105, minor character in the De re publica) and Paulus (Rep. 6.15-16) are too brief for consideration 
here.   
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figure prominently in the catalogues of military exempla.
115
  Their chief military 
exploits also receive explicit and laudatory mention
116
 – although consistently in aid 
of an unmilitary argument.  For instance, Cicero calls Africanus clarus and praises 
his consilio atque virtute in forcing Hannibal in Africam redire atque Italia decedere 
(Cat. 4.21; cf. Mur. 32; Rep. 1.1) in order to elucidate his own achievement in 
suppressing the Catilinarian conspiracy, by juxtaposition with a recognized saviour 
of Rome.
 
 In a similar vein, Aemilianus is praised as singularis et vir et imperator in 
connection with his subjugation of Numantia, in order to elevate by association 
Nasica‘s assassination of Ti. Gracchus in the same year: parvi enim sunt foris arma, 
nisi est consilium domi (Off. 1.76).  Aemilianus is further called Africanus qui suo 
cognomine declarat tertiam partem orbis terrarum se subegisse to underscore his 
integrity in not giving evidence in a case where his own interests are concerned (S. 
Rosc. 103; cf. Clu. 134).   
 Cicero also exploits the familial relationship between Africanus and 
Aemilianus.  In addition to depicting Aemilianus as completing the work of his 
grandfather (Sen. 19; cf. Off. 1.121), the victories of both men are cited as examples 
of the true happiness that attends honestas (Fin. 5.70).  T. Annius Milo‘s 
assassination of Clodius is compared to Aemilianus‘ conquest of Carthage (146), 
with the argument that both men were born for their tasks and that Milo‘s act was 
likewise necessary for the security of the state (Har. 6; cf. Sen. 19).  Hypothetical 
prophecies about Aemilianus‘ success in both Carthage and Numantia also anchor 
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 Africanus: Ver. 5.25; Mur. 31; Arch. 22; Phil. 11.17; Rep. 1.1; Parad. 12; ND 2.165.  Aemilianus: 
Ver. 5.14; Leg. Man. 60; Rab. Post. 2; Phil. 11.18.  Both, or unclear: Leg. Man. 47; Cat. 4.21; Sest. 
143; Balb. 40; Pis. 58; Planc. 60; Phil. 13.9; De orat. 210; Tusc. 1.110. 
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 Most noteably, Africanus‘ defeat of Hannibal at Zama (202), ending the Second Punic War, and 
Aemilianus‘ dual conquest of Carthage to end the Third Punic War (146) and Numantia (133).  For a 
full account of the careers of both men, see Scullard 1970 and Astin 1967, respectively. 
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 The military careers of Laelius and Cato, on the other hand, receive very little 
attention in Cicero‘s writings.  Laelius is not mentioned as a military man in the 
speeches, and Cato only twice – both times in vague allusions predicated on the 
presence of his great-grandson, M. Porcius Cato Uticensis.
118
  At Mur. 32 Cato‘s 
virtus egregia in the war against Antiochus concludes the list of decisive conflicts 
with foreign enemies which Cicero recounts to demonstrate the value of soldiering to 
the state.  At Arch. 22 Cato is linked with Africanus and illi Maximi, Marcelli, Fulvii 
as examples of men who received poetic praise for their service to the Republic.  The 
former passage is a direct attack on the younger Cato‘s dismissive attitude toward 
military glory, while the latter, with its explicit mention of huius proavus, is similarly 
meant to trap Cato with a family precedent in Cicero‘s favour.   
 The allusions in the treatises provide more concrete detail, but also more 
rhetoric.  Ironically, Cato‘s military career is most often referred to in the De 
senectute, and is therefore described by Cato ―himself.‖
119
  Cicero says little 
explicitly about Laelius‘ service, only mentioning his victory over the Lusitanian 
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 Rep. 6.11; Fato 13, 27.  At Cat. 4.21 Numantia and Carthage are simply condemned as duas urbes 
infestissimas.   
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 Laelius was Aemilianus‘ chief legate at Carthage, and won a victory in the Lusitanian War whilst 
governor of Hispania Citerior (c. 145).  See Astin 1967, 70 n. 1, 75, 102.  Cato had a much more 
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119
 Sen. 10-11 (early service and Tarentum), 18 (policy against Carthage), 32 (in Punic War, Spain, 
and Thermopylae), 39 (Tarentum).  Powell 1988, App. 3 discusses the historical accuracy of the De 
senectute, concluding that Cicero is trustworthy in the main, but that the literary agenda of the work 
must be borne in mind. 
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leader Viriathus in Spain.  The earliest of these passages is particularly signficant, 
and perhaps accounts for Laelius‘ enduring unmilitary identity.   
 
Nam ut ex bellica laude aspirare ad Africanum nemo potest, in qua 
ipsa egregium Viriathi bello reperimus fuisse Laelium: sic ingeni 
litterarum eloquentiae sapientiae denique etsi utrique primas, priores 




Although it is unlikely that the distinctions were meted out so neatly, the comment is 
nevertheless justified by its literary context: Cicero uses Laelius and Aemilianus to 
define their chronological period in the Brutus (esp. Brut. 82), and naturally 
considers which of the two was the better orator.  Context also dictates the form of a 
reference to Cato‘s auctoritas directing the Third Punic War after his death at Off. 
1.79 (cf. Rep. 2.1; Sen. 18).  Although the passage concerns military matters, it 
appears in a distinctly civic context, in order to illustrate that domestic leadership is 
as valuable to the state as generalship on the frontiers.   
 The inclusion of Cato and Laelius in the catalogues of military exempla is 
more problematic, and reveals a key aspect of Cicero‘s perception of these men as 
military men.  Both are cited – along with Africanus and Aemilianus – as exempla of 
divinely enabled excellence at ND 2.165, and of fame which transcends the passage 
of time at Tusc. 1.110.  Cato also appears at the end of the mainly military examples 
demonstrating the correspondence between honestas and bonus at Parad. 12, and 
follows Maximus and Paulus at Tusc. 3.70 in a list illustrating the belief that men 
should not grieve or lament publicly (cf. Am. 9-10).  The themes of these catalogues 
do not preclude civic exempla; but the fact that the rest of the exempla are military 
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 Brut. 84; cf. Off. 2.40.  Astin 1967, 81 denies that Laelius rivalled Aemilianus‘ career. 
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men suggests a military reference point.  The placement of Cato and Laelius at the 
end of these exemplary catalogues
121
 must therefore reflect Cicero‘s estimation of 
them compared to the more prominent military men.   
 Clearly Cicero admired Africanus and Aemilianus, and at least acknowledged 
Cato and Laelius, as military men.  However, it is not in this capacity that they serve 
as interlocutors in the De re publica, De senectute, and De amicitia.  Their suitability 
as exponents of the unmilitary arguments in these works derives from a second 
exemplary identity, which is developed in his descriptions of their unmilitary 
attributes and achievements.  This does not mean that their military identity is 
irrelevant to their function in the dialogues, but rather that it was not enough to make 
them credible spokesmen by itself. 
 There is in fact a marked division between military and unmilitary references 
to these men, although the individual ratios vary.  Africanus is proportionally the 
most military exemplum of the group, yet he is noted for creating the laws of 
Agrigentum (Ver. 2.123), reallocating seating at the Megalensian Games as consul in 
194 (Har. 24), defending Asiaticus against a Catonian tribune (Prov. 18),
 122
 being a 
good speaker (Brut. 77), and enjoying exceptional political influence in his old age 
(Sen. 61).   
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 In the passages cited here, Cato and/or Laelius is the last named exempla, followed by the 
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in chronological order (esp. Ver. 3.209; Pis. 58; Parad. 12), with foreign exempla listed first (e.g. Rep. 
1.5-6; Tusc. 1.110).  This could explain the placement of Cato and Laelius even as unmilitary men, but 
the suggestion that they are one (or two) of many possible examples seems rather to indicate a single 
exemplary theme. 
122
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 The unmilitary references to Aemilianus, Laelius, and Cato emphasize the 
culture which characterized the so-called Scipionic Circle.
123
  For Aemilianus, these 
allusions are slightly outnumbered by military allusions, but for Cato and Laelius 
they all but overwhelm texts referring to them in a military capacity.  This suggests 
that Cicero considered Cato and Laelius to be primarily civilian men, as is reflected 
in the nature of their speeches in the De senectute and De amicitia, respectively.  
Signficantly, Aemilianus, Laelius, and Cato are often cited together, as an exemplary 
unit of sorts.  They serve as a foil to Verres‘ greed in requisitioning corn for private 
use,
124
 as examples of the sort of man whose ingenium, studium, and doctrina are to 
be emulated (Top. 78), and as models of orators whose skill adds to the glory of the 
state (De orat. 1.215; cf. Inv. 1.5).  They are invoked to set the philosophical mood 
for the discussion of Book 5 of the Tusculanae disputationes (§2), as well as to 
demonstrate that learning imparts virtue (Arch. 16; cf. Mur. 66).  The auctoritas 
derived from their learning and way of life is reinforced in references to them as 
individuals.  Aemilianus‘ urbanity is expressed in references to his patronage of the 
Stoic philosopher Panaetius, as well as in quotations of his sayings.
125
  Allusions to 
his morality range from his liberalitas in ceding his share of Paulus‘ bequest to his 
biological brother Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus (cos. 145), to abstinentia in the 
handling of spoils from Carthage (Off. 2.76; cf. Ver. 2.3).  Cato‘s literary prowess – 
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 Ver. 3.209.  The plural Africanos makes it possible that Africanus is also included. 
125
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Ver. 2.28; De orat. 2.250, 258, 267, 268, 272.  
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including knowledge of Greek literature – is also stressed, by means of quoted 
witticisms as well.
126
  Laelius is chiefly noted for his eloquence and wisdom, 
although he generally shares these passages with Aemilianus or Cato.
127
  Laelius and 
Aemilianus are also cited together to mark the age when philosophy came to Rome 
(Tusc. 4.5), and named as examples of men qui ad rem publicam moderandam usum 
et scientiam et studium suum contulisset (De orat. 1.211).  The quantity of these 
references confirms an additional, unmilitary exemplary role for Aemilianus, 
Laelius, and Cato in Cicero‘s writings. 
 This brings us to the role of these men as interlocutors, and the significance 
of Cicero‘s use of military men for this purpose.  The key is in the blending of 
military and civic auctoritas against the backdrop of a political system which both 
required and rewarded military service.  Astin‘s observation that the Roman 
governing class of Cato‘s day was ―in no small measure a military aristocracy‖
 128
 is 
no less applicable to the military dynasts of Cicero‘s time, to say nothing of the 
propraetors and proconsuls who, like Cicero, found themselves defending the 
frontiers of the empire in the course of their governorships.  We have seen that it was 
a small rhetorical leap for Cicero to turn a reference to a past victory into a shining 
example of patriotism or unflinching devotion to duty.  Conversely, distinguished 
military service could serve as a synecdoche for distinguished public life as a whole.  
The themes of the De re publica, De senectute, and De amicitia required spokesmen 
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who exemplified active statesmanship, and it is in this capacity that Cicero invokes 
Africanus, Aemilianus, Laelius, and Cato as military men. 
 However, the nature of the dialogues demanded interlocutors whose views as 
well as the manner in which they expounded them was believeable.  Generals were 
expected to be eloquent when addressing their soldiers (adlocutio),
129
 but Cicero 
takes special care to emphasize the eloquence of Aemilianus, Laelius, Cato, and even 
Africanus.  This made them suitable as interlocutors in a way that a less articulate 
military man or fluent private man could not be, however great their reputations in 
their respective fields.  That this sort of accuracy was important to Cicero is made 
clear by letters to Atticus concerning the characters of the Academica.  The original 
version was set in 63-60 and involved Q. Lutatius Catulus, the general L. Licinius 
Lucullus, Q. Hortensius, and Cicero himself.
130
  However, Cicero soon realized (with 
Atticus‘ prompting) that   
  
Sane in personas non cadebant; erant enim logikw&tera quam ut illi 
de iis somniasse umquam viderentur. … Aptius esse nihil potuit ad id 
philosophiae genus, quo ille [sc. Varro] maxime mihi delectari 
videtur…  (Att. 13.19.5; cf. Att. 13.12.3) 
 
The treatise was subsequently revised, with the antiquarian M. Terentius Varro 
taking the place of Lucullus and Catulus, and Atticus that of Hortensius.  In a similar 
vein, political expediency precluded Cicero‘s own participation in the De re publica.  
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 Africanus‘ role in the so-called Somnium Scipionis (Rep. 6.9-29) is perhaps 
the most straightforward because of the comparative brevity of his speech.  It is in 
fact related by Aemilianus, but the tone is distinctly more rhetorical than Aemilianus‘ 
―voice.‖
132
  The speech opens with a prophetic summary of Aemilianus‘ future 
greatness (Rep. 6.11-12) before turning to its main theme: the promise of eternity in 
heaven for men who serve the state well.  
 
... sic habeto: omnibus qui patriam conservaverint adiuverint auxerint, 
certum esse in caelo definitum locum, ubi beati aevo sempiterno 
fruantur. ...harum rectores et conservatores hinc profecti huc 
revertuntur. (Rep. 6.13; cf. 26-9) 
 
The association of Africanus with the divine was traditional.  Scullard notes that 
already in Polybius‘ time there was an aura of legend surrounding Africanus which 
linked him with the gods.
133
  Here, his narration from heaven eloquently reinforces 
the value of his contribution to the state.  Implied divine revelation also allows 
Cicero to put cosmological concepts in the mouth of ―Africanus‖ which the real 
Africanus likely would not have understood.  The implications of the emphasis on 
cosmic order (Rep. 6.17-19) and patriotism are clear enough, however, and constitute 
a Ciceronian rallying cry for patriots to bring the present-day state back into order.
134
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 Aemilianus‘ role in the De re publica is more complex, owing to the nature of 
his ―speech‖ as a frequently interrupted conversation, the fragmentary nature of the 
treatise, and Cicero‘s near-veneration of him.  In Astin‘s words,  
 
Cicero saw in Scipio Aemilianus in particular the great man of public 
affairs, the political giant, who combined with success in action that 
enjoyment of learning which Cicero valued so highly.  Moreover, 
Scipio seemed to Cicero to contrast markedly with the successful 
generals of his own day: seeming content with a place of honour and 
leadership, he did not attempt a dominatio; in his courage, his fides, 
and his temperate personal life he could be seen as an exemplar of the 
traditional Roman virtues; and in the last years of his life he took the 
lead in the struggle against the ―popular‖ Gracchans.
135
   
 
The element of contrast is an important aspect of Aemilianus‘ function in the 
dialogue, and also conforms with the use of exempla to critique misconduct.  Yet the 
theme of the treatise – the ideal state – intensifies Aemilianus‘ exemplarity: his 
dominant position proclaims him to be the ideal statesman, thereby imparting greater 
weight to his actions and words.  One instance of this needs closer examination, 
because of its relevance to Aemilianus‘ relationship with Laelius, and the attitude 
which may be extrapolated from it. 
 
Fuit enim hoc in amicitia quasi quoddam ius inter illos, ut militiae, 
propter eximiam belli gloriam, Africanum ut deum coleret Laelius; 
domi vicissim Laelium, quod aetate antecedebat, observaret in 
parentis loco Scipio.  (Rep. 1.18) 
 
In fact, Aemilianus was only a few years younger than Laelius, and this explanation 
for their conduct toward each other must be rejected, since the closeness of their 
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relationship is otherwise attested.
136
  Rather, this vignette reveals the equivalent, 
though different, honours accorded to military and civic service, and by extension, 
their value to the state.  This is the backdrop against which we must see Cicero‘s 
desire to play Laelius to Pompey‘s Scipio.
137
    
 Of course, one of the best sources for the relationship between Aemilianus 
and Laelius is the De amicitia, in which Laelius relates his theory of friendship in 
order that Scipionis et Laeli amicitiam notam posteritati fore (Am. 15).  This innocent 
theme disguises the political ramifications of amicitia,
138
 whence Laelius‘ 
significance as an interlocutor derives.  Laelius speaks not merely as one who has 
experienced friendship, but as a senior statesman with the auctoritas of a career‘s 
service to the state.  Bearing this in mind, it is difficult not to see Cicero‘s concerns 
for the Republic following the Ides of March in Laelius‘ praise of reciprocal 
friendship as honourable, and condemnation of hangers-on and unquestioning 
adoration.
139
  The fact that all of the examples cited are military exempla reinforces 
the political undercurrent of the discussion (esp. Am. 18, 39, 42), as does the 
emphasis at the end of the dialogue on the friendship which exists within a mentoring 
relationship (Am. 101).  We may even read in this Cicero‘s desire to guide the next 
generation – specifically to play Laelius to the up-and-coming Octavian. 
 Finally, we have Cato‘s function in the De senectute, a treatise about the 
ways quibus facillime... ingravescentem aetatem ferre possimus (Sen. 6).  As was 
                                                 
136
 Astin 1967, 81 with sources. 
137
 Fam. 5.7.3, assessed below, p. 110.  The expression may have been conventional, since Cicero uses 
it to describe the relationship of Catulus to Marius (Tusc. 5.56).  Shackleton Bailey 1986 would have 
another reference at Phil. 6.10, concerning to the relationship of L. Antonius to his brother Antony.  
Although not unfeasible, this emendation seems unnecessary in light of the fact that Africanus‘ 
brother was also a Lucius (Asiaticus).  Manuwald 2007 n. ad loc makes the case convincingly.  
138
 Cf. Zetzel 1972, 177. 
139
 On reciprocal friendship: Am. 30, 44, 56, 59, 70.  On hangers-on and blind adoration: Am. 53, 83.  
 
69 
mentioned above, most of Cicero‘s references to Cato‘s military career are found in 
this treatise, where they form the backbone of an account of a long and active public 
career.  This continued political involvement was a key factor in Cicero‘s choice of 
Cato as the leader of this dialogue, along with his novitas, and oratorical skill.
140
  
Cicero was 62 when he wrote the treatise, and in many ways it reads like an 
exhortation to live up to Cato‘s example.  The political relevance of the dialogue is 
made clear once again by the exclusive use of military exempla to refute 
misconceptions about ageing, such as that it entails inactivity (Sen. 15-16) or the loss 
of political influence (Sen. 61).  The concluding discussion about the benefits of 
death – neque vero eos solos convenire aveo quos ipse cognovi (Sen. 83) – is perhaps 
forced, but consistent with the optimistic tone which is present throughout.  It also 
underscores, like the image of heaven in the Somnium Scipionis, the reward of good 
service to the state.  Thus Cato, like Africanus, Aemilianus, and Laelius, is made to 
speak from a semi-idealized position of influence and ability.  Simply put, these men 
represent the active, enlightened statesman that Cicero believed himself to be, but 
with the auctoritas which he dreamed of exerting.  
 
Marius, Cinna, and Sulla 
 The last group of military exempla is comprised of Marius, L. Cornelius 
Cinna (cos. IV 84), and Sulla as the leaders of the civil war.
141
  Much has been 
written about Cicero‘s treatment of Marius and Sulla in particular, but none of it 
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specifically with regard to Cicero‘s perception of these men as military men.
142
  The 
focus is instead political, and not unjustifiably so, given the context of Cicero‘s 
references to them and the matters which these typically concern.  However, the civil 
war was still a military engagement, and the new era of warfare ushered in by Sulla‘s 
march on Rome presented a serious challenge to Cicero‘s identification of militarism 
with patriotism.  This disconnection separates Cicero‘s references to these men from 
those to other historical military men, further illuminating his attitude towards 
warfare. 
 It should first of all be noted that due to chronological proximity, Cicero is 
the earliest surviving source to use these men as military exempla.
143
  Carney further 
notes with regard to Marius that Cicero‘s allusions to seeing the general – as a 
downtrodden exile – make him the only truly contemporary first-hand source.
144
  As 
for Sulla, Cicero served under him during the Social War,
145
 and he was still alive 
when Cicero delivered his first speeches.  Thus, although these men certainly had 
established reputations for Cicero to draw upon, there was scope for manipulation.  
In Roller‘s words, ―to produce an exemplum... is to struggle constantly to establish or 
disestablish a particular interpretation of an action‘s value... and alternative readings 
threaten to (or do) proliferate at every instant.‖
146
  Cicero‘s sympathetic picture of 
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Marius was ultimately superseded by a less friendly tradition; but his hostility toward 
Cinna and Sulla (especially after the dictator‘s death) found a place in posterity.
147
 
 As military men, however, all three men are consistently praised by Cicero – 
so long as their armies were directed against acknowledged enemies.  All three 
appear in the catalogue of Social War commanders at Font. 43, which is the only 
positive military reference to Cinna.
148
  Marius, on the other hand, is additionally 
counted among non litteris homines ad rei militaris scientiam, sed rebus gestis ac 
victoriis eruditos (Font. 43).  The theme of experience is a constant one in Cicero‘s 
references to Marius, who receives by far the most military praise of these men.  His 
entire career is praised in detail at Balb. 47: 
 
...se P. Africani discipulum ac militem, se stipendiis, se legationibus 
bellicis eruditum, se, si tanta bella attigisset quanta gessit <et> 
confecit, si tot consulibus meruisset quotiens ipse consul fuit, omnia 
iura belli perdiscere ac nosse potuisse; sibi non fuisse dubium quin 
nullo foedere a re publica bene gerenda impediretur. 
 
Yet, as we have seen in previous references to military men in the Pro Balbo, 
Cicero‘s point here is to cite precedents of grants of citizenship to support his client‘s 
case.  Marius‘ role in the Jugurthine War (112-105) and the war against the Cimbri 
and Teutons (106-101) are celebrated at Leg. Man. 60 (cf. Prov. 26) for similar 
reasons, as a precedent for the sole command Cicero advocated for Pompey: maiores 
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nostros semper in pace consuetudini, in bello utilitati paruisse.  Marius likewise 
appears in the catalogue of triumphators at Pis. 58 (cf. Planc. 60; Phil. 13.9), and his 
military vim atque virtutem receives special mention in the catalogue of true generals 
cited at Ver. 5.25 to contrast with Verres.  Perhaps the greatest indication of Cicero‘s 
respect occurs in the De oratore, where Marius is the expert (quorum eae sint artes) 
in military matters whom an orator might consult in order to acquaint himself with 
the topic.  The orator then ita pronuntiabit, ut ipsi C. Mario paene hic melius quam 
ipse illa scire videatur (De orat. 1.66).    
 Sulla is praised for his leadership in the First Mithridatic War, a command 
which brought him into conflict with Marius and eventually led to civil war.
149
  
Cicero‘s approval of Sulla in this capacity underscores the critical distinction 
between military force used in defence of the Republic and that used against it.  This 
is especially evident in the Pro lege Manilia, where Cicero emphasizes Sulla‘s 
military prowess against Mithridates while also explaining why Pompey was needed 
to finish the job.   
 
Triumphavit L. Sulla, triumphavit L. Murena de Mithridate, duo 
fortissimi viri et summi imperatores… Verum tamen illis 
imperatoribus laus est tribuenda quod egerunt, venia danda quod 
reliquerunt, propterea quod ab eo bello Sullam in Italiam res publica, 
Murenam Sulla revocavit. (Leg. Man. 8; cf. Mur. 32). 
 
The oblique reference to the civil war in the last line puts a diplomatic spin on 
events, to say the least, since Sulla‘s victories in the east gave him the power base 
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from which to seize power at Rome again in 84.
150
  His victory over the Samnites at 
the Colline Gate in 82 is mentioned later on in the speech, couched in glorious terms 
as Cicero recalls Pompey‘s wide-ranging military career: testis est Italia quam ille 
ipse victor L. Sulla huius virtute et subsidio confessus est liberatam (Leg. Man. 30; 
cf. Clu. 87).  Sulla‘s negotiations with the rival leader prior to this battle are recalled 
at Phil. 12.27 – not wholly positively, since Sulla behaved dishonestly, but the point 
is that the conference was free a vi periculoque, contrary to Antony‘s practice in 44 
and 43.   
 The fact that most of these passages are found in the speeches reveals the 
effect of context.  As Diehl notes with regard to Cicero‘s general treatment of Sulla, 
the allusions in the speeches vary in tone as required by the exigencies of the case, 
but those in the treatises are consistently negative.
151
  Apart from the remark at Font. 
43, Cinna is always criticized by Cicero; but the references to Marius conform to the 
pattern of those to Sulla to the extent that the most explicit of the comparatively few 
negative comments are found in the treatises.  Before discussing these, however, it is 
necessary to examine briefly the remaining positive references to Marius, because of 
the light they shed on Cicero‘s attitude towards him as a military man.  Like the 
unmilitary references to the military interlocutors, these are made important by their 
quantity relative to the passages which refer to military matters alone. 
 Roughly half of Cicero‘s positive references to Marius concern a personal 
engagement with the general, often in the form of explicit self-identification with 
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  Cicero shared with Marius his novitas, his home town, his exile, and, less 
concretely, his status as a saviour of the state.  He boasts about his origins ex eo 
municipio unde iterum iam salus huic urbi imperioque missa est (Sul. 23), and 
suggests that he and Marius are the most prominent Arpinates – while defending 
another novus homo.
153
  He also draws a parallel between Marius‘ aeterna gloria for 
defeating the Cimbri and Teutons and his own achievement against Catiline: erit 
profecto inter horum laudes aliquid loci nostrae gloriae.
154
  These themes were 
doubtless expressed in the Marius as well, although the surviving fragments give 
little indication of the content.
155
     
 It is as an exile, however, that Marius receives the most attention from 
Cicero.  Only one example need be cited: 
 
Nam C. Mari, qui post illos veteres clarissimos consularis, hac vestra 
patrumque memoria, tertius ante me consularis subiit indignissimam 




Cicero goes on to note that whereas Marius‘ recall was attended by violence, his was 
effected by the peaceful entreaties of his brother, Quintus, and his son-in-law, C. 
Calpurnius Piso Frugi.  Clearly Marius‘ precedent was a huge source of comfort for 
Cicero; but even more important was the superiority he could claim for returning 
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without harm to the Republic.  In Lavery‘s words, ―the apparent inconsistency 
between this empathy and the critical remarks… is readily explained by realizing 
Cicero‘s need to highlight his own achievements even at Marius‘ expense.‖
157
   
 From this attitude comes the civic ideology expressed by cedant arma togae, 
which likely accounts for the fact that after the Pro Plancio Marius is not mentioned 
in the speeches until the Philippics.  A dream about Marius Cicero had while in exile 
is treated – by another interlocutor – as just another example of divinely inspired 
dreams at Div. 1.49.  Cicero pours scorn on such an interpretation in the second 
book, stressing that it was simply his thoughts of Marius‘ magnus animus and 
constantia in exile that had brought the dream about (Div. 2.140; cf. 136-8; 141); 
gone is the warmth and intimacy of the earlier passages.  
 This brings us to the negative references to these men as military men.  Like 
the positive passages concerned activity outwith the civil war, the negative ones 
concern activity within it.  The key point of the criticism is the use of armies against 
the state.  The tone is set at Cat. 3.24, which clearly delineates whose actions he 
approved of and when.  The appeal to memory serves as a not-so-subtle means of 
having his own bias accepted alongside the recognized sequence of events. 
  
Etenim recordamini, Quirites, omnes civiles dissensiones, non solum 
eas quas audistis sed eas quas vosmet ipsi meministis atque vidistis. L. 
Sulla P. Sulpicium oppressit; C. Marium, custodem huius urbis, 
multosque fortes viros partim eiecit ex civitate, partim interemit. Cn. 
Octavius consul armis expulit ex urbe collegam; omnis hic locus 
acervis corporum et civium sanguine redundavit. Superavit postea 
Cinna cum Mario; tum vero clarissimis viris interfectis lumina 
civitatis extincta sunt. Ultus est huius victoriae crudelitatem postea 
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Sulla; ne dici quidem opus est quanta deminutione civium et quanta 
calamitate rei publicae.  (Cf. Har. 54; Phil. 8.7).  
 
Consistent with the patterns observed for negative exempla above, misconduct is 
defined in terms of the danger to the state: the citizen body becomes the arbiter of 
good and bad behaviour, according to who is removed from their number.  Marius, 
Cinna, and Sulla are elsewhere condemned as detestabilem civem rei publicae natum 
because they embraced civil war (Phil. 13.1; cf. 11.1), and their regimes as the most 
cruel and sinister ever seen.
158
  The violence of these respective regimes also 
receives much attention, and is frequently expressed in a military context.   
 The negative references to Marius are concentrated at the end of Cicero‘s 
career, in the aftermath of the civil war and during the struggle with Antony.  As 
Lavery explains, ―now [Cicero] appreciated more acutely the dangers posed by a vir 
militaris.‖
159
  The execution of Q. Lutatius Catulus (cos. 102) on his order is twice 
lamented with much criticism from Cicero, and forms a polarized juxtaposition 
between the army and humanitas.  Catulus had served with Marius against the 
Cimbri in 102, and they shared a victory and triumph for Vercellae in 101;
160
 yet 
Cicero prefers to treat Catulus in an unmilitary capacity, specifically as an orator 
(esp. Brut. 132-4; Off. 1.133).  To this extent he is fully the paene altero Laelio 
described at Tusc. 5.56, where Cicero asks whether Marius was happier when he and 
Catulus shared a victory over the Cimbri, or when he uttered the fateful command 
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moriatur.  The allusion at ND 3.80-1 is even more malicious.  After condemning 
Marius as omnium perfidiosissimus and praising Catulus as praestantissuma 
dignitate virum, Cicero proceeds to ask cur enim Marius tam feliciter septimum 
consul domi suae senex est mortuus.  Even the devious means by which Marius 
secured the command against Jugurtha – and thus his first consulship – receive 
mention in this period of Cicero‘s writings.
161
 
 Cinna and Sulla are both condemned for the many manifestations of their 
dominatio, throughout Cicero‘s writings.  The cruelty of the Cinnanum tempus is a 
recurring theme – in spite of an intriguing early reference to the period as triennium 
sine armis.
162
  Cinna is denounced for slaughtering the principes (Att. 7.7.7), and 
especially for the deaths of M. Antonius the Orator (cos. 99) (Phil. 1.34) and his 
consular colleague Octavius (Tusc. 5.55); he is further denounced with Octavius as 
consulem improbum in connection with Cicero‘s exile (Red. sen. 9).  The argument 
in this last passage is that never, since Cinna and Octavius were consuls, had Rome 
suffered two improbi consuls until Piso and A. Gabinius (coss. 58) – and Cicero paid 
the price.  The parallel may seem forced, but it is consistent with the ideals of 
defending the state – and its defenders – expressed in these criticisms.   
 Greed and arbitrariness are the themes of Cicero‘s criticisms of Sulla.  His 
dictatorship is typically called dominatio,
163
 and he is additionally disparaged as one 
of those qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant, dum quod velint consequantur 
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(Off. 1.109), and during whose regime sine iure fuit et sine ulla dignitate res publica 
(Brut. 227).  Rambaud notes that Sulla‘s capricious behaviour as dictator represents 
―cette décadence à la fois morale et politique.‖
164
  This is especially expressed in 
Cicero‘s remarks relating to the proscriptions, which dominate his criticisms of Sulla.  
Although Cicero affects reticence on the subject in his early works, he is outspoken 
in the later passages; Ridley may be right to attribute these to memories sparked by 
Cicero‘s temporary loss of property and citizen rights in his exile.
165
  Amid a 
reference to the miserrimum nomen of proscriptions,
166
 Cicero makes the grounds of 
his criticism clear: opinor, poenam in civis Romanos nominatim sine iudicio 
constitutam.  Cicero also uses Sulla‘s model to express fears of Pompey in the civil 
war with Caesar, worrying that he will sullaturit (Att. 9.10.6) and that his victory will 
be Sullano more exemploque (Att. 10.7.1).  The most damaging comment, however, 
occurs at Off. 2.27 and must be quoted in full. 
  
Itaque illud patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium poterat 
nominari. Sensim hanc consuetudinem et disciplinam iam antea 
minuebamus, post vero Sullae victoriam penitus amisimus; desitum 
est enim videri quicquam in socios iniquum, cum exstitisset in cives 
tanta crudelitas. Ergo in illo secuta est honestam causam non honesta 
victoria. Est enim ausus dicere hasta posita, cum bona in foro venderet 
et bonorum virorum et locupletium et certe civium, praedam se suam 
vendere. 
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Sulla is seen as the catalyst for a radical and disastrous change in Rome‘s policy of 
warfare, and as a sinister precedent for the subjugation of Roman citizens.  The 
proceeds of the proscriptions are also called praeda in a similar denunciation at Ver. 
3.81.
167
  In addition to reinforcing the military context of Sulla‘s actions, this 
terminology underscores the vulnerability of the Roman people – indeed the empire 
– when the generals who are supposed to defend the state instead turn against it. 
 
Conclusion: history and strategy 
 Rome‘s military heritage – as represented by the examples of historical 
military men – provided Cicero with a powerful and versatile means of contributing 
to the militarized culture of his day.  His references to these men display an acute 
awareness of the evocative power of a military name.  The frequency with which he 
refers to them draws attention to their integral role in his rhetorical arsenal.  As 
exempla, they provide a vehicle for praising and criticising contemporary behaviour, 
a personification of the mos maiorum, and a means of illustrating philosophical 
arguments with familiar heroic precedents.  Although many of the allusions 
emphasize unmilitary attributes –  and often appear in aid of unmilitary arguments – 
the military context of the exemplary auctoritas is always preserved, explicitly or 
implicitly.   
 This is especially evident when he strays from the strictly conventional 
application of exempla.  Foreign generals provide an ornamental Other against which 
to contrast Roman military and moral superiority, whereas the civic exemplary 
identity of Africanus, Aemilianus, Laelius, and Cato epitomizes Cicero‘s idealized 
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 See also Ridley 1975, 91-2. 
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union of learning and public life.  The refererences to Marius, Cinna, and Sulla, on 
the other hand, present a cautionary tale that confirms his primary perception of 
military men as defenders of the state.   
 The range of men and exploits to which he refers demonstrates his knowledge 
of this aspect of Rome‘s history; the public nature of his remarks shows his 
sensitivity to the political relevance (and efficacy) of such discussion.  Given the 
interrelationship between the army and politics, it is unreasonable to demand a less 
political discourse from Cicero; but given the unmilitary context of his writings, it is 




Cicero’s relationship with contemporary military men 
 
 From Cicero‘s attitude towards Rome‘s military heritage, we turn to his 
relationship with military men in his own time.  These included his senatorial 
colleagues, some of whose commands were conferred thanks to his oratory;
168
 his 
relationship with his militarily-inclined brother Quintus adds a family element to 
otherwise politically-based relationships.  Cicero‘s descriptions of these men and 
their achievements provide valuable insight into his awareness of the military 
activities of his peers, as well as his perception of contemporary militarism at Rome.  
With these themes in view, the focus of this chapter will be two-fold, examining his 
attitude towards the military achievements of his most prominent associates, and 
gauging the importance of their military identities to his interactions with them, in 
order to determine his perception of them as military figures.    
 It should first of all be noted that the military identities of these men, perhaps 
even more than those of the previous chapter, are inextricably linked to their political 
identities in Cicero‘s writings.  References to the men themselves are plentiful, but 
only a small proportion concern military matters owing to the domestic (if not 
civilian) focus of the majority of his works.  No doubt for this reason, commentators 
have preferred to evaluate Cicero‘s relationships with these men exclusively in 
political terms.
169
  Yet given the overlap between military and political spheres in 
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 Esp. Leg. Man. (Pompey), Prov. (Caesar), Phil. 5 (Octavian), Phil. 10 (M. Junius Brutus); cf. Phil. 
11 (C. Cassius Longinus). 
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 Prominent examples are Rawson 1978 and Lossmann 1962 on Cicero‘s amicitia with Pompey and 
Caesar, respectively.  The political emphasis makes them of very limited use for a military-based 
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Rome noted earlier, this one-sided view ignores a crucial aspect of his interaction 
with these men.  His military references to them provide a glimpse into the military 
workings of the late Republic, written in response to the activities of the leading 
commanders and as events unfolded.  This emphasis on action, rather than on the 
evocative power of a name, provides an access point for considering these citations 
apart from their immediate political or literary stimuli, and thus also for teasing out a 
distinctly military perspective within the overarching political one.    
 The measure of Cicero‘s engagement with the military identities of his 
contemporaries is his handling of military details in his discussion of their activity.  
Two factors will have affected this: knowledge and attention.  We may assume that 
he was reasonably well informed of who was campaigning where, given that 
provincial commands were conferred by senatus consulta and special ones rarely 
granted to privati.  Moreover, as is made abundantly clear by his critique of Piso at 
Pis. 38, governors normally kept the Senate informed of their campaigns by means of 
official dispatches.
170
  Cicero‘s familiarity with these (or at least his ability to consult 
them) is reflected in his speeches in recitations of individuals‘ military careers (esp. 
Leg. Man. 28-35, discussed below).  These are not without rhetorical embellishment, 
but factual errors would not have helped his argument and might have exposed him 
to ridicule if senators who knew otherwise were in the audience.  Significantly, there 
is no equivalent to these recitations in his treatises or letters.  The latter omission is 
noteworthy since the letters are arguably the best gauge of his day-to-day awareness 
                                                                                                                                          
study.  I am not aware of any studies or biographies which address Cicero‘s attitude toward his 
contemporaries in contexts other than political or literary.   
170
 Piso had not sent a single dispatch during the course of his governorship of Macedonia.  Cicero 
himself sent two while governor of Cilicia (Fam. 15.1 and 15.2); cf. Fam. 15.3 and 15.4 (to Cato), 
which reviews his activity in the province and was certainly intended as a public letter.  On the 
importance of regular communication from the front, see Beard 2007, 201-3. 
 
83 
of contemporary events.  As will be seen, when contemporary commanders and 
campaigns are mentioned in the letters, it is often with reference to the political 
implications of the current situation.  Allen, examining Cicero‘s treatment of 
Caesar‘s Gallic campaign, claims that ―the prominent Romans, including Cicero, had 
scant interest in [the campaigns] except as they influenced home politics or touched 
upon the activities of their own circle of friends.‖
171
  Although essentially accurate, 
this view puts a cynical spin on the political focus of Cicero‘s writings.  In a period 
marked by civil war and armed rebellion, to say nothing of the political dominance 
exerted by Caesar and Pompey as successful generals, the domestic consequences of 
military action were neither trivial nor selfish concerns.  Conversely – and as 
Cicero‘s references to Quintus‘ service with Caesar in Gaul demonstrate – the 
potential for political advancement which such postings could bring was not 
inconsiderable either. 
 The references to contemporary military men are concentrated in the 
speeches and letters, although useful topical citations are found in the treatises as 
well.  The private nature of many of the letters allows for a revealing comparison 
between Cicero‘s public and private comments.  Military references in the speeches 
and treatises teem with confidence in the commander in question, emphasizing the 
value of his contribution to the state.  Citations in the letters, on the other hand, show 
a much less assured Cicero, intimidated by the political influence which attended 
military strength, and anxious about how it might be used.  This division reflects the 
different aims and audiences of the respective genres, since it was politically 
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 Allen 1955, 143 with sources.  Signficantly, Caelius‘ letters to Cicero in 51-50 and 49-48 follow 
this pattern, expressing interest in military matters solely as a source of glory for Cicero.  See esp. 
Fam. 8.5; 8.10; 8.16; 8.17. 
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expedient to be seen to be supporting an influential figure in a public work and to 
confine one‘s doubts to private letters.  Chronological proximity also yields more 
nuanced rhetoric, since Cicero was able to skim over details which were common 
knowledge to his audience.  The references are simpler and much less didactic than 
those concerning historical military men – except, of course, when a specific point 
needed to be laboured.  This occurs primarily in the speeches and treatises, where 
Cicero often recalls distant or obscure events in order to illustrate his argument.  
Conversely, the letters tend to reflect his own interests at the moment of composition, 
as well as his relationship with the addressee.
172
  Thus, although the speeches and 
treatises contain the most military detail, the letters contain the most revealing 
comments about his relationship with the military men of his time.  
 Despite these major differences from how Cicero treats historical military 
men, there are elements of continuity which should be noted here.  Most importantly, 
the contemporary references perpetuate the view of the army as a defensive force for 
the protection of the state.  Conspicuous service in foreign wars remains grounds for 
praise, and participation in civil war continues to elicit fiery denunciation.  The idea 
of military service as a manifestation of patriotism is slightly modified to become an 
extension of good citizenship; but the difference is slight and simply reflects the fact 
that the contemporary men are not cited as exempla.  Lastly, the form of the citations 
remains very much dependent on the exigencies of the argument at hand, from the 
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 An important exception is Cicero‘s reflections on the Civil War and specifically on Pompey‘s 
leadership found in Fam. 9.6.2; 7.3.2; 4.7.2; 4.9.2; 6.6.4-6; 6.1.5 (discussed below).  Cicero‘s 
epistolary interests were not, of course, immune to political expediency.  Military matters are treated 
far differently  in letters to Caesar, Pompey, or other leading figures than they are in the more intimate 
letters to Atticus or Quintus.  
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advocacy of an extraordinary command, to a philosophical discussion, or to 
something as simple as an appeal to Atticus for advice.     
 The military men who will be examined in this chapter are the ones 
mentioned with the most frequency and detail in Cicero‘s writings, and represent 
every aspect of the army in the late Republic, from the rank and file of the army to 
the military dynasts Pompey and Caesar.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the quantity and 
depth of the references increases in proportion to the political influence of the 
individual in question.  This reflects the relationship between political office and 
military command (or vice versa), and highlights Cicero‘s sensitivity to the political 
power which military prowess could impart.  That this was a major concern for him 
is indicated by patterns which emerge in the form and function of these citations, 
depending on his political relationship with a particular military man.  The 
individuals may be divided into four groups on the basis of these patterns: soldiers, 
protégés, sponsors, and inimici.  Each group is characterized by a distinctive 
approach to the military records of the respective figures, as well as a unique aim on 
Cicero‘s part in discussing it.  Although he functions as a protégé, Quintus Cicero 
will be examined separately in order to take full account of his fraternal relationship 
with Cicero.   
 
Soldiers 
 The soldiers are a rather nebulous group in Cicero‘s writings.  All but 
anonymous, they are treated en masse, usually as an extension of their commander.  
Although Cicero‘s relationship with them is highly impersonal and explicit citations 
few and far between, the soldiers are nevertheless important because they represent 
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the most distinctly military group with which he interacts.  This is not to say that 
Cicero thought that soldiers had no political importance – he acknowledges the 
influence of the veterans in particular – but simply that he did not have a political 
relationship with them.  The fact that most of these references occur in speeches to 
the Senate or People suggests that Cicero‘s interaction with the soldiers was 
predicated on political exigency, and that he gave little thought otherwise to the men 
who made up the armies of the Republic.
173
    
 Cicero‘s references to the soldiers are generally positive in tone – with two 
important exceptions which will be addressed shortly.  The complimentary citations 
emphasize the soldiers‘ obedience and, by extension, contribution to the security of 
the Republic.  However, because obedience was to be expected from a good soldier, 
Cicero often minimizes the role of the soldiers in favour of praising their 
commander
174
 – and gaining his goodwill, especially in public speeches in the Senate 
or to the People.   
 The commendation of C. Vibius Pansa Caetronianus, A. Hirtius (coss. 44), 
and Octavian in the Fourteenth Philippic is typical of this model:  
 
Cum C. Pansa consul, imperator, initium cum hostibus confligendi 
fecerit, quo proelio legio Martia admirabili incredibilique virtute 
libertatem populi Romani defenderit…. cumque A. Hirtius consul, 
imperator… fortissimo praestantissimoque animo exercitum castris 
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 Caesar‘s relationship with his soldiers makes an interesting comparison.  His legions have distinct 
identities in his writings, and he normally describes how each part of his army contributed to the 
outcome of battle.  See e.g. BG 2.21-7 (the Sambre); 4.24-6 (British invasion); 7.47-53 (Gergovia); 
BC 3.88-96 (Pharsalus).  Henderson 1998, 67 notes that Caesar refers to his soldiers as nostri, ―in 
flagrant violation of his self-denying third-person autodiegetic narrative form.‖  On the soldiers of the 
late Republic, see esp. Nicolet 1976, 174-85; Keppie 1984; Erdkamp 2006, 291-5.  
174
 See Rosenstein 1990, 95-8, with sources, on the expectation that soldiers were sufficiently 
disciplined to hold their positions at any cost.  Caesar‘s particular habit of crediting victory to virtus 
militum is also noted on p. 94.  Cicero evokes the model of the soldier who prefers death to the 
disgrace of leaving his post at Tusc. 2.58-9 (concerning the endurance of pain).  
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eduxerit…. cumque C. Caesar <pro praetore>, imperator, consilio 
diligentiaque sua castra feliciter defenderit copiasque hostium quae ad 
castra accesserant profligarit, occiderit.   
(§§36-7; cf. §§25-8) 
  
With the exception of the Martian Legion – whose praise is subsequently qualified as 
virtus… digna clarissimis imperatoribus (§38) – the activity of the battle is 
summarized as though the generals performed it single-handedly.  A similar strategy 
is evident when Cicero credits Caesar and Quintus with confecta Britannia, 
obsidibus acceptis, nulla praeda, imperata tamen pecunia (Att. 4.18.5).  The army is 
mentioned at the end of the sentence, when it is marched back to the continent to 
signal the end of the foray.  Although belonging to peacetime, Cicero‘s account of 
the role of Lucullus‘ veterans in securing Murena‘s election in 63 also follows this 
pattern, since the credit accrues to their general for leading them.
175
  This is also the 
case for the handful of references to Pompey‘s army in Pro lege Manilia (e.g. §§39, 
45, 50, 68), a contional speech designed to focus attention on Pompey as the summus 
imperator (§28, discussed below).  Although rhetorically expedient – such public 
praise secured not only Pompey‘s favour but also that of the audience, who loved to 
hear their favourite general glorified – this focus nevertheless reinforces the idea that 
soldiers are behind-the-scenes figures.  An extreme version of this view is expressed 
at Marc. 6-7:  
 
Nam bellicas laudes solent quidam extenuare verbis easque detrahere 
ducibus, communicare cum multis, ne propriae sint imperatorum. Et 
certe in armis militum virtus, locorum opportunitas, auxilia sociorum, 
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 Cf. Smith 1960, 5, who estimates the size of Lucullus‘ forces at three cohorts, ―a token force‖ for 
the purpose of celebrating his triumph. 
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classes, commeatus multum iuvant, maximam vero partem quasi suo 
iure Fortuna sibi vindicat et, quicquid est prospere gestum, id paene 
omne ducit suum. At vero huius gloriae, C. Caesar, quam es paulo 
ante adeptus socium habes neminem.... Nihil sibi ex ista laude 
centurio, nihil praefectus, nihil cohors, nihil turma decerpit; quin 
etiam illa ipsa rerum humanarum domina, Fortuna, in istius 
societatem gloriae non offert: tibi cedit, tuam esse totam et propriam 
fatetur. 
 
The political significance of this speech (an expression of gratitude for the pardon 
Caesar had granted to the Pompeian M. Marcellus), combined with its fulsome tone, 
make it tempting to dismiss this passage as empty words;
176
 yet it is just possible that 
the reference to the detractors at the beginning signals Cicero‘s private thoughts on 
the matter, and that this passage is a frantic effort to distance himself from any sort of  
association.  
 The political benefits of downplaying the role of soldiers are even more 
evident in references to specific soldierly virtues.  The designation invictus belonged 
to the army, but Cicero consistently uses it to flatter the commander.  Cicero refers to 
Pompey‘s army in the East as invictus at Leg. agr. 2.52, as well as Caesar‘s in the 
Civil War at Lig. 18 (cf. Att. 11.7.3).  In the early Philippics, he makes much of the 
fact that Octavian‘s army was comprised of Caesar‘s invicti veterans (esp. Phil. 3.3; 
4.3), and praises him for enticing these men out of retirement (Phil. 5.44) to follow 
his lead (Phil. 3.38).  As Manuwald summarizes, ―Cicero strives to give the 
impression that Octavian has raised an army of veterans with the sole purpose of 
preventing Antonius from his (purported) attack on Rome.‖
177
  The emphasis on their 
undefeated record bolsters Cicero‘s argument for the Senate to embrace this 
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 Gotoff 1993, xxii notes that a careful reading of the speech reveals far more subtle motives than 
flattery.  See below, p. 243 for one example (Marc. 28-9). 
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 Manuwald 2007, n. to Phil. 3.3 cumque… timeretur. 
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defensive force, while simultaneously distracting attention from its legality.
178
  Many 
of these references also note the size and strength of Octavian‘s army to similar 
effect. 
 The circumstances of the war against Antony give rise to a variation on this 
type of reference, by which soldiers are praised in their own right in order to secure 
their loyalty for political purposes.
179
  This concerns the soldiers who voluntarily 
joined the Senate‘s cause either by defecting from Antony or participating in the levy 
held by Pansa.  The former consists chiefly of the Fourth and Martian Legions, 
whom Cicero consistently singles out when mentioning the senatorial armies.
180
  
Both legions are included in the proposal for a militiae vacatio for themselves and 
their children following the present campaign (Phil. 5.53), and an account of the 
losses suffered by the Martian Legion at the battle of Forum Gallorum prefaces the 
proposal for a monument to the war dead (Phil. 14.38).  The newly recruited legions 
are also commended at Phil. 11.39 (cf. 11.23-4), where Cicero says that diu legiones 
Caesaris viguerunt and exhorts the Senate to deliver to the recruits praemia 
promissa.  He later lamented – privately, in a letter – that there were no funds to give 
the promised rewards to the meriti milites (Fam. 12.30.3).  Although this expression 
of regret sounds like genuine concern, it must be read in the context of the 
disintegration of the war effort following Antony‘s defeat at Mutina, when Cicero 
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 On the problems associated with the legal status of Octavian‘s army, see Linderski 1984.  Subtle 
distinctions within Cicero‘s praise of the army suggest that he was aware of the differing legal statuses 
of the men, but not greatly concerned by them, compared to his immediate agenda binding the army to 
the Senate so that it could be used against Antony.  See esp. Manuwald 2007, n. to Phil. 5.52.  
Octavian‘s role within Cicero‘s political plans is discussed in detail below. 
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 On the political role of soldiers in this period, see Botermann 1968; Du Blois 1987, 19-21. 
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 E.g. Phil. 3.39; 5.53; 14.38.  The legions joined Octavian at the end of November 44, following 
Antony‘s brutal suppression of a mutiny at Brundisium, and in light of attractive payments given by 
Octavian to the soldiers who joined him.  See Manuwald 2007, n. to Phil. 3.3 cumque… timeretur and 
patrimonium… conlocavit for sources.   
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was desperately working to maintain the united front against Antony he had thus far 
achieved.
181
  His surprised tone when discussing the good judgement of soldiers 
elsewhere reveals a less generous disposition which must have been commonplace 
because Cicero makes no effort to disguise his delight (e.g. Phil. 3.8; 5.23; cf. 13.35).  
The most illuminating example of this concerns the legions which defected to Brutus 
in Macedonia and Illyricum early in 43.  The soldiers are described as men a quibus 
tanta in iudicando prudentia non erat postulanda (Phil. 10.12), a rather backhanded 
compliment that underscores Cicero‘s primary interest in their commander.
182
  The 
qualities that he praises in soldiers are not inherently theirs as individuals, but derive 
from their deeds in a way that suggests that for Cicero, soldiers were a means to an 
end.  
 This theme is reinforced in the negative references to the soldiers, which 
focus on lack of discipline as a danger to the state.  The army becomes a scapegoat 
for military failure and disgruntled veterans a force to be feared.  The former 
phenomenon is examined in detail by Rosenstein in his study of imperatores victi, 
where he attempts to show that blaming the army for defeat was a common practice 
for the Romans: ―the lack of virtus on the part of the troops… comprised a way of 
understanding the causes of defeat that effectively insulated those in command 
against accusations of negligence or culpability.‖
183
  Lucullus is the most prominent 
example of a commander exonerated in this way by Cicero, although he also excuses 
Pompey like this after the Civil War.  He states that Lucullus‘ army was overcome 
by homesickness, and, two years after Pompey‘s death, reflects that he approved of 
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 The letter was written in May 43.  Antony had been defeated on 21 April but managed to escape 
amid dissension over whether he should be pursued to death.   
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 Cf. Phil. 10.6, 9, 24, where Brutus is given credit for seizing the legions. 
183
 Rosenstein 1990, 94.  The role of the pax deorum is also noted in the ellipsis.   
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nec copias Cn. Pompei nec genus exercitus.
184
  (Significantly, Cicero never blames 
Crassus‘ defeat on his army, for reasons which will be addressed below, in light of 
his relationship with the Triumvir.)  In a variation on the theme, the willingness of 
Caesar‘s Civil War troops to wage war against their country is attributed to audacia, 
a distinctly political quality evoking subversion and revolutionary leanings.
185
 
 The threat posed by the veterans as a group is also firmly rooted in the 
political implications of their influence.  The Sullan veterans are invoked at Cat. 2.20 
as part of the third group of Catiline‘s followers, and called multi viri fortes et prope 
pars civitatis at Mur. 42 (cf. §49) to emphasize their prominence and potential for 
harm.
186
  As the decades passed, Caesar‘s veterans became the new bogeymen – 
another factor in favour of Octavian when he gained control of this inherently 
unstable element in 44.  In the discussion of the endurance of pain in Book 2 of the 
Tusculanae disputationes, Cicero sets up an elaborate comparison of veterans and 
raw recruits, reminiscent of Caesar‘s forces against Pompey‘s in 48.  The veterans, 
having the advantage in discipline, are not discouraged by wounds and fare better in 
battle (Tusc. 2.37-39; cf. Att. 11.7.3; 11.9.1).  The references in the Philippics are 
more concrete and indicate a real problem with indirect interference in politics by the 
veterans.  Cicero exhorts the Senate to stop allowing fear of the veterans to keep 
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 Fam. 4.7.2 (Sept. 46).  On Lucullus, see Leg. Man. 23: …tamen nimia longinquitate locorum ac 
desiderio suorum commovebatur.  Rosenstein, 1990, 101 wrongly gives greed as Cicero‘s excuse, 
apparently misled by the earlier mention of local rumour that Lucullus‘ army had been sent to loot a 
temple.  On Pompey, see Att. 11.9.1; Fam. 4.7.2.  Cicero tended to blame Pompey himself for the 
defeat, during the conflict as well as afterward.  The references are discussed below.  Cicero‘s 
complaints of ―bad influences‖ leading Octavian away from him make an interesting contrast, 
although this is not strictly a military matter.  See Ad Brut. 1.10.3; 1.18.3. 
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 Div. 2.114.  See Wirszubski 1961, 12-19 on Cicero‘s use of audax/audacia as a criticism, and 
generally on the political connotations of the term in Republican literature.  
186
 Cicero‘s account is contradicted by Sallust, who says that the majority of Manlius‘ followers were 
Etrurian locals who had been dispossessed by Sulla.  See Cat. 28.4. 
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them from deciding the policy needed by the Republic numerous times.  At Phil. 
11.38 he askes outright: 
 
Quamquam, patres conscripti, quousque sententias dicemus 
veteranorum arbitratu? Quod eorum tantum fastidium est, quae tanta 
adrogantia ut ad arbitrium illorum imperatores etiam deligamus? 
 
Cicero never directly refers to the military experience of his audience in his public 
works, although exhortations such as this one suggest that the veterans had 
considerable coercive power, at least among the senators.  At Phil. 13.13 it is 
reported that Sextus Pompeius was willing to join the senatorial armies at Mutina but 
did not want to upset the veterans, whereas at Phil. 10.15 Cicero claims that Brutus‘ 
detractors simply fear the veterans‘ reaction to having the tyrannicide Brutus as a 
commander; at Phil. 2.59 he admits himself (at least ironically) that he would not 
wish to incur the wrath of veterans in Antony‘s army by upsetting their commander.  
Consistent with the leadership role he cultivates in the Philippics, however, Cicero 
asserts that he is not afraid of the veterans (esp. Phil. 11.37, 39), and that the veterans 
themselves do not wish to be feared (Phil. 12.29).  This statement of omniscience, 
contrasting as it does with the earlier portrayal of the Sullan and Caesarian veterans, 
illustrates the flexibility of his public attitude towards the veterans.  Like all soldiers, 
generally, they represent to him the engine of Rome‘s defensive force.  Their 
importance derives from their function as a unit, but they are never as important as 
the generals who command them – at least on the political stage, which was his 





 Cicero‘s political agenda is even more evident in the references to what may 
be termed his military protégés.  These men include minor military figures defended 
by him, as well as Octavian, Brutus, and Cassius.  Cicero‘s relationship with these 
men was based on mutually beneficial aims which required a military counterpart to 
his own political influence.  These aims also revolved around a present need to 
preserve or enhance Rome‘s defensive forces.  In all cases, Cicero‘s cultivation of 
these men in a military capacity indicates a general regard for their achievements, but 
chiefly as a means to a political end.  
 The presence of this theme in Cicero‘s defence speeches is not always 
apparent, although it accounts for the seemingly tangential military appeals which 
Cicero makes in his clients‘ defence.  Despite the different charges facing M. 
Fonteius (pr.? 75), Murena, L. Valerius Flaccus (pr. 63), and L. Cornelius Balbus 
(cos. 40), Cicero‘s defence of each man is structured in the same way: the 
defendant‘s military record is reviewed at the beginning of the speech to establish a 
precedent of good citizenship, any specifically military elements of the charges are 
refuted with further reference to military virtue and patriotism, and the speech 
concludes with an exhortation linking the fate of the defendant with national 
security.
187
  The overall effect is to create a type of argumenta ex vita where military 
prowess stands for moral goodness, making the allegations seem inconsistent with 
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 Cf. Macdonald 1977, 427, who sees the similarities between the Pro Fonteio and Pro Flacco as 
template of sorts for defending a guilty governor.  With the exception of Balbus, these speeches are 
the chief source for the careers of these men.  Some addition information is collated by Watts 1964, 




the defendant‘s character on patriotic grounds.
188
  The efficacy of such appeals is 
well illustrated at Ver. 5.2: 
 
Quid agam, iudices? quo accusationis meae rationem conferam? quo 
me vertam? ad omnis enim meos impetus quasi murus quidam boni 
nomen imperatoris opponitur.... Belli pericula, tempora rei publicae, 
imperatorum penuriam commemorabit; tum deprecabitur a vobis... ne 
patiamini talem imperatorem populo Romano Siculorum testimoniis 
eripi, ne obteri laudem imperatoriam criminibus avaritiae velitis.  
 
The twin appeals at the end of the passage suit innocence and guilt equally, and we 
may well wonder how any military men were ever convicted.  Indeed, Rosenstein has 
shown that military failure did not affect (re)election to the consulship or 
appointments to further (or extended) commands.
189
  For present purposes, however, 
the strategy is important because it provides an incentive for Cicero to engage with 
the military identities of his protégés. 
 Of all the defendants, Murena‘s case was the most closely connected to 
Cicero‘s political agenda, and his value to the state as a military man is especially 
emphasized as a result.  Murena was prosecuted de ambitu at the height of the 
Catilinarian conspiracy, and it was very likely that he would, as consul the following 
year, be needed in the field to continue the war against Catiline and his followers.  
The review of his career provides proof of his ability and faithfulness, thereby 
demonstrating his qualification for the command against Catiline.  Significantly, 
Cicero‘s speech shows that Murena‘s military experience had drawn criticism from 
the prosecution.   
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 For the theoretical background to argumenta ex vita, see Cic. Inv. 2.32-4 (prosecution), 35-7 
(defence); Rhet. Her. 2.5; Quint. Inst. 7.2.28-35.  The effect of such appeals to character is discussed 
by Riggsby 2004. 
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…si adulescens patre suo imperatore non meruisset, aut hostem aut 
patris imperium timuisse aut a parente repudiatus videretur. …huic 
donis militaribus patris triumphum decorare fugiendum fuit, ut rebus 




Murena is further praised as a magnum adiumentum to his father (Mur. 12), and for 
his leadership as Lucullus‘ legate in the Mithridatic war: maximo in bello sic est 
versatus ut hic multas res et magnas sine imperatore gesserit, nullam sine hoc 
imperator (Mur. 20).  The implicit advocacy of military service is made explicit 
shortly after this review, when Cicero argues at length that it is better to be a soldier 
than an orator.
191
   
 Cicero‘s treatment of Fonteius‘ and Flaccus‘ careers is rather less dramatic.  
Both men were tried de repetundis
192
 and Cicero uses their military (and political) 
careers to date to depict blameless, upright citizens (Font. 3-6; Flac. 6).  He then 
turns the tables on the prosecution, trapping them in inconsistency.  In Pro Fonteio, 
he undermines the credibility of the prosecution‘s Gallic witnesses on the grounds 
that hostility is to be expected from the very men Fonteius warred against in the 
course of bringing his province sub populi Romani imperium dicionemque (§§12-14).  
In Pro Flacco, Cicero exploits the prosecutor‘s earlier statements to reveal a model 
military man:  
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 Mur. 11; cf. §15.  See Macdonald 1977, 169 on the controversy concerning Murena‘s father‘s 
triumph.  For further details of Murena‘s military record, see Macdonald 1977, 169-71.  Cicero‘s 
treatment of it is reviewed by Steel 2001, 135-9.   
191
 Mur. 30-41.  Wiseman 1971, 118 notes that Cicero‘s comparison of military and rhetorical fame is 
also meant to undermine the electoral support which Ser. Sulpicius Rufus, whom Murena defeated and 
who was now part of the prosecution, had won as a jurisconsult.  This passage is discussed in more 
detail below, p. 244. 
192
 Fonteius was tried in 69 for his governorship of Gaul (75-73), and Flaccus in 59 for his 




Vestri exercitus [sc. Flaccum] fortissimum militem, diligentissimum 
ducem, temperatissimum legatum quaestoremque [sc. cognovit], 
quem vos praesentes.. amantissimum rei publicae civem iudicastis.  
(§8) 
 
These qualities set up his defence of the main charge, that Flaccus retained funds 
raised by taxes which were levied on the pretence of building a defensive fleet.  
Cicero argues that the fleet was a necessary defence for a sea-bound province which 
had experienced problems with pirates in the past – gloria divina Pompei 
notwithstanding (Flac. 28-30) – and attributes the absence of pirates to the deterrent 
force of the fleet.
193
  Fonteius‘ alleged misconduct did not concern military matters 
(the embezzlement of taxes raised for road-building), but Cicero pointedly names 
Pompey as a witness of Fonteius‘ good conduct, since he wintered with his army in 
Gaul during Fonteius‘ term (Font. 16).    
 The connection with Pompey also appears in the defence of Balbus.  Balbus 
had been granted citizenship by Pompey for his service in the Sertorian war, but in 
56 this was challenged by opponents of the Triumvirate.
194
  Cicero‘s review of 
Balbus‘ record is different from the other defendants because of its emphasis on the 
names of his commanders, which sets up the connection with Pompey. 
 
… hunc [sc. Balbum] in Hispania durissimo bello cum Q. Metello, 
cum C. Memmio et in classe et in exercitu fuisse; ut Pompeius in 
Hispaniam venerit Memmiumque habere quaestorem coeperit, 
numquam a Memmio discessisse, Carthagine esse obsessum, 
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 Flac. 31.  Cicero also mentions a voyage by Crassus to prove that the fleet was deployed (Flac. 
32), and sums up Flaccus‘ thoroughness by pointing out that Quintus Cicero was the first governor of 
the province not to have to levy rowers because he inherited such a strong force from Flaccus (Flac. 
33). 
194
 See Gardner 1958, 618; Steel 2001, 81, 108-9. 
 
97 
acerrimis illis proeliis et maximis, Sucronensi et Turiensi, interfuisse, 
cum Pompeio ad extremum belli tempus fuisse.  (Balb. 5) 
 
Having addressed the facts of Balbus‘ service, Cicero shifts the focus of his 
arguments to the rectitude of Pompey‘s deed (esp. Balb. 6, 65), using Pompey‘s 
name as a guarantor for Balbus‘ merit.  Marius, Pompeius Strabo, and Sulla are also 
invoked to give precedents for grants of citizenship in times of war (Balb. 46-50, 64), 
reinforcing a central argument which identifies outstanding military service as both 
the grounds for deserving citizenship and a demonstration of good citizenship. 
 These patriotic accounts of the records of the defendants culminate in the 
appeals to nationary security.  Although these seem overblown at times, it is clear 
that they were carefully crafted to suit the circumstances of the trial.  The appeal in 
the Pro Fonteio is especially evocative and must be quoted in full:   
 
Fuit enim maior talium <tum> virorum in hac re publica copia; quae 
cum esset, tamen eorum non modo saluti sed etiam honori 
consulebatur. Quid nunc vobis faciendum est studiis militaribus apud 
iuventutem obsoletis, <fortissimis> autem hominibus ac summis 
ducibus partim aetate, partim civitatis discordiis ac rei publicae 
calamitate consumptis, cum tot bella aut a nobis necessario 
suscipiantur aut subito atque improvisa nascantur? nonne et hominem 
ipsum ad dubia rei publicae tempora reservandum et ceteros studio 
laudis ac virtutis inflammandos putatis? (§42; cf. §41, 49) 
 
The Republic‘s forces are portrayed at such a low ebb that it really does seem 
prudent to give Fonteius the benefit of the doubt.  The exhortations to the judges in 
Murena‘s and Flaccus‘ trials are even more insistent.  If we accept Cicero‘s account 
of the threat posed by Catiline, Murena‘s acquittal really was a matter of national 
security, since any delay to appoint a replacement consul would give the 
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Catilinarians the upper hand.
195
  Thus we have Murena portrayed as the salvation of 
the state: mihi credite, iudices, in hac causa non solum de L. Murenae verum etiam 
de vestra salute sententiam feretis (Mur. 84). Cicero‘s exhortation to the judges in 
Flaccus‘ trial takes a very similar form – with less reason – as he tells the judges they 
they are not voting for Flaccus himself, but de vobismet ipsis, dabitur de liberis 
vestris, de vita, de patria, de salute communi (Flac. 99).  Even Balbus‘ citizenship is 
turned into a matter of national defence as Cicero claims that depriving Rome‘s 
generals of the ability to grant citizenship will deprive Rome of summa utilitas ac 
maximum saepe praesidium periculosis atque asperis temporibus (Balb. 22). 
 This emphasis on value of military service certainly does not preclude less 
noble motives for undertaking the defence of Murena, Fonteius, and Flaccus, and 
these must be examined briefly to round out our picture of Cicero‘s relationship with 
these protégés.  He was drawn to Murena as a fellow novus homo as well as for his 
commitment to the pursuit of the Catilinarians.
196
  Flaccus also had a Catilinarian 
connection, since as praetor in 63 he had played a key role in apprehending the 
conspirators (Cat. 3.5-7, 14; cf. Flac. 6).
197
  Cicero‘s interest in Balbus and possibly 
also Fonteius, on the other hand, stemmed from Pompey.  The description of the 
exercitus… Cn. Pompei maximus atque ornatissimus at Font. 16 is consistent with 
later references to the general and provides an interesting glimpse of Cicero‘s 
opinion of Pompey before the politically-charged Pro lege Manilia.  Cicero cites his 
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 Mur. 82: Nam ne sufficiatur consul non timent…. sperant [sc. Catilina et suum consilium] sibi D. 
Silanum, clarum virum, sine conlega, te sine consule, rem publicam sine praesidio obici posse; cf. 
Flac. 98.  
196
 Cicero addresses Murena‘s novitas at Mur. 17.   
197
 Cicero presents the case as an indirect attack on his consulship, as the trial of his colleague C. 
Antonius Hybrida had been.  Macdonald 1977, 430 sees an attempt by the Triumvirs to remove an 
opponent who had quarrelled with Pompey, but Epstein 1987, 109-11 finds no Pompeian involvement 
or hostility.  The military aspects of Cicero‘s leadership as consul are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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motives for undertaking Balbus‘ defence as a iusta et debita gratia for Pompey‘s role 
in effecting Cicero‘s recall (Balb. 59), but practical considerations of submission to 
the Triumvirate were certainly the greater impetus.  By focussing on the military 
identities of these men, however, Cicero successfully objectifies his own interest 
while also delivering a veritable lecture on military virtue and good citizenship.  
Murena, Fonteius, and Flaccus were almost certainly guilty, and the right to grant 
citizenship was traditionally the preserve of the People itself;
198
 but when the fate of 
any man was linked to the security of the Roman empire, only a disloyal citizen 
could condemn him. 
  This attitude towards the value of military service is especially evident in the 
Philippics, where Cicero advocates the sanction of technically illegal commands held 
by Octavian, Brutus, and Cassius.  The appeal to national security takes on new 
importance against the backdrop of the war against Antony: the armies held by 
Octavian, Brutus, and Cassius provided timely defensive forces for the senatorial 
cause,
199
 and their very existence bolstered Cicero‘s unpopular contention that 
Antony was an enemy.  Their commands were therefore integral to his pro-war 
policy, and his position of leadership in the crisis allowed him to claim credibly that 
his own interests were really those of the state.
200
  The resulting personal rhetoric 
reveals a great deal generally about Cicero‘s attitude towards these men as military 
figures, as well as about the value he placed on their service relative to his political 
agenda. 
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 See Alexander 2002, esp. 126 (Murena), 75 (Fonteius), 97 (Flaccus).  On the authority of popular 
assemblies for matters concerning citizenship, see Lintott 1999, 200 (with sources).  
199
 As consul at the start of the conflict, Antony possessed the consular armies and controlled the 
consular prerogative of the levy.  He was also responsible for the appointment of P. Cornelius 
Dolabella as suffect consul, thereby effectively neutralizing him. 
200
 Cicero‘s leadership role in 44-43 is discussed in detail below, pp. 261-85. 
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 We may begin with Octavian, as the first and most prominent recipient of 
Cicero‘s advocacy in the war against Antony.  The letters make it clear that the 
relationship which developed between Cicero and Caesar‘s heir was based on mutual 
advantage: Octavian saw in Cicero the auctoritas and oratorical prowess that could 
launch his political career, whereas Cicero saw in Octavian and his veteran army a 
last chance to save the Republic from despotism.
201
  That Cicero saw Octavian 
chiefly as a military figure is reflected by the fact that he is always mentioned in the 
Philippics and letters after the beginning of the war in a military context.  Cicero‘s 
first statement of advocacy sets the tone:    
 
C. Caesar adulescens, paene potius puer, incredibili ac divina quadam 
mente atque virtute, cum maxime furor arderet Antoni… nec 
postulantibus nec cogitantibus, ne[c] optantibus quidem nobis, quia 
non posse fieri videbatur, firmissimum exercitum ex invicto genere 
veteranorum militum comparavit patrimoniumque suum effudit.  
(Phil. 3.3) 
 
Although Cicero uses Octavian‘s adopted name and highlights the organization of 
Caesar‘s veterans, he does not delve into Octavian‘s past service with Caesar to 
establish a record of military virtue.
202
  Rather, he makes Octavian‘s record start with 
this civil war, so that his service appears as wholly positive and heralded by 
outstanding patriotism and skill.  He is called the praesidium of Rome (Phil. 3.34) 
for his timely deflection of Antony, and praised for his initiative and speed in raising 
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 See esp. Att. 15.12.2; 16.8.1; 16.9.1; 16.11.6; 16.14.1; Fam. 12.23.2; 11.7.2.  Later sources are 
explicit about a consulship plot between Octavian and Cicero.  See Plut. Cic. 45.1; 46.1; App. BC 
3.82; Dio 46.45.2.  Octavian‘s motives notwithstanding, there is no evidence that the plot was ever 
acted upon. 
202
 Octavian had served under Caesar in Spain and was with his legions at Apollonia when news of the 
assassination reached him (Suet. Div. Aug. 8).  Given his age, this must have been his tirocinium 
militiae.   
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his veteran army – at Phil. 5.23 Cicero claims that Octavian paucis diebus exercitum 
fecit.  Proximity of references also credits Octavian (at least indirectly) with 
prompting the Fourth and Martian Legions to desert Antony.
203
  This swiftly 
constructed record of service to the state culminates in the decree in the Fifth 
Philippic, which Cicero introduces as follows: 
 
Demus igitur imperium Caesari, s<i>ne quo res militaris administrari, 
teneri exercitus, bellum geri non potest: sit pro praetore eo iure quo 
qui optimo. Qui honos quamquam est magnus illi aetati, tamen ad 
necessitatem rerum gerendarum, non solum ad dignitatem valet.  
(5.45; cf. 5.46) 
 
Like the defendants, Octavian‘s case is supported by an argument of necessity 
predicated on national security.  However, consistent with Cicero‘s interest in the 
continued pursuit of the war, and in recognition of the extraordinary nature of his 
proposal, it is followed by a personal guarantee that C. Caesarem talem semper fore 
civem qualis hodie sit qualemque eum maxime velle esse et optare debemus.
204
  
Again, beneficial military service is identified with good citizenship to make 
Cicero‘s cause one of patriotic rectitude.  The pledge adds the element of mentoring, 
in keeping with Cicero‘s claims in this period and afterward to be guiding the 
teenager.
205
  Octavian‘s age and political inexperience made him an ideal protégé for 
Cicero, who gained a malleable associate with proven military skill to 
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 On the Fourth and Martian legions, see above.  The deflection of Antony is also mentioned at Phil. 
3.5; 4.4; 5.43; 13.20; cf. Fam. 12.25.4; Ad Brut. 1.3.1.  On the organization of the veterans, see also 
Phil. 4.3-5; 5.23; 11.20; 12.9; 13.19-20; cf. Fam. 10.28.3; 11.7.2; and above.   
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 Phil. 5.51.  Cicero makes similar pledge for Murena at Mur. 90.  The proposal was in fact an 
attempt to reconcile Octavian‘s irregular position with the constitution, since praetorian rank was the 
lowest rank at which one could legally hold imperium. 
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 E.g.  Fam. 11.8.2; Ad Brut. 1.10.3; 1.15.6; cf. 1.18.3-4 which details Octavian‘s increasing 
independence.  It should be noted that Octavian had written to Cicero asking for his guidance before 
the conflict began.  See esp. Att. 16.9.1; 16.11.6; 16.14.1. 
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counterbalance his own unmilitary identity – much like the alliance he sought with 
Pompey, which will be examined below.  Here, however, it will suffice to note 
Cicero‘s anxiety to maintain Octavian‘s loyalty while also assuaging the Senate‘s 
concerns about sanctioning such a young commander.  Patriotism is later invoked in 
the Fourteenth Philippic when Cicero hails Octavian, alongside Hirtius and Pansa, as 
Imperator and credits all three generals equally with res publica conservata (Phil. 
14.28; cf. 36-37).  That he continued to advocate military rewards is clear from Ad 
Brut. 1.15.9 where he calls his proposal for an ovation for Octavian his wisest 
proposal of the war – but declines to explain why this is ne magis videar providus 
fuisse quam gratus.  This anxiety, in light of the eventual outcome of the 
relationship, suggests Cicero‘s engagement with Octavian as a military man was 
based on a real appreciation of the teenager‘s military potential, both for the task at 
hand and for Cicero‘s vision of a properly restored Republic.   
 Cicero‘s treatment of Brutus and Cassius in the Tenth and Eleventh 
Philippics, respectively, follows a similar pattern to that of Octavian, although 
obviously over a shorter period.  Despite long standing relationships with both men, 
Cicero does not truly acknowledge them as military men until the war with Antony, 
when that role serves his agenda.
206
  Brutus and Cassius had raised considerable 
armies in Macedonia and Syria, respectively – provinces which Antony had assigned 
to himself and P. Cornelius Dolabella (cos. 44) after seizing power.  Cicero praises 
their strength, initiative, and loyalty in order to demonstrate their fitness for 
command.   
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 Obviously, Cicero could not cite Brutus‘ and Cassius‘ service in the Civil War to support them 
here, and there were personal and political reasons for previously downplaying Cassius‘ involvement 
at Carrhae as Crassus‘ ―quaestor‖ (on which see Linderski 1975), and later contribution to fending off 
the Parthians during Cicero‘s proconsulship in Cilicia.   
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 Brutus‘ activity is described in terms of saving all of Greece from falling into 
Antony‘s hands, thereby defending Italy as well. 
 
…esset vel receptaculum pulso Antonio vel agger oppugnandae 
Italiae Graecia: quae quidem nunc M. Bruti imperio, auctoritate, 
copiis non instructa solum sed etiam ornata tendit dexteram Italiae 




The specific accomplishments are subsequently enumerated as moving to capture 
Antony‘s brother Gaius, overseeing a levy, and receiving legions from defectors such 
as P. Vatinius (cos. 47) (Phil. 10.13; cf. 11.26-7).  Brutus is also identified with the 
Republic, as Cicero proclaims that tenet igitur res publica Macedoniam, tenet 
Illyricum, tuetur Graeciam… maximeque noster est Brutus semperque noster (Phil. 
10.14; cf. 12).  This association is a direct response to senatorial opposition to 
another extraordinary command, and turns the debate into one of patriotism during a 
national crisis.  Cicero promotes Brutus as not only a powerful ally, but also a safe 
ally (esp. Phil. 10.14, 17) on the grounds of his insperatum et repentinum rei 
publicae praesidium (Phil. 10.24).   
 Experience, rather than action, is the focus of the endorsement of Cassius.  
The command at stake was for a war within a war – the pursuit of Dolabella, who 
had by this time declared for Antony, and assassinated the governor of Asia when he 
blocked Dolabella‘s access to Syria (Phil. 11.1-16 passim).  Unlike Brutus and 
Octavian, Cassius‘ record before the war with Antony is reviewed in order to 
demonstrate his control of the area in question:  
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 Phil. 10.9; cf. 11, 14; 11.27.  Shackleton Bailey 1986 n. ad loc. notes that the Antonius in question 




…tanti Tyrii Cassium faciunt, tantum eius in Syria nomen atque 
Phoenice est.  Paratum habet imperatorem C. Cassium, patres 
conscripti, res publica contra Dolabellam nec paratum solum sed 
peritum atque fortem. Magnas ille res gessit… cum Parthorum 
nobilissimos duces maximas copias fudit Syriamque inmani 
Parthorum impetu liberavit.  (Phil. 11.35) 
   
The victory over the Parthians is an interesting point of praise, since that campaign 
had also involved Cicero as the governor of neighbouring Cilicia; at the time Cicero 
was quite disparaging of Cassius‘ achievement because it detracted from his own 
military glory.
208
  Here, however, as for the defendants, the episode establishes a 
record of valour and patriotism in support of claims being made in the present.  The 
size and strength of Cassius‘ forces are also cited to support his fitness for the 
command (Phil. 11.32) but his presence and availability are his greatest strength: 
opus est et eo qui imperium legitimum habeat, qui praeterea auctoritatem, nomen, 
exercitum, perspectum animum in re publica liberanda.
209
  These words barely 
conceal Cicero‘s underlying concern that the pursuit of Dolabella not interfere with 
the war against Antony.  Only Cassius was unoccupied in this way, and this, rather 
than any exceptional military attribute, was the basis of Cicero‘s interest in him.  The 
fact that Cassius‘ command was not confirmed whereas Octavian‘s and Brutus‘ were 
exposes a fundamental tension between military matters and political agendas during 
times of crisis.  Cassius‘ military credentials were as strong as Octavian‘s and 
Brutus‘, and we have seen the disproportionate efficacy of appeals to military service 
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 See above, p. 19 and Att. 5.21.2; 6.1.14. 
209
 Phil. 11.26.  Cicero notes that the description applies to both Brutus and Cassius, but that Brutus‘ 
engagement with C. Antonius makes Cassius the better candidate, in addition to his presence in Syria.  
The legitimum imperium must refer to Brutus and Cassius‘ praetorian status, even though Antony had 
stripped them of their provinces. 
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in his defence speeches.  Essentially, so long as a demonstrable link could be made 
between national security and a specific individual, arguments in that individual‘s 
favour were likely to be accepted.  Cicero‘s use of this strategy in both the forum and 
Senate likely reflects his rhetorical training; but it also shows his willingness to 
exploit the cachet of military success in order to further his own political agenda.  




 Cicero‘s relationship with his military sponsors is outwardly very similar to 
that with his military protégés, but it is based on the opposite power dynamic.  These 
men were illustrious generals as well as influential senators, and their support – or at 
least neutrality – was frequently the deciding factor enabling Cicero to achieve his 
political aims.  Thus they were men whose favour he had to court from an early stage 
of his career, and he found praise of their military records a convenient and effective 
vehicle for achieving this.  The best examples are Lucullus, Pompey, and Caesar, 
arguably the most frequently mentioned military men in Cicero‘s writings, and the 
ones whose military achievements he particularly extols.  More to the point, 
however, these men were not always Cicero‘s sponsors throughout his entire career – 
Lucullus withdrew entirely from public life after the ratification of Pompey‘s eastern 
settlement in 59, and Cicero outlived both Pompey and Caesar – and his later 
references to them make a striking contrast to the earlier, politically-motivated ones.  
Comparison of these two phases provides valuable insight into the effect of political 
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necessity on his (stated) attitude towards these men, and his sense of their legacy as 
commanders.  
 The political motivation behind Cicero‘s acknowledgement of Lucullus, 
Pompey, and Caesar as military men is best reflected in the timing of his military 
references to them.  Three distinct phases may be identified.  The first concerns the 
ascendancy of Cicero‘s political career and involves Lucullus and Pompey.  Both 
men are consistently depicted in a military guise from the earliest surviving sources, 
all of them speeches and therefore calculated public statements.  Pompey‘s 
appearance at Font. 16 with his large army has already been noted, and fits well with 
both Cicero‘s personal knowledge of Pompey as a military figure from their time in 
Pompey‘s father‘s camp, and his roughly contemporary support for the lex Gabinia, 
as suggested by Ward.
210
  The most important early references are found in the Pro 
lege Manilia, however, which is also where Lucullus is first mentioned by Cicero.  
His approach is subtle in order to overcome the awkward political circumstances of 
the speech: his enthusiastic support of Pompey for the command of the Mithridatic 
War necessarily set him against the incumbent Lucullus, whom he could not afford 
to offend for fear of alienating himself entirely from the Optimates – all the more 
critical since Pompey‘s cause was a popularis one.
211
 
 Accordingly, Cicero is careful to say that Lucullus is retiring from the 
campaign (discedere, §5) and that his imperii diuturnitas has been limited (§26) 
rather than stripped.  He calls Lucullus a summus vir (§10) and gives a highly 
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 See above, pp. 15-18 for Cicero‘s service under Pompeius‘ Strabo and probable meeting of 
Pompey at this time, and Ward 1970a and 1970b on the early relationship between the two. 
211
 Keaveney 1992, 122 cautions against underestimating the amount of sympathy for Lucullus, from 
senators who believed that he had been deprived of gloria.  On Pompey‘s popularis leanings, see 
Comm. pet. 1.4-5. 
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complimentary review of the highlights of his command, from his relief of Cyzicus 
from siege by Mithridates‘ forces (§20), defeat of the Sertorian fleet and entry to the 
Pontus region (§21), and conquest of the capital of Mithridates‘ ally and son-in-law 
Tigranes (§23).  The account sounds so conclusive that in §22 he has to explain why 
a successor is needed at all.  Finally, as has already been noted, he blames Lucullus‘ 
downfall on the homesickness of his soldiers, deftly avoiding undermining the image 
of military competence which he has built.
212
  
 Pompey‘s role in the midst of this praise of Lucullus is as the commander 
whom the People want (§5; cf. §12) and the right man for the job (§27).  It is in 
supporting the latter contention that Cicero produces his definitive praise of Pompey 
as a general – in terms which are unrivalled elsewhere in the corpus.  His career is 
reviewed comprehensively in §§28-35, framed by Cicero‘s theory of the summus 
imperator.  Cicero names scientia rei militaris as the first attribute of this imperator 
and demonstrates Pompey‘s qualification conclusively. 
 
Quis igitur hoc homine [sc. Pompeio] scientior umquam aut fuit aut 
esse debuit?  Qui e ludo atque e pueritiae disciplinis bello maximo 
atque acerrimis hostibus ad patris exercitum atque in militiae 
disciplinam profectus est, qui extrema pueritia miles in exercitu 
summi fuit imperatoris, ineunte adulescentia maximi ipse exercitus 
imperator. … Civile, Africanum, Transalpinum, Hispaniense... 
servile, navale bellum, varia et diversa genera et bellorum et hostium 
non solum gesta ab hoc uno sed etiam confecta.  (§28) 
 
Additional mention of his Sullan campaigns and victories over Sertorius, Spartacus, 
and the pirates in the following sections builds to the assertion that Pompey is the 
obvious candidate for the command: dubitatis, Quirites, quin hoc tantum boni… in 
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 See above.  Cicero‘s treatment of Lucullus in this speech is discussed by Steel 2001, 148-54. 
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rem publicam conservandam atque amplificandam conferatis?
213
  Like Cicero‘s 
military protégés, Pompey‘s command is linked to national security; however, it 
must be noted that the command itself is not part of Cicero‘s policy, but simply a 
means of securing Pompey‘s favour.  It is in this light that we should see Cicero‘s 
decision to credit Pompey with the victories over Sertorius and Spartacus, since his 
contribution there amounted to mopping up the remaining Spartacans after Crassus 
had quelled the revolt.
214
 
 The fact that Cicero‘s references to Lucullus‘ and Pompey‘s military records 
become more laudatory in subsequent speeches confirms the high standard of 
political advocacy he had set for himself.  Lucullus‘ generalship is again praised in 
the Pro Murena and Pro Archia, in response to the demands of political patronage.  
It will not have been mere coincidence that Lucullus was finally awarded a triumph 
for his victory at Tigranocerta – which had happened in 69 – during Cicero‘s 
consulship.  Lucullus in turn helped Murena to be elected consul, and his defence by 
Cicero served both men‘s interests.
215
   The defence of Archias should be seen as a 
continuation of this aid, since the circumstances of the case (an attack on Archias‘ 
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 Leg. Man. 49; cf. 50.  Pompey‘s Sullan campaigns and his defeat of Sertorius and Spartacus are 
also mentioned in §§10 and 29 (cf. Phil. 11.18), and his victory over the pirates of discussed in §§30-
35 (cf. Flac. 29).   
214
 Crassus was responsible for the infamous crucified slaves on the Appian Way and had all but 
extinguished the revolt when Pompey, returning from Spain, encountered and defeated some bands of 
slaves which had fled north.  The campaign is described in detail by Marshall 1976, 25-34; Ward 
1977, 83-98; cf. Seager 1979, 36-7.  Pompey‘s intervention sparked a long-standing grudge on 
Crassus‘ part since, as Marshall 1976, 31 notes, ―Crassus was apparently interested in acquiring a 
military reputation in order to keep up with… Pompeius whom he could obviously see securing 
political advantage from his military successes.‖  Ward 1977, 99 notes that this rivalry with Pompey 
persisted throughout the rest of Crassus‘ life. 
215
 Murena was Lucullus‘ legate in the Third Mithridatic War, and had actually commanded the seige 
of Tigranocerta.  Cf. Keaveney 1992, App. 1, who sees in Leg. Man. 8 (concerning the triumph 
celebrated by Murena‘s father for his victory in the First Mithridatic War) possible evidence that the 
Murenae believed they might have won the Mithridatic Wars.   
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previously undisputed citizenship) suggest that the prosecution was politically 
motivated to harass Lucullus, Archias‘ patron and friend.
216
     
 Freed from the constraints of praising Pompey at the same time, Cicero 
praises Lucullus‘ Mithridatic campaign as one conducted maiore consilio et virtute 
than any other Cicero can recall (Mur. 33), and a credit to his name:    
 
Hoc dico: Si bellum hoc, si hic hostis, si ille rex contemnendus 
fuisset, neque tanta cura senatus et populus Romanus suscipiendum 
putasset neque tot annos gessisset neque tanta gloria L. <Lucullus> 
(Mur. 34) 
 
Lucullus is also a clarissimus imperator (Arch. 11) who is made famous by Archias‘ 
poem about the Mithridatic War (libri…inlustrant, Arch. 21).  There is less attention 
in these speeches to his specific achievements, but the episodes which are examined 
are done to the greatest advantage.  At Mur. 33 Cicero depicts Lucullus‘ success as 
foiling the naïve plans of Mithridates, and at Arch. 21 he makes Lucullus the leader 
of the Roman People into uncharted lands. 
 The military references to Pompey in this period display a much more 
intimate association with his sponsor.  Cicero commends Pompey‘s achievements in 
the east in the Catilinarians, but also appropriates their magnitude in order to show 
off his own achievements at home.  At Cat. 2.11 an oblique reference to the ending 
of all external wars unius virtute sets up Cicero‘s frenzied insistence that intus 
insidiae sunt, intus inclusum periculum est, intus est hostis.  Once the conspirators 
have been apprehended, Cicero addresses Pompey as an equal: 
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 See Keaveney 1992, 138; Berry 2004, 294. 
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… intellego… unoque tempore in hac re publica duos civis extitisse 
quorum alter finis vestri imperi non terrae sed caeli regionibus 




The association is taken one step further in Fam. 5.7.3, where Cicero recapitulates 
his contribution to the security of the state and announces his infamous wish to play 
Laelius to Pompey‘s Scipio Aemilianus.  This has traditionally been read as an 
alliance between an orator and a general, but this interpretation does not take into 
account Cicero‘s assertions of equality in the Catilinarians, or his view of Laelius as 
a military figure and Aemilianus as an example of humanitas, as was seen in Chapter 
2.
218
  Rather, the alliance is one of defenders of the Republic – at home and abroad, 
by peace and by war – in an idealized union of political and military skill.  Pompey‘s 
deficiencies in the former category are noted by Cicero throughout his writings,
219
 
and his later criticisms of Pompey‘s management of the Civil War (discussed below) 
indicate that he felt free to advise Pompey on military strategy despite his own 
limited experience.    
 A new phase in Cicero‘s relationship with Pompey as a commander was 
ushered in by the Triumvirate and especially the return from exile.  In a further 
manifestation of Cicero‘s self-identification with the state, he links Pompey‘s role in 
securing his recall with defending the Republic: 
 
                                                 
217
 Cat. 3.26; cf. 4.21.  At Leg. agr. 2.25 and 3.16 Cicero also praises Pompey for protecting the 
liberty of the People – a fitting focal point for speeches ad populum before the Catilinarian crisis 
brought Cicero‘s own leadership to the fore. 
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 E.g. Astin 1967, 81; Ward 1967, 6; Rawson 1978, 92; Steel 2005, 60-1; Stevenson 2005, 150; cf. 
Ward 1967, 182, describing the alliance as one between a military and a civilian hero.  For Cicero‘s 
perception of Laelius and Aemilianus, see above, pp. 58-69 passim. 
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 Usually in moments of disillusionment.  See esp. the criticism at the outset of the Civil War at Att. 
8.16.1: nec vero ille me ducit qui videtur; quem ego hominem a)politikw/taton omnium iam ante 
cognoram…; cf. Att. 1.13.4; 1.16.12.   Gell. 14.7.1-3 says that Pompey asked Varro to write him a 
political handbook; cf. Att. 8.3.3; 1.13.4; 1.14.1-4; Fam. 8.1.3; Suet. Jul. 28.3; Dio 40.56. 
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…qui omnibus bellis terra marique compressis imperium populi 
Romani orbis terrarum terminis definisset, rem publicam everti 
scelere paucorum, quam ipse non solum consiliis sed etiam sanguine 
suo saepe servasset (Sest. 67; cf. Dom. 129; Planc. 93)  
 
These speeches are also full of attestations of friendship between the two, and a list 
of Pompey‘s attributes at Dom. 16 bears a striking resemblance to the qualities of the 
summus imperator from the Pro lege Manilia.
220
       
 This is also the context in which Caesar first appears in Cicero‘s writings in a 
military guise, and the fact that he is consistently praised underscores the role of 
politics in Cicero‘s acknowledgement of him as a military man.  The positive tone of 
the De provinciis consularibus is frequently remarked upon and rightly attributed to 
Cicero‘s need to please the Triumvirs;
221
 but his use of military detail to do so has 
escaped notice. The strategy is the same as that used for the military protégés, but, 
like Pompey‘s Mithridatic command, Caesar‘s command is not itself part of Cicero‘s 
political agenda.  Significantly, his account of Caesar‘s military record is restricted to 
his activity in Gaul in order to construct an argument based on precedent: sit in eius 
tutela Gallia, cuius fidei, virtuti, felicitati commendata est.
222
  Indeed, Caesar‘s 
service before 59 is never mentioned in his writings, for reasons which are unclear 
but suggest that he did not engage with Caesar as a military figure until political 
circumstances forced him to – and then solely as a means of earning his goodwill.
223
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 On Cicero‘s friendship with Pompey and his role in Cicero‘s recall, see Red. pop. 16; Dom. 27, 30-
1; Sest. 39; Pis. 34-5, 76; Rab. Post. 33; Mil. 39.  Cf. Att. 4.1.7 where Cicero claims that Pompey 
called him his alter ego when appointing him the first of his 15 legates for the grain commission.  The 
attributes listed at Dom. 16 are fides, consilium, virtus, auctoritas, and felicitas, whereas those at Leg. 
Man. 28 are scientia rei militaris, virtus, auctoritas, and felicitas. 
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 See most recently Lintott 2008, 206-8. 
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 Prov. 35.  Note the similarity of the attributes to Leg. Man. 28 and Dom. 16.  
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 Caesar‘s early career is traced in detail by Taylor 1957.   
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The composite parts of the campaign are examined in a way that emphasizes 
Caesar‘s contribution to Rome‘s security.
224
   
  
Itaque cum acerrimis nationibus et maximis Germanorum et 
Helvetiorum proeliis felicissime decertavit, ceteras conterruit, 
compulit, domuit, imperio populi Romani parere adsuefecit…. Nihil 
est enim ultra illam altitudinem montium usque ad Oceanum quod sit 
Italiae pertimescendum. (§§33-4; cf. Pis. 81-2) 
 
He is further praised for conducting a campaign of offence instead of defence, and 
said to have achieved even more than Marius in this way (§32).  Cicero concludes 
with a slightly tongue-in-cheek, but nevertheless characteristically patriotic assertion 
that si inimicissimus essem C. Caesari, sentirem tamen rei publicae causa (§40).  In 
the Pro Balbo, the focus shifts to Caesar‘s empire-building (§64) in a careful 
counterbalance to all the praise of Pompey in the speech.
225
  Arguably the most 
encomiastic reference occurs in the Pro Rabirio Postumo, however, and focusses 
strictly on military skill: 
 
Multas equidem C. Caesaris virtutes magnas incredibilisque 
cognovi… Castris locum capere, exercitum instruere, expugnare 
urbis, aciem hostium profligare, hanc vim frigorum hiemumque quam 
nos vix huius urbis tectis sustinemus excipere, eis ipsis diebus hostem 
persequi cum etiam ferae latibulis se tegant atque omnia bella iure 
gentium conquiescant – sunt ea quidem magna; quis negat? (§42) 
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 Caesar also presents his activity as motivated by national interest.  See e.g. BG 1.8.3; 1.33.2; 
1.45.3;  4.17.1; 4.19.4; 7.17.4.  Wiseman 1998, 1 notes that populus Romanus is mentioned 41 times 
in Book 1 of the BG alone. 
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 See esp. Balb. 9, which traces Pompey‘s career in a manner reminiscent of Leg. Man. 28, and 16, 




The tone is similar to the summus imperator rhetoric of the Pro lege Manilia, but not 
nearly as well developed.  The list format may indicate that Cicero is following a 
rhetorical model rather than being spontaneous (cf. similar lists of virtues at Marc. 5, 
9).  A subsequent explanation that Caesar is motivated by praemia ac memoria 
sempiterna rather detracts from the picture of military perfection, and makes a stark 
contrast to the magnanimity implied by the references to Pompey‘s skill.  Yet against 
this view we have Cicero‘s contemporaneous epic on Caesar‘s British expedition, 
and anxious letters to Quintus in Gaul asking about Caesar‘s goodwill towards 
him.
226
   
 This type of wavering characterizes the military references to both Caesar and 
Pompey in the Civil War and aftermath.  The conflict represented a point of no return 
for both men as Cicero‘s sponsors because they had taken arms against the state 
without attempting to resolve the conflict peacefully.  Cicero no longer wished to be 
associated with either man politically, but again necessity forced him to embrace 
Caesar.  No doubt due to the political implications of this war, there are fewer 
explicitly military references than might otherwise be expected.
227
 
 Cicero‘s opinion of Pompey‘s leadership falters from the outset of the 
conflict.  In addition to his reluctance to take on the Capuan command given to him 
by Pompey,
228
 he expresses distrust of Pompey‘s control of his army and apparent 
lack of strategy.  In Att. 7.12.1 (22 Jan. 49) he says that if Pompey stays in Italy 
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 See below, pp. 124-8. 
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 The vast majority of Cicero‘s references to Pompey and Caesar at this time are in letters 
concerning their jockeying for political position.  These are examined by Holliday 1969, chs. 4-5, 
focussing on Pompey.  It should be remembered that Cicero still held proconsular imperium at the 
outset of the conflict (see above, p. 24).  He seems to have felt that it gave him special credibility with 
Caesar and Pompey, and aimed to use that influence to mediate.  
228
 On Cicero‘s service in the Civil War, see above, pp. 24-7. 
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exercitum firmum habere non possit, and the following month laments Pompey‘s 
lack of animus, consilium, and diligentia (Att. 7.21.1; cf. Att. 8.2.2).  These criticisms 
soon turn to outright condemnation as the conduct of the campaign leads Cicero to 
see Pompey as another Sulla (esp. Att. 8.11.1-2; 9.7.3; 9.10.6), and even to fear a 
Pompeian victory (Att. 8.7.2).  His brief time in Pompey‘s camp did little to improve 
his opinion of the general, and his only contemporaneous comment is a vague lament 
of the state of affairs (e.g. Att. 11.4.1). 
 Cicero‘s references to Caesar are also frequently veiled, although Caesar is 
consistently portrayed as a force to be feared.  The fact that the Senate had given him 
the materials with which he now assailed the Republic troubled Cicero especially 
(esp. Att. 7.11.1; Fam. 16.11.12), and the potential of power for cruelty is an 
undercurrent in the four letters between the two men which date from this period 
(Att. 9.6a; 9.11a; 9.16.2-3; 10.8b).  More telling are Cicero‘s references to 
philosophical discussions of whether it it is right to make war on one‘s country if it is 
ruled by a despot (Att. 9.4.2), and whether it is right to be in a despot‘s council if he 
is debating matters of public interest (Att. 10.1.3). 
 Nevertheless there is a complete reversal of opinion following the Civil War, 
and Caesar‘s pardon.  The so-called Caesarian speeches (Pro Marcello, Pro Ligario, 
Pro Rege Deiotaro) are all encomia of Caesar, consistent with Cicero‘s subservience, 
but with very little explicitly military praise.  Context supplies an attractive 
explanation: all three men had fought on the Pompeian side in the Civil War, and 
Cicero is at pains throughout these speeches to demonstrate their new loyalty to 
Caesar‘s cause.  Any discussion of military service would run the risk of 
inconsistency, and so we find Cicero redefining military greatness.  At Marc. 23 he 
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credits Caesar with rebuilding the state after the war, but by far the most common 
frame of reference recalls Caesar‘s legendary clementia in sparing Cicero as well as 
Marcellus, Ligarius, and Deiotarus (Marc. 31-3; Lig. 30; Deiot. 40, 43). 
 This brings us to the final phase of Cicero‘s references to his military 
sponsors: those made after their sponsorship had ended.  The fact that these 
references differ markedly in tone and content from the earlier references further 
demonstrates the conditioning effect of political expediency, and also suggests that 
these later citations may in fact represent Cicero‘s true (or at least primary) attitude 
towards the figure in question.  Interpreted in this way, the results are highly 
evocative.  Lucullus remains nominally a military figure (Sest. 58; Har. 42), but by 
far the most attention is paid to his life of luxury.
229
  A lasting friendship seems to be 
behind Cicero‘s initial plans to make Lucullus a character in his Academica, but a 
different impression is given in a letter to Atticus where he is described as a homo 
nobilis but nullo modo philo<lo>gus.
230
 
 Cicero‘s attitude towards Pompey after his death is rather mixed.  Although 
he was effectively barred from openly lamenting his friend while Caesar lived – at 
Deiot. 12 he says that Pompey‘s praise is finite, whereas Caesar‘s is infinite – he 
does make some revealing private comments.  Following in the pattern of the Civil 
War citations examined above, Cicero expresses resignation about the outcome (esp. 
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 See esp. Leg. 3.30-3; Fin. 2.107; Off. 1.140; 2.57.  Keaveney 1992, 153 notes that this was the 
image of Lucullus handed down to posterity: ―Lucullus the flabby, back from the wars, lolling by his 
ponds, indifferent to the fate of the Republic.‖   
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 Att. 13.12.3; cf. 13.16.1; 13.15.5.  Keaveney 1992, 11-12 sees disparaging comments in Cicero‘s 
letters as largely inaccurate and argues that Cicero deliberately minimized Lucullus‘ political 
importance in his later life in order to emphasize his own role in the state.  Although this is certainly 
the case with Cicero‘s relations with other political figures, Lucullus had retired and Cicero no longer 
needed to court his favour; his emphasis on his own accomplishments at this time need not be seen as 
disparaging.   
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Fam. 9.6.3; 4.9.2) and laments his lack of influence with Pompey (esp. Fam. 6.6.4-6; 
cf. Phil. 2.23-4, 38).  More surprising, however, is the outright condemnation of 
Fam. 7.3.2 where Cicero recalls the events at Dyrrachium and Pompey‘s refusal to 
follow his advice to delay the battle: ex eo tempore vir ille summus nullus imperator 
fuit.  His flight from Pharsalus is alluded to at Div. 1.24 to rebuff arguments on the 
worth of divination,
231
 and Cicero asks whether foreknowledge of his fate would 
have stopped him at Div. 2.24.  The Ides of March reawakened Cicero‘s Republican 
ideals and lead to a partial rehabilitation of Pompey as a military man.  He is called a 
summus et singularis vir (Off. 2.20) and a singularis vir ac paene divinus (Phil. 
2.39), and his underage honours (Phil. 5.43-4) and command against Sertorius pro 
consulibus are celebrated (Phil. 11.18).  On the whole, however, Cicero‘s primary 
mode of reference to Pompey at this time accentuates his former benefit to the Senate 
(esp. Phil. 2.54; 13.34) – a notable nostalgia since Cicero was at this time grooming 
Octavian for another Laelius-to-Scipio relationship. 
 As for Caesar, there can be no question that Cicero‘s later references to him 
represent a truer opinion of the general than his previous statements – even though 
due discretion is exercised.  At Phil. 13.2 Caesar is discreetly condemned alongside 
Sulla, Marius, Octavius, and Cinna as men who desired civil war,
232
 and at Off. 3.84 
as a rex who enslaved the Roman People with the Roman army.  A lengthy list of 
Caesar‘s attributes at Phil. 2.116 is outwardly complimentary, but carries a grave 
warning to Antony:  
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 The argument is that divination, like imperatorum scientia, is useful even though it sometimes 
fails.  Significantly, the words used are summus imperator.  Cicero returns to Pompey‘s example at 
Div. 1.27.   
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 Phil. 13.2: Nam quid ego de proximo dicam cuius acta defendimus a[u]ctorem ipsum iure caesum 





Cum illo ego te dominandi cupiditate conferre possum, ceteris vero 
rebus nullo modo comparandus es. Sed ex plurimis malis quae ab illo 
rei publicae sunt inusta hoc tamen boni est quod didicit iam populus 
Romanus quantum cuique crederet, quibus se committeret, a quibus 
caveret.  (Phil. 2.117) 
 
In short, Caesar was not a general to Cicero but a powerful man made more powerful 
by the armies at his back.  The fact that he liked Lucullus and Pompey did not detract 
from the potential for harm when generals dominated the Senate; but it did give him 
a more comfortable identity with which to interact.  Cicero‘s use of military praise to 
secure the political sponsorship of these men highlights Roman sensitivity to military 
gloria and the scope for political advancement which that gloria could impart. 
 
Military inimici 
 The final type of relationship to be examined is that between Cicero and the 
military men whom he counted as inimici.  The most prominent of these are Crassus 
and Antony, whose stormy political relationships with Cicero are well attested in his 
writings, and the focus of many modern commentators.
233
  The effect of this 
antagonism on Cicero‘s perception of the two men as military figures has not been 
studied, however, despite an intriguing military element in both cases.  Both men 
initiated controversial wars – Crassus‘ against the Parthians in 53, and Antony‘s 
against the state in 44-43 – thereby threatening national security.  We have already 
observed Cicero‘s abhorrence of magistrates who abuse their authority and resources 
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 On Cicero‘s relationship with Crassus, see esp. Shackleton Bailey 1971, 31, 40, 43-5, 86-7; 
Marshall 1976, 35, 113-14; Ward 1977, 68, 143-51.  On his relationship with Antony, see esp. 
Shackleton Bailey 1971, 230-2, 245-7; Huzar 1978, 119-20. 
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in his use of exempla to critique poor behaviour.
234
  His references to Crassus and 
Antony echo this attitude, and their historical context indicates that military 
misconduct was in fact the basis of his inimicitia with both men. 
 Cicero‘s references to Crassus‘ and Antony‘s military careers are distributed 
throughout his writings, but become more frequent – and vindictive – following their 
controversial campaigns.  Indeed, the early service of both men is consistently 
referred to in positive or at least neutral tones, whereas their later activity is always 
treated in a negative way.  Crassus is praised for his role in ending the war against 
Spartacus at Ver. 5.5, and he appears in this connection in the lengthy list of 
commanders who celebrated triumphs (and related honours) at Pis. 58.
235
  His 
popularity as a general is also alluded to at QFr. 2.3.2 where Clodius has the crowd 
shout Crassus‘ name as their preferred commander for the Egyptian command.  The 
only neutral reference to Antony‘s military service occurs at Fam. 16.11.1 and 
concerns his departure to join Caesar in 49.
236
  The near-superficiality and small 
number of these references indicate that although Cicero had a basic knowledge of 
both men‘s military records, he had little interest in them – apart from their 
controversial campaigns.   
 The references to these campaigns vastly outnumber the other citations, and 
are always detailed and critical.  Their dominance reflects the significance Cicero 
placed on this military activity, and shows that it defined his view of both men as 
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 See above, pp. 48-9 (Verres and Piso). 
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 Crassus celebrated an ovation for the defeat of Sertorius, a dubious distinction since victories over 
slaves were not eligible for triumphs (Gell. 5.6.20-1).  See Plut. Crass. 11.8; cf. Marshall 1976, 33-4; 
Ward 1977, 98.  Marshall 1972 discusses the prestige accruing from Crassus‘ celebration.  On the 
ovation as a consolation prize, see Beard 2007, 63.   
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 Antony‘s career is treated in full by Bengtson 1977 and Huzar 1978.  Huzar 1978, 27 notes that 
Antony began his military career quite late at age 25. 
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military men.  He is disparaging of Crassus‘ Parthian expedition from the outset, 
reacting to his departure by sarcastically calling him another Paulus and dismissing 
him as a homo nequam.
237
  In the treatises he makes much of Crassus‘ maxim that 
neminem esse divitem nisi qui exercitum alere posset suis fructibus (Parad. 45; Off. 
1.25; cf. Parad. 52) and the greed that prompted the campaign.  At Fin. 3.75 Cicero 
attributes Crassus‘ decision to cross the Euphrates nulla belli causa to greed, and at 
Off. 1.109 he cites Sulla and Crassus as men who would do anything to achieve their 
aims.  This bitterness is consistent with Cicero‘s concept of the army as a defensive 




 The most detail and scorn, however, is reserved for the events leading up to 
Crassus‘ defeat at Carrhae, specifically his deliberate disregard for the auspices.  
Cicero‘s criticisms are doubly damning because Crassus‘ son – who died with him – 
was an augur (his death created the vacancy which Cicero eventually filled).  He 
emphasizes Crassus‘ own responsibility for his downfall, as well as his attempt to 
shift the blame to the tribune, C. Ateius Capito: non igitur obnuntiatio Atei causam 
finxit calamitatis, sed signo obiecto monuit Crassum, quid eventurum esset, nisi 
cavisset. …peccatum haereat non in eo, qui monuerit, sed in eo, qui non 
obtemperarit.
239
  Other omens which preceded the defeat are described at Div. 2.84 
and 2.99, whereas at Div. 2.22 and Tusc. 1.12 Cicero explores the juxtaposition of 
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 Att. 4.13.1, Nov. 55.  Paulus famously defeated Perseus and celebrated a lavish triumph in 167.   
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 Crassus received the command by virtue of the lex Trebonia (55), a law orchestrated by Crassus 
and Pompey to secure favourable commands for themselves the following year.  See Ward 1977, 274-
5, with discussion of ancient sources.  On Crassus‘ Parthian campaign as an unjust war, see Mattern-
Parkes 2002-03.   
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 Div. 1.30.  The episode is analyzed by Rosenstein 1990, 71-2, who concludes that Crassus‘ actions 
were likely not significant at the time (Capito was later condemned by the censors for inventing the 
omens), and only became so after Carrhae. 
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Crassus‘ greedy aspirations for the campaign and the magnitude of his loss.  The 
image of Crassus as a general is ultimately that expressed at Fin. 2.57: a callidus 
offender who is also very powerful (praepotentem), and usually (solebat) relied on 
his own resources.  
 Antony‘s military activity in his conflict with the state is treated in even more 
disparaging terms in the Philippics.  Despite the fact that these speeches were 
delivered as events unfolded, Antony‘s action is consistently described in 
recapitulating narrative.  His alleged plans for a massacre in Rome are reviewed 
numerous times, supposedly substantiated by his brutal suppression of a mutiny 
among his men at Brundisium. 
 
Quis enim est tam ignarus rerum, tam nihil de re publica cogitans qui 
hoc non intellegat, si M. Antonius a Brundisio cum iis copiis quas se 
habiturum putabat, Romam, ut minabatur, venire potuisset, nullum 
genus eum crudelitatis praeteriturum fuisse? quippe qui in hospitis 
tectis Brundisi fortissimos viros optimosque civis iugulari iusserit; 
…nisi unus adulescens [sc. Caesar] illius furentis impetus 





Cicero‘s vilification of Antony will be discussed further in Chapter 6, but the 
constant reference to savagery and reckless disregard for the state should be noted 
here for the type of record it portrays.  Antony‘s treachery so offended Cicero that he 
retroactively applied present characteristics to past activity, constructing a record of 
military misconduct that is fully the equal of the quickly-constructed record of valour 
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 Phil. 3.4-5.  In the ellipsis Cicero claims that Antony‘s wife Fulvia was splashed by the blood of 
the dying soldiers.  Antony‘s action had been to arrest the leaders of the uprising and execute every 
tenth man.  The episode is also related at Phil. 4.4; 5.22-23; 13.18; cf. Fam. 12.25.4; Ad Brut.. 1.3.1.   
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he attributes to Octavian.
241
  In the Second Philippic, Cicero blames Antony for 
starting the Civil War (§§51-3), as well as for the deaths of the fallen soldiers, 
claiming tris exercitus populi Romani interfectos: interfecit Antonius (§55).  Finally, 
his administration of Italy in Caesar‘s absence is described as conculcandam Italiam 
(§57).  Even though this speech was never delivered,
242
 it is nevertheless an 
important indicator of Cicero‘s perception of Antony‘s military capacity.  At Phil. 
3.1 Cicero denounces the conflict as a bellum nefarium… ab homine profligato ac 
perdito, and at Phil. 5.23 mocks Antony‘s ―flight‖ to Gallia Cisalpina while in his 
general‘s cloak (paludatus).  The implication of this last citation is that a proper 
general would have marched to on to Rome to face battle there instead of relocating 
the theatre of war.  It is perhaps no coincidence that military references to Antony in 
subsequent speeches minimize his active role, reducing him to a static presence that 
provides the context for the valour of Octavian, Hirtius, and Pansa (esp. Phil. 14.25-
28).  A late reference in the letters reveals Cicero‘s frustration with Antony as a 
general who puts his own security above the welfare of the state: quid enim abesse 
censes mali in eo bello in quo… incolumis imperator honoribus amplissimis 
fortunisque maximis, coniuge, liberis, vobis adfinibus ornatus bellum rei publicae 
indixerit? (Ad Brut. 1.18.2). 
 We have now seen how Cicero viewed Crassus and Antony as military men; 
it remains to explore the effect of inimicitia on this view.  The first point to note is 
that although Cicero censures the morals and motives of both men, he never 
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 See above. 
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 The precise date of publication for the Second Philippic continues to be debated, but the current 
consensus favours late November 44, once Antony had commenced his march on Gallia Cisalpina.  
See esp. Shackleton Bailey 1986, 31; Frisch 1946, 143.  Ramsey 2003, 158-9 makes a compelling 
argument for circulation in late November and publication on 20 December, concurrent with the Third 
and Fourth Philippics. 
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challenges their military credentials.  The reference to Crassus as a second Paulus 
and taunting of Antony‘s alleged flight belittle the respective actions, but make no 
attempt to deny either man‘s status as a general.  The attitude is the same as that 
expressed towards negative exempla, where the figure is not condemned as 
inherently evil, but for using his abilities to the detriment of the state.
243
   
 The timing and quantity of the negative military citations is also noteworthy.  
The positive and neutral military references explored above are in fact attended by 
equally flattering or objective unmilitary references.  Those pertaining to Crassus are 
analyzed in detail by Havas, who finds no evidence of inimicitia.
244
  Whereas 
Marshall cites Crassus‘ involvement with Catiline, association with Clodius, and 
possible involvement in Cicero‘s exile as sources of enmity between the two,
245
 the 
references simply do not support the idea of long-standing hostility.  In addition to 
the military praises already noted, Cicero bought Crassus‘ house (Fam. 5.6.2), and on 
the eve of his exile advised Quintus to seek help from Crassus if he needed it (QFr. 
1.3.7; cf. Fam. 14.2.2); for his part, Crassus brought the Catilinarians‘ letters to 
Cicero, praised his consulship publicly (Att. 1.14.3-4), and served with him as 
defence counsel for Murena.
246
 
 Cicero‘s opinion of Antony before 44 must be inferred from a silence which 
speaks volumes.  He is first mentioned at Mil. 40 where he is praised – in a passage 
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heavy with sarcasm – for giving Milo an opportunity to assassinate Clodius.  After 
this reference he enters Cicero‘s writings only as an extension of Caesar
247
 and does 
not appear in his own right until after the Ides of March.  It seems likely therefore 
that Cicero thought little of Antony until his new-found influence forced Cicero to 
acknowledge him on the political stage.  That they were not overt political enemies at 
this time is borne out by studiously polite letters exchanged throughout 44 protesting 
amicitia.
248
  Cicero also wrote a letter like this to Crassus (Fam. 5.8), asserting his 
support for the proposal which made Crassus governor of Syria.  These letters should 
not be accepted at face value, but they nevertheless show that Cicero maintained 
outwardly civil relations with Crassus and Antony until immediately before their 
controversial commands.   
 The commands, and the misconduct which attended them, were therefore the 
spark that brought on Cicero‘s inimicitia with both men.  Antony is denounced 
thoroughly and consistently from the moment that he marched the consular armies 
against Decimus.  The comparative lateness of the bulk of Cicero‘s denunciations of 
Crassus may be attributed to political context, as it would not have been prudent to 
criticize the Triumvir while Caesar‘s and Pompey‘s coalition lasted, or an 
overreaching general during the Civil War itself.
249
  Cicero‘s inimicitia with Crassus 
and Antony was based on their abuse of their military privileges for personal gain, 
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and on the threat to the security of the Republic which that abuse posed.  From the 
moment they undertook this action, this was the only military capacity in which he 
saw them.  The ferocity of his reaction often gives the impression of pettiness, but it 
must be read in the context of his perception of the army as a defensive force.  What 
is significant is how this enmity transcends public life: whereas his interaction with 
soldiers, protégés, and sponsors was often motivated by political advantage, his 
antagonism towards Crassus and Antony was much more personal and based on an 
ethical judgement of their military activity. 
 
Quintus Cicero  
 The last military man to be considered in this chapter is Quintus Cicero.  As 
has already been noted, Cicero‘s relationship with his brother as a military man is 
special because of its unpolitical origins.  It is also special because of the seemingly 
shameless way in which Cicero exploits Quintus‘ military service and contacts for 
his own political aims, as though their blood bond relieved him of the need to 
pretend otherwise.  Cicero‘s discussion of Quintus‘ military service shows clearly 
that he acknowledged his brother as an experienced, able commander; but it does not 
reveal any particular admiration of this fact.  If anything, Quintus‘ military abilities 
seem to have provoked a sort of inferiority complex in Cicero.  Shackleton Bailey 
makes much of sibling rivalry between the two men, particularly in their later 
years.
250
  The scope for this was considerable.  Both had been trained in oratory, both 
were interested in literature and philosophy, and both achieved high office despite 
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  A certain amount of competition was inevitable, and is 
occasionally reflected in Cicero‘s writings.  To give one particularly revealing 
example, at De orat. 2.10 Cicero claims to quote Quintus‘ own joke that he chose not 
to practice oratory because he believed unum... satis esse non modo in una familia 
rhetorem, sed paene in tota civitate.  It is tempting to think of Quintus as being 
―forced‖ into a military career by his brother‘s civilian talents.  His aptitude for 
soldiering – something Cicero could not rival – was no doubt a source of friction in 
fraternal relations, and offers an attractive explanation for Cicero‘s attitude towards 
him as a military figure. 
 Cicero refers to all of Quintus‘ campaigns, but primarily in the letters (often 
to Quintus himself) and rarely in more than passing detail.  This underscores the 
private nature of their relationship – Cicero writes to his brother with a candour 
second only to his letters to Atticus – but also complicates the assessment of the 
citations since it is impossible to determine whether vague references are the result of 
lack of information or lack of interest.   
 The military duties of Quintus‘ proconsulship in Asia are only vaguely 
alluded to – in their absence – in a lengthy letter of brotherly advice.  Cicero 
expresses relief that the extension of Quintus‘ command does not entail bellum 
aliquod magnum et periculosum administranti (QFr. 1.1.4), and lists enemy plots, 
skirmishes, defections of allies, and mutiny as military threats about which Quintus 
need not worry (QFr. 1.1.5).  His legateship with Pompey for the grain commission 
is mentioned explicitly at Scaur. 39, but two contemporaneous letters simply urge 
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Quintus to sail safely in December, and to mind his health in Sardinia (QFr. 2.1.3; 
2.3.7).  Balsdon, noting that Quintus is the only one of Pompey‘s 15 legates about 
whom we know anything, blames disinterest for the lack of further detail in the 
letters.
252
  Slightly more information is provided about Quintus‘ campaign with 
Caesar in Gaul, but here the focus shifts rather to Caesar than Quintus.  At Att. 4.18.5 
the two are credited with confecta Britannia, and at QFr. 2.16.4 Cicero waxes lyrical 
about Quintus‘ literary material: quos tu situs, quas naturas rerum et locorum, quos 
mores, quas gentis, quas pugnas, quem vero ipsum imperatorem habes!  The lack of 
concrete detail about the campaign supports Abbott‘s cynical assertion that Quintus‘ 
presence is the only reason the Gallic War is mentioned in the letters at all.
253
  This 
ambiguous treatment of Quintus‘ military record culminates in the references to his 
service as Cicero‘s legate in Cilicia.  Despite what must have been a demanding role, 
given Cicero‘s lack of experience, Quintus is mentioned only three times in a 
military capacity.  Two references concern his marching the army to its hiberna (Att. 
5.20.5; 5.21.14) and the other his leadership with Cicero of a cohort in the Amanus 
campaign.
254
  Significantly, this last reference occurs in a public letter, sent to Cato 
but meant as a public letter to be related to the Senate.  Yet, in Shackleton Bailey‘s 
words, ―it may not be an accident that Cicero nowhere expresses any appreciation of 
his brother‘s services in Cilicia.‖
255
  As we have already seen, Cicero also 
downplayed Cassius‘ contribution in repulsing the Parthians from Syria, emphasizing 
his own role instead.  As for the Civil War, Cicero never mentions Quintus‘ 
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127 
contribution to the Pompeian cause.  The nearest citation concerns a report in 47 
from Hirtius and Pansa that Quintus intended to join Caesar in Africa.
256
 
 When the narrative surrounding these terse citations is examined, Cicero‘s 
priorities – and perception of his brother as a military man – become clear.  In a 
word, Quintus is an extension of Cicero himself, and Cicero is anxious to avoid any 
discredit stemming from his brother‘s conduct.  The letter of guidance to Quintus in 
Asia concludes with a lengthy, if tactful, reproach of Quintus‘ bad temper, which 
Cicero writes is bringing ill repute to his accomplishments (esp. QFr. 1.1.44).  In 
response to Quintus‘ wish to return home from Gaul, Cicero reminds him that 
praesidium firmissimum petebamus ex optimi et potentissimi viri benevolentia ad 
omnem statum nostrae dignitatis,
257
 and warns him not to write anything that he 
would not like published (QFr. 3.6.2).  For a time both men had been engaged in 
writing epics on Caesar‘s British campaign – Cicero admits that Quintus is a better 
poet than him at QFr. 3.4.4 – but Quintus was diverted by his military duties, and the 
eventual disappointing outcome of Caesar‘s campaign rendered Cicero‘s poem 
unpublishable.  Yet the most illuminating references linking Cicero‘s political 
standing to Quintus‘ military conduct concern his role in Cilicia.  Compared to three 
references to Quintus in a strictly military capacity, there are five references to him 
as Cicero‘s potential successor in the province.
258
  Although Cicero admits that 
Quintus is the best candidate (Att. 6.4.1), the quaestor for 50, C. Coelius Caldus, was 
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ultimately selected when the threat of Parthian invasion evaporated (Att. 6.6.4).  We 
should not see in this decision any particular confidence in Quintus‘ military abilities 
so much as reluctance on Cicero‘s part to put his brother in a position that might 
reflect badly on both of them.
259
  It should perhaps be noted here that Quintus‘ 
political offices were won in the years of his brother‘s senior magistracies.  Wiseman 
sees the preparations for a bid for the consulship in Cicero‘s exhortations to Quintus 
to stay with Caesar in Gaul for the sake of their dignity.
260
  Certainly it is an 
attractive explanation for Cicero‘s exploitation of his brother‘s military contacts.  Yet 
even this interpretation suggests that Cicero may have misconstrued Quintus‘ 
political aspirations and consequently misjudged the ―help‖ he imagined he was 
giving to his brother.  The point to note is that Quintus was not Cicero‘s military 
proxy, but rather served a function very similar to that of the military protégés, 
whose ability and achievements bolstered Cicero‘s political aims in the Senate and 
forum.  If not the most brotherly of reasons to engage with Quintus‘ military career, 
it is nevertheless consistent with his general pattern of his interaction with military 
men of the time. 
 
Conclusion: perception and personalities 
 Cicero‘s relationships with contemporary military men were extremely 
varied, and underscore the complex interrelationship between the army and politics 
in the late Republic.  However, the role of political factors in determining how he 
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interacted with these men indicates that for him their military identities were 
secondary to their civic ones.  The soldiers, lacking direct political influence, fade 
into the periphery of Cicero‘s military awareness in favour of their commanders.  
These he interacts with in three distinct ways: his protégés provide the military 
acumen which is specially needed for his political agenda; his sponsors afford him 
the political protection of their own militarily-derived influence; and his inimici serve 
as examples of the abuse of military authority and endangerment of the state.  His 
relationship with his brother Quintus provides an intriguing case study of an 
unpolitical relationship which nevertheless emphasizes the political advantages to be 
gained from association with an accomplished military man. 
 This preoccupation with politics (that is, domestic concerns) highlights the 
limitations of Cicero‘s civilian perspective – not in terms of deficiencies in his 
understanding, but with regard to his opportunity to engage with these men in a 
strictly military capacity.  With the exception of Quintus, who served with him in 
Cilicia, all of the relationships examined in this chapter belong to the forum, Senate, 
or private life.  It may be noted in this connection that Cicero neither alludes to nor 
attempts to construct military personae for his contemporaries.  On the contrary, 
there are numerous indications that he did not view these men as ―military men‖ but 





Ciceronian military theory I: domi 
 
 The preceding chapters have examined the most direct forms of Cicero‘s 
engagement with military matters, demonstrating his participation in the militarized 
culture of his day.  Building on this foundation, the remaining chapters will explore 
the attitude which shaped the activity observed above, in order to gain a more 
nuanced appreciation of his civilian perspective.   
 We begin with a survey of his military theory in two chapters.  In the absence 
of large-scale theoretical discussions de re militari in the surviving corpus, the 
analysis will be as much a reconstruction as an assessment of ideas.  It may be noted 
here that Ciceronian military theory is not about science but ethics – a fitting focus 
for a commentator who had little first-hand experience of combat.  In light of the 
domestic focus of his career and writings, military matters domi are our starting 
point.  In addition to being mentioned more frequently in his speeches, treatises, and 
letters than their foreign counterparts, they are the subject of his most detailed 
theoretical discussions about military matters (esp. his theory of bellum iustum).  
Most noteworthy, however, is the prominence of civilian concerns in what ought to 
be military discourse.  This raises important questions about his conception of the 
place of the army in the state, and his priorities where civic and military interests 
coincide.  This chapter will examine his view by way of major themes in his remarks, 
evaluating them in context (historical, political, and rhetorical) and comparing his 
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ideas to similar expressions in contemporary literature in order to gauge his 
conformity with prevailing views. 
 The definitions of ―domestic‖ and ―foreign‖ that are used in this chapter and 
in Chapter 5 derive from the Latin binary phrase domi militiaeque.  For reasons that 
are unclear, the phrase is often translated as a purely civic/military dichotomy.
261
  
However, as Mommsen recognized, it denotes domestic and foreign spheres as 
distinct, complementary areas of activity.
262
  The use of militia to express ―foreign‖ 
evokes the ancient origins of the term, when Rome‘s foreign policy consisted of 
annual campaigns and military alliances.  Indeed, as Barton notes, the Romans had 
no concept of a peace/war dichotomy until the civil wars of the first century.
263
  Thus 
despite the overlap in personnel carrying out domestic and foreign administration in 
the late Republic – to say nothing of the dual civic and military responsibilities of the 
higher magistrates – domestic military matters can be discussed separately from 
foreign ones.   
 The legal constraints of the pomerium, the traditional boundary of the urbs 
Romana, are no impediment to this definition.  It was forbidden to carry weapons 
within the capital, and a general forfeited his imperium upon crossing the 
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 but the city was nevertheless the veritable command centre for the 
Roman army: it declared war and peace,
265
 and was the source of the commanders 
and imperium that made foreign campaigns possible.  Thus, although Rome was 
officially a demilitarized zone, it was not an unmilitary zone.  Nor could Cicero, even 
under the aegis of a civilian career, totally escape dealing with military matters as a 
senator and an advocate – as was shown in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 His conceptual engagement with these matters is demonstrated by a body of 
texts which show that he was very sensitive to the scope for domestic influence on 
military policy.  Instead of depicting a militarized home front, however, his 
comments construct a rather unmilitary ideal whereby military activity is evaluated 
according to civic criteria.  In the interest of clarity, military matters which are 
intimately connected with the city of Rome (as the location of activity or otherwise) 
or involve the army in a domestic capacity will be considered as domestic matters in 
this chapter.  Four such themes stand out in Cicero‘s writings and are the focus of 
this discussion: justice in warfare, the ideal commander, military gloria, and civil 
war.   
 His comments about these matters are concentrated in the speeches and 
treatises, specifically in speeches concerning military matters (esp. Leg. Man., Prov., 
Phil.) and the most political treatises (Rep., Leg., Off.).  As was noted previously, 
generic constraints considerably limited his scope for discussing military matters in 
his writings.  His theory is patchily developed and often presented as a tangent to 
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other matters.  Nevertheless, the quantity and level of detail of the remarks indicate 
the importance of these types of activity to Cicero and his audience, and there are 
indications that his views differed somewhat from prevailing attitudes or practice.  
For this reason it is particularly important to distinguish between rhetoric belonging 
to (and directly influenced by) a specific event, and rhetoric which is prompted by 
reflection after the fact.  Caesar‘s commentaries are the closest surviving equivalent 
of the former type of rhetoric, and will be used together with the histories of Sallust 
and Livy to provide literary context for Cicero‘s theory as a whole. 
 Following the trend observed in the previous chapters, his attitude towards 
domestic military activity reflects his primary conception of the army as a defensive 
force.  As will be seen, he was committed to the traditional procedures which 
directed military policy, but had serious reservations about the way in which they 
were applied in his day.  His distrust of political influence secured by military force 
is manifested in scepticism about his colleagues‘ eagerness for commands.  His 
unique position as a commentator in this period should be borne in mind in this 
connection: his is the only surviving eye-witness account by a participant who was 
aloof from the competition for commands.  As we saw in Chapter 3, Cicero was 
involved in – and in some cases, initiated – senatorial debates concerning military 
matters.  He also spoke at contiones in favour of laws concerning commands.
266
  Yet 
he declined a province after his consulship and was a reluctant governor in 51.
267
  
This background gives his writings a civilian perspective that is unrivalled in the 
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period, and offers an intriguing alternative discourse to the military – and largely 
foreign-focussed – narratives of Caesar, Sallust, and Livy.   
 
Justice in warfare 
 Justice in warfare receives the most attention of all the aspects of domestic 
military matters in Cicero‘s writings, and is the subject of his most technically 
detailed discussions.  As a result, his articulation of this theory – especially the 
concept of bellum iustum – has been well documented by modern scholars, albeit in 
an abstract way focussing more on Cicero as a representative of an established 
tradition than someone with his own philosophical agenda.  Whatever the reality of 
Roman bellicosity in the Republican period,
268
 the presence of such a complex – and 
evidently contested – theoretical framework confirms the importance of war in the 
Roman consciousness.  Although war itself is a foreign matter, this aspect of 
Cicero‘s theory belongs to the domestic realm because it is concerned with abstract 
conditions leading to or arising from war rather than combat proper. 
 There are three elements to Cicero‘s concept of justice in warfare: the 
motives for war, the rules of engagement, and the theory of just war (bellum iustum).  
The first element reflects the fact that war and peace were formally decided domi.  
Although Cicero mentions a number of specific reasons for declaring war, these can 
be reduced to two basic categories of wars for defence and wars for prestige.  
Defensive wars include those undertaken in self-defence (Rep. 3.35) as well as in the 
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defence of allies (esp. Leg. Man. 6, 14; Off. 2.26).  Wars for prestige concern gloria 
and imperium (Leg. Man. 6; Off. 1.38; 2.26), the preservation of economic and 
territorial interests (Leg. Man. 6; Off. 2.85), and revenge (Leg. Man. 11; Rep. 3.35; 
Off. 1.36).  That a war could be both defensive and prestige-based is shown by 
passages which link both motives.  However, there are three passages which suggest 
that Cicero viewed defence as the only acceptable motive for war.  The earliest of 
these is Rep. 3.34 (= August. CD 22.6), a fragment from Laelius‘ discussion of 
justice stating that nullum bellum suscipi a civitate optima, nisi aut pro fide aut pro 
salute.  The terms fides and salus correspond to wars in defence of allies and wars of 
self-defence, respectively.  The absolute – though idealistic – phrasing of the 
statement, combined with the either/or presentation of the motives, leaves no room 
for alternatives.  Unfortunately, the narrative surrounding the statement has not been 
preserved, and we cannot know why Cicero advocated these two motives in 
particular.
269
  Some insight is provided by the other two passages.  At Off. 1.35 and 
again at 1.80 he argues that war should only be waged for the sake of peace: ut sine 
iniuria in pace vivatur and ut nihil aliud nisi pax quaesita videatur, respectively.
270
  
The rationale in the former instance is that only beasts (beluarum, §34) resolve 
conflicts by violence; in the latter it is that reason (ratio decernendi) is of greater 
value than the courage (fortitudo) which leads to war.  The similarity of the 
arguments and their relatively close placement within the treatise suggest that this is 
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an urgent message Cicero wishes to broadcast.  It is tempting to read videatur in the 
latter passage as evidence that he accepted a degree of deception in the justification 
of wars; but as will be seen below and in Chapter 5, the idea of satisfying external 
observers is consistent with his concept of military ethics.  In a similar vein, the 
negative connotations of pax in a military context do not mean that Cicero condones 
wars of aggression.
271
  A more useful measure is his own practice in this treatise, 
which is his most mature philosophical work and contains the longest and most 
detailed account of military theory in the Ciceronian corpus (1.34-40, 80-1).  In a 
striking departure from his earlier habits, whenever defensive and prestige-based 
motives for war are mentioned together in the De officiis, the defensive motive 
precedes the prestige-based one (e.g. 1.35-8; 2.26; cf. Leg. Man. 6; Rep. 3.35).  The 
passages advocating war for the sake of peace are the culmination of this theme and 
fit well with Cicero‘s conception of the military as a defensive force. 
 Significantly, this view does not appear elsewhere in surviving contemporary 
literature.  Indeed, when compared to Caesar, Sallust, and Livy, Cicero‘s account of 
the reasons for waging war seems rather limited.  All of the motives mentioned by 
him are mentioned in their writings – along with many others that are not.  Kostial 
identifies seven objective and three subjective reasons for commencing warfare in 
her survey of Roman Kriegsgründe, most of which cannot be categorized as strictly 
defensive or prestige-based.
272
  According to her system, not even half of the motives 
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 Pax did not have the modern positive connotations of ―peace‖, but was a condition imposed on 
defeated enemies that signalled the end of hostilities.  See Woolf 1993; Barton 2007 and Rosenstein 
2007b, esp. 226-8.  All three studies are very general and lack the scope to account for Cicero‘s 
rhetoric specifically. 
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 Kostial 1995, 68-116 with sources.  The objective motives are Selbstverteidigung, Angriff auf 
römische Bundesgenossen, Vertragsbruch, Kooperation und Koalition mit dem Feind, Gewährung 
von Zuflucht für Feinde Roms, Vergehen gegen römische Bürger und römische Verbündete, and 
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for war which were operative in the late Republic are mentioned by Cicero.  Self-
defence, the defence of allies, and glory are the only full matches; the Ciceronian 
theme of revenge blurs Kostial‘s objective/subjective division because of its 
relevance to the material profits from punitive campaigns as well as redress for 
mistreatment of citizens or allies.
273
 
 Of course, it would be wrong to label Cicero‘s theoretical outlook deficient 
on the grounds of comparison with a modern compilation.  It will be noted that his 
references to motives for war come from three works only: his first political speech, 
the Pro lege Manilia (66); his first political treatise, the De re publica (54-51); and 
his last political treatise, the De officiis (44).  The references in the Pro lege Manilia 
are a natural consequence of the subject matter of the speech, and are concentrated in 
the sections describing the nature of the war (§§6-19) where they bolster the core 
argument that a general as illustrious as Pompey is needed to bring it to an end.  The 
references in the treatises are more abstract, although not without relevance to 
current events.  Book 3 of the De re publica concerns justice, but its many lacunae 
make it difficult to piece together Cicero‘s overall argument.  Against the backdrop 
of the military despotism of the triumvirate and Caesar‘s conquest of Gaul, however, 
it is possible to detect a critique of current practice: the discussion of military justice 
presents an ideal which highlights and condemns the injustice of present 
                                                                                                                                          
Vergehen gegen Gesandte.  The subjective motives are Beute (including als Entschädigung und 
Belohnung), Ruhm und Ehre, and Reale und neurotische Angst.  Cf. Albert 1980, 17-20. 
273
 Kostial cites Ver. 5.55, 58 as examples of the theme of Vergehen gegen römische Bürger und 
römische Verbündete, perhaps mistakenly because the passages concern Verres‘ mistreatment of the 
Sicilians and do not depict it as a motive for war.  Cf. Leg. Man. 11, which is also cited under this 




engagements – embodied most (in)famously by Crassus‘ Parthian campaign.
274
  The 
passage concerning motives for war is part of an explicit definition of bellum iustum, 
a central concept of Cicero‘s military theory which will be examined in detail below.  
The concept reappears in a similarly critical context in the De officiis, which was 
composed amid preparations for war with Antony.
275
  The placement of the 
discussion as the first major theme of the treatise indicates a preoccupation with 
military ethics – as well as an eagerness to transmit to the next generation (via his 
son Marcus, the dedicatee) his ideas about how and why war ought to be waged. 
 Against this backdrop, it is telling that the De officiis also contains Cicero‘s 
only discussion of rules of engagement.  His ideas are exceptionally well developed, 
and comprise the most detailed and, by virtue of the date of the treatise, most mature 
element of his military theory.  He begins with the injunction that maxime 
conservanda sunt iura belli (1.34) and proceeds to expound eight specific ideals 
using reason and exempla.  They are:  
1.  War must only be waged for peace (1.35) 
2.  Defeated opponents must be spared if they fought without cruelty (ibid.) 
3.  Peace should be made without treachery (insidiae) (ibid.) 
4.  People who have been conquered must be treated with consideration, and 
people who surrender must be protected (ibid.) 
5.  A just war (bellum iustum) must have clear demands and a formal 
declaration (1.36) 
6.  Only soldiers who have sworn oaths (i.e. are legally soldiers) may enter 
battle (1.37) 
7.  Wars for gloria or imperium must meet the conditions of just war and 
should be fought less fiercely than wars for survival (1.38) 
8.  Promises to enemies must be honoured (1.39; cf. 3.107, 108) 
 
We may add these further ideals from later on in the treatise: 
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 On Cicero‘s reaction to Crassus‘ Parthian campaign, see above, pp. 117-24 passim. 
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 See Att. 15.13a.2 (c. 28 Oct. 44); 16.11.4 (5 Nov.). 
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9.  War should not be avoided if it is beneficial (1.80) 
10.  War must be waged so that one is seen (videatur) to aim solely at peace 
(ibid.) 
 
It should first of all be noted that this theory is not all original – nor does Cicero 
claim that it is.  The outline of the treatise, as well as much of the theory expounded 
within it, is from Panaetius.
276
  At Off. 1.36 he notes that military law is prescribed 
by the fetial code: ac belli quidem aequitas sanctissime fetiali populi Romani iure 
perscripta est.  It is an intriguing reference to an institution which had long since 
lapsed,
277
 but consistent with authority he accords the ancient war-priests in the De 
legibus.  The fetials are the official interpreters of suscipiendo et gerendo et 
deponendo [sc. bello] ius in his ideal state (2.34), and responsible for declaring war 
and peace (2.21).   
 It seems likely, therefore, that Cicero was aware of the formalities of war and 
that his theory is consistent with it (e.g. rules 6 and 8).
278
  Yet the ethical theme of 
this discussion gives plenty of scope for interpretation and principle.  We have 
already seen how the first and tenth rules are unmatched in late Republican literature.  
The third rule is phrased as an opinion – mea quidem sententia paci quae nihil 
habitura sit insidiarum semper est consulendum (Off. 1.35) – which is implicitly 
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 See Off. 2.60; Att. 16.11.4.  In the former passage, Cicero notes that he is not merely translating 
Panaetius‘ ideas in his treatise: Panaetius quem multum his libris secutus sum non interpretatus.   
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 As Ogilvie 1965, n. to 1.32.5 notes, ritual had given way to pragmatism by the Second Punic War, 
as an adaptation to deal with distant wars against enemies who did not share Roman ius fetiale.  Legati 
empowered by the Senate took over the fetials‘ function of demanding redress (denuntiatio), calling 
the gods to witness (testatio), and declaring war (indictio) – all without the need to consult the Senate 
between stages.  On the ancient origins of the fetials, cf. Rep. 2.31, where Cicero says that Servius 
Tullius‘ new laws for the declaration of war incorporated existing fetial ceremonies.  For other 
attributions of the founding of ius fetiale, see Barnes 1986, 44.  On the fetial law itself and the 
procedure for declaring war, see esp. Rich 1976; Rüpke 1990, 97-117; Santangelo 2008 (with an 
excellent survey of relevant scholarship and debate on the matter in nn. 1 and 2). 
278
 According to Ilari 1985, 162-3, the concept of ius belli as a quasi-legal institution was unique to the 
Republican period and does not appear in literature from the Empire.  See e.g., Ver. 4.116; Phil. 5.25; 
Sal. Jug. 91.7; 102.13; Caes. BG 1.44; cf. Tac. Ann. 12.17.4. 
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linked to Caesar‘s domination of the state.
279
  According to Dyck, the distinction in 
the seventh rule between wars for gloria and imperium and those for survival is 
incompatible with Panaetius‘ outlook and therefore may be Cicero‘s own.
280
  A more 
obvious innovation is found in the fourth rule, which seems to be a direct 
contradiction of Caesar‘s example.  Whereas Caesar pledged to save the Aduatuci si 
prius quam murum aries attigisset se dedidissent (BG 2.32), Cicero says that 
surrender should be accepted quamvis murum aries percusserit (Off. 1.35) – a 
striking challenge to Caesar‘s legendary clemency.
281
  Possible novelty in the 
articulation of the bellum iustum theory in the fifth rule will be addressed shortly; it 
will suffice to note here that although we cannot determine the degree of originality 
in these aspects of Cicero‘s theory, the fact that it is broadly comparable to that of his 
contemporaries demonstrates a high level of engagement and makes him an 
authoritative commentator. 
 We may now examine his articulation of the theory of bellum iustum, as the 
culmination of his theory concerning justice in warfare.  Although the idea of just 
war was far older than Cicero (see e.g. Arist. Pol. 1333a35), he is arguably the most 
influential proponent of this aspect of it: his definition of just war was adopted by 
Isidore in his Etymologiae (18.1.2, 3 = Cic. Rep. 3.35) and subsequently enshrined in 
ecclesiastical law by the 12
th
-century Decretum of Gratian (2.23.1-3).
282
  As was 
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 Off. 1.35: In quo si mihi esset obtemperatum, si non optimam, at aliquam rempublicam, quae nunc 
nulla est, haberemus.  Cf. Walsh 2000, n. ad loc. 
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 Dyck 1996, n. to 1.38, alleging that Panaetius took a dim view of gloriae cupiditas.  Cf., however, 
Plut. Dem. 13.5-6 citing Panaetius‘ approval of action undertaken for the sake of to\ kalo/n.  At issue, 
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159-68. 
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 Cf. the rather vague imperative at Verg. Aen. 6.853: parcere subiectis et debellare superbos. 
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 Barnes 1986, 38.  Cicero‘s definition also influenced Augustine greatly.  See e.g. CD 22.6 and 
Mattox 2006, esp. 15-18. 
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mentioned above, this is the best-studied aspect of his military theory, yet it has 
largely escaped evaluation within its own historical and rhetorical context.
283
 
 Cicero refers to bellum iustum (or iniustum) in his writings throughout his 
mature career.
284
  Allowing for differences of genre, the appearance of the term in his 
writings is comparable to that of his contemporaries.
285
  However, only he and Livy 
give detailed accounts of the theory.  Whereas Livy‘s much longer version describes 
the fetials‘ ritualized procedure for declaring war (1.32.5-14), Cicero‘s is presented 
in a quasi-legal form as commands.  These occur in the De re publica and the De 
officiis in four passages.  Intriguingly, no two passages are alike, although three are 
broadly similar.  At Rep. 2.31 it is said that omne bellum quod denuntiatum 
indictumque non esset, id iniustum esse atque impium iudicaretur.  Justice derives 
from the proper observation of the fetial procedure, whereby reparations are ritually 
demanded and war declared if these demands are not met.
286
  It is the most traditional 
version of the theory in Cicero‘s writings.  At Rep. 3.35 (= Isid. Etym. 18.1.3) the 
conditions are given as denuntiatio, indictio, and rerum repetitio, a concept likely 
borrowed from Roman private law.
287
  Res repetitae are also mentioned in the final 
version of the theory at Off. 1.36: potest nullum bellum esse iustum nisi quod aut 
rebus repetitis geratur aut denuntiatum ante sit et indictum.  The function of aut in 
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 Div. Caec. 62; Cat. 2.1; Prov. 4; Deiot. 13; Phil. 13.35; Att. 7.14.3; cf. Inv. 2.70 (iuste); Leg. 3.9 
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 See Ramage 2001, 146 with sources. 
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 See Dyck 1996, n. to 1.36 ac belli quidem aequitas…. 
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this statement has been debated by scholars, but was most likely the result of 
―carelessness‖ – to use Dyck‘s word – in a treatise written very quickly.
288
  
Nevertheless, the segregation of the fetial procedures and the rerum repetitio is not 
inappropriate in a discourse on military theory, and may even indicate two rival 
systems for declaring war in the late Republic.   
 This brings us to the contradictory version of the theory, which occurs at Rep. 
3.35.  Note that no reference is made to the fetial procedures, in favour of reasons for 
going to war. 
 
Illa iniusta bella sunt quae sunt sine causa suscepta, nam extra 
<quam> ulciscendi aut propulsandorum hostium causa bellum geri 
iustum nullum potest.  (Rep. 3.35 = Isid. Etym. 18.1.2-3)  
 
The limitation of bellum iustum to wars for revenge and those for active self-defence 
is striking and must be read in the context of the events of the 50s.  Because the 
passage survives only in Isidore‘s testimonia, we cannot know how or whether 
Cicero qualified this statement in the surrounding discussion: it is also possible that 
nam signals Isidore‘s gloss and is not part of the original Ciceronian text.  It is 
tempting to see divine overtones in this reference to justice, in accordance with the 
original principle that just wars were those which the gods approved.  This increases 
the force of the implicit critique of contemporary practice in a manner consistent 
with Cicero‘s practice in his public speeches.
289
  Isidore tells us that this passage 
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preceded the more traditional one cited above, which suggests that this 
unconventional definition of bellum iustum was Cicero‘s priority.  The fetial 
procedure had already been mentioned in Book 2, so it needed only a brief mention 
in Book 3 to contextualize the proposed modifications.   
 The implications of this passage have puzzled scholars who have tried to 
create a composite account of Cicero‘s theory of bellum iustum.  Michel and Ilari 
read it as evidence that Cicero‘s concept of military justice was broader than the 
dictates of the fetial code.
290
  Barnes makes it an overarching qualifier in his four-
point summary of Cicero‘s theory: 
 
―[Pour Cicéron] une guerre est juste seulement si (i) elle est notifiée à 
l‘avance, et (ii) elle est formellement déclarée, et (iii) elle sa rapporte 
à une demande de réparation, et (iv) son but se limite ou à l‘expulsion 




Both of these interpretations ignore the effect of time and experience on Cicero‘s 
outlook, however.  Barnes goes so far as to argue that Off. 1.36 represents Cicero‘s 
unique theory – as expressed in the De re publica – masquerading as the fetial 
formula.
292
  Apart from the fact that Off. 1.36 makes no reference to revenge and the 
repulsing of enemies, aggression is generally downplayed in this iteration of his 
theory in favour of a defence- and process-oriented attitude towards warfare (esp. 
Off. 1.35; cf. 1.38 on not fighting wars for gloria or imperium as fiercely as those for 
survival).  Of greater significance is the placement of the definition of bellum iustum 
after the demand that war should only be fought for the sake of peace.  In the same 
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way that the promotion of a narrow view of justice makes sense against the historical 
backdrop of the triumvirate, so the identification of justice with peace and defence 
make sense in the aftermath of one bloody civil war and on the verge of another.   
 Because Cicero‘s version of the theory of bellum iustum is the only one 
surviving from his time, it is difficult to gauge his conformity with contemporary 
attitudes.  Livy mentions bellum iustum but rarely qualifies it (e.g. 9.8.6; 42.47.8).  
Sallust does not use the term, but his references to Rome‘s obligation to defend its 
allies (e.g. Cat. 6.5; Jug. 14.7, 19; 24.2) indicate the existence of a proprietary code 
governing the conduct of war.  Caesar, on the other hand, actively engages in self-
justification of his foreign campaigns: Book 1 of the De bello Gallico makes much of 
his protection of his province and Roman allies (esp. 11.3; 14.1, 33.2).  Bearing in 
mind that these are extremely situation-specific and indirect references to justice in 
warfare, it is safe to say that Cicero was as concerned with justice as his 
contemporaries and had a similar conception of it.   
 Cicero‘s concept of justice in warfare is characterized by respect for 
traditional procedures and a preoccupation with ethical considerations.  Although the 
majority of his ideas are not unique, they are important as a real point of contact 
between him and his more military-minded contemporaries.  His less conventional 
attitude towards the desirability of war reaffirms his primary view of the army as a 
defensive force and hints at the reservations about empire which will be explored in 




The ideal commander   
 Once the decision to go to war had been made, it remained for the Senate (or 
People) to appoint a commander.  The debates which attended this decision 
emphasized the personal and professional merits of the particular candidates, usually 
with an eye to the rewards a successful campaign could bring – most notably the 
honour of a triumph.  Cicero‘s aloofness from the competition for commands makes 
his concept of the ideal commander particularly valuable; but the fact that his views 
are only articulated in speeches about specific commanders introduces a bias that 
complicates the analysis considerably.  This section will attempt to isolate the private 
ideal within these very public speeches, identifying central themes and assessing the 
rhetoric in its historical and political context. 
 It is ironic that this extremely well documented aspect of Ciceronian military 
theory is also the least properly theoretical, due to the nature of the relevant passages.  
The absence of any abstract discussion about the ideal commander in the corpus 
raises important questions about Cicero‘s interest in the matter.  It is tempting to 
suggest that his rhetoric simply reflects contemporary ideas about what made a good 
general, and that he had no independent concept of an ideal commander.  Although 
his arguments were certainly calculated to appeal to his audience (and thus secure the 
appointment of his candidate), it would be wrong to think that he had no views on the 
subject.  This not only contradicts the engagement with military matters that was 
observed in the previous chapters but also overlooks the significance of his support 
for a considerable number of extraordinary commands.  Indeed, as will be seen, the 
impression that emerges from his advocacy of extraordinary commands is that the 
 
146 
ideal commander was the right man for the job – according to civic criteria as well as 
military ones. 
 We begin with his concept of the ideal commander as it is revealed in his 
advocacy of commands for Pompey, Caesar, Octavian, Brutus, and Cassius,
293
 as 
well as from a short passage denouncing Verres as a commander.  This last reference 
is the only one not to concern an actual command, and therefore serves as a standard 
against which to assess the other references.  At Ver. 5.25, Cicero uses a catalogue of 
exemplary commanders to draw attention to Verres‘ shortcomings in that field.
294
  
The qualities of the ideal commander are given as sapientia, celeritas in re gerunda, 
consilium, ratio, disciplina, vis, and virtus.  All are traditional virtues, and their use 
in the context of a catalogue of exempla seems to signal a conventional reckoning of 
the attributes of an ideal commander.  The examples – Maximus, the Scipiones 
Africani, Paulus, and Marius – are among the most frequently mentioned military 
men in the Ciceronian corpus, and appear elsewhere with numerous other traits.
295
  
Their association with these qualities, in a speech that was never delivered, should 
represent an objective ideal of the ideal commander, since the aim of the passage is 
simply to demonstrate that Verres is not one. 
 The remaining passages are best examined in chronological order to 
appreciate the development of Cicero‘s rhetorical strategy fully.  The Pro lege 
Manilia contains the most elaborate account of the ideal commander, epitomized by 
the theory of the summus imperator.  Three separate sets of criteria are used to 
describe this ideal and to demonstrate Pompey‘s suitability for the command of the 
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Mithridatic War.  Because the criteria have clearly been selected to correspond to 
Pompey‘s attributes, the resulting argument is rather self-fulfilling to modern ears; 
but this need not mean that Cicero was simply parroting conventional views.  It will 
be argued that his own priorities can be detected in the unexpected inclusion of 
civilian criteria.   
 The first set of criteria emphasizes military attributes: ego enim sic existimo, 
in summo imperatore quattuor has res inesse oportere, scientiam rei militaris, 
virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem (§28).  Only virtus is repeated from the Verrine 
passage, although auctoritas is a conventional virtue.  The inclusion of felicitas is 
significant because this is one of only four favourable references to military felicitas 
in Cicero‘s writings.
296
  Given that this is a contional speech and that Pompey‘s 
success had made him a popular hero, this nod to luck may be a concession to the 
people‘s reverence for Pompey as a divinely favoured figure.
297
  Scientia rei 
militaris, on the other hand, softens an unavoidable critique of Lucullus‘ aptitude for 
command, especially when read with the second set of criteria: neque enim solae 
sunt virtutes imperatoriae quae volgo existimantur, labor in negotiis, fortitudo in 
periculis, industria in agendo, celeritas in conficiendo, consilium in providendo 
(§29).  These attributes are more conventional (the list format may indicate a 
rhetorical topos), yet they are presented as counterparts to military virtue, rather than 
as military virtues in their own right.  This is even more the case for the third set of 
criteria, which concerns explicitly unmilitary qualities: 
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Non enim bellandi virtus solum in summo ac perfecto imperatore 
quaerenda est sed multae sunt artes eximiae huius administrae 
comitesque virtutis. Ac primum quanta innocentia debent esse 
imperatores, quanta deinde in omnibus rebus temperantia, quanta fide, 
quanta facilitate,  quanto ingenio, quanta humanitate!  (Leg. Man. 36) 
 
Torelli reads this passage as a criticism of contemporary commanders, but 
particularly of Lucullus, whom Pompey would supersede as a result of this speech.
298
  
This does not, however, fit with the friendly relationship between Cicero and 
Lucullus that was observed in Chapter 3.
299
  Even so, the dominant theme of self-
restraint is certainly a critique of prevailing attitudes towards provincial 
administration, whereas the emphasis on congeniality suggests a stereotype of 
boorish generals.  If we take ingenium to mean intelligence as well as talent, we have 
an ideal commander that is not dissimilar to the composite portrait of Scipio 
Aemilianus in Cicero‘s writings: a man of exceptional military skill, personal 
probity, and learning, who is a credit to the Republic in all that he does.
300
 
 Cicero‘s rhetorical construction of the ideal commander changes drastically 
after the Pro lege Manilia.  His recommendation of Caesar in the De provinciis 
consularibus and of Brutus and Cassius in the Philippics is based almost entirely on 
objective-sounding, situation-specific criteria.  In the De provinciis consularibus, 
highly flattering accounts of Caesar‘s exploits in Gaul bolster primary arguments 
concerning the instability of the region and the need for a consistent policy (esp. 
§§19, 32-5; cf. 47).  This is the context of Cicero‘s other favourable reference to 
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military felicitas, which, although outwardly positive, is undermined by the fear-
mongering of its preface:  
 
Impolitae vero res et acerbae si erunt relictae, quamquam sunt accisae, 
tamen efferent se aliquando et ad renovandum bellum revirescent. 
Qua re sit in eius tutela Gallia cuius fidei virtuti felicitati commendata 
est. (Prov. 34-5) 
 
Whereas Pompey‘s personal qualities recommended him for the Mithridatic War, 
Caesar is recommended by the situation in Gaul, and specifically by his past 
performance there.  In fact, there is so little strictly personal material in Cicero‘s 
advocacy of Caesar that his arguments could be applied to any commander who had 
been successful in the area.
301
 
 The criteria used to recommend Brutus and Cassius in the Tenth and Eleventh 
Philippics, respectively, make an instructive comparison.  Despite the fact that an 
entire speech is devoted to each man‘s command, the most concrete attributes 
referred to are imperium, auctoritas, and copiae (Phil. 10.9; 11.26).  The imperium is 
dubious, since it derived from their status as praetors and not a military command; 
auctoritas simply expresses their influence in Macedonia and Syria, respectively, 
where they had won over armies to the senatorial cause (cf. nomen, Phil. 11.26, 35); 
and copiae recalls the pragmatic criteria applied to Caesar‘s Gallic command.  
Although these qualities are substantiated by short attendant descriptions of both 
men‘s military success and devotion to the Republic, their records are less important 
as points of argument than the need to crush Antony‘s threat by all means available.  
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Cassius is not even recommended specifically – his attributes are introduced by 
means of hypothetical musing: expedito nobis homine et parato, patres conscripti, 
opus est.
302
  At the end of this passage, Cicero concedes that either Brutus or Cassius 
would be a good choice for the command against Dolabella – but stresses that 
because Brutus is already engaged, Cassius should be chosen.  It should be noted that 
this prioritization actually contradicts the values at Leg. Man. 50, where being on 
hand and armed is said to be of secondary importance to ceterae summae utilitates – 
that is, the personal attributes of the summus imperator.    
 Finally, we have Cicero‘s promotion of Octavian in the Fifth Philippic.  
Although the speech predates the Tenth and Eleventh Philippics, its rhetoric is less 
developed, and it serves as an end-point on the Ciceronian continuum of definitions 
of the ideal commander.  Like Caesar, Octavian is depicted as a commander already 
in possession of a command which he should be permitted to keep (§45).  Like 
Brutus and Cassius, he is recommended less on his own merit than according to the 
urgent threat to national security.  His past conduct is discussed in more detail than 
Brutus‘ or Cassius‘ (§§42-4, 46), but this is chiefly to bolster Cicero‘s claims that the 
young man talem semper fore civem qualis hodie sit qualemque eum maxime velle 
esse et optare debemus (§51).  The most problematic criteria, however, are those 
applied directly to the command: demus igitur imperium Caesari s<i>ne quo res 
militaris administrari, teneri exercitus, bellum geri non potest (§45).  This one-sided 
argumentation completely depersonalizes the debate, making the fact that he has an 
army Octavian‘s greatest attribute (cf. Phil. 11.20).  To be fair to Cicero, his 
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 Phil. 11.26.  Cf. the emphasis on readiness at 11.35: Paratum habet imperatorem C. Cassium… nec 
paratum solum sed peritum atque fortem. 
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rhetorical strategy worked and Octavian‘s command was sanctioned; but from a 
theoretical standpoint, he was promoting the war rather than the general. 
 Clearly Cicero‘s method of identifying an ideal commander changed during 
the course of his career.  His shift from personality-based arguments to situation-
specific ones is striking, and difficult to evaluate in the absence of surviving 
speeches by other public figures.  The historical context of his speeches goes some 
way towards explaining this shift, however.  The speeches featuring impersonal 
arguments were delivered in the Senate and after his consulship.  We saw in Chapter 
3 that his attitude towards contemporary military figures was determined by his 
political relationship with them.  His relationship with Caesar, Brutus, and Cassius 
was well known by the time he spoke for them; the strength of his advocacy for 
Octavian effectively bound him to the young man.  Because of this sponsorship 
dynamic, Cicero needed to downplay his personal stake in his support for these 
men‘s commands, in order not to seem to be favouring them out of partisanship.
303
 In 
contrast, his support for Pompey‘s command was relatively safe, since he was not yet 
an established political figure.  As Berry notes, ―[the] law would doubtless have been 
passed whether or not Cicero advocated it, but by publicly associating himself with 
it, and with Pompey, Cicero helped to ensure that he would have the political support 
necessary to secure… the consulship.‖
304
  The importance of maintaining one‘s 
political standing is demonstrated by frequent attestations in the De provinciis 
consularibus of friendship with Caesar (esp. §§23-5, 40-3).  Both Quintus and 
Trebatius were serving with Caesar in Gaul, and we may imagine Cicero being as 
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11.36; Ad Brut. 1.15.7; 1.16.1.  Cf. Leg. Man. 60-3, where Cicero attacks Catulus for inconsistency, 
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anxious not to do anything to incur the general‘s wrath against them as he was not to 
have his brother do anything that would reflect badly on him.
305
 
 Despite variations in Cicero‘s description of the ideal commander, there are 
indications of his personal view.  The criteria which remain constant echo the 
attitude towards military service as a form of patriotism as was seen in Chapters 2 
and 3.  The ideal commander is first and foremost a defender of the state; he is also a 
leader with proven ability, and is ideally intelligent and principled as well.  The 
unmilitary qualities praised at Leg. Man. 36 seem to reflect an independent 
Ciceronian ideal that mirrors his concern with civic administration.
306
  With the rise 
of military despotism, however, it was no longer publicly tenable and had to be 
abandoned.  A tantalizing clue to the irregularity of civic-based criteria appears at 
Fam. 15.4.14, where Cicero, appealing to Cato to support his triumphal ambitions 
following his victories in Cilicia, notes that Cato often gave priority to the personal 
merits of a commander rather than his achievements in the field when deciding such 
matters.  This would not have needed mention if it were common practice; indeed, 
Cicero‘s entire appeal is predicated on the uniqueness of Cato‘s customs and 
interests (esp. §§12-16). 
 This brings us to Cicero‘s attitude towards extraordinary commands.  His 
support for these controversial commands raises important questions about his 
perception of them, since they were regarded at the time as dangerous, and are cited 
by modern scholars as a key factor in the fall of the Republic.
307
  The central issue is 
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tipo di capo militare.‖  
307
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definition of ―extraordinary‖ and against viewing the late Republic as an unbroken series of these 
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the exceptional empowerment of a single commander under unusual circumstances – 
whether with unspecified geographic range, like Pompey‘s Mithridatic command and 
Cassius‘ proposed command against Dolabella; for an extended period of time 
(prorogatio), like Caesar‘s Gallic command; or to a privatus who had not yet started 
the cursus, like Octavian.  To this list we may add the senatorial appointment of 
Brutus, because it circumvented the normal procedure of awarding extraordinary 
commands by tribunician lex.
308
  The Romans were always wary of giving too much 
power to a single person because of the scope for abuse on the model of the kings of 
old.  Unfortunately, the prestige of an extraordinary command – in particular, its 
promise of triumph-worthy combat – made it extremely attractive politically.  Nor 
was every commander content to disband his army when his command expired.
309
  
The key to understanding Cicero‘s support for these commands is his rebuttal of 
counter-arguments.  As will be seen, this reveals a pragmatic flexibility that may 
have been unique. 
 The clearest statement of the argument against extraordinary commands 
occurs in the Pro lege Manilia, where the misgivings of Catulus and Hortensius are 
cited and overturned.  Two lines of reasoning are employed: Hortensius argues that 
the command would concentrate too much power in one man (§52), whereas Catulus 
says that it would make the state too dependent on Pompey (§59).  The similarity of 
                                                                                                                                          
commands (esp. 295-7).  Intriguingly, Cicero is the only late Republican author to use the term 
extraordinarium imperium with any regularity.  See Leg. Agr. 2.8; Dom. 18; Sest. 60; Prov. 19; Phil. 
3.23, 11.17; Att. 5.9.11; Ad Brut. 1.4a.3; 1.10.3; 1.17.6; cf. Caes. BG 1.32.2 (in self-defence).  Other 
terms which are generally accepted as cognates (e.g. maius imperium) appear more frequently. 
308
 See Manuwald 2007, n. to Phil. 5.45 demus igitur… optimo, which applies equally to Brutus‘ as 
well as Cassius‘ situations. 
309
 Levick 1982, 58 describes the situation well: ―... great generals on returning to Rome would not be 
happy to sink back as consulars into equality with stay-at-home lawyers and orators.‖  Plut. Pomp. 21 
and App.  BC 1.121 record fears that Pompey would not disband his army when he returned from the 
East.  Sulla‘s example was something of a bogeyman until Caesar superceded him in 49.   
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the arguments shows that the concentration of power was the real issue; Catulus‘ 
more gracious wording reflects his favour with the People, who loved Pompey.
310
  
The concentration of power is also the chief contention in the other relevant 
speeches, apart from the problematic harangue at Phil. 11.17, where extraordinary 
commands are condemned as populare atque ventosum and inconsistent with nostra 
gravitas.  Yet it must be remembered that extraordinary commands were for the 
People to award, and that to turn the matter over to the comitia would be to delay the 
prosecution of the war and risk another candidate being awarded the command.
311
   
 In all cases, Cicero‘s strategy for promoting the extraordinary command is to 
emphasize the particular demands of the situation.  He opposes Hortensius‘ 
arguments as out of date (§52), and forgetful of the safety Pompey which brought to 
the state as a result of his extraordinary command against the pirates (§§53-8).  
Extrapolating from this success, Cicero claims that another extraordinary command 
is appropriate.  Against Catulus‘ caution, he advises his audience to take full 
advantage of such a qualified commander (§59), reminding them of Rome‘s 
traditional conservatism in peace and ingenuity in war (§§60-2).  The division of the 
speech into discussions of the nature of the war (§§6-19), its magnitude (§§20-6), 
and the choice of commander (§§27-48) reflect secondary sources of opposition to 
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 Cicero also makes much of the fact that Hortensius opposed Pompey‘s command against the 
pirates (Leg. Man. 52-3). 
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 Cf. Phil. 11.21-5.  Cicero is guilty of some inconsistency with this passage, since Cassius‘ 
command as it is presented in the decree is extraordinary.  See esp. §30: …quamcumque in 
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Servilius – which Cicero opposes – is extra ordinem (§25).  The terminology may be important: 
Cicero never calls Pompey‘s or Caesar‘s commands ―extraordinary‖ in the speeches for them, 
although they are called imperium. 
 
155 
the command: why an extraordinary command is needed in the first place, and why it 
must go to Pompey.   
 The key situation-specific arguments for Caesar, Brutus, Cassius, and 
Octavian have already been examined above and need not be repeated here.  Of 
greater interest is Cicero‘s handling of the fear attending the proposal for an 
extraordinary command.  It is most prominent in the De provinciis consularibus – 
naturally, given concerns about Caesar‘s activity in Gaul and whether he would 
return to Rome peacefully.  Although the matter at hand was not the granting of an 
extraordinary command per se – this had been done three years earlier by the lex 
Vatinia
312
 – the proposals being debated entailed such drastic changes to its terms 
that Cicero was effectively defending the original command.   He explains Caesar‘s 
lack of urgency about returning to Rome as a desire to finish his work in Gaul. 
 
Nam ipse Caesar quid est cur in provincia commorari velit, nisi ut ea 
quae per eum adfecta sunt perfecta rei publicae tradat? Amoenitas 
eum, credo, locorum, urbium pulchritudo, hominum nationumque 
illarum humanitas et lepos, victoriae cupiditas, finium imperii 
propagatio retinet. Quid illis terris asperius, quod incultius oppidis, 
quid nationibus immanius, quid porro tot victoriis praestabilius, quid 
Oceano longius inveniri potest? (§29; cf. §§30, 35) 
 
By making the demand for Caesar‘s return seem ridiculous, Cicero neatly deflects 
the allegation of greed implicit in surrounding references to honours (including a 
triumph).  Conversely, by depicting Caesar as especially devoted to the Republic, 
Cicero is able to depict anything less than prorogatio as unpatriotic.  The 
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vulnerability of his position is revealed by his reliance on the themes of the sanctity 
of tribunician law, the mos maiorum and national security in his rebuttal of the 
proposals themselves (§§36-8).  Reassigning the Gauls to the consuls, or limiting the 
duration of Caesar‘s command, were reasonable preventative measures against his 
power; but neither could be implemented without overturning the lex Vatinia (which 
forbade premature reassignment of Cisalpina and Illyricum), thus setting a dangerous 
precedent that was obviously motivated by fear. 
 Fear of Brutus and Cassius centred on their identity as tyrannicides.  Both 
men had had to flee Rome in the aftermath of the Ides, forsaking their duties as 
praetors.  In defiance of Antony‘s reallocation of provinces, they went to Macedonia 
and Syria, respectively, and recruited soldiers to the Republican cause.  It was only 
natural for Cicero‘s opponents to present both men as potential war-mongers who 
could not be trusted.
313
  Calenus‘ proposal to take Brutus‘ legions away from him 
(Phil. 10.6) is countered with a review of Brutus‘ character (Phil. 10.7-9) which 
leads to a striking identification of Brutus with the Republic: tenet igitur res publica 
Macedoniam, tenet Illyricum, tuetur Graeciam.
314
  The recommendation of Cassius 
follows the same lines, but with disturbing results.  In what must have been an effort 
to demonstrate that Cassius would serve the Republic without being asked, Cicero so 
emphasizes his initiative as to make him seem dangerously uncontrollable.  Cassius 
has been his own Senate (Phil. 11.27), and makes his own laws: 
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 See esp. Phil. 10.14-17 and the dismissal of the veterans‘ complaints at Phil. 11.37-9.  See also 
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 Phil. 10.14.  Cf. Phil. 10.12: omnes legiones, omnes copiae quae ubique sunt rei publicae sunt. 
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Huic igitur legi [sc. a numine deorum] paruit Cassius, cum est in 
Syriam profectus, alienam provinciam, si homines legibus scriptis 
uterentur, eis vero oppressis suam lege naturae. (Phil. 11.28)  
 
A subsequent recapitulation of his military record (Phil. 11.35), ending with the Ides 
of March (maximam eius et singularem laudem) does little to soften the effect.  As 
has already been mentioned,
315
 Cassius is virtually ignored in Cicero‘s rebuttal of the 
proposals under debate, although his anxiety that Cassius be given the command can 
be detected.  More than any other factor, Cicero‘s failure to allay the fears of his 
audience in this speech caused his proposal to fail. 
 Finally we have Octavian, who was feared because of his age.  Despite the 
precedents of young commanders adduced by Cicero at Phil. 5.48, the fact remained 
that Octavian was a teenager, too young for elected office, and yet at the head of an 
illegal army.  Cicero‘s strategy to overcome this was to emphasize the demands of 
the situation.  Thus the justification for the proposal of imperium and honours of 
propraetorian status: qui honos quamquam est magnus illi aetati, tamen ad 
necessitatem rerum gerendarum (Phil. 5.45).  In §§47-51 Cicero attempts to sidestep 
the legal issues by invoking the precedent of very ancient times, before the advent of 
the leges annales.
316
  In a manner reminiscent of his promotion of Pompey, he 
extrapolates Octavian‘s current loyalty into a promise of future exemplary conduct 
(§50).  To drive his point home, he pledges himself as Octavian‘s guarantor (§51) – 
evidently the ―argument‖ which won the day.     
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 When evaluating Cicero‘s advocacy of extraordinary commands and his 
definition of an ideal commander, it must be remembered that his arguments were 
heard rather than read.  Thus, even though many of them ring hollow to modern ears, 
they did appeal to contemporary sensibilities and were overwhelmingly successful.  
His manipulation of the facts to suit his agenda demonstrates an unexpectedly 
flexible attitude towards extraordinary commands especially – but opportunism is not 
always a vice.  His support of Caesar was predicated on antagonism towards Piso and 
Gabinius (esp. Prov. 2, 8-9, 17), but it was also consistent with the political climate 
and with his desire to cultivate an alliance with the triumvirs (see esp. Att. 4.5.1-3).  
Brutus and Cassius‘ antagonism towards Antony was unquestionable, and Cicero 
could be certain of their trustworthiness because of his friendship with them.  
Octavian‘s army was the only standing force available on the Kalends of January 43.  
Finally, his high hopes in Pompey were entirely borne out by the general‘s defeat of 
Mithridates and settlement of what became the eastern provinces – and the political 
goodwill resulting from his support of the command duly led to his election as consul 
for 63.  The fact that many of Cicero‘s arguments in favour of extraordinary 
commands incorporate the qualities attributed to the ideal commander in his mature 
speeches highlights the importance of military experience and aptitude in popular 
opinion.  His willingness to put the demands of the situation before convention 




                                                 
317
 Berry 2006, 109 traces Pompey‘s subsequent career and concludes that ―…even though the 
[R]epublic was in due course to collapse, Cicero‘s judgement in 66 that Pompey should be appointed 




Military gloria   
 The gloria deriving from military success was extremely important in the late 
Republic, particularly because of the public status that attended it.
318
  This is what 
drove the intense competition for commands, and ultimately catalyzed the military 
dynasts‘ consolidation of political and military power.  Cicero‘s treatment of military 
gloria reflects these developments in a way which suggests a rather ambivalent 
attitude towards it: he acknowledges military gloria as a valuable political and social 
attribute, but also promotes a distinctly unmilitary concept of ―true‖ gloria as if to 
challenge the prevailing military associations of gloria.  This section will investigate 
his concept of military gloria and evaluate it in its historical context.  It will also 
examine how military gloria fits into his broader understanding of gloria.   
 His attitude towards triumphs, the most concrete manifestation of military 
gloria, provides a convenient preliminary test-case for his theory.  The triumph was a 
highly ritualized and symbolic victory celebration in which the commander re-
entered the city at the head of a parade of soldiers, captives, and booty.
319
  As a ritual 
event, it represented the return to peace, and the transmission of the triumphator‘s 
dynamis (to use Versnel‘s word) to the city for the community‘s welfare – hence, 
according to Versnel, the unusual privilege for the triumphator of retaining his 
military imperium after crossing the pomerium.
320
  The sheer scale of the procession, 
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which included dramatic re-enactments of the victory, also made it an important 
spectacle, focussing all attention on the triumphator.
321
   
 Triumphs (and the lesser related honours of ovations and supplications) were 
almost an annual occurrence during Cicero‘s adult life, and were celebrated in 
increasingly lavish style.
322
  Yet of the more than thirty triumphs, supplications, and 
ovations decreed between 88 and 43, only six are discussed by Cicero in any detail in 
his surviving works.  These are the triumphs of Sulla over Mithridates (81); Pompey 
over King Hiarbas of Numidia (79); Lucullus over Mithridates and Tigranes (63); C. 
Pomptinus over the Allobroges (54); and Lepidus over Narbonese Gaul and Nearer 
Spain (43); and the supplicatio of Bibulus over Syria (50).
323
  Although the honours 
progressively receive more mention from Cicero, this does not reflect growing 
interest on his part.  He was responsible, as consul, for awarding Lucullus‘ triumph – 
a good turn which put Lucullus in his debt and led to his soldiers voting Murena into 
the consulship while they were in Rome (Mur. 37-8, 69).  His support for Lepidus‘ 
triumph (and gilt equestrian statue, Phil. 5.41) was similarly motivated, whereas his 
attention to Pomptinus stemmed from his regard for the man as one of the praetors 
involved in the ambush of the Catilinarian conspirators.  Bibulus‘ supplicatio, on the 
other hand, is mocked because Cicero believed that it was undeserved and unduly 
overshadowed his own victories as governor of neighbouring Cilicia.
324
  Thus, his 
attention to these awards can be directly attributed to an immediate personal or 
political impetus for calling attention to the honour.   
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 Where this is not the case, his citations function simply as reference points, 
whether chronological (e.g. the triumph of Spinther at Att. 5.21.4) or exemplary (esp. 
the lists at Pis. 44, 58, 62).  The latter type of references tend to focus on the prestige 
deriving from a triumph, rather than on the event itself.  Thus we have the oblique 
reference to Pompey‘s three triumphs and maximarum rerum gloria (Div. 2.22; cf. 
Balb. 9, 16), and the description of Isauricus‘ triumph as gratissimus and 
iucundissimus to the Roman people (Ver. 5.66).  The attendant emphasis on names 
rather than battle details anchors the discussion in the domestic, political realm.  This 
is also how Sallust treats triumphs (e.g. Cat. 30.3-4; Jug. 114.3), whereas Livy, in his 
intact books, often focusses on the senatorial debates and circumstances which led to 
the awarding of triumphs.
325
  Because Cicero‘s references are entirely context-
driven, however, they cannot be organized into themes and consequently reveal little 
about his attitude towards this manifestation of military gloria.  His reticence is 
much more suggestive, indicating lack of interest in the triumph as a ritual or 
spectacle, and reluctance to engage with victories that gave rise to it.   
 That he nevertheless acknowledged the importance of the triumph is shown in 
his abstract references to the ceremony.  At Ver. 5.66 he praises it as a show of 
Rome‘s superior strength: ...nihil est victoria dulcius, nullum est autem testimonium 
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 Esp. 2.17.6-7 (Sp. Cassius Vicellinus in 502); 3.70.14-15 (L. Quinctius Cincinnatus in 458); 
36.39.4-40.10 (P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica in 191).  See also Beard 2007, 58, 76-80 on factual 
problems with Livy‘s narrative, including his tendency to import the sensitivities of the first century 
into his descriptions of events in the middle Republic.  By contrast, the periochae emphasize the 
battles which led to triumphs.  Curiously, only two of Pompey‘s triumphs (§§89, 103) and all of 
Caesar‘s (§§115, 116) are mentioned.  The campaigns of the other triumphators of the period are 
generally noted, although the words triumphus/triumphare are not used.  Triumphs are not mentioned 
in Caesar‘s commentaries, as is appropriate for a work with an external focus.  Cf. BAfr. 22.3 where 
Caesar‘s continuator alludes to Pompey‘s first triumph.  Although  not strictly contemporary, 
Velleius‘ history makes an instructive parallel to Cicero‘s and Sallust‘s writings because he also 
emphasizes the domestic experience of the triumph.  See e.g. 2.30.2, 40.4 (Pompey); 2.34.2 (Lucullus 
and Metellus Creticus); 2.56.1-2 (Caesar).   
 
162 
victoriae certius quam, quos saepe metueris, eos te vinctos ad supplicium duci 
videre.  The surrounding narrative makes it clear that he is representing the ―bread 
and circuses‖ definition of importance.  By contrast, elite priorities are reflected in 
the surprisingly detailed discussion of social standards pertaining to the triumph at 
Pis. 56-62.  Here, in the course of condemning Piso‘s indifference to the honour, 
Cicero states that triumphal ambitions are the only acceptable pretence for desiring a 
provincial command (§56) and that the honour of a triumph must not be refused, 
even if the command itself had been unwelcome:  
 
Nam ut levitatis est inanem aucupari rumorem et omnis umbras etiam 
falsae gloriae consectari, sic est animi lucem splendoremque fugientis 





 The implications of falsa gloria and iusta gloria in a military context will be 
addressed shortly.  Nisbet rightly notes that Cicero‘s estimation of rectitude is based 
on the Aristotelian mean;
327
 but what is perhaps more interesting is how this self-
centred ethical focus makes no mention of socio-political consequences.  In 211 Cn. 
Fulvius Flaccus was exiled for refusing his triumph, a punishment which Versnel 
explains in terms of the triumphator withholding his dynamis from the 
community.
328
  Cicero‘s emphasis on the individual‘s moral character may reflect 
changing perceptions of place of the triumph in the community in the first century – 
a view further supported by his final precept.  At Pis. 62 he suggests that triumphs 
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are not the rewards of high-profile wars only, citing the example of M. Pupius 
Piso.
329
  The rhetorical advantages of contrasting the Piso who claimed not to want a 
triumph against the Piso who sought one against the odds are obvious; but they do 
not account for the inclusion of this theory fully.  Established laws stipulated that 
triumphs could only be awarded if the commander had killed at least 5000 enemies 
in a single engagement.
330
  Assuming that Pupius Piso had met this requirement, his 
eligibility should not have been in question.  Thus Cicero seems to advocate criteria 
based on merit rather than the traditional measures – a perspective which may 
explain his sense of entitlement for his victories as governor of Cilicia. 
 Cicero‘s concern about the worthiness of the triumphator is also reflected in a 
body of references to (allegedly) undeserved or unachieved honours.  Piso‘s dubious 
distinction of being the only consular governor of Macedonia not to be awarded a 
triumph is mentioned three times in the In Pisonem (§§38, 55, 97; cf. §44).  At Prov. 
14 the Senate‘s refusal to grant Gabinius a supplicatio is construed as proof of 
Gabinius‘ moral deficiency and treachery.
331
  In the following sections he is 
compared unfavourably to T. Albucius (propr. Sardinia c. 104), whose failure to 
attain a supplicatio after celebrating a mock-triumph in his province ended his 
career.
332
  By contrast, Cicero‘s criticism of Bibulus turns on his alleged 
exaggeration of his achievements: si [sc. a Bibulo] ea gesta essent quae scripsit, 
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gauderem et honori faverem (Att. 7.2.6; cf. Fam. 2.17.7).  Arrogance and 
complacency makes these men unworthy of honours which are in turn degraded by 
association with them and others like them.  It is worth noting in this connection that 
Sallust also complains about triumphs having become the rewards for corruption 
(Jug. 41.7), and describes the nobility flaunting their triumphs quasi ea honori, non 
praedae habeant.
333
   
 This cynicism is critical background to his definition of military gloria, 
which is developed in references scattered throughout his writings.  Drexler and 
Mazzoli both note several instances of gloria belli and gloria victoriae in his 
writings, but their primarily lexicographical focus makes Cicero‘s interest seem 
rather abstract.
334
  The vast majority of his references to military gloria are personal 
– that is, acknowledging the military gloria of an individual as an innate quality.  
Pompey, Crassus, Caesar, Plancus, Decimus, Brutus, Cassius, and a handful of 
exemplary figures are all recognized as possessing military gloria, normally in 
connection with victories although the gloria of the figures belonging to the civil war 
with Antony derives from their militant patriotism.
335
  He also praises the military 
gloria of the Roman people, often in connection with empire (esp. Leg. Man. 11, 12; 
Mur. 22).  This dual focus on individual and national gloria is consistent with the 
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 Jug. 31.10, in the speech of C. Memmius in favour of sending L. Cassius Longinus (cos. 107) to 
mediate with Jugurtha.  The remarks belong to their late second-century settings, but Sallust‘s 
bitterness suggests that they also reflect concern about contemporary corruption. 
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 See Drexler 1962, 12-14 and Mazzoli 2004, 68.   
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 For Pompey‘s military gloria see Ver. 5.5; Leg. Man. 27, 67; Flac. 29, 30; Balb. 13, 16; Deiot. 12; 
Att. 2.21.3; Fam. 1.9.11; 9.9.2.  For Crassus‘ see Ver. 5.5.  For Caesar‘s see Prov. 29; Marc. 7, 25-6; 
and n.b. that Cicero wrote a poem about Caesar‘s British expedition.  For the figures involved in the 
civil war of 44-43, see Fam. 10.3.3; 10.5.2, 3; 10.12.5; 10.13.2; 10.14; 10.19.2 (Plancus); Fam. 11.5.3 
(Decimus); Ad Brut. 1.12.1 (Brutus); and Fam. 12.7.1 (Cassius).  For the exemplary figures, see Rep. 
2.13 (Tullus Hostilius); Tusc. 2.59; Div. 1.51 (the Decii); Tusc. 5.56 (Marius and Catulus); and Vat. 
28; Rep. 1.18; Tusc. 1.110; Brut. 84 (the Scipiones Africani). 
 
165 
writings of Caesar, Sallust, and Livy and therefore demonstrates a comparable 
conception of its value and place in society.
336
 
 This is where the similarities end, however, since although Cicero praises 
individuals and the Roman People for possessing military gloria, he is not at all 
complimentary about it as an abstract concept.  It is true that he recommends a 
military career as the prima commendatio ad gloriam at Off. 2.45; but in the first 
book of the treatise he cautions Marcus against gloriae cupiditas and specifically 
warns him not to seek military authority.
337
  This is the culmination of the idea 
expressed in the comparison of iusta and falsa gloria at Pis. 57 (quoted above), and 
has the same ethical implications: there are proper sources of gloria which benefit 
the state, and gloria must not be sought from improper sources as an end in itself.  
This principle is also at the heart of Cicero‘s theory of vera gloria, which can be seen 
as a direct attack on contemporary attitudes towards military gloria.  The earliest 
reference to true glory is at Sest. 139, where it is closely identified with patriotism 
and altruism: 
 
Qui autem bonam famam bonorum, quae sola vere gloria nominari 
potest, expetunt, aliis otium quaerere debent et voluptates, non sibi.  
Sudandum est iis pro communibus commodis, adeundae inimicitiae, 
subeundae saepe pro re publica tempestates: cum multis audacibus, 
improbis, non numquam etiam potentibus dimicandum.   
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 On the military gloria of an individual, see e.g. Caes. BG 7.50; Sal. Jug. 7.1; Liv. 1.31.8; 2.43.11; 
4.24.3; cf. Caes. BG 3.24.; 8.19 concerning military gloria shared by an army.  On the military gloria 
of the Roman people see esp. Liv. prae. 7; cf. Caes. BG 7.1.8; 8.6.2; Sal. Cat. 53.3 concerning the 
military gloria of other nations. 
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The passage is part of a long exhortation to the next generation to pursue gloria for 
the right reasons (§§136-43; cf. 51, 102).  That he is proposing something unusual is 
indicated by his careful wording, which is unequivocal but also inspiring.  A similar 
exhortation in the Somnium Scipionis links the pursuit of true glory with rewards in 
the afterlife: speaking of hominum gloria, Africanus tells Aemilianus to let ipsa 
virtus lead him ad verum decus and depicts this glory as a higher calling than 
cultivating one‘s earthly reputation.
338
  The uniformity of his expression nearly ten 
years later confirms the importance of this concept of gloria to him.  At Off. 2.31 he 
states that summa et perfecta gloria derives from the love, trust, and respectful 
admiration of the People.  The following discussion about how to secure these three 
conditions for glory makes no reference to military exploits but focusses instead on 
personal qualities which are distinctly relevant to civic activity: willingness to confer 
beneficia (§32), justice and good sense (§§33-5), and virtue (§37-8).  The discussion 
concludes with the instruction that qui igitur adipisci veram [iustitiae] gloriam volet, 
iustitiae fungatur officiis (§43).  The link between duty and true glory is reminiscent 
of the earlier descriptions of vera gloria, as is the firmness of his language.  Precisely 
what he meant by duty is clarified in the Fifth Philippic, where vera gloria is again 
described in terms of patriotic service: 
 
Ea natura rerum est, patres conscripti, ut qui sensum verae gloriae 
ceperit quique se ab senatu, ab equitibus Romanis populoque Romano 
universo senserit civem c[l]arum haberi salutaremque rei publicae, 
nihil cum hac gloria comparandum putet. (§49; cf. 50) 
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 Rep. 6.29.  It should be noted that Cicero‘s use of virtus also contradicts the traditional Roman 
construction of virtus as courage or manliness (esp. in a military context).  On the changing meaning 
of virtus in this period, see McDonnell 2006. 
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There is no denying that such an ethically-based, civic (re)definition of gloria suited 
Cicero‘s civilian career particularly well; but the fact that he invokes it to motivate 
others rather than draw attention to himself certainly indicates anxiety about the 
domestic consequences of unbridled military-focussed ambition.   
 In his survey of Cicero‘s use of gloria, Jal identifies civil war – in particular, 
growing acceptance of it as a necessary evil in the quest for power – as the impetus 
for the redefinition of gloria.
339
  According to him, Cicero‘s aim was to refute the 
idea that gloria could derive from exploits in civil war.  Hence, we may imagine, his 
failure to mention any of Caesar‘s Civil War triumphs.  However, the greater 
argument was that gloria resulted only from ethically-waged wars such as followed 
the theory of bellum iustum.  This also accounts for the scorn he pours on Piso and 
Gabinius as corrupt commanders and, by extension, bad citizens.  There are 
tantalizing hints in the letters from the war against Antony that Cicero‘s 
correspondents shared his civic-based conception of gloria.  Plancus speaks of 
winning gloria in the context of doing his utmost pro rei publicae salute (Fam. 
10.11.3) and laments Octavian‘s refusal to cooperate following the deaths of the 
consuls as abandoning tanta gloria (Fam. 10.24.6).  Similarly, P. Cornelius Lentulus 
Spinther expresses hope that gaining gloria in the war will allow him plus prodesse 
rei publicae (Fam. 12.14.7).  Sallust actually mentions vera gloria, but with the 
cynicism of another cycle of civil war‘s worth of historical hindsight: instead of 
being praised, it is cited as the root of the civil wars of the late Republic because it 
initiated conflict (Jug. 41.10). 
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 Jal 1963a, esp. 45-6.  Jal organizes Cicero‘s references to gloria into two groups based on tone: 
those which are positive are generally early (until the Pro Archia) whereas those which are negative 
(i.e., against cupiditas gloriae) are generally late.   
 
168 
 To conclude this section it will be useful to return to the actual celebration of 
military gloria.  It should be noted that although Cicero challenges the criteria for 
gloria, he never undermines its social or political importance.  On the contrary, he 
supports its function as a reward for good service and praises gloria won according 
to traditional procedures.  However, the triumph in the first century was no longer a 
solemn manifestation of Rome‘s prowess, but a celebration of the powerful general 
as a celebrity in his own right.  We know that Cicero disliked the spectacle of games 
(esp. Fam. 7.1.2, 3), so we need not be surprised at his reticence about the tangible 
aspects of military gloria.  For the intangible elements, like for so much of his 
attitude towards military matters, his perception is anchored in an idealized view of 
citizenship wherein military service is an extension of one‘s patriotic duty.  
 
Civil war 
 This brings us to civil war as the last and most extreme type of domestic 
military matter discussed by Cicero.  Although rarely an urban event, civil war 
belongs to the domestic sphere rather than the foreign one because of the internal 
nature of the conflict.  It literally defined the late Republic, and is accordingly well 
represented in Cicero‘s writings.  However, because the topic was so fraught with 
social and political controversy, his comments yield a particularly distorted view of 
his theory.  Political exigency demanded a complementary tone when speaking 
before the victor and his partisans, but traditional ideology held that civil war was an 
abomination and worse than any peace (e.g. Att. 7.14.3; 7.15.2; 9.6.7).  Overall, 
Cicero‘s treatment of civil war conforms to the prevailing understanding of ―civil‖ as 
pertaining exclusively to Roman citizens; but his rhetoric during the conflicts with 
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Catiline and Antony reveals a more nuanced definition in which citizenship is not the 
sole criterion.    
 This theory must be read in light of the civil war/external war binary that 
operated in the ancient world.  The earliest surviving definition is from Plato, who 
states that e)pi\ me\n ou]n th|= tou= oi)kei/ou e)/xqra| sta/sij ke/klhtai, e)pi\ de\ th|= tou= 
a)llotri/ou po/lemoj (Rep. 5.470b).  The equivalent Latin terms are bellum civile 
and bellum, respectively, which also express a distinction based on citizenship.  
There is no surviving definition from the Republican period, but Isidore‘s description 
invoking Sulla and Marius may preserve a contemporary account.
340
  According to 
him, civile bellum est inter cives orta seditio et concitati tumultus, sicut inter Syllam 
et Marium, qui bellum civile invicem in una gente gesserunt (Etym. 18.1.3).  That the 
criteria for civil war were not widely understood at the time is demonstrated by 
considerable disagreement in the ancient sources about which Republican and early 
Imperial conflicts were civil wars.
341
  This includes two Ciceronian lists at Cat. 3.24 
and Phil. 8.7.  Both passages enumerate four civil wars since the 80s – a period for 
which modern reckoning counts up to twice that number.  At Cat. 3.24 the wars 
between Sulla and P. Sulpicius Rufus (88), Octavius and Cinna (87), Sulla and the 
Marians (83-82), and Lepidus and Catulus (78) are cited.  At Phil. 8.7 the war 
between Caesar and Pompey takes the place of that between Lepidus and Catulus, 
and there is no mention of Catiline.  As will be seen below, the exclusion of Catiline 
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 As was seen above, Isidore quotes Cicero for his definition of bellum iustum.  Caes. BC 2.29.3 
mentions civile bellum genus, but the passage is corrupt and the meaning cannot be reconstructed.   
341
 Jal 1963c, 43 surveys the sources, most of which focus on wars of the Empire.  Serv. Ad Buc. 4.13 
starts with Antony at Mutina whereas ad Aen. 6.832 includes the war between Caesar and Pompey.  
Suet. Aug. 9.2 also mentions bellum Mutinense.  The fullest list is given by Ampel. Lib. Mem. 40.4 
and includes Sulpicius versus Sulla, Lepidus versus Catulus, Caesar versus Pompey, Octavian versus 
Sex. Pompeius, Octavian versus Brutus and Cassius, and Octavian versus Antony and Cleopatra.  Cf. 
Rosenberger 1992, 40-2 on civil wars and violence in the last century of the Republic. 
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is consistent with Cicero‘s strategy to depict that conflict as a full-blown external 
war.  The omission of Lepidus, on the other hand, was certainly a concession to his 
son, who was still nominally supporting the Senate against Antony at this time.  Most 
importantly, the consistent exclusion of the Social War and the uprisings of Sertorius 
(83-72) and Spartacus (73-71) suggests that Cicero understood civil war as a contest 
between Roman combatants of equal political status, regardless of where the fighting 
took place. 
 Cicero‘s acceptance of this criterion is reflected in his use of the term bellum 
civile, which is only applied to the conflicts enumerated in the above lists and for the 
war with Antony.
342
  The fact that it is usually unmodified is a sign of tact – although 
Cicero condemns civil warfare in unequivocal terms, his criticism tends to accrue to 
the instigator of the war and not the war itself (esp. Phil. 13.1-2, quoted below).  The 
most surprising use of bellum civile is in the so-called Caesarian speeches.  Given 
that Cicero is pleading the case of Pompeians to Caesar himself, a euphemism might 
have been expected.  Yet the conflict is repeatedly called bellum civile and even 
bellum.
343
  The latter usage amount to a statement of fact, albeit an emotive one.  
Cicero‘s letters from the Civil War also refer to the conflict as bellum in this way, as 
do those of his correspondents.
344
  Significantly, this included Caesar (Att. 9.16.2), 
who also acknowledged that the conflict is bellum civile in his commentary (BC 
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 See e.g. Tusc. 5.56; Div. 2.53 (Sulla versus Marius); below, n. 343 (Caesar versus Pompey); Phil. 
8.8 (Antony). The conflict with Catiline is never called bellum civile.  Although relevant, the terms 
seditio and tumultus are omitted from this study because they are not inherently military words and 
because Cicero does not use them in a consistent way. 
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 Bellum civile: Marc. 18, 24; Lig. 28; cf. Marc. 12, 29.  Bellum: Marc. 10, 13, 14, 15, 23, 24, 31; 
Lig. 2, 3, 4, 7, 35; Deiot. 13; cf. Deiot. 7, 27, 37 (regarding Deiotarus‘ service in Roman wars 
generally), 25 (bellum Africanum). 
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 E.g. Att. 9.1.3; 9.6.7; 9.9.2; 9.10.2; 9.11a.2; Fam. 16.11.2; cf. Att. 9.2a.3.  For letters to Cicero 
describing the conflict as bellum see e.g. 9.7a.1 (Balbus and Oppius); 9.7b.2 (Balbus); 9.10.4 (quoting 
Atticus).   
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1.67.3; 2.29.3; 3.1.3).  We may therefore conclude that the term was not 
automatically offensive.  It is the term of choice in Livy‘s periochae for the years 49-
45 (Per. 109-16), and Sallust also uses it to describe the disorder attending the 
Catilinarian conspiracy (Cat. 16.4; 47.2). 
 Bellum civile was not the only means of describing a civil war, however.  
Cicero‘s more subtle allusions to internal conflicts further confirm his acceptance of 
the citizenship criterion by what they attempt to disguise.  This chiefly concerns the 
words bellum and hostis, which properly belong to external wars but were evidently 
standard rhetoric (or invective) even in civil ones.  With the conspicuous exception 
of references to Catiline and Antony in the Catilinarians and Philippics, respectively, 
Cicero suppresses these terms when discussing civil war in his public speeches.
345
  
Thus the list of civil ―wars‖ at Cat. 3.24 is actually a list of civilis dissensiones, and 
Sulla‘s first civil war is referred to as rei publicae status desperatus (Font. 6; cf. Har. 
18).  At Flac. 1, the conflict with Catiline is called gravissimus atque acerbissimus 
rei publicae casus.  In a variation on this strategy, euphemisms are sometimes 
substituted for bellum.  Caesar‘s civilis victoria is praised at Deiot. 33, and Sulla is 
called victor in reference to Italy at Leg. Man. 30.  Discreet language did not 
preclude criticism of civil war or its consequences, however: 
 
Dissensit cum Mario, clarissimo civi, consul nobilissimus et 
fortissimus, L. Sulla; horum uterque ita cecidit victus ut victor idem 
regnaverit. Cum Octavio conlega Cinna dissedit; utrique horum 
secunda fortuna regnum est largita, adversa mortem. Idem iterum 
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 Cf. Div. 1.4 where the war between Octavius and Cinna is called Octaviano bello.  Because the 
reference serves as a chronological point of reference, the use of bellum does not contradict the 
patterns observed in the speeches.  Conversely, because the perjorative use of bellum at Phil. 14.23 is 
clearly context-driven (Cicero is giving examples to show that supplicationes are not awarded in civil 
wars), it also poses no problem to this interpretation. 
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Sulla superavit; tum sine dubio habuit regalem potestatem, quamquam 
rem publicam reciperarat. (Har. 54) 
  
In a similar vein, Livy‘s epitomator describes Sulla‘s return in 88 simply as L. Sylla 
civitatis statum ordinavit (Per. 77).  According to Cicero, even Caesar claimed that 
the Civil War was not bellum but secessio, and that both he and Pompey were chiefly 
interested in the welfare of the state (Lig. 19).  If we accept Hutchinson‘s suggestion 
that Lucretius‘ De rerum natura was written during or after 49, the patriai tempus 
iniquum referred to in the proem (1.41) is another such veiled allusion.
346
  These 
omissions and evasive manoeuvres reflect the stigma attached to involvement in civil 
war and demonstrate that it was not easily dispelled. 
 Cicero‘s avoidance of the term hostis required even more delicacy due to the 
word‘s significance in the context of civil war.  Although it was a stock invective 
term, it was also the word used to condemn citizens as public enemies at the start of 
civil wars.
347
  Cicero‘s refusal to describe Catiline, Antony, and their associates as 
anything other than hostes during their respective conflicts will be addressed below 
as a significant anomaly.  More usually, he simply side-stepped the issue, as in this 
description of Pompey‘s victories: 
 
Testis est Italia quam ille ipse victor L. Sulla huius virtute et subsidio 
confessus est liberatam; testis est Sicilia quam multis undique cinctam 
periculis non terrore belli sed consili celeritate explicavit; testis est 
Africa quae magnis oppressa hostium copiis eorum ipsorum sanguine 
redundavit; testis est Gallia per quam legionibus nostris iter in 
Hispaniam Gallorum internicione patefactum est; testis Hispania quae 
saepissime plurimos hostis ab hoc superatos prostratosque conspexit; 
testis iterum et saepius Italia quae, cum servili bello taetro 
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 See Hutchinson 2001. 
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 On the political significance of the term in the late Republic, see esp. Jal 1963b. 
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periculosoque premeretur, ab hoc auxilium absente expetivit, quod 
bellum exspectatione eius attenuatum atque imminutum est, adventu 
sublatum ac sepultum.  (Leg. Man. 30) 
 
Only the African and Spanish campaigns were proper external wars, and so they 
alone are associated with hostes.  In 81 Pompey defeated King Hiarbas of Numidia, 
and in 72 he crushed Sertorius‘ uprising.  Although to modern eyes both conflicts 
had elements of civil warfare – Hiarbas was allied with a Marian, and Sertorius was 
Roman – the foreignness of the opposing armies was key.  By contrast, Pompey‘s 
Sicilian campaign was against the consul Carbo, and his Gallic one against 
indigenous peoples who were nominally allies of Rome.  We have already seen how 
victor L. Sulla is an allusion to civil war; the wording of the sentence concerning 
Sicily applies equally to Pompey‘s efficiency against the pirates, and was certainly 
meant to be ambiguous.  The overall effect is similar to his strategy of emphasizing 
the foreignness of the allies in the Social War, which is a strategy also employed by 
Caesar in his commentaries.
348
 
 The uniformity of Cicero‘s references to the canonical civil wars of the first 
century highlights the disconnection with his treatment of the conflicts with Catiline 
and Antony.  It should be noted at this stage that the Catilinarian conspiracy is often 
not considered a civil war by modern scholars.
349
  The conspiracy as it seems to have 
been planned originally was an urban event, focussed on assassinating senators and 
setting the city on fire in order to create panic (esp. Cat. 1.7; 4.4).  However, when 
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 The Social War is variously called the Marsic War (after the leading tribe, e.g. Phil. 8.31; Div. 
1.99; 2.54), the Italian War (e.g. Arch. 8; Har. 18; Pis. 87; Fam. 5.2), and the Latin War (e.g. Div. 
1.55).  Caesar emphasizes the bellicosity of non-allied states with terms such as bellum Helvetiorum 
(BG 1.30.1) and bellum Germanicum (BG 4.16.1), and by using personal names, e.g. bellum 
Ambiorigis (BG 6.5.1; 6.29.4).   
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 Rosenberger 1992, 42-3 discusses the conflict as bellum civile only by way of collating ancient 
references to it. 
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Catiline joined forces with the peasant army of C. Manlius, what might have been a 
dissensio turned into bellum requiring the dispatching of senatorial armies to defend 
the Republic‘s interests.  By contrast, Antony‘s march north with the consular armies 
was a more obviously bellicose action, and the battles which followed were on a 
much larger scale than Catiline‘s last stand outside Pistoria.  In addition to the 
rhetoric, these two episodes are separated from the other civil wars mentioned by 
Cicero because he was in a position of leadership during both, and therefore 




 His rhetoric indicates that this perception was predicated on a belief that 
extreme misconduct automatically resulted in the forfeit of one‘s citizenship.  Thus 
even though Catiline, Antony, and a significant number of their partisans were 
Roman citizens, Cicero felt able to regard them as proper hostes waging bellum 
against the Republic.  This attitude is best observed in his use of these key terms in 
the formative speeches of both conflicts – that is, the first two Catilinarians and first 
six Philippics, which were delivered (or circulated, in the case of the Second 
Philippic) before the Senate committed itself to war and record the initial 
impressions which inspired his controversial pro-war policy.
351
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 On military features in Cicero‘s leadership during these conflicts, see below, pp. 261-85.  On his 
relationship with Antony as a military inimicus, and for a more detailed description of Antony‘s 
conduct during the civil war, see above, pp. 120-1. 
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 The First Catilinarian was delivered on 7 November and the Second on 8 November (Berry 2006, 
302-3 against the conventional dating of 8 and 9 November, respectively; see most recently Dyck 
2008, 243-4).  The Senate committed itself to war when Catiline and Manlius were declared hostes in 
the middle of the month.  The first six Philippics were delivered during 2 September 44-3 January 43, 
at which point the Senate committed itself to war by adopting Cicero‘s motions to sanction opposition 
to Antony and levy troops.  The post-commitment speeches show signs of rhetorical restraint, as 
Cicero fought maintain forward momentum amid growing unease about the implications of his total 
war policy.  See below, pp. 261-85 passim.  
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 The sheer frequency with which hostis is used is surprising in itself because it 
is clearly meant to anticipate the Senate‘s official decree.  Catiline is condemned 
three times as the leader of an enemy camp (Cat. 1.5, 27; 2.15) – despite the fact that 
Manlius was its commander at the time and the senatus consultum ultimum of 21 
October had been passed against him.  Antony is similarly denounced as a hostem 
populi Romani (Phil. 3.14) and even compared unfavourably to Hannibal (Phil. 
5.25).  So-called ―disjunctive‖ references, which exploit the hostis/civis dichotomy as 
well as a hostis/consul one, further emphasize his treachery.  For example: 
 
Nam si ille [sc. Antonius] consul, fustuarium meruerunt legiones quae 
consulem reliquerunt, sceleratus Caesar, Brutus nefarius qui contra 
consulem privato consilio exercitus comparaverunt. Si autem 
militibus exquirendi sunt honores novi propter eorum divinum atque 
immortale meritum, ducibus autem ne referri quidem potest gratia, 
quis est qui eum hostem non existimet…  (Phil. 3.14; cf. 4.2, 5, 8) 
 
Even references which do not explicitly reject Catiline and Antony‘s citizenship 
contribute to their marginalization as external enemies.  A handful of instances which 
make no mention of citizenship seem to echo political invective, but the gravity 
imparted by the war context must be borne in mind.
352
  The implications of patria 
must equally be taken into account for references to hostis patriae (e.g. Cat. 1.33; 
Phil. 2.1, 2; 4.5), which can only denote a citizen.  Most striking are passages which 
explicitly acknowledge Catiline and Antony‘s citizenship in order heighten the 
contrast between their actions and the expected conduct of citizens.  At Cat. 2.28 
Cicero states that although the conspirators have made themselves hostes, he will 
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 Cf. Jal 1963b, 69; Novielli 1996, 209-10 (regarding the same strategy at Phil. 13.1-7); contra 
Nisbet 1961, 196, who argues that invective terms such as hostis were ―too trite to have much 
meaning.‖     
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allow them to leave Rome unmolested quia nati sunt cives (cf. §29).  The effect of 
the contrast in this passage is even more damning:  
 
Nos ad civem mittimus ne imperatorem populi Romani, ne exercitum, 
ne coloniam circumsedeat, ne oppugnet, ne agros depopuletur, ne sit 
hostis.  (Phil. 5.27) 
 
The force of bellum in these speeches is entirely consistent with that of hostis.  As 
was mentioned above, both Catiline‘s and Antony‘s activity is always denounced as 
bellum.  Significantly, it is never bellum civile, although the term is used to describe 
the Civil War of 49 (e.g. Phil. 2. 23, 47, 70, 72) and in hypothetical statements about 
the consequences if war is delayed (esp. Phil. 5.5).  It occurs most frequently without 
any modifiers, making it seem to be mere invective.
353
  However, when these 
references are read together, a theme of external warfare emerges.  In the same 
section where Cicero accuses Catiline of being a dux belli futurus (Cat. 1.27), he also 
posits this surprising distinction between bellum and latrocinium: tantum profeci, 
cum te a consulatu reppuli… ut id quod esset a te scelerate susceptum latrocinium 
potius quam bellum nominaretur.  The contrast expresses a fundamental distinction 
between legitimate warfare waged by a consul and Catiline‘s illegal, private activity.  
Yet it will be noted that the distinction is one of title only, since Catiline‘s privatus 
status is cited as the sole criterion for latrocinium.  Antony‘s bellum is compared 
with dissensio to similar effect:   
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 E.g. Cat. 1.27; 2.13, 14, 24; Phil. 2.1; 3.2; 4.8; 5.1, 3, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 33, 45, 53; 6.1, 2, 7, 
15.  Cf. Fam. 5.1 (Q. Metellus Celer to Cicero); Sal. Cat. 26.5 regarding Catiline‘s activity as bellum 
and Att. 15.4.1 (May 44) accusing Antony of planning bellum in Gaul. 
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Sentiet <s>ibi bellum cum re publica esse susceptum…. nisi forte 
Caesaris partis a Pansa et Hirtio consulibus et a filio C. Caesaris 
oppugnari putamus. Hoc vero bellum non <est> ex dissensione 
partium… (Phil. 5.32) 
 
A few sections later he is described as planning non solum cum exercitu suo sed 
etiam cum omni immanitate barbariae bellum inferre nobis (Phil. 5.37).  The animal 
reference reinforces the marginalization implicit in the rejection of dissensio, 
associating the conflict with external, full-blown warfare by default.  The polarity is 
imperfect, but strong under the circumstances.   
 That Cicero actively disregarded citizenship in his definition of these 
conflicts is further demonstrated by his use of adjectives with bellum.  Although all 
of these can either be translated as ―civil‖ or have strong domestic overtones, they 
are used in a way that emphasizes the internal location of the conflict rather than 
citizenship.  This can be seen in the most complex example:   
 
Atque haec omnia sic agentur, Quirites, ut maximae res minimo 
motu… bellum intestinum ac domesticum post hominum memoriam 
crudelissimum et maximum me uno togato duce et imperatore sedetur.  
(Cat. 2.28; cf. 1.23; 2.1, 11) 
 
The two adjectives intestinum ac domesticum make this the strongest expression of 
civil war in these speeches, but one which must be read in light of Cicero‘s self-
representation as the togatus dux et imperator.  In Steel‘s words, ―Rome was, of 
course, an entirely demilitarised area and could only be saved by a togate 
protector.‖
354
  The superlatives crudelissimum and maximum, considered by Dyck to 
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 counterbalance the image of a calm crisis at the 
beginning of the passage, confirming the magnitude of this domestic threat.  Jal notes 
that although bellum domesticum/intestinum and bellum civile are used 
interchangeably by some (mostly late) authors, there is evidence that bellum civile 
was considered to be a separate type of war.
356
  Conversely, adjectives such as 
crudele, insidiosum, horribile, and nefarium stress treachery as could only be 
committed by an insider.  Thus Catiline‘s activity is condemned as hoc horribile 
bellum ac nefarium (Cat. 2.15; cf. 1.25), and tantum et tam insidiosum bellum (Cat. 
2.28) whereas Antony‘s is denounced as bellum nefarium contra aras et focos (Phil. 
3.1) and tantum bellum, tam crudele, tam nefarium (Phil. 3.3; cf. 6.2). 
 The most revealing indication of Cicero‘s conception of these conflicts is 
given in two inconspicuous passages which require an understanding of his rhetorical 
strategy to be understood fully.  At Cat. 2.1 Cicero claims that palam iam cum hoste 
nullo impedimente bellum iustum geremus.  Dyck denies that this is a reference to the 
theory of bellum iustum, arguing instead that it denotes ―proper‖ war as opposed to 
intrigue.
357
  However, in light of the rhetorical strategy outlined here, and given that 
civil wars were never just by definition, it is not impossible that this reference was 
meant to invoke the external frame of reference of just war.  Similarly, when the 
conflict with Antony is presented as a choice between honesta pax and bellum 
necessarium at Phil. 5.2 we should recall Off. 1.35 (where pax sine iniuria is the only 
motive for war) and apply that external perspective.
358
  Cicero was well aware that 
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his terminology, and the course of action it represented, was contentious.  His 
description of the detrimental effect of his use of hostis and bellum in the Philippics 
must have applied equally in 63, making it unlikely that his use of such inflammatory 
language was purely for show.
359
   
 Of course, any assessment of Cicero‘s conception of civil warfare based on 
these speeches must take into account the relationship between rhetoric and belief.  
The effect of his use of military rhetoric during these conflicts is discussed in detail 
in Chapter 6.  Here it will suffice to note that the attitude expressed by this rhetoric 
can be detected in his comments about the canonical civil wars.  The fury of his 
denunciation of Sulla, Marius, Octavius, Cinna, Carbo, and Caesar at Phil. 13.1-2 is 
the best example: 
 
Nam nec privatos focos nec publicas leges videtur nec libertatis iura 
cara habere quem discordiae, quem caedes civium, quem bellum 
civile delectat, eumque ex numero hominum eiciendum, ex finibus 
humanae naturae exterminandum puto. Itaque sive Sulla sive Marius 
sive uterque sive Octavius sive Cinna sive iterum Sulla sive alter 
Marius et Carbo sive qui alius civile bellum optavit, eum detestabilem 
civem rei publicae natum iudico.  Nam quid ego de proximo dicam… 
Nihil igitur hoc cive, nihil hoc homine taetrius, si aut civis aut homo 
habendus est, qui civile bellum concupiscit.  
 
Only in the Eighth Philippic, once the crisis was underway, does Cicero begin to 
term the conflict with Antony bellum civile, probably as a concession to 
conservatives who would not abide condemning a citizen as a hostis.  This rhetorical 
compromise provides an instructive precedent for his milder treatment elsewhere of 
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the wars mentioned in the passage, and suggests that his tone there was the result of 
political exigency and not necessarily a reflection of his views.  That his definition of 
hostis was not completely revolutionary can be seen from the lack of controversy 
surrounding his equivalent denunciation of Dolabella for the murder of Trebonius in 
Asia (esp. Phil. 11.5-6; cf. 16, 29).  Finally, it must be noted that the conflicts with 
Catiline and Antony did not follow the model of the canonical civil wars, as contests 
between pairs of high-ranking inimici and their partisans.
360
  Catiline and Antony 
lacked an opposing general, and were effectively fighting against the Republic itself, 
in much the same position as an external enemy.  This is the context of Cicero‘s 
lament that these wars were uniquely about destroying the Republic (esp. Cat. 3.25; 
Phil. 5.5), and the background to his delight in the concordia ordinum inspired in 
defence of the state (e.g. Cat. 4.15, 19; Phil. 8.8).  Of course, it is impossible to know 
with certainty what his conception of civil warfare was relative to his rhetoric.  
Nevertheless, the trends in his use of bellum and hostis combined with anecdotal 
evidence that the conflicts with Catiline and Antony merited treatment as external 
wars show that his rhetoric ought to be taken seriously as an unconventional 
approach to civil war.  
 
Conclusion: the civilian on the home front   
 Cicero‘s theoretical engagement with domestic military matters reveals a 
complex value system in which civilian concerns – or at least those appropriate to 
peacetime – are given precedence over strictly military ones.  His narrow definition 
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of acceptable warfare and unmilitary redefinitions of the ideal commander and vera 
gloria show his mistrust of the way in which Rome‘s military resources were being 
used.  This is a direct challenge to prevailing practices whereby military success 
abroad all but ensured political dominance at home.  By taking a broader view of the 
situation, Cicero formulated a best practice that  addressed the state‘s need for good 
leadership in peacetime as well as wartime.  The relationship between civic and 
military responsibilities of the higher magistrates also informs his attitude towards 
civil war.  Moving beyond the conventional definition of it as simply a conflict 
involving citizens, he condemns Catiline and Antony as external hostes waging 
proper bellum against the state.  Invective effect notwithstanding, the uniformity of 
his attack suggests a fundamental belief that misdeeds of a certain magnitude – such 
as bringing war against fellow citizens – automatically entailed the forfeit of one‘s 
citizenship. 
 Given that the domestic sphere was Cicero‘s primary frame of reference, his 
emphasis on domestic concerns is not surprising.  The significance of this aspect of 
his theory is that it represents an alternative, civilian viewpoint, from a commentator 
who was not directly involved in the competition for commands.  This is certainly 
not to say that Cicero is an objective witness, but rather that his domestic bias gives 
us insight into contemporary issues which are not recorded in the narratives of 
Caesar, Sallust, or Livy.  This in turn raises important, but unanswerable questions 
about how representative Cicero‘s ideas were.  Differences of terminology and usage 
compared to Caesar‘s commentaries especially, and Livy‘s history to a lesser extent, 
highlight the effect of Cicero‘s civilian point of view.  Conversely, his attention to 
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ethics anticipates Sallust‘s moralizing and suggests a shared stimulus that both were 
vulnerable to as primarily civilian figures.   
 Any assessment of Cicero‘s military theory must take into account the effect 
of genre and political exigency on its expression.  The fact that his theory can be 
reconstructed at all from texts not devoted to the subject testifies to Rome‘s 
importance as a command centre as well as the pervasiveness of military culture in 
the late Republic.  His attitude is best described as pragmatic, adapting to life 
experience as well as to individual stimuli.  With the partial exception of his 
approach to military gloria, his innovations are always forward-looking, aiming to 
spare the next generation the mistakes of his own.  Nevertheless, the haphazard 
nature of his theoretical comments highlights the lack of a codified system for 
managing critical military activities in an age of increasing territorial expansion and 




Ciceronian military theory II: militiae 
 
 The domestic focus of Cicero‘s career and life do not particularly recommend 
his writings as a source for theory about res militaris militiae.  However, a careful 
reading of the corpus yields considerable evidence of engagement with the activities 
of the army abroad.  These passages illuminate an intriguing but elusive theoretical 
system that offers perhaps the most tangible evidence of the limitations of a civilian 
perspective; yet it also suggests that his background may have given him an unusual 
perception of Rome‘s place in the world as a major, military power.  Because many 
of his remarks are not abstract, this chapter has two aims.  Like the previous chapter, 
it will survey and assess major themes in his writings in order to demonstrate the 
range and depth of his engagement with foreign military matters.  It will also 
emphasize correlations between focal points in his descriptions of actual events and 
similar ideas in his abstract statements as strong indications of his theoretical 
outlook. 
 As was explained in Chapter 4, the definition of ―domestic‖ and ―foreign‖ 
which is used in these two chapters derives from the Latin phrase domi 
militiaeque.
361
  Whereas military matters domi are inward looking and largely 
administrative, military matters militiae are outward looking and concern Rome‘s 
interaction with the wider world.  War naturally looms large in this connection, but it 
is by no means the only military matter pertaining to the foreign sphere, especially in 
the first century: issues of national security and defence, as well as militarized 
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aspects of foreign policy that were determined in the field also belong to this 
category.  For the purposes of this chapter, any activity or pursuit involving the army 
and non-Roman peoples outwith Italy will be considered a foreign military matter. 
 Cicero‘s lack of association with the foreign sphere has traditionally been a 
major obstacle for the study of his views on these matters.  Steel, in her study of 
Cicero‘s rhetoric of empire, speaks of ―the conundrum of a speaker on imperial 
issues who had extraordinarily little exposure on a practical level to the empire, or to 
the military activity which was its essential underpinning.‖
362
  His governorship of 
Cilicia was his only experience of foreign military service – and he was 55 years old 
at the time.
363
  This means that for most of his life (and career) his understanding of 
front-line combat was based on second-hand information.  Nevertheless, as was seen 
in Chapters 3 and 4, a public career necessitated awareness of current campaigns and 
issues of national defence.  It should not, therefore, be assumed that he was ignorant 
or naïve about such matters before he went to Cilicia.  There is no evidence that he 
avoided engaging with foreign military themes before this time or that he was 
considered by his peers to be uninformed.
364
  On the contrary, his influence in the 
Senate and forum fits well with his statement at Part. 95 that orators must be 
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knowledgeable about facultates armorum, pecuniae, sociorum, earumve rerum quae 
ad quamque rem efficiendam pertinent.
365
  
 It is therefore important to differentiate between the effects of his civilian 
perspective on the one hand, and of the domestic setting of his writings on the other.  
The impact of generic constraints that was outlined in the previous chapter applies 
especially to his discussion of foreign military matters, since most of his speeches, 
treatises, and letters were directed at a civilian audience and concerned issues of 
domestic significance.  The rhetorical consequences of patriotism should also be 
mentioned in this vein, since they affected how far he was able (or willing) to 
criticize the activity of the army.  For example, although he often censures the 
conduct of his peers, he never suggests that the army is too powerful or should avoid 
intervening abroad as a rule.  He likely also enjoyed the affirmation of Roman 
supremacy which new victories and foreign conquests provided, regardless of the 
political points to be gained by praising the successful commander in public. 
 The combination of his limited discussion of foreign military matters and his 
even more limited experience of them have not encouraged scholarly inquiry into his 
views on the topic.  His attitude towards the concept of empire is a significant 
exception, but no study has yet approached the matter from a strictly military 
standpoint.
366
  At the risk of artificiality this chapter will attempt to bridge this gap 
by concentrating on military matters to the exclusion (as far as possible) of 
associated social and political ones (e.g. taxation, citizenship, and judicial 
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administration).  Like in Chapter 4, the discussion will focus on the best developed 
themes in his writings.  These are: the provincial governor as a commander, the socii 
as military allies, and empire.  It should be noted that all three themes are linked by 
the concept of imperium, both in terms of command/power and in the sense of 
―empire‖.  This association gives a sort of natural progression to the analysis in this 
chapter, and also yields a rare and useful point of contact between Cicero and the 
imperium-rich narratives of Caesar and Sallust.    
 The relevant passages are distributed unevenly throughout the corpus.  In an 
inversion of patterns observed in previous chapters, the letters are extremely useful 
(particularly the ones concerning his governorship of Cilicia), whereas the speeches 
and treatises provide less material.  Of the speeches, his invectives against ―bad‖ 
governors (esp. Ver. 5, Pis.) give the most insight into his perception of the army‘s 
activities abroad.  The main treatises of note are the most political ones (Rep., Leg., 
Off.) – a coincidence which underscores the political (i.e. domestic) implications of 
foreign military matters in this period.   
 The theory which emerges shares many traits with his theory concerning 
domestic military matters, as well as with the outlook traced throughout this thesis.  
The army is still regarded primarily as a defensive force, and good service in the 
field as a manifestation of good citizenship.  Orthodoxy continues to loom larger 
than orthopraxy, although critiques of unscrupulous governors naturally address how 
they ought to discharge their duties as much as why they should do so.  Similarly, 
even though his ideas are quite conservative at their core, the flexibility of the way in 
which the army was used abroad gave him a real opportunity to modify current 
practice in light of current problems.  Perhaps most importantly, he continues to 
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promote civic/domestic values such as good governance and good citizenship.  
Although the suitability of such priorities in a foreign context is debatable, their 
association here sheds valuable light on his perception of the relationship between 
the Senate and the army. 
 
The provincial governor as a commander 
 The military responsibilities of provincial governors are the most prominent 
foreign military theme in Cicero‘s writings – somewhat artificially, since his letters 
from Cilicia and a handful of speeches about former governors account for the 
majority of the relevant passages.  Despite the personal nature of these texts, they 
reveal a great deal about his perception of governors as military leaders and the 
importance of their activity in that capacity.  This aspect of his thinking is 
particularly well-developed, but not uncomplicated: most problematic is the fact that 
he seems not to regard governors as inherently military magistrates, even though they 
possessed imperium and the position was frequently viewed as a vehicle for 
obtaining military gloria.
367
  This section will trace this theme in his writings and 
attempt to explain it as a reaction to widespread misuse of military force in 
provincial administration at the time.  In the interest of clarity, the most abstract 
passages will be examined first, followed by critiques of contemporary governors, 
and finally Cicero‘s own example.   
  Though few in number, the abstract passages offer a valuable conceptual 
measure of his attitude towards governors as commanders.  Governors were 
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responsible for both judicial and military administration in their provinces, but 
whereas warfare was never guaranteed, matters of jurisdiction were certain to require 
attention.
368
  It is therefore worth considering where Cicero ranked military 
responsibilities within the rubric of a governor‘s tasks.   
 The clearest (and earliest) of three texts that are relevant to this question is 
Leg. 3.9, where ―Cicero‖ outlines the duties of magistrates in his ideal state. 
 
Imperia potestates legationes, cum senatus creverit populusve iusserit, 
ex urbe exeunto, duella iusta iuste gerunto, sociis parcunto, se et suos 
continento, populi <sui> gloriam augento, domum cum laude 
redeunto.  
 
The prominent placement of duella...gerunto near the beginning of the list, combined 
with the military connotations of gloria and laus later on, obscures the fact that 
waging war is the only inherently military task in this list.
369
  More to the point, this 
task is far outnumbered by others which might equally be performed in a judicial 
capacity.
370
  The repetition of iusta iuste further restricts the scope for military 
activity, depicting it as something which should only occur under specific, ethical 
circumstances, and which is by no means the magistrate‘s sole (or primary) concern.  
The literary context of this passage – in a treatise setting out the laws for Cicero‘s 
ideal state – means that we can safely assume that these words represent Ciceronian 
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theory.  Furthermore, in light of the abuse that was endemic in the 50s and 40s, when 
the treatise was written, they should certainly be read as a critique of current practice.  
What is significant in this regard is that Cicero‘s solution is to minimize military 
activity in favour of judicial activity.  
 Similar priorities may be detected at Off. 2.85, which concerns public 
leadership generally.     
 
Ab hoc igitur genere largitionis... aberunt ii qui rempublicam 
tuebuntur, in primisque operam dabunt ut iuris et iudiciorum aequitate 
suum quisque teneat, et neque tenuiores propter humilitatem 
circumveniantur neque locupletibus ad sua vel tenenda vel 
recuperanda obsit invidia, praeterea, quibuscumque rebus vel belli vel 
domi poterunt, rem publicam augeant imperio agris vectigalibus.  
 
Although governors are not specifically mentioned, the phrase vel belli vel domi and 
the allusion to imperium, agri, and vectigalia evoke the military and judicial 
responsibilities of provincial administration.  The juxtaposition of front lines and 
home front, though conventional,
371
 implies that the empire can be aided by domestic 
activity as well as military activity.  The greater contribution of this passage, 
however, is the clear priority Cicero gives to justice (as indicated by the words in 
primisque).  The effect is analogous to that in Leg. 3.9, although this argument 
appeals to utilitas, the theme of Book 2 of De officiis, rather than an ethical right.   In 
any case, the idea expressed fits well with model of strong civic (i.e. unmilitary) 
leadership from military men that was observed throughout the previous chapters, 
and further indicates that Cicero may not have viewed governors as inherently 
military magistrates. 
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 This is less the case in the third passage, which is also from Book 2 of the De 
officiis.  It belongs to the celebrated description of Rome‘s empire as a patrocinium 
and depicts the magistratus imperatoresque of the past as striving after maxima laus 
by defending the provinces and allies aequitate et fide (Off. 2.26).  Even though this 
is a distinctly military activity, one feels that the laus attaches to aequitas and fides 
and not to the warfare itself.
372
  The reference to aequitas and fides recalls the 
priorities in Leg. 3.9 and Off. 2.85, whereas the emphasis on defence is certainly 
intended to contrast with the aggressive nature of contemporary wars, and thus 
promotes an image of the magistrate as a defender rather than a warrior. 
 To these theoretical passages we may add QFr. 1.1, Cicero‘s essay-like letter 
of advice on governorship.  Despite its intimate connection with Quintus‘ 
administration of Asia (then entering its third year), the forward-looking, generic 
tone of Cicero‘s advice makes it possible to use this letter as a theoretical text.  Of 
specific interest for present purposes is attention he pays to military matters – or, 
more correctly, his lack of attention.  Consistent with the minimization of military 
duties in Leg. 3.9 and Off. 2.85, and the emphasis on faithful defence in Off. 2.26, 
there are only two explicit references to military duties in this lengthy and otherwise 
detailed letter.  Remarkably, neither of them is prescriptive: in §§4-5 he rejoices that 
no wars threaten the success of Quintus‘ term, and in §25 he praises the general 
peacefulness of the province. 
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 In fairness to Cicero, Asia seems to have been a quiet province at this time.
373
  
The point to note, then, is how the governor‘s military leadership ceases to be a 
priority for him when warfare is removed from the equation.  He does not advise his 
brother to take thought for the army‘s morale or to monitor the activities of hostile 
tribes within and outside his territory, for instance, but concentrates on matters 
pertaining to judicial administration.   
 One theme within this discussion offers some context to this focus.  It 
concerns guardianship, and it has the effect of imposing a moral framework on all of 
the governor‘s tasks.  In §10 Quintus is called the custodia of his province, in §5 
pars rei publicae is said to have been entrusted (commissa est) to him, and in §31 he 
is told to promote himself as parens Asiae.  He is further advised to wield his power 
as follows: sit lictor non suae sed tuae lenitatis apparitor, maioraque praeferant 
fasces illi ac secures dignitatis insignia quam potestatis (§13).  Because lictors and 
fasces were restricted to imperium-wielding magistrates, Cicero‘s use of the word 
potestas rather than imperium may indicate a deliberate diversion from the military 
connotations of the governor‘s power.
374
  The overall emphasis in these passages on 
defending the province by non-violent, unmilitary means substitutes an abstract ideal 
of ―protection‖ for the concrete action of warfare, and significantly undermines the 
image of the governor as a commander first and foremost. 
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 In the absence of relevant abstract material in contemporary literature, it is 
difficult to determine whether Cicero‘s perception was unique to him or more widely 
shared.  Caesar‘s De bello Gallico gives the impression that he was rarely not on 
campaign, but his case is hardly typical.  Sallust‘s surviving works, conversely, are 
not concerned with routine provincial administration but with urgent wars and the 
commanders dispatched to address them.  Livy‘s narrative is similarly unhelpful, 
since his books about the first century have not survived intact, and the periochae 
yield little insight.  A survey of triumphs, supplications, and ovations in this period 
suggests that only a handful of provinces were prone to warfare,
375
 so it stands to 
reason that although governors were equipped to wage war, many did not need to – 
and that Cicero‘s perception of the priorities of governorship may have been realistic, 
if perhaps unusual.   
 This brings us to his critiques of actual governors, whose success and 
especially failure as commanders routinely attracts comment in his speeches and 
letters.  The result is a highly rhetorical but no less revealing account of governorship 
in the late Republic.  Three main military functions may be identified from recurring 
themes of praise and blame: to wage war, to maintain the forces, and to represent 
Roman might.  When read against the guardianship model in the abstract passages 
these focal points suggest that Cicero‘s conception of governors as commanders was 
based as much on their contribution to national security as their particular ability to 
undermine it. 
 Anxiety on this account is evident in his treatment of governors at war.  His 
remarks are best assessed in light of his theory concerning justice in warfare, which 
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was outlined in Chapter 4.
376
  According to his ideal, war should only be waged for 
reasons of defence (esp. Rep. 3.34; Off. 1.35, 80).  His advocacy for and prosecution 
of his peers in the forum and Senate are entirely consistent with this model, which 
moreover supports the guardianship ideal outlined above.   
 We may begin with the positive remarks, most of which have already been 
examined elsewhere in this thesis and need not be reviewed at length here.  His 
praise of Fonteius, Flaccus, and Caesar (esp. in Prov.) as commanders was discussed 
in Chapter 3, where his strategy of associating military service with patriotism and 
moral trustworthiness was observed.  His treatment of Decimus, Brutus, and Cassius 
during the war against Antony makes an interesting comparison, since these men 
engaged in civil war during their governorships (Brutus and Cassius‘ positions were 
irregular, however), but are praised for defending the Republic as though the conflict 
was an external one.
377
  Not enough of the Pro Scauro survives to reconstruct his 
handling of Scaurus‘ campaigns (nor indeed, the extent to which the allegations de 
repetundis concerned military matters), but if Macdonald is correct that the Pro 
Fonteio and Pro Flacco are indicative of Cicero‘s method, we may assume that he 
also would have been praised as a loyal and valuable defender of the state.
378
   
 Unsurprisingly, the negative remarks present the inverse of the positive ones.  
Instead of patriots we find criminal traitors who abuse their imperium and armies for 
personal gain, thereby endangering the Republic.  It is worth mentioning at this stage 
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blown bellum (rather than bellum civile) against Antony as a hostis is unclear (cf. Phil. 3.14; 4.8).  See 
above, pp. 168-80 for background and an evaluation of Cicero‘s perception.  For praise of Decimus as 
a defender-figure, see esp. Phil. 3.37; 4.8-9; cf. Phil. 3.13 praising the peoples of Gaul for defending 
the Republic.  For similar praise of Brutus and Cassius, see e.g. Phil. 10.4, 12 (Brutus); Phil. 11.27 
(both) and above, pp. 102-5 on Cicero‘s relationship with them as military protégés. 
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 Macdonald 1977, 427.  
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that Cicero never attacks a governor for not finding an opportunity to make war 
during his term.  Consistent with the ethical focus of his thinking – and no doubt with 
an eye to the most damaging strategy available – he focuses on the motives of the 
governor in question.  Verres, Piso, and Gabinius bear the brunt of his invective on 
this topic.  Even though Cicero‘s antagonism towards them was forensically and 
politically inspired rather than ideologically-based,
379
 his complaints nevertheless 
provide valuable insight into the scope for disaster if governors wage war badly or 
fail to respond to military threats. 
 Verres‘ ability to defend his province is repeatedly called into question in the 
fifth speech of the second actio, which is devoted to military matters.  He is mocked 
as a bone custos defensorque provinciae (§12) and censured for using naval ships in 
commercial ventures rather than for the defence of the province (§43; cf. §59, 80), 
but by far the most damning criticism concerns his surrendering of the command of 
the provincial fleet to a Syracusan named Cleomenes (§§82-110 passim).  In addition 
to contravening procedure,
380
 Verres‘ decision is condemned because it brings about 
a defensive crisis which ultimately sees the destruction of the fleet by pirates and the 
embarrassing spectacle of a governor who refuses to command – a praetor 
inertissimus nequissimusque (§100; see generally §§93-110). 
 The front-line transgressions of Piso and Gabinius are tame by comparison.  
Both men are reproached for using their armies to harass the local populations.  
Piso‘s campaigns are denounced generally as vexatio (Pis. 40) and a specific raid on 
erstwhile allies is labelled a nefarium bellum et crudele (Pis. 84).  For his part, 
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 See §83-4: the command ought to have gone to a Roman citizen first, then to a citizen of an allied 
state, but not to a Syracusan on account of their historical hostility towards Rome. 
 
195 
Gabinius condemned for making war on peaceful tribes and stealing money while 
wielding imperium infinitum (Dom. 23; cf. Pis. 41).  Consistent with the legal basis 
of Cicero‘s concerns with Verres‘ surrendering of his command, much is also made 
of Gabinius‘ unauthorized war in neighbouring Egypt, in connection with which he 
allegedly sold his army to Ptolemy Auletes (Pis. 48-9).  Lintott evaluates the case, 
and notes that since magistrates were legally allowed to leave their provinces rei 
publicae causa, Cicero‘s objections must be based on a subjective evaluation of the 
campaign as an unnecessary sortie.
381
  This is certainly correct, but it is nevertheless 
significant that Cicero frames his argument by depicting Gabinius as a greedy, war-
hungry commander: cum finis provinciae tantos haberet quantos voluerat, quantos 
optarat, quantos pretio mei capitis periculoque emerat, eis se tenere non potuit (Pis. 
49).  This focus on ethical motivation fits his practice elsewhere, and suggests that he 
was genuinely alarmed by governors who used their forces and military imperium to 
pursue policies which accorded more with their own interests than those of the state. 
 Issues of self-interest also loom large in his treatment of the governor‘s 
maintenance of his forces.  Cicero‘s attention to this practical aspect of governorship 
must be understood in light of the role of provincial forces as Rome‘s first line of 
defence against external invasion.  It is therefore telling, if not entirely surprising, 
that this function is only explicitly discussed in connection with governors who fail 
to perform what Cicero depicts as a moral obligation.  In a slight deviation from 
above, Verres and Piso are his primary targets.  Incompetence is a dominant theme 
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 Lintott 1993, 24; cf. 36.  Gabinius‘ intervention led to the restoration of Ptolemy as king, a 
senatorial priority since 57.  Cicero had personal reasons to oppose Gabinius‘ involvement, since he 
backed P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther (cos. 57) as the candidate for the job.  See esp. Steel 2001, 229-
30; Lintott 2008, 191-4. 
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and bolsters an underlying argument that such negligence poses a threat not only to 
the immediate safety of the state but also to its future security.  
 The potential magnitude of this threat is conveyed in two passages where the 
provincial forces are depicted defenders of the entire Republic, and not merely the 
territory where they are stationed.  At Ver. 5.50, Verres‘ exemption of Messana from 
its treaty obligation to provide a ship to the navy is denounced as the diminishing 
(minuere) of the auxilia populi Romani and copias maiorum virtute ac sapientia 
comparatas.
382
  At Pis. 48, Piso is likewise condemned for disbanding the 
praesidium rei publicae and custodia provinciae.  In a related vein, Cicero also 
complains that Piso‘s hostilities with the Denseletae, Rome‘s allies, have cost the 
Republic men who might have been perpetuos defensores Macedoniae (Pis. 84).  
Although this does not refer to actual casualties (he proceeds to say the Denseletae 
have been made into vexatores ac praedatores by Piso‘s abuse), it does highlight the 
fact that maintaining an army entailed the provision of material and manpower as 
much as the preservation of goodwill among the allied troops.  
 Both of these themes inform his objections to specific aspects of Verres‘ and 
Piso‘s management of their forces.  Verres is condemned for undermining the 
strength of his forces by numerous means: in addition to exempting Messana from its 
obligations to supply men and material (Ver. 5.43, 49, 51), he is said to have 
accepted bribes in exchange for exempting local allies from service (Ver. 5.61-2, 
131, 133), appropriated the funds intended for the maintenance of the fleet (Ver. 
5.60-2), failed to install a full complement of men in the individual ships of the fleet 
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 Ver. 5.50; cf. 59.  The logic is flawed, as Berry 2006, n. ad loc. rightly notes: Tauromenium had 
been made to provide a ship contrary to their treaty (see Ver. 5.49), and so there was no net change in 
the naval complement. 
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(Ver. 5.63, 131, 134), and depleted the existing forces by hunger (Ver. 5.131, 134).  
An allusion to the weakness of the fleet prefaces the narrative of the disaster with the 
pirates that was mentioned above (see Ver. 5.86), creating a causal relationship 
between Verres‘ negligence (and corruption) and the subsequent vulnerability of the 
province.   
 Piso fares little better.  He is attacked for wasting his army ferro, fame, 
frigore, pestilentia (Pis. 40; cf. 98; Prov. 5), and for draining the treasury at the 
expense of the army assigned to him by the Senate and Roman people (Pis. 37).  Yet 
by far the most scorn is reserved for the fact that he actually lost his army.  Cicero‘s 
mock-charity barely conceals his concern that Piso (allegedly) did not consider 
national interests when he disbanded the remnants:  
 
Mitto de amissa maxima parte exercitus; sit hoc infelicitatis tuae; 
dimittendi vero exercitus quam potes adferre causam? quam 
potestatem habuisti, quam legem, quod senatus consultum, quod ius, 
quod exemplum? (Pis. 47; cf. 46, 53).   
 
This insistence on precedent and legality contradicts the initiative and absolute 
authority of the governor as an imperium-holder, and implies that the governor 
should feel personally responsible for the defence of the province, including the 
condition of his forces.  A governor‘s failure to maintain his army might well go 
unnoticed until the army was needed, by which time it would be too late.  Cicero‘s 
criticisms of Verres and Piso on this theme exploit the anxiety that attends concealed 
threats but also indicate that he was privately worried about this potential for harm. 
 This brings us to the third military function of governors: representing Roman 
might.  His comments on this theme offer the best evidence of an abstract conception 
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of governors as commanders, and show that he identified the imperium of governors 
as a source of instability and thus danger to the state.  Consistent with the theoretical 
passages examined above, his remarks revolve around the idea of the governor as a 
guardian.  This theme is not always developed in explicitly military terms, but its 
relevance is clear and supports the suggestion that he did not view governors as 
military magistrates first and foremost. 
 The governor‘s responsibility for both military and judicial administration has 
already been mentioned and need not be reiterated here.  Of greater interest are the 
problems which arose from their practical autonomy.  As Lintott observes, ―the 
growth of Roman military power and empire... made the powers of a consul in Rome 
seem insignificant compared with those of a consul or proconsul abroad.‖
383
  For his 
part, Cicero describes the governor‘s power in his province as absolute (esp. Ver. 
5.39; Leg. 3.6; QFr. 1.1.22) – a circumstance which afforded tremendous scope for 
abuse, especially when an army was involved.  His treatment of Verres, Piso, and 
Gabinius offers convenient case studies of the consequences when armed force 
combined with (alleged) greed.  Theirs will not have been isolated examples in an 
age which saw the rise of private armies,
384
 and there is no reason to assume that 
Cicero‘s hostility towards them cannot be generalized.    
 His conception of the governor as a representative of Roman might is best 
seen as a distancing from the trend towards personal administration in the first 
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 Lintott 1999, 95.  On the Senate‘s lack of control over magistrates in the field, see esp. Brunt 1978, 
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century.  He does not challenge the governor‘s imperium or initiative, but 
subordinates them to the interests of the state as a whole.  The best articulation of this 
concept occurs at Ver. 5.35-9, where he describes all public offices as trusts which 
must be taken seriously.  An eloquent description of his own anxiety that he be seen 
to deserve his position as aedile-elect (§37) prefaces a critique of Verres‘ apparent 
attitude towards his magistracies which must be quoted at length. 
 
...hoc putares, aliquam rei publicae partem tibi creditam...? Cum tibi 
sorte obtigisset uti ius diceres, quantum negoti, quid oneris haberes, 
numquam cogitasti? ... Secuta provincia est; in qua numquam tibi 
venit in mentem non tibi idcirco fascis ac securis et tantam imperi vim 
tantamque ornamentorum omnium dignitatem datam ut earum rerum 
vi et auctoritate omnia repagula pudoris officique perfringeres, ut 
omnium bona praedam tuam duceres, ut nullius res tuta, nullius 
domus clausa, nullius vita saepta, nullius pudicitia munita contra tuam 
cupiditatem et audaciam posset esse. (Ver. 5.38-9) 
 
 This passage exposes a fundamental conflict between the magistrate‘s 
individualism and his responsibility as a representative of the state.  The extreme 
nature of Verres‘ example aside, Cicero‘s clear prioritization of the state‘s interests 
over those of the individual turns the magistrate into a steward of sorts, who 
exercises power without possession.
385
  This idea accords with his description of 
Quintus‘ governorship of Asia as pars tibi rei publicae commissa est (QFr. 1.1.5), as 
well as with his appeal to the Senate to let Gaul remain in Caesar‘s charge, in eius 
tutela Gallia... commendata est (Prov. 35).   
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 The idea of the governor as a steward challenges Steel‘s judgement that 
Cicero‘s focus on individuals is a weakness of his engagement with foreign 
administration.
386
  I would argue that the arguments at Ver. 5.38-9, when read against 
the backdrop of his attention to warfare and the maintenance of the forces, suggest 
that his ideal governor is essentially anonymous: the intrusion of personalities signals 
bad administration.  This fits with his highly personalized depiction of Verres, Piso, 
and Gabinius, who are seen to treat their forces and military resources as things to be 
disposed of as they please, whether for financial gain or to intimidate the local 
populations.  Conversely, good governors do not come to life in the speeches.  They 
are depicted as dependable, but rather one-dimensional, defenders of the realm.    
 Crucially, hints of a similar perspective may be detected in the writings of 
Caesar and Sallust.  Caesar customarily depicts his activity in Gaul as being 
motivated by national interest, usually in terms of the dignitas, mos, imperium or 
other abstract attribute of the populus Romanus (esp. BG 1.8.3; 1.45.3; 4.17.1; 
7.17.4).  Sallust, on the other hand, acknowledges and laments the corruption of the 
times with specific regard to public office.  At Cat. 3.3 he refers to the audacia 
largitio avaritia that dominated public life (and corrupted him) in his youth, but he is 
much more explicit at Jug. 3.1: 
 
Verum ex iis magistratus et imperia, postremo omnis cura rerum 
publicarum minume mihi hac tempestate cupiunda videntur, quoniam 
neque virtuti honos datur neque illi, quibus per fraudem iis fuit uti, 
tuti aut eo magis honesti sunt.  
 
                                                 
386
 Steel 2001, esp. 189: ―the demands of his own persona forced him away from uncomfortable issues 
and towards the simpler demands of personalities.‖  
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Although this reflection seems to refer to the time of writing, it makes an instructive 
parallel to Cicero‘s focus on ethics which belongs to roughly the same time period.  
The point to note is that whereas Sallust simply complains about what is, Cicero 
presents a reforming alternative. 
 We may now examine his example in Cilicia as a practical test of his 
commitment to the ideas outlined thus far.  An inquiry of this type is recommended 
by his own allusions to his writings as ―guarantors‖ of his conduct, as well as by the 
detailed narrative of his activity contained in his letters.
387
  Remarkably, this 
narrative shows him to be entirely in compliance with the three functions traced 
above. 
 As was seen in Chapter 1, he arrived in Cilicia to the news of an impending 
Parthian invasion and therefore began his term in preparation for warfare.
388
  
Consistent with this aim – and with the season (Att. 5.17.3; Fam. 15.2.1) – he 
gathered intelligence about the enemy position (e.g. Att. 5.16.4; Fam. 15.1.2; 15.4.7) 
and marched his army to a strategic location close to Armenia, in case its king 
revolted, and to Galatia, to have the best access to Deiotarus‘ help (Att. 5.20.2; Fam. 
15.2.2; 15.4.4).  He presents himself as being fully in control throughout the 
skirmishes with the Amanienses and especially the siege of Pindenissum, using first-
person verbs and only occasionally acknowledging the contributions of Quintus and 
his other legates (esp. Att. 5.20.3, 5; Fam. 15.4.8, 10).  The overall impression is of a 
consummate commander who is guided by reason and duty. 
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 His military activity as governor is summarized above, pp. 18-23. 
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 His attention to the well-being of his army also makes him seem like an 
exemplary task-oriented commander.  By virtue of his predecessor‘s less scrupulous 
administration, his first task as governor was to assemble his army, which was 
nowhere near its paper strength of two legions (esp. Att. 5.15.1; Fam. 3.6.5; 15.4.2).  
His distribution of the praeda to his men following the capitulation of Pindenissum 
demonstrates concern for their morale.
389
  So, too, may the very fact of his 
campaigns against the local rebel tribes, who offered a timely distraction from 
uneventful marches in search of the Parthians.
390
  On a more practical note, the 
letters also show him making arrangements for his army‘s winter quarters – billeted 
on problem communities under Quintus‘ command (Att. 5.20.5; Fam. 15.4.10). 
 His refusal to provide troops on two occasions may also be considered under 
the heading of maintenance.  In the first instance, King Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia 
requested a bodyguard to protect him from an assassination plot, and in the second, 
no less than Brutus asked him to give cavalry to a prefect named Scaptius for the 
purpose of pressuring the locals to pay a higher rate of interest than was legal.
391
  
Regardless of the merits of either case, to relinquish any part of an army that was 
under strength to begin with was not in the interests of the province‘s defences.  
Ariobarzanes‘ request actually came on the heels of news that the Parthians were in 
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detail by Badian 1968, 84-6. 
 
203 
Syria, whereas the Scaptius affair intensified after the campaign season, but at a point 
in Cicero‘s administration when a hint of scandal would undermine his studious 
abstinence and risk losing the cooperation of the allies.   
 Finally, we have Cicero‘s self-presentation as a representative of Roman 
might.  Like Caesar, he appeals to the interests of the populus Romanus when 
describing his actions (Fam. 15.1.3; 15.2.1).  Richardson notes that although he 
frequently refers to his Cilicia as nostra provincia, there is no indication that he 
perceived it as a private possession.
392
  The same might be said for his army, which 
is occasionally called exercitus populi Romani (e.g. Fam. 15.1.3; 15.2.7), and meus 
exercitus (e.g. Att. 6.5.3; Fam. 15.2.7), but appears most frequently simply as 
exercitus.   
 By far the most relevant feature of his narrative however, is his stress on his 
aequitas, abstinentia, and integritas as a governor.
393
  These virtues belong to the 
civilian realm and recall the emphasis on unmilitary activity in Leg. 3.9, Off. 2.26, 
and Off. 2.85.  They also belong to a guardian or steward, and reflect an ideal of 
anonymous, neutral administration.  It is a measure of the times that Cicero‘s 
abstinence made him stand out as a governor, rather than fade into the background of 
Roman foreign administration. 
 By way of conclusion, Cicero‘s example must be subjected to one last test.  
His appeals to Atticus and Caelius not to allow his term to be extended, and his 
deliberations over whether to leave Quintus in charge of the province at his departure 
inject a degree of self-interest into his administration that seems to contradict his 
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self-representation as a dutiful magistrate.
394
  In both cases his reputation was at 
stake: he did not want to be in charge of a major war against the Parthians, but was 
also reluctant to leave his brother in his stead lest Quintus do something to embarrass 
him politically (Att. 6.6.4; cf. QFr. 1.1.37-40 on Quintus‘ temper).  If the restored 
text of Att. 6.6.3 is correct, he admits that his eventual choice of his quaestor Coelius 
as successor is contrary to the interests of the Republic (id rei publicae non utile).  
There is no easy way to reconcile this type of sentiment with an ideal of a selfless 
guardian-governor; but it does not follow that the positive aspects of his example are 
invalidated by a few private expressions of anxiety for his reputation.
395
  The fact 
that he publicly lived up to his model in the De re publica confirms that he had an 
abstract conception of the governor‘s military role and that it was practicable in the 
real world. 
 Cicero‘s treatment of governors as commanders provides perhaps the best 
insight into his perception of foreign military matters because of the range of 
activities and issues it incorporates.  It shows that he acknowledged the military 
importance of the position but was also sensitive to the lack of practical measures to 
oppose unscrupulous magistrates who treat their armies and power as personal 
possessions.  His response is an ethical discourse which transforms the governor 
from a warrior to a guardian, and promotes a style of administration which justifies 
Roman rule by showing that Rome deserves its supremacy. 
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 On his anxiety that his term might be extended, see esp. Att. 5.17.5; cf. 5.15.1; Fam. 2.10.4.  On his 
deliberations about Quintus as his successor, see esp. Att. 6.3.2; 6.4.1; 6.5.3; 6.6.3; Fam. 2.15.4.  His 
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The socii as military allies 
 This bring us to our second theme: the socii as military allies.  It is an 
intriguing and significant focal point in Cicero‘s treatment of foreign military matters 
because of the allies‘ awkward position in late Republican foreign policy as people to 
be protected and defended on the one hand, and a convenient source of manpower 
and material for Roman wars on the other.  The fact that both views are expressed in 
his writings indicates the influence of rhetorical exigency; yet, as will be seen, when 
historical and political context is taken into account it becomes possible to detect a 
coherent theoretical system.  This is the aim of this section, which will explore his 
perception of the military identity of the socii and their place in Rome‘s military 
programme. 
 The choice of the socii as the focus of this inquiry is based on Cicero‘s 
linguistic practice: socii is by far his preferred term for referring to foreign allies, 
even though other terms were in use at the time.
396
  With few exceptions, it functions 
as a sort of catch-all word for describing various foreign peoples who have a link 
with Rome; the absence of any sort of definition indicates that his usage was normal 
and easily understood by his audience.
397
  Nevertheless, one instance of the word 
merits closer attention.  An apparent contradiction in Att. 5.18 – where Cicero 
                                                 
396
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complains about a lack of loyal socii to bolster his army (§1) and then congratulates 
himself on earning the loyalty of the socii (§2) – indicates that socii could refer to 
both local (subject) provincials and non-subject allies.
398
  The word was inherently 
euphemistic, and although it probably does not signify that Rome‘s allies were (or 
should be) treated as equals, Cicero seems to take its connotations of partnership and 
camaraderie literally in his discussion of the socii in a military capacity.
399
 
 The general tone of this discussion suggests that, for him, the socii were 
defined by their activity – that is, their contributions of men and material to the 
Roman army.  The letters from Cilicia in particular show how pivotal allied 
contributions might be: Cicero begins his term lamenting the lack of reliable allies to 
bolster his legions, and subsequently finds himself indebted to Deiotarus for placing 
his entire army at his disposal.
400
  Sicily is praised for supplying grain and a safe 
harbour during the Punic Wars (Ver. 2.3); Gaul for providing grain, infantry, and 
cavalry during Fonteius‘ administration (Font. 8); and Massilia, Gades, and 
Saguntum for expected future aid in the form of propugnator who will endure labor, 
commeatus, and periculum for Roman generals (Balb. 23).  Passages praising 
specific socii as fidelissimi, antiquissimi, and other terms denoting strength and 
faithfulness serve to contextualize events in a particular part of the empire, whether 
war-related or with regard to injuries suffered by the locals.  To give one example, at 
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Font. 13 Massilia is praised in connection with its support of Fonteius‘ efforts to 
bring the whole province under Roman control:  
 
...est item urbs Massilia, de qua ante dixi, fortissimorum 
fidelissimorumque sociorum, qui Gallicorum bellorum pericula 




The mention of compensation hints at an intriguing dynamic which will be examined 
in detail below.  For now it will suffice to note how rhetorical exigency generally 
dictates where and how specific groups of socii are identified in Cicero‘s writings.  
The fact that these groups tend only to be mentioned in texts that are about them 
anyway (e.g. Cilician allies in Cicero‘s letters from Cilicia) indicates that his 
attention to them was largely a matter of convenience.   
 Although at first glance this seems like a major weakness in his engagement 
with foreign military matters, his writings actually offer more insight into the 
military identity of the socii than any others from the period.  The term is not defined 
in the writings of Caesar, Sallust, or Livy, and the relevant entry in Varro‘s De 
lingua Latina has not survived.  The focal points of Caesar‘s references to the socii 
are strikingly similar to those of Cicero‘s: the term quantifies a type of relationship 
between two parties – significantly, he applies it to both Roman allies and the allies 
of his opponents – and particularly evokes the military aid rendered or anticipated 
within that relationship.
402
  The value of Sallust‘s and Livy‘s narratives is 
complicated by chronological scope.  Because so much of their work deals with pre-
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 Cf. Font. 35 (Massilia); Mur. 33 (Cyzicus); Flac. 71 (Apollonis); Pis. 84 (Macedonia); Phil. 11.5 
(Smyrna). 
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 See e.g. BG 1.11; 1.43; 1.45; 8.6 (Roman allies); 1.14; 1.36; 3.9; 5.39; 6.10 (allies of opponents). 
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Social War history, socii most often appears in reference to Italian allies.
403
  
Nevertheless, the transition to post-Social War times is seamless and confirms that 
Cicero‘s use of the term to describe foreign allies was normal.
404
   The only anomaly 
is Sallust‘s Bellum Catilinae, where socius/socii almost always refers to the 
conspirators (e.g. 16.4; 18.8; 43.3; 56.4); but this usage is entirely explained by 
context.   
 Having established (as far as possible) how Cicero conceived of the socii in 
military terms, we may now consider the place he accords them in Rome‘s military 
programme.  Of specific interest is his perception of the proper dynamic between 
Rome and the socii – who was obliged to whom, and what this entailed in a military 
context.  Roman interests naturally dominate the discourse, but his attention to the 
welfare of the socii appears to be unusual, especially in light of his complaints about 
their abuse at the hands of unscrupulous commanders.  In the interest of clarity, the 
analysis will begin with a thematic survey of his remarks before proceeding to the 
evaluation proper. 
 As was mentioned above, the socii appear in Cicero‘s writings both as people 
to be defended by Rome and as a resource for the Roman army.  His treatment of the 
idea of obligation allows his comments be to divided into three groups: those which 
focus on Rome‘s obligation to the socii; those which focus on the obligations of the 
socii to Rome; and those which condemn the use of military force to the detriment of 
the socii. 
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 See e.g. Sal. Jug. 14.19; 84.2; 95.1; Liv. 8.5.3; 30.35.3; 45.43.7.      
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 See e.g. Sal. Jug. 24.3; 44.1; 88.3; 95.1; Liv. 27.20.8; 35.12.7; 38.37.3; 45.39.4; cf. Sal. Cat. 12.5; 
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 The passages which belong to the first group are characterized by an 
idealistic tone which depicts Roman motives as purely altruistic.  The idea that the 
socii need and merit Rome‘s protection is part and parcel of Cicero‘s theory about 
justice in warfare.  As was seen in Chapter 4, defending the allies ranks highly 
among his approved reasons for going to war and is consistent with his assertion that 
wars should only be waged for the purpose of defence.
405
   
 This type of concern for the safety of the socii is also a major theme outwith 
the treatises.  The phrase salus sociorum occurs five times in the Pro lege Manilia, 
accounting for almost half of the instances of the phrase in the entire corpus and 
putting a humanitarian spin on Cicero‘s promotion of Pompey for the war.
406
  At 
Sest. 98, the socii are included in the lengthy catalogue of the institutions and entities 
which comprise the foundations of otium cum dignitate and must be defended at all 
costs.
407
  A romanticized description of the historical relationship between Rome and 
its foreign dependents at Div. Caec. 66 does not use the word socii, but implies their 
inclusion by the use of cognates: 
 
Clarissimi viri nostrae civitatis temporibus optimis hoc sibi 
amplissimum pulcherrimumque ducebant, ab hospitibus clientibusque 
suis, ab exteris nationibus, quae in amicitiam populi Romani 
dicionemque essent, iniurias propulsare eorumque fortunas defendere. 
 
Cicero probably had forensic defence in mind, but the principle is certainly relevant 
to our present discussion – not least because it predates a very similar sounding 
                                                 
405
 See Rep. 3.34 and discussion above, p. 135. 
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 See Leg. Man. 6, 12, 14, 19, 71; cf. 21 (salvis sociis); 32 (quem socium defendistis?); 45 (socios 
conservaturus sit).  The other instances occur at Caec. 27; Ver. 2.28; 3.21, 213; 5.139, 188; QFr. 
1.1.2.  N.b. that all of these passages concern provincial government. 
407
 On the nature and political significance of this Ciceronian ideal, see esp. Wirszubski 1954; cf. 
Wood 1988, 194-9. 
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version of traditional practice at Off. 2.26-7, which does use socii in a military 
context.  Oddly, although concern for the welfare of the socii is a recurring theme in 
his letters from Cilicia, this is never expressed in military terms.
408
   
 This brings us to the second group of comments, which emphasize the 
obligations of the socii to Rome.  These passages are characterized by a sense of 
entitlement which revolves around contractual obligations rather than ethical ones.  
Cicero‘s long harangue about the implications of Verres‘ decision to exempt 
Messana from its treaty (Ver. 5.43-59) yields a salient point about the purpose of 
such agreements: 
 
qui [sc. Mamertini] ex foedere ipso navem vel usque ad Oceanum, si 
imperassemus, sumptu periculoque suo armatam atque ornatam 
mittere debuerunt, hi ne in freto ante sua tecta et domos navigarent, ne 
sua moenia portusque defenderent, pretio abs te ius foederis et imperi 
condicionem redemerunt. (Ver. 5.50; cf. 51, 59) 
    
A similar concern is voiced more tactfully at Balb. 24-5, where Cicero says that it 
would be a serious matter (grave) if the Roman people were deprived of allied aid in 
battle – because the best and bravest socii should have the opportunity to earn 
Roman honours such as citizenship (cf. Balb. 44, 54).  The treatment of Deiotarus 
and his son in the Eleventh Philippic provides an instructive parallel, since their 
assistance is taken for granted in the proposal for Cassius‘ command.
409
  Against this 
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 His abstinentia chiefly concerns financial matters, such as taxes and requisitioning of supplies.  See 
esp. Att. 5.16.2-3; 5.17.2; 5.20.6 and discussion by Brunt 1978, 189-90. 
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 Phil. 11.31: Regem Deiotarum patrem et regem Deiotarum filium, si, ut multis bellis saepe numero 
imperium populi Romani iuverint, item C. Cassium pro consule copiis suis opibusque iuvissent, 
senatui populoque Romano gratum esse facturos.  Neither Deiotarus is mentioned in the contemporary 
correspondence with Cassius, although one is alluded to in Ad Brut. 1.6.3 (19 May 43), in connection 
with the war against Dolabella.  Cicero‘s attitude here is in marked contrast to the appreciation 
expressed in the Cilician letters (see above, n. 400), but not inconsistent with the tone of Deiot. 
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backdrop, it is no surprise that at Part. 95 the socii are spoken of in passing as 
something to be used (utor).   
 A handful of remarks depicting taxation as the privilege of the victorious 
round out this group of passages, and provide valuable insight into the practical 
considerations connected with administering an empire.  At QFr. 1.1.33-4 taxes are 
described as a fair burden in exchange for military protection: id autem imperium 
cum retineri sine vectigalibus nullo modo possit, aequo animo parte aliqua suorum 
fructuum pacem sibi sempiternam redimat atque otium (§34).  The sense of 
entitlement is more overt at Ver. 3.12, where taxes are depicted as victoriae 
praemium ac poena belli (cf. Ver. 2.7).  Indeed, a survey of references to socii in the 
corpus reveals that they are frequently mentioned alongside vectigalia as tangible 
benefits deriving from the provinces (esp. Ver. 3.127; Leg. Man. 4, 19; De orat. 
2.58). 
 So far we have seen that Cicero acknowledged both Roman and allied 
obligations to each other.  The third group of passages, which deal with the use of 
military force against the socii, provide crucial context to a discourse that reveals 
much about his awareness of the issues at stake but little about his sense of the 
proper dynamic between the socii and the army.  His opposition to the abuse of the 
socii is not noteworthy in itself, but the fact that it seems to function as a vehicle for 
criticizing individual magistrates is. 
 It should first of all be noted that all but one of the passages in this group 
come from speeches, and consequently yield a highly rhetorical portrait of 
contemporary practice.  As previously, Verres, Piso, and Gabinius are the targets of 
Cicero‘s complaints; but there is also one passage that involves Caesar.  It is the only 
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passage in this group that comes from a treatise, and Caesar is not named, but the 
allusion to a triumph in which Massilians were paraded as conquered enemies makes 
the identification clear.  The cause of Cicero‘s outrage is equally clear when he refers 
to the Massilians as people ex ea urbe... sine qua numquam nostri imperatores ex 
Transalpinis bellis triumpharunt (Off. 2.28).   
 Of the remaining men, Piso receives the most attention by far.  He is accused 
of using his army to murder and plunder the socii (Pis. 38, 40), and of actually 
waging war against the Denseletae, a natio semper oboediens huic imperio (Pis. 84).  
The cities that have been injured by him are listed at Pis. 96 in a passage which 
concludes with the assessment that these peoples regard him as a sociorumque 
depeculatorem, vexatorem, praedonem, hostem.  In a similar vein, he is denounced at 
Pis. 91 as Poena et Furia sociorum.  Arguably the most damning rebuke occurs at 
Prov. 4, where Cicero alludes to money which the inhabitants of Macedonia had paid 
to a Roman commander in order to enjoy peace.  He proceeds to say that that they 
now wage bellum prope iustum because that peace no longer exists.  The allusion to 
the theory of bellum iustum is significant here, and is a considerable compliment 
because, theoretically speaking, only Rome could wage just war.
410
   
 Piso is also condemned with Gabinius as has duplicis pestis sociorum and 
provinciarum vastitates in connection (implied) with their military activity (Prov. 13; 
cf. Prov. 14).  For his part, Gabinius is accused of making contracts with hostes 
against the socii (and also with socii against cives, Prov. 12), and using his army to 
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Cicero‘s inability to countenance a just war waged by foreigners. 
 
213 
plunder cities (Pis. 41).  The latter allegation is accompanied by an unflattering 
description of him as gurges atque helluo natus abdomini (Pis. 41).   
 Last but not least, Verres is attacked for using the navy as a means of 
transporting goods stolen from the province (esp. Ver. 5.44-6, 59, 63); his acceptance 
of bribes in exchange for exemptions from duty may also be considered as abuse, to 
the extent that it was certainly motivated by greed rather than generosity (esp. Ver. 
5.51, 61-2).  He is called a mercennarius praetor and a praedo improbissimus (Ver. 
5.54) in this connection, as well as a praedo sociorum for the similarity of his 
conduct to that of the pirates who threatened Sicily during his term (Ver. 5.122).  The 
final blow, however, occurs in Ver. 5.124, in an imaginary address by the people of 
Tyndaris.  The prosopopeia makes explicit reference to their amicitia and fides with 
Rome during the Punic and Sicilian Wars, and asserts that they always provided belli 
adiumenta et pacis ornamenta to the Roman people.  The contrast between the 
treatment they might have expected and the treatment they received from Verres is 
summarized in the following line, when Cicero exclaims multum vero haec iis iura 
profuerunt in istius imperio ac potestate! (Ver. 5.124). 
 The analysis of these remarks and the ones concerning Roman and allied 
obligations to each other is complicated by generic factors and the comparatively 
small sample size.  Comparison with the writings of Caesar and Sallust offers a 
tantalizing clue about how representative Cicero‘s narrative is, but one which raises 
more questions than it answers.  Although both authors mention Rome‘s obligation 
to defend the socii (though to a lesser extent than Cicero), neither addresses the 





  It is almost impossible to draw meaningful conclusions from this 
pattern, but (at the risk of over-speculation) it is just possible that the convergence of 
attention on Rome‘s defensive obligation indicates that this was the primary way of 
talking (if not thinking) about the socii at the time.   
 It will be noted that this theme is the only one with any theoretical basis in 
the three groups of Cicero‘s comments examined above.  It is also one with many 
attractive features.  Quite apart from its humanitarian aspects and the practical 
benefits of good relations with the socii, it also served Roman patriotic and 
especially imperial interests.  As Riggsby notes with regard to Caesar‘s handling of 
the theme, ―the basis of this obligation to defend friends is in no way altruistic, but is 
a matter of defending one‘s own reputation and honor.‖
412
  Being able to depict its 
wars as defensive ones waged to protect others gave Rome a virtually unassailable 
moral high ground and allowed it to celebrate its supremacy as righteous and 
deserved. 
 This interpretation can be reconciled with the arguments implicit in Cicero‘s 
other comments.  The most detailed remarks concerning the obligations of the socii 
to Rome all come from speeches and are very context-driven.  The hint of irony in 
the complaint about Messana‘s exemption (Ver. 5.50), combined with the rhetoric in 
the surrounding sections (esp. §51), make it clear that the real issue is Verres‘ 
granting of the exemption in the first place and not Messana‘s contribution to 
national security.  Similarly, the allusion to Rome‘s dependency on allied assistance 
at Balb. 24-5 furnishes a flattering transition to Cicero‘s main argument in support of 
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 On Rome‘s obligation to defend the socii, see e.g. BG 1.35.4; Sal. Cat. 6.5; Jug. 14.7, 19; 24.2.  
Caesar also depicts himself as defending the socii at e.g. BG 1.11.2-5; 7.10.2-3; 7.33.1-2.  On the 
abuse of the socii, see e.g. Caes. BC 3.31-3.  
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the granting of citizenship as a reward for military service – such as Balbus had 
received.  The strategy behind the reference to the Deiotari at Phil. 11.31 is less 
immediately obvious, although the expectation of cooperation fits with Cicero‘s 
optimism about such matters in the Philippics generally (esp. praise of Lepidus‘ 
loyalty at Phil. 13.7-8, 49).   
 The subtle subterfuge in the comments condemning the abuse of the socii is 
also consistent with the idea that the defence of the socii was Cicero‘s primary 
concern.  As was mentioned above, his complaints function as a vehicle for 
criticizing the commanders in question.  This is true even of the only passage of the 
group that did not come from a speech (Off. 2.28), where the mere mention of 
Massilians in a triumph made it clear that Caesar is the subject.  The socii serve as a 
symbol in these passages, quantifying the magnitude of the commander‘s misconduct 
by manipulating the audience‘s emotions in favour of the helpless (even hapless) 
socii.
413
   
 This is not to suggest, however, that Cicero regarded the socii as passive 
partners in Rome‘s military programme.  His letters from Cilicia show that he was 
well aware of their military role and the dangers of using force to overawe them.  At 
Fam. 15.3.2 he writes quae copiis et opibus tenere vix possumus, ea mansuetudine et 
continentia nostra, sociorum fidelitate teneamus.  Lintott agrees that his decision not 
to burden the local allies with a levy was prudent, even though it meant that his army 
was not as strong numerically as it might have been.
414
  His trust in Deiotarus in 
particular may be gauged by the fact that he sent his son and nephew to stay with the 
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king during the campaign season (Att. 5.17.3; 5.18.4); diplomacy aside, his letters 
about the ensuing campaigns indicate that he was genuinely grateful for the 
assistance of Deiotarus‘ army (Att. 5.18.2; Fam. 15.1.6; 15.2.2; 15.4.5).   
 It seems fair to conclude, then, that Cicero acknowledged the value of the 
military assistance provided by the socii, but found it rhetorically and politically 
expedient to focus on Rome‘s dominant role in his speeches and treatises.  Frézouls 
argues that this is a natural mode of discourse about the relationship between 
governed and governing in the late Republic, and that Cicero and his peers truly 
believed that Rome had the best interests of the socii at heart: 
 
C‘est donc avec bonne conscience que Salluste, Cicéron, ou César 
considèrent les rapports de Rome avec les provinciaux, persuadés 
qu‘elle a apporté à ces peuples – on va leur apporter – le bienfait d‘un 
cadre politique qui leur épargnera la stasis habituelle tout en les 





Cicero‘s treatment of the socii in a military capacity suggests that his commitment to 
this idea was not changed by the reality of his times.  He found fault with 
individuals, but continued to promote Rome as the defender of the socii.  In light of 
his example in Cilicia, it is tempting to say that he believed in this ideal independent 
of its ideological advantages.
416
  Neither his defence of governors de repetundis nor 
occasional indications of disdain for provincials need undermine this impression, 
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Liv. 1.9.14 (rape of the Sabines); 1.52.3 (renewing the treaty with the Latins). 
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since both can be accounted for in terms of forensic exigency.
417
  What his comments 
reveal most of all is the complexity of the issues involved, and the lack of an 
established procedure to guide current activity.  His contribution to this debate is his 
pragmatism and humanitarian concern for the welfare of people who have entrusted 
themselves to Rome‘s protection.  The result is not an exclusively military discourse, 
but to the extent that it addresses the obligations that attend military power and 
prowess, it is not without value.   
   
Empire 
 This brings us to empire as the final theme of Cicero‘s abstract engagement 
with foreign military matters.  Rome‘s empire was won by the strength of its army, 
and so it is fitting to conclude a study of Ciceronian military theory with an 
examination of his perception of what would become the Republic‘s military legacy.  
As was mentioned in the introduction, military themes have been largely overlooked 
in what is otherwise a considerable body of scholarship about Cicero‘s attitude 
towards empire and imperialism.
418
  Building on this foundation, this section aims to 
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 Much has been made about the apparent inconsistency of his defence of Flaccus, Fonteius, and 
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contribute to a fuller and more nuanced understanding of his perspective on this 
aspect of his thought. 
 It should first of all be noted that Cicero‘s writings are in fact the best 
surviving source for late Republican imperialism.  This is the combined result of the 
range of issues that is addressed in his speeches, treatises, and letters; the sheer size 
of the corpus; and, above all, his perspective as a participant-witness documenting a 
critical period of transition.
419
  Nevertheless, his engagement with the concept of 
empire has attracted nearly as much criticism as attention from scholars.  Chief 
among the complaints is the absence of a clear concept of empire and imperialism in 
his writings.  Smethurst claims that Cicero did not understand international politics, 
Steel finds fault with his focus on personalities instead of structural issues, and Wood 
speaks of his lack of engagement as ―a fatal blind spot in his social and political 
speculations.‖
420
  A kinder assessment is offered by Gruen and, most recently, 
Richardson, who both note that Cicero is not unique in his period for not addressing 
the theoretical basis of empire.  Richardson‘s assessment in particular provides 
useful context to the debate:  
 
What appears to be lacking in Cicero is any coherent notion of an 
―empire‖, at least in the sense that this might be expressed by the 
words imperium Romanum in the centuries that were to follow. ... The 
result [of expansion in the Republican period] was not a coherent 
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It is unrealistic and unproductive to expect Cicero to exhibit an in-depth 
understanding of a phenomenon that did not mature until after his lifetime.  Rather 
than retrace well-trodden paths of inquiry – and in the interest of proceeding with the 
analysis at hand – I broadly accept the findings of the aforementioned scholars and 
will not attempt to extract a definition of empire from the Ciceronian corpus.  
Instead, this investigation will focus on his conception of the relationship between 
empire, imperium, and the army.  This will be explored by way of an examination of 
military and imperial themes in his abstract use of the term imperium, followed by an 
evaluation of his idealized vision of Rome‘s empire as a patrocinium (Off. 2.26-9) – 
his most theoretical statement on the topic.  Insight into the impact of his domestic 
frame of reference on his outlook will be sought by comparing his expression to that 
of contemporary authors. 
 Before examining Cicero‘s comments, it is worth emphasizing that empire 
was a reality by the first century.  In Gruen‘s words, ―by the age of Cicero, empire 
was a fact – acknowledged, lauded, celebrated.‖
422
  That the acquisition and 
possession of empire was viewed as being intimately connected with the army is also 
apparent in the sources, even though, as Lintott notes, ―it is clear that the empire was 
not held down merely by military force.‖
423
  Whether Cicero‘s contemporaries 
deliberately pursued (or were conscious of following) an imperialistic foreign policy 
is another question entirely.  It is no longer believed that Rome‘s expansion was the 
product of ―defensive imperialism‖, whereby the state only went to war in response 
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to threats to its security or the security of its allies.
424
  In light of Rome‘s militarized 
culture and chronic warfare (both external and civil), it seems likely that it – or at 
least its ruling class – was inherently bellicose.  This puts Cicero in an awkward 
position as a civilian and a man of peace, and anticipates an unconventional 
perspective on the role of the army in extending Rome‘s influence abroad. 
 There are few hints of such a perspective in his use of the term imperium, 
however, which has been exhaustively examined by Richardson.  His statistical 
tables show that the term occurs throughout Cicero‘s writings and at every stage in 
his career, and highlight two important trends in its frequency: as might be expected, 
it is common in speeches about commanders (esp. Ver., Leg. Man., Prov., Phil.), but 
it is also prominent in works which are now recognized as core texts for his imperial 
outlook (e.g. Leg. agr., Sest., Rep., Off.).
425
  Richardson further identifies two main 
uses of imperium which reflect this breakdown: references to the power of a 
magistrate/pro-magistrate or a command given by the same, and references to the 
power of the Roman people collectively.
426
  The first type corresponds to the basic 
meaning of the term, which denotes the specific power given to magistrates and pro-
magistrates that authorized them to exercise authority in judicial and military matters 
(although it is primarily associated with military authority); by extension it also came 
to denote a command given by such magistrates and pro-magistrates.
427
  To the 
extent that this usage is essentially technical and does not illuminate a relationship 
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between military commands and empire, it need not concern us here beyond the fact 
that it is a normal part of Cicero‘s descriptions of commanders.
428
   
 Of far greater interest is the second meaning of imperium.  Accounting for 
nearly one third of the instances of imperium in Cicero‘s writings,
429
 it expresses an 
abstract idea (in contrast with the actual imperium of magistrates and pro-
magistrates) that is often translated into English as ―empire‖.  Without passing 
judgement on the propriety of such a translation, it must be stressed that there is no 
indication in any of these passages that Cicero had a territorial empire in mind. 
Rather, as Richardson argues, this abstract conception of imperium seems to be as the 




 What is significant about these passages – and not noted by Richardson due 
to the scope of his study – is that the concept of imperium is typically presented as 
something which is acquired and maintained by military force.  This is readily 
apparent in statements identifying imperium as a motive for warfare or something at 
stake in actual wars.
431
  Other passages are more subtle, such as this elaborate one 
from De haruspicum responso that seems to be about religious piety: 
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Etenim quis est tam vaecors qui... non intellegat eorum [sc. deorum] 
numine hoc tantum imperium esse natum et auctum et retentum? ... 
nec numero Hispanos nec robore Gallos nec calliditate Poenos nec 
artibus Graecos nec denique hoc ipso huius gentis ac terrae domestico 
nativoque sensu Italos ipsos ac Latinos, sed pietate ac religione atque 
hac una sapientia, quod deorum numine omnia regi gubernarique 
perspeximus, omnis gentis nationesque superavimus. (§19) 
 
The tone of the passage owes much to the topic of the speech, which concerned the 
haruspices‘ ruling about certain portents attending Cicero‘s reoccupation of his 
house (the site of which Clodius had had consecrated as a shrine to libertas during 
Cicero‘s exile).  This all but conceals the reality behind Rome‘s supposed supremacy 
over the Spanish, Gauls, Carthaginians, Greeks, and finally Italians and Latins – all 
of whom were defeated in major wars and thus brought under Roman rule, or, if the 
reference to the Italians and Latins concerns the Social War, incorporated into the 
state as citizens (cf. Leg. Man. 54; Phil. 4.13).  The word fortuna is not used in this 
passage, but it is a small rhetorical leap to read a causal relationship into the gods‘ 
favour that entitles Rome to its conquests and domination.
432
 
 More typical are references to generals personally extending the boundaries 
of the empire.  At Rep. 3.24 Cicero says that the tribute fines imperi propagavit was 
the standard epitaph for great generals; he credits Pompey (Cat. 3.26) and Caesar 
(Prov. 29, 33; cf. Balb. 64) with this, and exhorts Lepidus to do the same (Phil. 
                                                                                                                                          
the Latins, Sabines, and Samnites, the Punic Wars, and the Third Macedonian War), 3.86 (Third 
Macedonian War); cf. Mur. 58 (Numantine War and Third Punic War). 
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 Cf. Cat. 2.29; 3.18-22; Dom. 143; Sest. 53; Vat. 14; Scaur. 48; Mil. 83.  Religion is a very minor 
theme in Cicero‘s comments about military matters, and is therefore not included in this study.  On his 
attitude towards religion generally, see Goar 1972.  On fortuna in Roman military culture in the late 





  In a related vein, the designation of defensor or custos imperi is only 
applied to generals.
434
  As might be expected, commanders who abuse their military 
power are condemned as threats to the empire (esp. Sest. 17; Prov. 13; Pis. 49 
concerning Piso and Gabinius).  References to empire also serve to quantify the 
magnitude of foreign threats, which are always presented as bellicose and therefore 
meriting a military response: for example, Carthage and Numidia are described as 
duos terrores huius imperi (Mur. 58), Carthage alone as a nation praepotens terra 
marique that huic imperio immineret (Balb. 34; cf. 39), and Mithridates as 
acerrimum hostem huius imperi at Sest. 58.   
 In addition to these fairly concrete references to practical military matters, 
there is a sizeable body of passages which suggest that imperium was regarded as a 
manifestation of Rome‘s military prowess.  These passages provide the best insight 
into Cicero‘s attitude towards the value of empire and the reasons for deploying the 
army in its name.  One striking theme in this collection is the desirability of world 
rule, as conveyed in statements which enthusiastically describe the imperium populi 
Romani as a universal phenomenon.  These typically take the form of references to 
orbis terrarum.
435
  To give one particularly clear example, at Balb. 16 Pompey‘s 
three triumphs are cited as proof that Rome rules the world: testes essent totum 
orbem terrarum nostro imperio teneri (cf. Cat. 3.26; 4.21; Sest. 67).  The 
implications of this passage from the Eighth Philippic are even more revealing of 
contemporary thought: 
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Nos nostris exercitibus quid pollicemur? Multo meliora atque maiora. 
...nos libertatem nostris militibus, leges, iura, iudicia, imperium orbis 
terrae, dignitatem, pacem, otium pollicemur.  (§10) 
 
This confidence in Rome‘s innate superiority and the superiority of its army 
dovetails with the other dominant theme in this group of passages.  In place of the 
reference to geography, we have allusions to gloria, laus, and dignitas which depict 
imperium as a possession which confers prestige and is part of Roman national 
identity.  A clustering of such remarks in the Pro lege Manilia suggests that this 
concept resonated with the people.  Variations on the phrase vestri imperi dignitas et 
gloria occur six times in the speech (§§11, 12, 14, 53, 54, 64; cf. 41 imperi vestri 
splendor) and nowhere else in the corpus.
436
  By contrast, statements linking 
imperium and either dignitas or gloria/laus are relatively common.
437
   
 The military connotations of gloria must be borne in mind in order to 
appreciate fully the relevance of these passages to the army.  That dignitas could also 
be used in such a way is indicated at Mur. 24: summa dignitas est in eis qui militari 
laude antecellunt; omnia enim quae sunt in imperio et in statu civitatis ab his defendi 
et firmari putantur (cf. Div. 1.27).  In a similar vein, the province of Gaul is praised 
as illud firmamentum imperi populi Romani, illud ornamentum dignitatis at Phil. 
3.13, in connection with its loyalty during the war against Antony.   
 Cicero‘s persistent linking of military themes with an imperium that is 
outwardly unconnected with military power or command is striking in its own right, 
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 The nearest equivalents do not have a personal pronoun.  See Flac. 28; Har. 51; Sest. 101; De orat. 
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 See e.g. Ver. 5.98; Flac. 16, 64; Sest. 98; Rep. 1.60; Fin. 1.60; Part. 112 (gloria/laus); Ver. 4.25, 
68; 5.150; Leg. agr. 2.9; Mur. 6, 24; Red. pop. 21; Sest. 1, 139; Phil. 3.13; De orat. 2.168; Div. 1.27; 
Fam. 1.7.4 (dignitas). 
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but is even more significant when compared to contemporary usage.  Richardson 
includes a comparative analysis of late Republican authors in his study of Cicero, 
and finds that Cicero‘s abstract use of imperium is unusual in contemporary 
literature.
438
  The only comparable passages occur in the works of Caesar and Sallust, 
where they account for a small portion of the total instances of imperium.  Only five 
(out of 96) passages in Caesar‘s commentaries refer to the imperium of the Roman 
people, compared to eighteen (out of 90) passages in Sallust‘s works.
439
  Cicero is 
unique, however, for routinely associating this imperium with military activities and 
values.  Caesar‘s references to empire, though intimately connected with the 
battlefield, often concern diplomacy rather than warfare, whereas Sallust‘s tend not 
to mention the army at all.   
 We may ask at this stage why empire had such a military resonance for 
Cicero.  Rhetorical context is certainly part of the answer, since the majority of his 
abstract references to imperium occur in speeches about foreign military matters, 
where praising Rome‘s prowess was a natural and effective strategy.  Yet this does 
not account for the similarity of passages in the treatises and letters, which, as we 
have seen in previous chapters, often reveal more of his personal views or at least 
highlight potential conflict between his public and private attitude.  That historical 
context also played a role is indicated by three clusters of remarks that are identified 
by Richardson.  These concern speeches from the years 63, 56, and 44-43 – years 
which correspond to pivotal moments in Pompey‘s eastern campaigns and Caesar‘s 
                                                 
438
 See Richardson 2008, 92-103. 
439
 Caes. BG 1.33.2, 1.45.3; 4.16.3-4; BC 3.11.3-4, 3.57.4; Sal. Cat. 9.5; 10.1-3; 10.6; 12.5; 36.4; 
51.42; 52.10; Jug. 14.2; 14.16; 24.10; 31.10-11; 31.25; 39.1; Hist. 1 fr. 11; 1 fr. 55; 3 fr. 2; 3 fr. 48; 4 
fr. 69.  Thirty-two other instances in Sallust‘s works are too generalized to classify.  See Richardson 
2008, 98-100 on Sallust‘s linguistic habits, and pp. 92-7 on Caesar‘s. 
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Gallic ones, and the war against Antony, respectively.
440
  That current events should 
affect Cicero‘s rhetoric is not surprising; but the diverse nature of these speeches 
makes the distribution pattern more striking, and suggests that he may have been 
trying to provoke discussion about the way in which Rome wielded its military 
might. 
 This hypothesis is supported by a handful of statements from the same time 
periods which express anxiety about the close connection between army and empire.  
It will be recalled from Chapter 4 that although he accepts imperium as a cause of 
war, he also stipulates that wars of this nature should be waged minus acerbe because 
survival was not at stake (Off. 1.38).  In the De lege agraria and De provinciis 
consularibus he suggests that Rome‘s imperium is hated abroad because of the 
abusive way in which it is often administered.
441
  At Cat. 4.21 he goes so far as to 
question whether conquering new provinces is a greater achievement than preserving 
the homeland – a sentiment which accords neatly with the dictum at Off. 1.76: parvi 
enim sunt foris arma, nisi est consilium domi.  These remarks agree with the 
scepticism about contemporary military practice that was observed above, and 
indicate that he was sensitive to the disadvantages of an empire ruled by force.  
However, to condemn the imperium populi Romani outright would be too much, both 
politically and patriotically.  Given the lack of a coherent concept of empire in his 
writings, it seems likely that the fluid nature of the empire in his time made it 
impossible for him formulate a theoretical solution until late in his life. 
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 See Leg. agr. 1.2 (concerning the decemvirs); 2.45 (generally); Prov. 6 (concerning Piso); cf. Ver. 
5.126-7 alluding to the abuse which attended empire. 
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 This brings us to Off. 2.26-9 as the most detailed and only properly 
theoretical statement about empire in the Ciceronian corpus.  Dyck describes it as 
―the most thoughtful reflections on imperialism that have come down to us from a 
Roman pen.‖
442
  In it, Cicero presents patrocinium as a historically-inspired 
alternative to imperium, and draws a direct line between the breakdown of traditional 
social structures initiated by Sulla‘s proscriptions and the chronic domestic 
instability that plagues the present time.  The description of patrocinium is vital and 
must be quoted in full: 
 
Verum tamen quam diu imperium populi Romani beneficiis tenebatur, 
non iniuriis, bella aut pro sociis aut de imperio gerebantur, exitus 
erant bellorum aut mites aut necessarii, regum, populorum, nationum 
portus erat et refugium senatus, nostri autem magistratus 
imperatoresque ex hac una re maximam laudem capere studebant, si 
provincias, si socios aequitate et fide defendissent. Itaque illud 
patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari.  
(Off. 2.26-7) 
 
The fact that the contrast between patrocinium and imperium is unrivalled in 
preceding and contemporary literature immediately signals that Cicero is promoting 
an independent (and probably personal) ideal.
443
  His nostalgic argument appeals to 
patriotic pride but also constructs an ethical framework whereby the rectitude of 
Rome‘s foreign policy is measured by the welfare of its subjects (cf. QFr. 1.1.24).  
Griffin and Atkins suggest that patrocinium is used metaphorically to contextualize 
the dynamic Cicero envisions between ruler and ruled, but Steel‘s literal 
interpretation based on Roman patronage habits in the provinces is preferable 
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 The word patrocinium is almost a uniquely Ciceronian word in late Republican literature.  It 
appears twice in Sallust‘s Bellum Catilinae (41.4; 48.8) and once in Nepos‘ Life of Phocion (3.1), 
always in a literal sense of support or advocacy.  The concept of ―protectorate‖ may be detected in 
Sal. Jug. 14.12, 16 in Adherbal‘s address to the Senate.   
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 Indeed, the military implications of this juxtaposition become much clearer if 
patrocinium and imperium are replaced by patronus and imperator.  The patronus is 
an unmilitary figure next to the imperator, and by associating Rome‘s empire with 
unmilitary traits rather than military ones, Cicero not only challenges the military 
basis of the empire but also implicitly blames the army for contemporary problems.  
His anxiety about Rome‘s reliance on force is apparent in two remarks which 
introduce and conclude his discussion, respectively.  The first is a thinly-veiled 
warning that any empire built on force is unsustainable: nec vero ulla vis imperii 
tanta est, quae premente metu possit esse diuturna (Off. 2.25).  The second is a 
lament which rounds out his narrative of the corruption of the age: atque in has 




 The repetition of metus/metuo in these two remarks sheds crucial light on 
Cicero‘s conception of the relationship between empire, imperium, and domestic 
strife: imperium properly used could bring about the empire Cicero envisaged (i.e. a 
patrocinium), but would beget domestic strife if improperly used.  Because it was 
practically impossible to control a magistrate‘s conduct once he received imperium, 
the threat of domestic strife was inescapable – and recent history had demonstrated 
the corrupting power of great imperium.  His review of the past forty years begins 
with Sulla‘s proscriptions, which he depicts as the defining moment when past 
                                                 
444
 See Steel 2001, 194: ―What Cicero is doing here... is to transfer to the state the relationship which 
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n. 4. 
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 Off. 2.29.  Cf. similar complaints about Roman rule at Sal. Cat. 3.9; Diod. 32.4.4-5. 
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practices were completely abandoned (penitus amisimus, Off. 2.27).  From Sulla‘s 
example he turns to Caesar‘s, identifying the dictator indirectly by references to 
unum calamitatis ius which encompassed universae provinciae regionesque, and his 
parading of Massilian allies in triumph (§§27-8).  Continuing with the theme of civil 
war, he warns that bellorum civilium semen et causa will never be eliminated so long 
as perditi homines hope for new rewards.
446
  He then repeats the phrase he used to 
describe Rome‘s breach with the past to say that the Republic also has been 
abandoned: rem vero publicam penitus amisimus (§29).   
 Although this passage is very cynical, the fact that Cicero delivers his 
warning indicates a certain degree of hope for future change.  To the extent that this 
change would be driven by dutiful, patriotic magistrates, a correlation can be made 
with the emphasis on obligation in his remarks concerning governors as commanders 
and the socii as military allies.  The focus on defence in §§26-7 also recalls the 
priorities observed above, and creates an intriguing association between unmilitary 
activity and moral probity that echoes the attention to civic values in his theory 
concerning domestic military matters.  It yields a rather simplistic dichotomy in this 
passage, but against the backdrop of military despotism and chronic civil war, a 
policy of healing domestic wounds before trying to conquer the world is surely 
justifiable. 
 Cicero‘s comments about empire show that he approved of the fact of 
Rome‘s military-based imperialism, if not the way in which it was practised in his 
own time.  This distinction is important because it helps to quantify his awareness 
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 Off. 2.29.  Cicero uses the word used is hasta to evoke the auction grounds, which were 
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and understanding of the relevant issues (a major point of contention for his critics), 
and suggests that he was personally interested in the practical problems of 
administering an empire.  Although not as well developed as other aspects of his 
thought, his theory is remarkable because it seems to suggest that his ideal empire 
was a peaceful one.
447
  This concept is perhaps best explained as a combined effect 
of his domestic point of view and his humanitarian attitude towards the welfare of 
Rome‘s subjects: in a perfect empire, all of the inhabitants would enjoy the benefits 
of Roman rule as they were enjoyed at home. 
 
Conclusion: Cicero’s world view 
 Cicero‘s theory concerning foreign military matters is perhaps the most 
revealing yet least satisfying aspect of his outlook.  Although his writings provide 
ample evidence of his engagement with the issues – a not insignificant point in light 
of the domestic focus of his career – the scope of his discussion is limited 
considerably by the domestic subject matter of the majority of his works.  As a result, 
we are left with tantalizing hints of a perspective which gives every indication of 
being unusual but which nevertheless requires a degree of speculation to animate 
fully. 
 One feature which is clear is that Cicero‘s writings give more prominence to 
the ethical consequences of Rome‘s foreign military commitments than Caesar‘s and 
Sallust‘s do.  His focus on the military responsibilities of governors, the place of the 
socii in Rome‘s military programme, and the nature of imperium reflects the major 
issues of the day (esp. imperial self-awareness) but also shows that he saw a causal 
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relationship between ambition fuelled by armed force and worst traits of Roman rule.  
His remarks indicate particular concern that Rome should be seen to deserve its 
empire by combining moral victories with actual ones.  The fact that his ethical 
system emphasizes concerns which are not inherently military – namely justice and 
personal integrity – does not mean that he viewed the army as unimportant; rather, it 
constructs an ideal aimed at correcting the abuses associated with military activity in 
the period.  Thus we have governors depicted as guardians of their provinces rather 
than commanders first and foremost.  The socii are recognized as a vital source of 
manpower and military resources for the Roman army, and Rome‘s empire is recast 
as a patrocinium which protects rather than rules over its subjects.   
 The obvious idealism of Cicero‘s comments should not overshadow the 
significance of his thinking.  Many of the relevant passages are hortatory in nature 
and therefore describe best case scenarios.  Impracticality here must not be confused 
with deficiency of thought: his successful handling of military matters as governor of 
Cilicia and patterns in his choice of forensic clients (and invective victims) confirm 
that he was aware of the practical demands of empire.  Habinek goes so far as to 
credit his ideology with anticipating Augustus‘ Pax Romana.
448
  It is an attractive 
suggestion, but within the confines of the late Republic all that can be said with 
certainty is that Cicero‘s narrative shows that Rome‘s military might created as many 
obligations as it did opportunities. 
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 So far we have examined the ways in which Cicero engaged with military 
men and activities, both as a participant and in theory.  It remains, in this final 
chapter, to address an important recurring feature of this engagement: the tension 
between civic and military values that underlies his thought and activity.  The fact 
that he routinely gives priority to civic concerns over strictly military ones clearly 
indicates a bias, and it is worth considering whether this prioritization is indicative of 
what might be termed ―anti-militaristic‖ sentiment.  This chapter will investigate the 
nature of his bias by way of the two most revealing collections of texts concerning 
the theme: a series of explicit pro- and anti-military value judgements and his self-
constructed identity as a domestic military leader in 63 and 44-43.  The analysis will 
emphasize political and rhetorical context in an effort to isolate expressions of 
opinion from those reflecting the needs of the moment.  The presence (or absence) of 
equivalent sentiments in the writings of contemporary authors will provide a 
framework for determining the significance of Cicero‘s pro-civic bias. 
 The implications of the label ―anti-militarism‖ are considerable, not least for 
their effect on  the authority and value of his military comments.  At first glance, his 
conspicuously civilian identity and civic-focussed values give the impression of 
antagonism towards the army; yet they also fit a man who disliked military life and 
was passionate about the well-being of his country.  This overlap between inclination 
and principle complicates the analysis of Cicero‘s bias, and is the downfall of many 
 
233 
modern attempts to describe his position.  Although the term anti-militarism is never 
used, it is implied by the tone of the discussion, which typically cites Cicero‘s failure 
to pursue a military career after the Social War as evidence of antagonism towards 
military activity.
449
  We may also be tempted to attribute his apparent pro-civic bias 
to insecurity about his lack of military credentials in a militaristic age.  Because these 
interpretations are intimately connected with Cicero‘s authority as a military 
commentator but not supported by the findings of the previous chapters, it will be a 
secondary aim of this chapter to clarify the relationship between his civilian career 
and his pro-civic value system. 
 It should be noted here that Cicero never denies the value of military activity 
in absolute terms.  Even his most explicit statements in favour of civic activity are 
formulated as comparisons with military activity (e.g. Cat. 4.21; Off. 1.74-7).  Thus 
the issue at the heart of this chapter is the relative value he accords to civic versus 
military activity.  The term ―anti-militarism‖ will be used loosely to refer to this 
phenomenon in order to draw attention to the unconventional priorities indicated in 
his writings.  Tension between the civic and military spheres has been a minor but 
constant theme in the previous chapters, from the evaluation of his military 
experience in Chapter 1 to the identification of civic priorities in his military theory 
in Chapters 4 and 5.  The very presence of this tension is revealing because it 
indicates that he thought of the civic and military spheres as having competing 
interests on some level.  This competitive view contrasts with what appears to have 
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been a prevailing co-operative view (judging by signs of strain in Cicero‘s rhetoric), 
although it is difficult to quantify contemporary attitudes.  Caesar‘s commentaries 
present only the military side of the equation, whereas Livy‘s chronicles give an 
artificially balanced account of events domi militiaeque; Sallust, as will be seen, 
takes a competitive view that is highly reminiscent of Cicero‘s and equally self-
conscious.     
 The relevant passages are distributed throughout Cicero‘s mature career.  The 
earliest texts are from his consulship,
450
 but the majority are concentrated at the end 
of his life, specifically the years following his return from Pompey‘s camp in 48.  
This fits with the pattern observed in Chapters 4 and 5, where his best developed 
military theory was clustered in his most mature treatises and seemed to be inspired 
by the lessons of the Civil War.  It suggests that his attitude towards the value of 
military activity, like his ideas of how it should be performed, was the product of 
experience and a desire to bequeath his insight to the next generation.  The fact that 
the value judgements are almost equally divided between the speeches and treatises – 
and are absent from the letters – confirms that he intended them as public statements, 
whether or not they reflect his own views.  Chronology and genre are less relevant 
for the texts concerning his self-representation as a domestic military leader, fixed as 
they are to historical events.  However, the striking similarity of his strategy in both 
episodes recalls the similar use of war rhetoric explored in Chapter 4, indicating that 
this was also a product of principle.  Of particular interest is the relationship between 
military credentials and political influence which these passages imply, as well as the 
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way in which Cicero attempts to surmount (or circumvent) it.  In both 63 and 44-43 
he was in a position of influence but evidently felt the need to augment this with a 
quasi-military persona – and led the Senate into war against Roman citizens in that 
guise.   
 Although the total quantity of these passages is such as to warrant study as a 
rhetorical phenomenon, they represent a small minority of his military comments.  
The polarized, competitive view is the exception rather than the rule, despite the 
civic/military tension observed above but in accordance with the controversial nature 
of their anti-military content.  The fact that Cicero can be shown to be promoting an 
alternative value system makes these passages the most quantifiable evidence of 
novelty in his military outlook.  How far this was the product of his civilian identity 
and whether he was alone in his views remain matters for speculation.  The analysis 
of his preserved statements offer some tantalizing clues, however, placing Cicero on 
a continuum of anti-militaristic reactions to military despotism and civil war in the 
transition from Republic to Empire.  Because anti-militarism is the primary concern 
of this chapter, his value judgements will be examined first and assessed against anti-
militarism in contemporary authors.  This will allow the analysis of his activity in 63 
and 44-43 to serve as confirmation for these findings, and link these two episodes to 
the contemporary anti-militarism explored in the first part of the chapter. 
 
Value judgements  
 Cicero‘s pro- and anti-military value judgements form a striking series of 





 they represent the fullest expression of the civic/military 
tension in his writings.  In each statement, civic or military activity is described as 
superior to the other, as though they were in direct competition.  Naturally – and 
often by necessity, as will be seen – Cicero was able to argue either way.  Thus the 
existence of pro-military statements is not surprising, even though it contradicts his 
better-attested pro-civic prejudice.   
 Of greater significance are patterns of distribution and theme.  Nearly all date 
from the years after the Civil War, and none date from before his consulship.  This 
suggests that experience was crucial to his outlook, and that there was a degree of 
fluidity in his perception that allowed him to react to current events without 
sacrificing abstract ideals.  This is supported by the fact that four of the anti-military 
statements concern his suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy as a 
civilian/domestic event – a clustering which also raises questions about how far his 
―anti-militarism‖ was really self-aggrandizement.
452
  Perhaps most importantly, the 
pro- and anti-military value judgements do not occur in self-contained groups.  
Instead, they alternate throughout the relevant speeches and treatises – the De officiis 
even contains one of each type (Off. 2.45; 1.77, respectively), casting doubt on 
Cicero‘s committment to either argument within the work, and in the value 
judgements generally. 
 The key to understanding these statements is context and subtext.  Even 
though both civic and military interests seem to be represented, once conditioning 
factors and historical background are taken into account it becomes clear that all of 
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the value judgements express a pro-civic bias.  It is remarkable that this can be 
detected even in outwardly pro-military statements, and indicates that Cicero‘s view 
was based on a principle that overrode even political and forensic exigency.  The 
complex and convoluted lines of reasoning he employs in the anti-military statements 
confirm that his argument there was unconventional and perhaps less cogent than he 
might have wished.  By contrast, his pro-military arguments are straight-forward, 
evoking ―everyone thinks so‖ rationales which both affirm and exploit popular 
opinion.   
 In the interest of clarity, and in order to appreciate the consistent pro-civic 
bias of these statements fully, the pro- and anti-military value judgements will be 
examined separately.  Cicero‘s ―real‖ argument will be extracted from his rhetoric 
and weaknesses inherent to it or the overall presentation will be identified and 
assessed.  This will be followed by a comparative study of anti-militaristic statements 
in contemporary authors which will emphasize their points of complaint as well as 
generic factors influencing their precise expression.  Using these as a standard 
against which to measure Cicero, it will be demonstrated that he was neither alone in 
his scepticism of the army nor in fact anti-militaristic. 
 We begin with the anti-military value judgements, and with the four 
pertaining to the suppression of Catiline, which are linked by theme and the 
recurrence of specific ideas within them.  The earliest of these statements is Cat. 
4.21, where Cicero asserts that his achievement is on par with the victories of 
Rome‘s military heroes. The passage has attracted a great deal of attention for the 
offensive or at least outlandish nature of the statement, as possible evidence of 
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revision prior to publication.
453
  Africanus‘ defeat of Hannibal, Aemilianus‘ conquest 
of Carthage and Numantia, Paullus‘ defeat of Perses, Marius‘ victories over the 
Cimbri and Teutones, and Pompey‘s exploits are mentioned in the lead-up to the 
assertion (rather presumptously introduced) that erit profecto inter horum laudes 
aliquid loci nostrae gloriae, nisi forte maius est patefacere nobis provincias quo 
exire possimus quam curare ut etiam illi qui absunt habeant quo victores 
revertantur.  Yet Cicero is, in Dyck‘s words, ―skating on thin ice‖ with this 
argument, because the commanders he mentions all celebrated triumphs, whereas he 
had only been voted a supplicatio.
454
  The heavy patriotic overtones of his rationale 
obscure the reality that the Senate – the very body to which he addressed this speech 
– had not recognized his achievement as the equivalent of a military victory and that 
his comparison with the military heroes was strictly speaking unjustified.   
 It is perhaps evidence of the poor reception of this argument that it does not 
reappear in Cicero‘s praises of civic activity until Off. 1.78, where it is a tangent to 
the main line of reasoning.  Instead, his other value judgements concerning the 
events of 63 refer to the oft-quoted and much-maligned verse from his poem about 
this consulship: cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi.  It is discussed in the 
most detail in the In Pisonem, where it supports Cicero‘s attack on Piso‘s intellect.   
 
...scire cupio quid tandem in isto versu reprehendas, ‗cedant arma 
togae.‘ ‗Tuae dicis‘ inquit ‗togae summum imperatorem esse 
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cessurum.‘ ... Non dixi hanc togam qua sum amictus, nec arma 
scutum et gladium unius imperatoris, sed quia pacis est insigne et oti 
toga, contra autem arma tumultus atque belli, poetarum more tum 
locutus hoc intellegi volui, bellum ac tumultum paci atque otio 
concessurum. ... ‗At in altero illo‘ inquit ‗haeres, ―concedat laurea 
laudi‖.‘ ... Atque ista oratione hoc tamen intellegi, scelerate, vis, 
Pompeium inimicum mihi isto versu esse factum...  (Pis. 73-4) 
 
Cicero‘s explanation highlights the conflict between the poetic and literal 
interpretation of it.  He is at pains to justify himself, since Piso had claimed earlier 
that the verse applied to Pompey specifically, and was moreover the cause of 
Cicero‘s exile: “non illa tibi” inquit “invidia nocuit, sed versus tui” (§72).  There is 
nothing controversial about cedant arma togae, although Cicero is identified with 
peace and civilian status regardless of how one reads it.  However, as Nisbet notes, 
the second half of the verse disproves Cicero‘s assertions of neutrality, since laurea 
denotes a general‘s victories.
455
  Arma in the first part of the line therefore cannot 
mean war or violence generally, but must refer to the weapons of a specific general – 
precisely the opposite of Cicero‘s claim.  That he is in an awkward position may 
further be seen in the forced-sounding references to his friendship with Pompey 
(§§75-6), his only real attempt to counter Piso‘s allegations.  He criticizes Piso for 
discarding his laurea at the Esquiline Gate on his return from Macedonia (§74; cf. 
61), but does not relate this to why Piso‘s reading of the poem is wrong.  The 
circumstances make it impossible to determine his intended meaning of the verse, but 
they do set up an intriguing implicit contrast between civic and military figures: even 
if Piso‘s interpretation of the verse reflects the prevailing understanding of it, he is an 
illiterate brute of an Imperator next to Cicero the civilian poet.   
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 Greater insight into Cicero‘s value system is provided by the two other 
citations of the verse at Phil. 2.20 and Off. 1.77.  The latter passage is the most 




Illud autem optimum est, in quod invadi solere ab improbis et invidis 
audio: ‗cedant arma togae concedat laurea laudi.‘ Ut enim alios 
omittam, nobis rem publicam gubernantibus nonne togae arma 
cesserunt? Neque enim periculum in re publica fuit gravius umquam 
nec maius otium. Ita consiliis diligentiaque nostra celeriter de 
manibus audacissimorum civium delapsa arma ipsa ceciderunt. Quae 
res igitur gesta umquam in bello tanta? qui triumphus conferendus?  
(Off. 1.77) 
 
The verse is quoted as the best expression of a principle which is introduced with a 
manifesto in §74: sed cum plerique arbitrentur res bellicas maiores esse quam 
urbanas, minuenda est haec opinio.  In §76, following some Greek and Roman 
exemplary illustrations, Cicero sums up his argument with the neat phrase parvi enim 
sunt foris arma, nisi est consilium domi.  He then invokes P. Nasica as a foil to 
Scipio Africanus the Elder – asserting that Africanus‘ victories were not of more 
benefit to the Republic than Nasica‘s assassination of Ti. Gracchus (!).  The tone of 
this assertion is highly apologetic, but Nasica‘s is a necessary precedent for Cicero‘s 
civilian triumph over the Catilinarians.  According to Dyck, this is an ―instance 
where the issues that are really on Cicero‘s mind obtrude themselves even at the 
expense of the clarity of the argument.‖
457
  The emphasis on individual examples 
underscores Nisbet‘s contention that the verse is not a generalization.  There is no 
question that Cicero is proud of his conformity to his ideal, but his stronger 
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commitment to the dissemination of the principle itself is made clear when he 
addresses his son Marcus: licet enim mihi, M. fili, apud te gloriari, ad quem et 
hereditas huius gloriae et factorum imitatio pertinet (§78).  As Griffin and Atkins 
note, Marcus is encouraged to follow in his father‘s civilian footsteps.
458
  A recitation 
of a compliment from Pompey – strikingly similar to Cat. 4.21 – confirms the 
magnitude of Cicero‘s achievement, bringing him to the conclusion that civic 
accomplishments are not only not inferior to military ones, but require greater 
diligence and effort: sunt igitur domesticae fortitudines non inferiores militaribus; in 
quibus plus etiam quam in his operae studiique ponendum est (§78).  
 The treatment of the verse in the Second Philippic is more problematic.   
 
‗Cedant arma togae.‘ Quid? tum nonne cesserunt? At postea tuis armis 
cessit toga. Quaeramus igitur utrum melius fuerit libertati populi 
Romani sceleratorum arma an libertatem nostram armis tuis cedere. 
Nec vero tibi de versibus plura respondebo: tantum dicam breviter, te 
neque illos neque ullas omnino litteras nosse; me nec rei publicae nec 
amicis umquam defuisse, et tamen omni genere monumentorum 
meorum perfecisse operis subsicivis...  (Phil. 2.20) 
 
Nisbet argues that Cicero here promotes the wrong reading of the verse, as he did in 
the In Pisonem.
459
  The rhetorical context is actually strikingly similar to that of the 
In Pisonem, as Cicero is forced into a defensive position in the midst of an invective 
against a political opponent.  Only the first part of the verse is quoted, but the 
controversy of the latter part is present in his rhetorical question to Antony.  As in 
Piso‘s case, this leads to the disparagement of Antony‘s literary sophistication.  
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Cicero is once again the civilian poet-patriot next to Antony the brutish and 
threatening general.  This polarization based on personalities supports the principal 
argument that military achievements are not inherently superior to civic ones; but it 
also shows that much depends on how the general or civilian in question wields their 
influence. 
 That Cicero‘s attitude was not simply borne of pride in his own example is 
shown by the remaining two anti-military value judgements, which do not refer to 
the Catilinarian conspiracy.  The earliest of these is De orat. 1.7-8, a convoluted 
passage which opens on a very pro-military note: quis enim est qui si clarorum 
hominum scientiam rerum gestarum vel utilitate vel magnitudine metiri velit, non 
anteponat oratori imperatorem? (§7).  He proceeds to compare orators to both 
commanders and statesmen, and oratory to unidentified alia studia, concluding that 
orators and the study of oratory are more valuable because they are under-
represented in contemporary society.  The context of this passage makes it clear that 
this is Cicero‘s own view: in the proem he speaks in his own voice to Quintus, the 
dedicatee of the treatise, explaining why he chose to write such a work.  We may 
imagine him identifying himself with the viri omnium eloquentissimi clarissimique 
whose thoughts he purports to set out.  Fantham notes that his answer to the question 
in §7 is that great orators are rare because they must combine skill in oratory with 
statesmanship
460
 – a criterion he would certainly have believed he met.  Overall, his 
need-based argument is essentially the same as the one he uses to defend his military 
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protégés in the forum: it is an opportunistic deflection of attention from the inherent 
worthiness of the subject in favour of the sympathetic value of what it represents.
461
   
 This brings us to the last anti-military value judgement.  At Marc. 28-9 
Cicero champions the superiority of civic activity to no less a military man than 
Caesar. 
 
Obstupescent posteri certe imperia, provincias, Rhenum, Oceanum, 
Nilum, pugnas innumerabilis, incredibilis victorias, monimenta, 
munera, triumphos audientes et legentes tuos: sed nisi haec urbs 
stabilita tuis consiliis et institutis erit, vagabitur modo tuum nomen 
longe atque late, sedem stabilem et domicilium certum non habebit.  
 
Gotoff calls this passage ―a pretty conceit in which the stability of Rome is a 
condition for the stability of Caesar‘s reputation.‖
462
  While true, the general 
principle would certainly apply to any military figure in Caesar‘s position.  
Nevertheless, the idea that civic accomplishments are a guarantee of lasting fame is 
striking in the Roman context, and particularly in the context of this speech.  The 
statement has its origins in §25, as a reply to Caesar‘s claim that he has lived long 
enough.  Cicero uses this to construct a binary of admiration and glory, playing on 
Caesar‘s desire for immortality by arguing that his military achievements, although 
admirable, are not a source of glory.  Thus the assertion here that although future 
generations will be astounded (obstupescent) by Caesar‘s conquests, he will not 
secure fame unless he stabilizes Rome itself – which is to say, undoes the damage of 
the Civil War.  We should see in this ―lest others think‖ caveat a thinly-veiled 
caution to Caesar lest he think that his military conquests are a sufficient legacy.  
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That the path to immortality sketched by Cicero agrees with his own political agenda 
of restoring the Republic is no accident of course.  Nevertheless, the manner of his 
advice to Caesar shows that civic service rather than the identity of the figure 
performing it is the priority. 
 Having seen how Cicero challenged the conventional weighting of civic and 
military achievements, we turn now to the value judgements which support the 
traditional order – or at least appear to.  Whereas the anti-military statements are 
striking in their bold assertions of the value of civilian service, his pro-military ones 
are distinguished by a subtle conflict between context and subtext which mitigates 
the apparent inconsistency. 
 The earliest, and perhaps best-known of these occurs at Mur. 30, where 
Cicero seems to claim that it is better to be a soldier than an orator. 
 
Duae sint artes quae possint locare homines in amplissimo gradu 
dignitatis, una imperatoris, altera oratoris boni. Ab hoc enim pacis 
ornamenta retinentur, ab illo belli pericula repelluntur. ... Omnia ista 
nobis studia de manibus excutiuntur, simul atque aliqui motus novus 
bellicum canere coepit. ... Quod si ita est, cedat, opinor, Sulpici, 
forum castris, otium militiae, stilus gladio, umbra soli; sit denique in 
civitate ea prima res propter quam ipsa est civitas omnium princeps.  
(cf. §22) 
 
The rationale is compelling, but Cicero‘s own example belies his argument.  Outside 
the forum, as the togatus dux et imperator, he was orchestrating war against Catiline; 
inside it, he was defending the military man Murena.  The key, of course, is the 
refutation of Sulpicius‘ attack on Murena‘s claim to the consulship, which required 
an encomium of military service to counterbalance Sulpicius‘ civic career and 
dignitas.  The fact that the resulting rhetoric upholds the status quo obscures the 
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significance of the circumstances of the trial.  Murena, although a general and 
therefore ―better‖ than an orator, still needs an orator to defend him.  Conversely, his 
defence rests not on his own merits as a military man but on the fact that a general is 
needed to carry on the war with Catiline, continuing Cicero‘s policy and presumably 
also pursuing an ostensibly peaceful resolution.  Cicero‘s enthusiastic praise of 
military service in this speech reflects the demands of the case rather than his own 
view.  This is nothing unique, but the fact that Cicero avoids undermining his own 
credibility with these claims shows that the substance of his argument was more 
important than its packaging. 
 A similar strategy can be detected in the next pro-military statement, which is 
the earliest of the cluster from the years following his return from the civil war.     
 
Verum quidem si audire volumus, omissis illis divinis consiliis, 
quibus saepe constituta est imperatorum sapientia salus civitatis aut 
belli aut domi, multo magnus orator praestat minutis imperatoribus. 
‗At prodest plus imperator.‘ Quis negat?  Sed tamen – non metuo ne 
mihi acclametis; est autem quod sentias dicendi liber locus – malim 
mihi L. Crassi unam pro M‘. Curio dictionem quam castellanos 
triumphos duo. (Brut. 256) 
 
Here again the value of commanders to the community is emphasized over the less 
tangible contributions of civilian activities.  However, the distinction between 
sapientia and benefit (prodest) hints at Cicero‘s real thoughts on the matter.  This 
passage forms a digression from the main argument of the treatise, and the manner of 
its introduction is revealing: the topic is brought up by Brutus, who mentions 
Caesar‘s praise of Cicero‘s eloquence and states that he reckons that gloria greater 
than a triumph.  ―Cicero‖ is thus given an opportunity to reflect on that theme, which 
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leads to our oddly-worded statement.  Although ―Cicero‖ claims to be unafraid of 
disapproval, he sets up the initial comparison as one between a magnus orator and 
minuti imperatores.  At Mur. 30, the comparison is between an fully-fledged 
imperator and a bonus orator.  ―Cicero‖ also disparages outpost triumphs in favour 
of oratory and sculpture.  The advice in §257 to judge a man‘s importance not by 
utility but by real worth further implies that military service lacks real worth.  As 
above, context is key to appreciating the ―real‖ argument.  The literary setting of the 
dialogue disguises a political manifesto.  As Hendrickson has shown, the Brutus is a 
reply to the real Brutus‘ treatise De virtute, which advocated complete withdrawal 
from political life and the cultivation of inner virtue during Caesar‘s domination.
463
  
Cicero believed that this entailed the death of oratory, and the Brutus purports to 
chart the decline by way of a historical survey of past and present orators.  However, 
as the first publication of Cicero‘s post-war philosophical period, the Brutus in fact 
heralds his return to public life.  Thus there is a gentle rebuke in the dedication for 
Brutus to throw off his retirement.  Although Cicero seems to adhere to the precepts 
of Brutus‘ advice in this passage, the examples of real worth which he cites also 
happen to be important civilian figures: L. Crassus the orator, and, in the next 
section, Phidias the sculptor.  Cicero was literally not at liberty to be more forthright, 
but the passage stands as an admirable first effort.   
 In addition to rallying his contemporaries, Cicero also rallies himself with his 
pro-civic value judgements.  A reflection on death at Fin. 2.97 concludes that 
praeclarae mortes sunt imperatoriae; philosophi autem in suis lectulis plerumque 
moriuntur.  The contrast of the public stage of the general‘s death with the private 
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setting of the philosopher‘s bed is consistent with the active and contemplative 
binary, and the reader is meant to aspire to the general‘s end.  However, the 
discussion which surrounds this statement complicates matters considerably, 
beginning with the statement which follows this line: refer tamen, quo modo (2.97).  
Book 2 of the De finibus is a refutation of Epicurean ethics from the Stoic point of 
view, put in Cicero‘s mouth.  The value judgement is part of his attack on Epicurus‘ 
alleged inconsistency.
464
  In §97 his death is compared with the deaths of two well 
known military exempla, Epaminondas at Mantinea and Leonidas at Thermopylae – 
but the sentence is framed with the words non…antepono, making Epicurus‘ courage 
fully the equal of these commanders, and expressing the idea that philosophers can 
be heroes, too.  So, far from disparaging philosophers and other contemplatives, this 
passage actually elevates them to equality with commanders.  Nor is it hard to 
imagine Cicero in 45, following the breakdown of two marriages, the death of Tullia, 
and enforced political retirement under Caesar, nurturing the idea that philosophers 
like himself can still die gloriously. 
 This brings us to the last pro-military statement, which occurs at Off. 2.45.   
 
Prima est igitur adulescenti commendatio ad gloriam, si qua ex 
bellicis rebus comparari potest.  In qua multi apud maiores nostros 
extiterunt; semper enim fere bella gerebantur. Tua autem aetas incidit 
in id bellum cuius altera pars sceleris nimium habuit, altera felicitatis 
parum. ... Atque ea quidem tua laus pariter cum re publica cecidit. 
Mihi autem haec oratio suscepta non de te est... 
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At first glance, this passage seems to be the antithesis of Off. 1.77.  Far from 
promoting civic activity, a military career is described as prima for a young man – 
specifically Cicero‘s son Marcus, to whom the treatise was dedicated.  The 
approving summary of Marcus‘ career highlights the young man‘s conformity with 
the traditional practice of extensive military experience before starting the cursus 
honorum.  Of course, Cicero had taken a different path, and so we have a situation 
similar to that in Mur. 30 where he seems to support the status quo but stops short of 
undermining his own position.  Griffin and Atkins see the statement as an 
acknowledgement of the superior place of military gloria in Rome.
465
  This is true, 
but does not take into account what this passage may also reveal about Cicero‘s 
relationship with his son.  The ellipsis contains an impressive description of the 
military skills Marcus had demonstrated during his tirocinium in the Civil War – 
skills which would make any Roman father proud, but show Marcus to be more like 
his uncle Quintus than his father.  It is therefore tempting to see a momentary flicker 
of frustration in this passage, perhaps comparable to the feelings of inferiority 
aroused by Quintus‘ military skill.
466
  The statement is prefaced by a lengthy 
discussion on the importance of being as one wishes to be regarded, in light of the 
scrutiny that attends fame and distinction.  Marcus had been spared needing to fight 
for his place in society, yet Cicero makes a point of saying that his military 
reputation cum re publica cecidit.  The implications of this fresh start become clearer 
in §46, where Cicero states that mental pursuits are more rewarding than purely 
physical ones, and that facillume autem et in optimam partem cognoscuntur 
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adulescentes, qui se ad claros et sapientes viros bene consulentes rei publicae 
contulerunt.  We know from subsequent references to Marcus‘ service in the war 
against Antony that Cicero was proud of his son‘s military skill and success.
467
  By 
getting caught up in Marcus‘ personal situation in this passage, he is allowed to break 
character temporarily and espouse a view of military activity based on a specific 
example.  Marcus had proved his ability and aptitude for military service – it was 
now time for him to begin his civic training so that he could follow in his father‘s 
footsteps. 
 The consistent pro-civic bias of these value judgements signifies that they are 
expressions of a principle rather than rhetorical expedients.  Although it was 
certainly to Cicero‘s advantage to promote a value system in which his own pursuits 
of oratory and civic government were considered superior to commanding an army, 
to attribute his outlook wholly to motives of self-aggrandizement or justification is to 
overlook possible historical and political conditioning factors.  The last decades of 
Cicero‘s life (and of the Republic, generally) were fraught with civil war and 
political instability caused by power-hungry commanders.  That the violence of the 
age bred cynicism about Rome‘s military leadership is clear from contemporary 
sources.
468
  The cluster of Cicero‘s value judgments in the years 46-43 indicates that 
the experience of the Civil War was formative, triggering a more assertive type of 
―anti-militarism.‖  
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A continuum of anti-militarism? 
 Remarkably, a similar effect can be identified in the writings of contemporary 
authors and those of the next generation.  Chief among these are the poets of the 
early Augustan period, all of whom except Ovid were born before or during the Civil 
War of 49-45.  This shared experience of civil war (including those of the late 40s 
and 30s), combined with similarities in their expressions of anti-militarism thus 
unites these authors more than genre and ―era‖ divide them.  Their rhetorical 
reactions furnish a continuum on which to place Cicero‘s reaction and provide 
compelling evidence that scepticism of contemporary military policy was more 
widespread than is usually acknowledged. 
 The authors may be divided into groups of prose and poetry.  Sallust is 
artificially isolated as the only prose example by virtue of the pro-military narrative 
perspective of Caesar‘s commentaries and the annalistic aloofness of Livy‘s history, 
which does not construct a pro- or anti-military discourse.  The poets of particular 
note are Catullus, Vergil, Horace, Tibullus, Propertius, and Ovid.  Overall, the anti-
militarism of both groups is strikingly similar to Cicero‘s, being framed as 
competitions between civic and military activities.  Although the specific type of 
civic activity varies, it is consistently – and almost always explicitly – depicted as 
superior to its military counterpart.   
 This can be seen in the proems of both of Sallust‘s mongraphs, which were 
written during civil wars.
469
  Ever the moralist, he laments the decline of Roman 
society and especially her political class.  But whereas Cicero championed the 
civilian side of public life, Sallust withdraws from it completely in frustration. 
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Atque ego credo fore qui, quia decrevi procul a re publica aetatem 
agere, tanto tamque utili labori meo nomen inertiae imponant, certe 
quibus maxuma industria videtur salutare plebem et conviviis gratiam 
quaerere. Qui si reputaverint, et quibus ego temporibus magistratus 
adeptus sim et quales viri idem adsequi nequiverint et postea quae 
genera hominum in senatum pervenerint, profecto existumabunt me 
magis merito quam ignavia iudicium animi mei mutavisse maiusque 
commodum ex otio meo quam ex aliorum negotiis rei publicae 
venturum. (Jug. 4.3-4)  
 
The version at Cat. 3.3-4.2 is less confident but has the same tone of defiant yet self-
conscious apology.  Even before the last line, where otium is upheld as a form of 
public service (cf. Cat. 3.2 on the value of writing history), it is clear that Sallust‘s 
value system is controversial.  The detail of his criticism of contemporary practice 
suggests that he expected his audience to be sympathetic to his position and perhaps 
even like-minded.  Like Cicero, he never questions the value of military activity 
directly; but statements praising intellectual accomplishments over those of brute 
force (Cat. 1.3) and wishing that men had the same appetite for honourable pursuits 
as for detrimental ones (Jug. 1.5) certainly allude to contemporary affairs.  The 
connection he draws between political change and war is particularly noteworthy: 
 
Nam vi quidem regere patriam aut parentis, quamquam et possis et 
delicta corrigas, tamen importunum est, quom praesertim omnes 
rerum mutationes caedem, fugam aliaque hostilia portendant. (Jug. 
3.2) 
 
This statement is prefaced by an explicit rejection of civic magistracies and military 
commands on the grounds that neque virtuti honos datur (Jug. 3.1).  For Sallust, war 
was an inevitable, unavoidable consequence of contemporary politics – as indeed it 
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must have seemed by the late 40s.  His sensitivity to the social effects of civil war fit 
with the reasons he gives for choosing to write about the Catilinarian conspiracy and 
the war with Jugurtha, and indicate an outlook that is very similar to Cicero‘s.
470
 
 The poets also advocate a substitution of ―superior‖ civilian pastimes for 
―inferior‖ military ones.  The most important form which this anti-militarism takes is 
the elegiac theme of militia amoris, whereby military vocabulary is used to describe 
love affairs.  The descriptions range from metaphorical comparisons of the lover and 
the soldier, each labouring in their respective ―camps‖, to more elaborate 
constructions that rate romantic ―triumphs‖ above military ones.  The theme is 
neither unique to this period nor unusual in love poetry, but its occurrence in the 
context of civil war and the aftermath of civil war merits further, more literal 
attention.
471
   
 It is in this light that we should read Catullus 11 as a ―precursor‖ of militia 
amoris.
472
  Catullus died before the Civil War of 49 and his poems contain very little 
identifiable anti-militarism.
473
  The juxtaposition of military and romantic themes in 
poem 11 thus supplies a useful standard for anti-militarism before the civil wars.  On 
the surface, the poem seems favourable to military service, which provides welcome 
distance during a painful break-up.  An elaborate description of Catullus on 
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 Sallust explains his interest in the war with Jugurtha as the first real episode of political resistence 
to the nobility (Jug. 5.1-2), and says that the Catilinarian conspiracy was important because of the 
nature of and threat posed by Catiline‘s crimen (Cat. 4.4). 
471
 See Murgatroyd 1975 and Gale 1997, 78-85 on the Greek origins of militia amoris and the 
development of the theme in Roman elegy.  Cloud 1993 argues that the Augustan poets cannot be 
used as evidence of an anti-military counterculture precisely because militia amoris is a conventional 
theme; but this ignores both the historical context of the poetry and the link with anti-militarism in late 
Republican literature.   
472
 As identified by Hejduk 2008, 13.  Cf. Steel 2001, 136 on Cic. Mur. 22 as a foreshadowing of 
―some of the elegiac extravagances of  the militia amoris.‖ 
473
 His treatment of Caesar and Pompey is highly unflattering, however, and occasionally alludes to 
their military identities.  See esp. 29.12; 54.6-7, both using the phrase unice imperator.  On Catullus‘ 
relationship with Caesar and Pompey, see esp. Scott 1971 (regarding poem 29). 
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campaign at the frontiers of the empire prefaces the rather summary repudiation that 
concludes the poem.  There is a crucial statement in the transition between 
travelogue and rejection, however.  In lines 13-14 Catullus refers to his companions, 
who will relay his message, as omnia haec, quaecumque feret uoluntas caelitum, 
temptare simul parati.  The choice of infinitive, along with the universal relative, 
show that the journey is fictional.
474
  If Catullus is in Rome, the mention of distant 
lands is but a threat which quantifies his hatred: he is so out of love that he would 
prefer the hardships of campaign to being near his former mistress.  That 
campaigning is meant is indicated by the word comites in line 1, which is the normal 
term for members of a military cohors.
475
  This inversion of the separated lovers 
variant of militia amoris (e.g. Verg. Ecl. 10; Ov. Am. 2.10.31-8) nevertheless 
attaches negative value to military activity – especially if the references to foreign 




 The anti-militarism of the remaining poets – all of whom lived through some 
part of the cycles of civil war between 49 and 31 – is more straightforward.  Many of 
these men deal with civil war specifically in their poetry, condemning it in 
accordance with the traditional Roman abhorrence of that type of conflict.
477
  Such a 
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 This explains the choice of Furius and Aurelius as companions despite the abuse they are subjected 
to elsewhere.  See poems 16 (both); 15, 21 (Aurelius); 23, 26 (Furius).  Fordyce 1961, 124 gives two 
explanations of their function here: they represent Catullus‘ new hatred for Lesbia, or Lesbia sent 
them to Catullus with a message from her. 
475
 See Quinn 1970, n. ad loc, where Crassus‘ Parthian campaign and Caesar‘s second British 
campaign are identified as the most likely options. 
476
 This idea is perhaps most apparent in lines 11-12: Gallicum Rhenum horribile aequor ultimosque 
Britannos.  Fordyce 1961, 124 reads the reference to Caesar as a genuine compliment. 
477
 See e.g. Hor. Epod. 7.3-10; 16; Carm. 1.35.32-40; 2.1.21-4; 3.6; Prop. 1.21; 1.22; cf. Verg. G. 
1.489-514 and Aen. 6.828-33 on the civil wars of the 40s and 30s; Tib. 2.3.36-40 concerning the 
human cost of war and greed.  On Roman attitudes towards civil war, see above, pp. 168-80. 
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sentiment is therefore to be expected; but the promotion of civic activity as the equal 
(or better) of military service is not. 
 Vergil is the earliest of these writers.  He was born in 70 and was thus old 
enough to participate in the Civil War, unlike his successors who will be examined 
below.
478
  His attitude towards warfare is outwardly tempered by his public 
admiration of Augustus as the bringer of peace, yet misgivings about Rome‘s 
military policy may be detected even in this context.  In the First Georgic an 
invocation to the gods hunc saltem euerso iuuenem succurrere saeclo ne prohibete 
(lines 500-1) is followed by the description of a world turned upside-down by 
warfare that is not all civil in nature: 
 
quippe ubi fas uersum atque nefas: tot bella per orbem,                
    tam multae scelerum facies, non ullus aratro 
dignus honos, squalent abductis arua colonis, 
    et curuae rigidum falces conflantur in ensem. 
hinc mouet Euphrates, illinc Germania bellum; 
    uicinae ruptis inter se legibus urbes                




The agricultural focus of the Georgics should not detract from the significance of 
Vergil‘s use of agriculture as a barometer of right and wrong in this passage.  
Mynors notes that saltem (line 500) in Vergil‘s writings normally denotes a second-
best option, which in this context likely implies that it would have been better for the 
wars not to have happened than for Rome to need the saviour-figure represented by 
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 It is unclear, however, whether Vergil served in this or subsequent civil wars.  On the difficulties of 
reconstructing his biography, see Horsfall 2001, 1-25.  The Eclogues date from the late 40s, the 
Georgics from 37-29, and the Aeneid was unfinished at Vergil‘s death in 19. 
479
 G. 1.505-11.  Spurr 1986, 180 also reads the passage as referring to world-wide destruction, but 





  The implicit conflict between agriculture and war makes war 
seem unnatural – even when it involves foreign peoples – whereas the complaint 
about neglected farmland suggests that Rome‘s wars are fundamentally 
unsustainable.  The association of agriculture with peacetime and plenty make it a 
preferable pastime by comparison.
481
   
 In a related vein, Ecl. 9.11-13 advises that carmina cease to be relevant tela 
inter Martia – a sentiment with a striking similarity to Cicero‘s declaration at Mur. 
22 that the artes of the forum are put aside at the first sign of war.  Intriguingly, war 
is even less to be desired in the Aeneid, where, as Lyne notes, there is no pride in the 
―ugly violence‖ by which Aeneas fulfils his destiny of founding the future Roman 
empire.
482
  Aeneas does not rejoice at his impending victory over the Laurentines 
(8.537-40), is eager to end the fated bloodshed after he defeats the Latins (11.108-
11), and reproaches his men for their irae when they rush to fight Turnus on his 
behalf (12.313-14).  In a word, he is a hero who would rather be elsewhere, putting 
his piety to use in a peaceful, civic context.
483
   
 Next we have Horace, who, as a sixteen-year-old in 49, was old enough to 
understand the implications of the conflict.  He served at Philippi (Carm. 2.7.9; 
3.4.26-7) and may also have served against Sextus Pompey in 36 and against Antony 
at Actium.
484
  Although he is very positive about Octavian‘s victories, he mainly 
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 Mynors 1990, n. ad loc. 
481
 Cf. examples from the animal kingdom at G. 3.209-41 and 4.67-87, where duelling bulls and bees, 
respectively, show how passion gets in the way of agricultural productivity.  Both passages are 
discussed in this context by Nappa 2005, 136-7 and 168-70, respectively.  On the implicit anti-war 
message of the Georgics, see Cowles 1934, 360-1. 
482
 Lyne 1983, 203; cf. 191.  Similar points are made by Cowles 1934, 361-73 in his discussion of 
anti-war themes in the Aeneid.  
483
 See e.g. Gransden 1991,  n. ad 11.108-11: ―A powerful statement of Aen.‘s and the implied 
author‘s hatred of war.‖ 
484
 See Nisbet and Hubbard 1970, xxvii. 
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refers to his foreign victories rather than the civil wars.
485
  It is against this backdrop 
that Carm. 3.2 should be read, his most anti-military poem that does not concern civil 
war specifically.  The precise date is uncertain, but the sentiment fits war-weariness 
following Actium.
486
  The conventional claim that dulce et decorum est pro patria 
mori (line 13) is followed by the reasonable observation that death also comes to 
cowards – recalling Horace‘s own disgraceful flight from Philippi without his 
shield.
487
  Combined with the exhortation to virtus which ends the poem, Horace 
seems to be defending the worth of civic or at least civilian exploits.
488
  This makes 
his anti-militarism very similar to that of Cicero and Sallust.  Indeed his remedy for 
civil war in Epod. 16 – to flee to the Isles of the Blest – recalls Sallust‘s total 
withdrawal from public life.
489
 
 This contrasts with the attitude expressed by Tibullus, Propertius, and Ovid.  
Tibullus was a young boy when civil war broke out in 49; Propertius was born in 48, 
and Ovid in 43.  None of them was therefore old enough to comprehend these 
conflicts in a meaningful way or to participate in them.
490
  Yet anti-militarism is even 
more pronounced in their poetry than in Horace‘s – a striking distinction, given the 
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 Epod. 9; Carm. 1.2.; 2.9.17-24; 3.14.1-4; 4.14; 4.15. 
486
 Nisbet and Rudd 2004, xix-xx argue that Books 1-3 were published together in 23 (contra 
Hutchinson 2002), although the individual poems are not presented in chronological order. 
487
 Carm. 2.7.9-14 and West 1998, 52.  Like a long line of Greek poets before him, Horace discarded 
his shield in flight; in the heroic tradition of Aeneas and Hector, he was also divinely removed from 
the field (Il. 5.344; 20.325, 443).   
488
 Cf. Nisbet and Rudd 2004, 23; contra Sydenham 2005, n. ad loc. 
489
 This controversial poem is interpreted by Mankin 1995, 245 as a test of Horace‘s putative 
audience, similar to Agamemnon‘s (nearly disasterous) test of his men‘s commitment to the Trojan 
war at Il. 2.110-41.  On the similarity of its apocalyptic tone  to Verg. Ecl. 4, see Mankin 1995, esp. 
244; Watson 2003, esp. 481. 
490
 Tibullus served overseas in the 20s with his patron M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus (cos. suf. 31).  
See elegies 1.3; 1.7 and Maltby 2002, 55.  Neither Propertius nor Ovid had any military experience. 
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overlapping publication periods of Horace, Tibullus and Propertius
491
 – taking a 
distinctive form where love and love elegy are the civic activities in competition with 
military ones.  Given the historical context, it is attractive and justifiable to attribute 
this to the result of growing up during civil war, an experience which irreversibly 
shaped their attitudes towards military service even after Augustus had established 
the Pax Romana. 
 The best example of this view is Propertius 2.7.  Written in response to the 
repeal of a marriage law
492
 which would have forced Propertius to marry a 
respectable Roman woman and produce sons for Rome‘s army, it is a wholesale 
rejection of the traditional Roman values of military service and fatherhood.  The 
world of love is set up as a parallel universe in which conventional virtues such as 
military triumphs count for nothing (lines 5-6).  At the poem‘s climax, Propertius 
vows that nullus de nostro sanguine miles erit (line 14) – pledging allegiance instead 
to his mistress‘ camp (lines 15-16) and claiming that her love will mean more to him 
than patris nomen (line 21).  Cairns questions whether this poem constitutes an 
actual criticism of Octavian‘s military-based power (rather than a poetic pose 
consistent with militia amoris);
493
 but it should be noted that the second book of 
Propertius‘ poems is contemporary with Octavian‘s campaigns in Gaul and Spain 
(27-24) and may therefore express real aversion to military service and its perceived 
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 Horace was active from c. 35 (Satires) to 13 (Odes Book 4, Epistles Book 2) whereas the elegies of 
Tibullus and Propertius date from c. 27-19 (or later) and 28-sometime after 16, respectively.  See 
Maltby 2002, 40 for a more precise chronology. 
492
 Hejduk 2008, n. to 2.7.3 suspects a law imposing financial penalties on bachelors, and dates the 
repeal to 28, though she acknowledges the lack of evidence for the nature and even existence of such a 
law.  See esp. Gale 1997, 80-90.  
493
 See Cairns 2006, 325 rightly emphasizing the friendship between Octavian and Propertius‘ patron 





  If his rhetoric in this poem is perhaps too passionate, his rationale in 
elegy 2.15 is difficult to refute: 
 
qualem si cuncti cuperent decurrere vitam 
    et pressi multo membra iacere mero, 
non ferrum crudele neque esset bellica navis, 
    nec nostra Actiacum verteret ossa mare, 
nec totiens propriis circum oppugnata triumphis 
    lassa foret crines solvere Roma suos.   (lines 41-6) 
 
Directly linked to the civil wars during the transition to Empire, this ―call to love‖ 
champions the validity of civilian pursuits as ones which do not harm the state.      
 A similar, though more roundabout claim is made by Tibullus in elegy 1.10, 
his most anti-militaristic poem and one which is contemporary with Propertius Book 
2.  Here the simple rustic life is contrasted with the savageness and greed of war: 
divitis hoc vitium est auri, nec bella fuerunt/ faginus adstabat cum scyphus ante 
dapes.
495
  Like Horace, Tibullus also questions the wisdom of hastening death by war 
(lines 4, 33-4) as a preface to his own, alternative hero: the rural father who dies an 
old man in his cottage (lines 39-40).  Maltby notes the ―irony‖ of Tibullus‘ use of 
military vocabulary in this connection.
496
  The effect is to heighten the contrast 
between war and peace as well as draw attention to the substitution of military for 
civilian priorities.  (A related strategy is present in elegy 1.7 where praise of 
Messalla‘s triumph gives way to praise of the road repairs he funded with his spoils – 
safe journeys being more of a concern for rustic folk than tales of distant 
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 The first ten elegies of Book 2 are thought to have been published in 26. 
495
 1.10.7-8; cf. 1.1.1-6.  On the traditional link between war and wealth, see e.g. Plat. Phaedo 66c; 
Lucr. 5.1423-4; cf. Ov. Am. 3.15.5-6 asserting the ancient prestige of his family against men who 
gained wealth and power in the civil wars. 
496





)  Finally – and crucially – the poem champions peace as the time when 
veneris bella rage (line 53).  These ―wars‖ are seen as positive not because they are 
pleasing to the combatants, but because they are small-scale conflicts with no lasting 
consequences.   
 The universality of Propertius‘ and Tibullus‘ harm-based argument contrasts 
with the highly specific example in Ovid‘s Am. 2.12.  In this extreme version of 
militia amoris, the poet‘s successful abduction of Corinna from her guardians is 
compared to a military victory worthy of a triumph (line 5); she is the equivalent of a 
town taken in battle (line 7-8); he has been the general, soldier, cavalry, infantry, and 
standard bearer in his war (lines 13-15); and is Cupid‘s standard bearer in campaigns 
of love (lines 27-8).
498
  The effect is similar to passages in Propertius 2.14 and 3.4, 
where this same equivalence between romance and military triumph is made on a 
smaller scale.  The most important feature of Ovid‘s poem, however, is how he 
quantifies the superiority of his romantic activity. 
 
haec est praecipuo victoria digna triumpho,   
    in qua, quaecumque est, sanguine praeda caret. 
non humiles muri, non parvis oppida fossis 
    cincta, sed est ductu capta puella meo!  (lines 5-8)   
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 1.7.57-62.  These repairs were part of an Augustan program to improve the infrastructure of Rome, 
and amounted to the ancient equivalent of adopting a highway.  See Maltby 2002, n. ad loc. 
498
 Prop. 2.7; 2.14; and 3.4 present a similarly personal point of view, but do not develop military 
metaphors to nearly the same extent as Am. 2.12.  Cf. esp. Am. 1.2.19-50, where Cupid‘s ―triumph‖ 
over the poet is described as an exact parallel of the military honour and Am. 1.9, comparing the 
similar hardships endured by soldiers and lovers (the overall effect is strikingly similar to Cic. Mur. 
22, comparing the lifestyles of soldiers and advocates).  Ovid‘s poetic attitude towards military 
matters is discussed by Davis 2006, esp. 74-7, who argues (p. 75) that ―for the most part Ovid treats 
the military as contemptible and their achievements as negligible.‖ 
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The theme returns at the end of the poem, where Ovid again congratulates himself on 
his bloodless victory – using the same words, sine caede (line 27), as Cicero uses to 
describe his victory over Catiline.
499
  In addition to recalling his predecessor‘s 
civilian achievement, Ovid‘s phrase reinforces the elegists‘ ideal of love as a 
constructive and life-preserving pursuit.   
 We may now construct our continuum of anti-militarism.  It begins with 
Catullus, whose pre-civil war poems exhibit a type of proto-militia amoris that 
depicts military life as undesirable and may allude to contemporary criticism of 
Caesar‘s imperial conquests.  Next we have Cicero, whose value judgements are 
concentrated in the years 46-43 and uphold civic activity as more beneficial to the 
state than military activity.  Sallust and Horace, active in the next cycle of civil war, 
both recommend withdrawal from public life and defend the worth of private civilian 
pursuits.  Conversely Vergil, who did not take part in the fighting, subtly challenges 
the primacy of warfare by drawing attention to the good that comes of peace.  The 
elegists refine this view into the ancient equivalent of a ―make love not war‖ 
campaign – consistent with war weariness in the early years of the Pax Romana.   
 Although it is true that most of these authors promote their own strength as an 
alternative to military activity, the resulting value systems should not be attributed 
solely to self-interest (or self-justification).  This analysis has shown that the 
experience of civil war was a far greater factor in determining both the strength and 
form of anti-militarism in their writings.  It is particularly telling in this regard that 
the strongest anti-militaristic sentiments belong to the authors who lived through the 
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 Cat. 3.23: Erepti enim estis ex crudelissimo ac miserrimo interitu, erepti sine caede, sine sanguine, 
sine exercitu, sine dimicatione; togati me uno togato duce et imperatore vicistis.  See also below. 
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violent transition from Republic to Empire, as though growing up in the shadow of 
civil war had a greater psychological effect than witnessing or participating in the 
conflict as an adult.  The significance of this interpretation is that it makes it possible 
to view this anti-militarism as less of an attack on traditional Roman values and more 
of an expression of cynicism about Rome‘s vulnerability to the ambitions of ruthless 
commanders.  For Cicero specifically, this means that his pro-civic bias must be 





Cicero’s self-representation as a domestic military leader 
 Having established the nature of Cicero‘s pro-civic bias, we may now 
examine two curious episodes where he deliberately cultivated a military persona.  In 
63 and again in 44-43 he led the Republic into war as a domestic military leader – the 
togatus dux et imperator against Catiline in 63, and the princeps sumendorum 
sagorum against Antony in 44-43.  The rhetoric he used to construct these personae 
shows a clear understanding of his audience‘s expectations of military leader-figures; 
but there is also evidence that he manipulated these expectations to serve his political 
agenda.  Given the strength of the convictions explored above, it is striking that he 
thought it necessary or desirable to affect a militarized ethos at all.  This tension 
between military credentials and political influence is the focus of this section, which 
will evaluate both the significance and validity of Cicero‘s quasi-military role. 
 It should be noted at this stage that although the Catilinarian conspiracy and 
civil war with Antony are among the best documented episodes in Roman history, 
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 Cf. Smith 1966, 20, 26. 
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little attention has been paid to the quasi-military character of Cicero‘s leadership.
501
  
His enduring reputation as a civilian leader and the fact that more fighting took place 
in the Senate than in the field tend to overshadow military features of these conflicts 
which both inspired and justified a militaristic response.  Although the Catilinarian 
conspiracy was initially concerned with urban violence (albeit on a large scale), it 
gained a warlike character when Catiline left the city and joined forces with Manlius 
and his peasant army.  A senatorial army was dispatched against this joint force and 
routed it at Pistoria in January 62.  The bellicosity of Antony‘s attempt to seize 
Gallia Cisalpina was also unclear at the outset of the conflict, but for legal rather than 
evidentiary reasons.  As consul, he was entitled to lead the consular armies, and the 
province had been allocated to him for 43.  His intentions – and threat – were 
revealed when the incumbent governor, Decimus Brutus, refused to give way.  
Antony blockaded him at Mutina until senatorial armies defeated his forces in April 
43.  His claim that he was avenging Caesar‘s assassination (Decimus had stood 
closest to Caesar on the Ides) reawakened hostilities left over from the Civil War and 
led to numerous armies being raised in anticipation of a major war.
502
 
 Among the ancient sources, only Sallust‘s Bellum Catilinae addresses 
military features of Cicero‘s leadership in 63; but his narrative closely resembles that 
of Cicero‘s speeches and almost requires the reader to have them at hand to fill in 
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 Studies of 63 tend to focus on legitimacy of Cicero‘s leadership from a political perspective (esp. 
Konstan 1993; Cape 1995; Drummond 1995), whereas those of 44-43 focus on the rhetoric of the 
Philippics (esp. Wooten 1983; Hall 2002).  Nicolet 1960, May 1988, and McDonnell 2006 do address 
Cicero‘s military posturing, but nevertheless from literary (May and McDonnell) and political 
(Nicolet) perspectives.  Monteleone 2004 is a significant exception, comparing the Fourth Philippic to 
a general‘s pre-battle speech to his soldiers.  Cf. Lintott 2008, 142-8, 374-407 on the historical reality 
of the events recounted in the Catilinarians and Philippics, respectively. 
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 Most prominently, the armies of Brutus and Cassius, whose commands Cicero advocates in the 
Tenth and Eleventh Philippics, respectively.  On Antony‘s motivation, cf. Dio 46.35, stating that 





  Fortunately, Cicero‘s own account of his role is exceptionally rich.  For the 
suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, we have the four Catilinarians, the Pro 
Murena, and a handful of letters immediately following Cicero‘s term of office, in 
addition to recollections throughout the corpus spanning the rest of Cicero‘s life.
504
  
The civil war against Antony is even better documented with contemporary sources 
that include the fourteen Philippics and almost 100 letters dating from the start of the 
conflict in November 44 to the end of the correspondence in July 43.  The result is a 
play-by-play account in which the situation and Cicero‘s leadership are depicted in 
conspicuously military terms.  Two parallel pairings of senatorial and contional 
speeches on the same topics (Second and Third Catilinarians, and Fourth and Sixth 
Philippics, respectively) show how Cicero adapted his rhetoric to appeal to both 
popular and elite views of the conflict,
505
 and thus also to different attitudes toward 
military leadership.  Significantly, Cicero never gives the impression that he believes 
that he is a general in any of these texts.  At Cat. 2.11 he offers himself (profiteor) as 
a dux for a domesticum bellum, and at Phil. 4.11 he states that he will act ut 
imperatores… solent.  His military self-representation is therefore a type of self-
reference which is at once both daring and restrained in its claims, existing in 
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 For example, Sallust provides full-length versions of Caesar‘s and Cato‘s speeches at the debate on 
the Nones of December (§§51 and 52, respectively), but says of Cicero‘s speech (the Fourth 
Catilinarian) only that he asked the Senate what should be done with the apprehended conspirators 
(§49).  Sallust had access to Cicero‘s memoirs on his consulship (no longer extant) and seems to adopt 
this ―official‖ version of events.  The other ancient sources are particularly depreciatory of Cicero‘s 
leadership in 44-43, attributing it to vanity and a personal feud with Antony.  See esp. Nic. Dam. Vit. 
Caes. 28; Plut. Cic. 45-6; Dio 45.14; App. BC 3.82. 
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 It is generally accepted that the published Catilinarians were composed after 63, on the basis of 
anachronistic inclusions and the testimony of Att. 2.1.3 (June 60), in which Cicero says he is sending 
to Atticus his consular sw~ma for publication.  See Dyck 2008, 10 for the most recent discussion, 
contra McDermott 1972.  The date of the Pro Murena has not been challenged, although its absence 
from the list of speeches in Att. 2.1.3 provides a terminus ante quem for its publication.   
505
 See Morstein-Marx 2004, 28-9, 103. 
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sufficient bulk to establish distinct themes, yet not so much that these are 
undermined by repetitiveness. 
 In order to evaluate Cicero‘s self-representation as a military leader during 
these conflicts, it must be divided into three constituent elements: his actions, relative 
to his status and inherent authority; his rhetoric, and how it depicts both himself and 
the situation in a military way; and the effect of the combination of his actions and 
rhetoric, in political as well as personal terms.  This division is effectively one of 
form and function, but because posturing necessarily raises issues of appearance 
versus reality, his actions must be examined separately from his rhetoric. 
 The most prominent aspect of Cicero‘s leadership activity in 63 and 44-43 is 
his domination of the Senate, through which he directed controversial pro-war 
policies against men whom he was the first to identify as public enemies.  His ability 
to do this in 63 owed much to his status as consul, which made him (along with his 
colleague C. Antonius Hybrida) legally the head of state, with supreme executive as 
well as military authority.
506
  To these powers were added the injunction of the 
senatus consultum ultimum on 21 October, a decree which Cicero conveniently 
interpreted as empowering him in particular.
507
  Although it was issued in response 
to Manlius‘ rising in Etruria, Cicero applied it to Catiline as well (Cat. 1.3, 4), in 
what some scholars have decried as the impetus that drove the then-innocent 
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 See Lintott 1999, 104-7; cf. 96-7 on imperium, noting that a lex curiata was required to authorize 
an imperium holder to command an army.  Cicero describes the authority of the consuls in regal terms 
at Leg. 3.8: regio imperio duo sunto, iique…  consules appellamino; militiae summum ius habento, 
nemini parento; ollis salus populi suprema lex esto.  Cf. Pis. 25. 
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 Sal. Cat. 29 oulines the authority conferred by the senatus consultum ultimum and seems to say that 
it applied to a single magistrate: ea potestas…magistratui maxuma permittitur.  Cf. Phil. 5.34, where 
Cicero proposes that the Republic be entrusted to both consuls. 
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patrician to open treason in order to assuage his dignitas.
508
  This interpretation 
ignores somewhat the threats of violence Catiline had broadcast during the elections 
that led to his third defeat.  These were severe enough that Cicero urged the Senate to 
postpone the elections, and, when this failed, presided over the voting wearing a 
lorica – rather conspicuously – and surrounded by a bodyguard of friends.
509
  It is 
impossible to know whether Cicero‘s choice of armour was symbolic or purely 
practical, but the episode makes at interesting prelude to his self-portrayal as a dux 
during the conspiracy proper. 
 Immediately in the First Catilinarian (c. 7 November) we see Cicero taking 
military measures to forestall Catiline‘s alleged plans: he has dispatched praesidia, 
custodia, vigilia to Praeneste to defend it from attack (§8), stationed additional 
praesidia at his home to thwart an assassination attempt (§10), and likely also 
arranged the nocturnum praesidium Palati and munitissimus senatus locus referred to 
in the opening lines of the speech.  Given the degree of Cicero‘s personal leadership 
and the extent to which he claims credit for the decisions of the Senate in the 
Catilinarians, we should probably see him behind the decree recorded by Sallust to 
dispatch Q. Marcius Rex, Q. Metellus Creticus, Q. Pompeius Rufus, and Q. Metellus 
Celer to protect vulnerable areas of Italy.
510
  These initial operations were followed 
up with the nocturnal ambush of the Allobroges and their Catilinarian escorts at the 
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 See esp. Waters 1970 and Seager 1973; contra Phillips 1976. 
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 Mur. 49-52; cf. Cat. 1.11; Sal. Cat. 31; cf. Plut. Cic. 14. 
510
 Sal. Cat. 30.  It is worth noting that none of these were regular armies, since Pompey had taken 
these with him on his eastern campaigns.  See Gruen 1974, 430.  Plut. Cic. 10 paints a particularly 
bleak picture of Rome‘s lack of defences as a result: Pomphi&ou me\n e1ti toi~v basileu~sin e)n Po&ntw| 
kai\ 'Armeni&a| diapolemou~ntov, e)n de\ th|~ 9Rw&mh| mhdemia~v u(festw&shv pro\v tou\v newteri&zontav 
a)cioma&xou duna&mewv.  Rex and Creticus had both been waiting to celebrate triumphs – and were 
therefore still in possession of imperium – when the senatus consultum ultimum was issued, whereas 
Rufus and Celer were praetors specially authorized to levy new troops for the occasion. 
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Mulvian bridge in the night of 2/3 December.  The strategy sounds almost Caesarian 
and conforms to the examples de insidiis listed in Frontinus‘ Strategemata: a location 
which restricts movement is garrisoned under cover of darkness, and the ―enemy‖ is 
attacked from all sides.
511
  This ambush provided Cicero with the evidence he needed 
to prove the existence of the conspiracy, and ultimately led to the execution of the 
ringleaders in Rome.  Although the execution cannot be considered as part of 
Cicero‘s military leadership,
512
 it is important as the catalyst for a distinctly military 
honour to the consul.  He had already been awarded a thanksgiving – for saving the 
state rather than simply serving it well (Cat. 3.15; 4.20) – in connection with 
exposing the plot after the Mulvian bridge ambush; now he was hailed as parens 
patriae and awarded the civic crown (cf. Pis. 6), an honour normally given for saving 
the life of a citizen in battle.
513
  As shall be seen, Cicero was exceedingly proud of 
winning these honours as a togatus.  The fact that he received them at all may 
indicate that his contemporaries regarded his leadership as a type of generalship, or it 
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 Cic. Cat. 3.5-6.  Front. Str. 5.1, 20, 24, 32, 34 all have elements of strategic similarity, despite the 
fact that they are drawn from battles in the midst of large-scale wars.  Sal. Cat. 45.1 emphasizes 
Cicero‘s initiative in executing this ambush. 
512
 The execution resulted from the senatus consultum ultimum, which was not a declaration of war.  
The only connection between the emergency decree and matters of war – specifically the definition of 
hostis – concerns the forfeiture of citizen rights.  However, Drummond 1995, 97-100 notes that these 
two arguments were not linked in the senatorial debate on the Nones of December.  On the legal 
aspects of the senatus consultum ultimum, see Drummond 1995 and Lintott 1999, 89-93: the fact that 
the decree challenged the citizen right of provocatio and permitted any use of force ut res publica 
defendatur made it prone to controversy.  For the wording of the decree see sources at Lintott 1999, 
89 n. 1. 
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 The conditions of award are described by Gel. 5.6.13-14 and Plin. Nat. 16.12-13; cf. analysis by 
Maxfield 1989, 70-4.  The prestige attached to the honour is indicated by Liv. 33.23.6, where he says 
that the Senate, when addressing gaps in membership, gave priority to men who had been awarded the 
civic crown.   The most prominent recipient in Cicero‘s day was Caesar, who gained his in 80 for his 
service at the storming of Mytilene (see Suet. Jul. 2). 
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 This ambiguity is less immediately obvious in Cicero‘s leadership in 44-43, 
but no less problematic.  As a private citizen who had been virtually retired from 
politics before the Ides of March, he had no direct access to power – although the 
influence of a consular was a formidable force in senatorial debates.  It should 
perhaps be noted in this connection that in 44 Cicero was one of very few consulars 
left in the Senate.  At Phil. 2.12 he gives an impressive list of luminaries who had 
supported his suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, but since died.  The 
implications of this statement are made more clear in a letter written to Q. 
Cornificius (pr. 45) in October 44: saepe doleo, quod nullam partem per aetatem 
sanae et salvae rei publicae gustare potuisti.
515
  The combination of life experience – 
including the reputation won in 63 – and regret for not taking a more active role in 
the civil war seem to have spurred Cicero to meet Antony‘s threat head-on (e.g. Att. 
16.11.6; Phil.1.38; 7.6-8).   
 This entailed an uncompromisingly antagonistic stance toward the then-
consul, promoted in the Senate and to the People.  From the moment that Antony 
marched on Gallia Cisalpina and Decimus sent his manifesto to the Senate pledging 
not to cede the province to him, Cicero seized the opportunity to lead the opposition.  
In the Third Philippic (20 December 44) he embraced Octavian and his private army 
of Caesar‘s veterans, championing their cause alongside that of Decimus in the 
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 The wording of the reminiscence at Phil. 2.13 may indicate that Cicero‘s precedent opened the way 
for others to be awarded thanksgivings for civic-based leadership.  Cf. Phil. 14.11: Etenim cui viginti 
his annis supplicatio decreta est ut non imperator appellaretur aut minimis rebus gestis aut 
plerumque nullis? 
515
 Fam. 12.23.3.  Manuwald 2007, 910 enumerates the remaining consulars.  Cicero and Ser. 
Sulpicius Rufus (cos. 51) were the only remaining Pompeians. 
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Senate (esp. §§5-8, 37-38).  This type of advocacy is perhaps the most concrete 
manifestation of Cicero‘s leadership.  In the Fifth Philippic he called for and secured 
the sanction of Octavian‘s command, including the controversial grant of 
propraetorian status to the teenager (§§46, 53).  He obtained the authorization of 
Brutus‘ command in Macedonia with the Tenth Philippic, and attempted to do the 
same for Cassius in Syria with the Eleventh Philippic, but was unsuccessful; in a lost 
Philippic he reiterated Cassius‘ case to the people, who supported it.
516
  Octavian and 
Hirtius marched their armies to Gallia Cisalpina shortly after the Fifth Philippic (1 
January 43) and in accordance with Cicero‘s pro-war policy.  Pansa followed them in 
March after an abortive debate concerning the sending of a second embassy to 
negotiate with Antony – which was defeated on Cicero‘s motion in the Twelfth 
Philippic.   
 Cicero‘s leadership in the Senate was complemented by complex and 
potentially subversive activity in private and to the People.  As the conflict with 
Antony intensified, he wrote to Decimus and L. Munatius Plancus (cos. 42), 
exhorting them to be their own Senate with regard to decisions in the field (Fam. 
11.7.2; 10.16.2; cf. Phil. 11.27).  From January onward, he wore a sagum 
conspicuously to express his opinion of the conflict – in defiance of the Senate, who 
declared a state of tumultus only on c. 4 February.  The symbolism of this gesture 
was heightened by the fact that his age and status exempted him from the customary 
change of dress when war was declared.
517
  Morstein-Marx draws attention to the 
oral and visual nature of politics in the late Republic; we should assess Cicero‘s 
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 Cf. Fam. 12.7.1 (7 Mar. 43), where Cicero tells Cassius of the people‘s support for his command.  
Cicero‘s relationship with Octavian, Brutus, and Cassius as military protégés is discussed above, pp. 
99-105. 
517
 Phil. 8.32; cf. 5.31.  See also Manuwald 2007 nn. ad loc.  
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sagum against the backdrop of the interpretive role he assumes in the Fourth and 
Sixth Philippics, which were delivered to the people.
518
  His private encouragement 
and public image together put him in a position tantamount to an alternative authority 
to the Senate.  It was not inherently military authority, but, as in 63, the 
circumstances imbued it with military significance.   
 Rhetoric provided a powerful complement to Cicero‘s leadership activity.  It 
may be divided into two distinct but related categories: militarized rhetoric, and 
rhetoric pertaining to Cicero‘s self-representation as a military leader.  The 
militarized rhetoric defined both conflicts as military events, which in turn provided 
a literary context for Cicero to portray himself as a military leader, furnishing a type 
of self-fulfilling internal consistency.  Although Cicero‘s self-representation as a 
military leader took different forms in 63 and 44-43, his use of militarized rhetoric is 
strikingly similar. 
 The key terms in both cases are hostis and bellum, which express Cicero‘s 
opinion of Catiline, Antony, and the threat which they and their associates pose to 
the state.  As was noted in Chapter 4, these terms are applied consistently throughout 
both conflicts, despite the fact that neither man had officially been declared an 
enemy when Cicero began to agitate against them.
519
  Nevertheless, the rhetoric is 
                                                 
518
 Morstein-Marx 2004, esp. 70-1.  Concerning Cicero‘ role as popular interpreter of senatorial 
affairs, see esp. Phil. 6.1-5 where Cicero presents his opinion of the preceding senatorial debate in the 
guise of a summary.  Morstein-Marx 2004, 248 n. 24 suggests that a proper summary had likely been 
given by Pansa at an official contio. 
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 See above, p. 176 with discussion of their use in Cat. 1-2 and Phil. 1-6. Catiline was declared a 
public enemy, along with Manlius, at the end of November, once word reached Rome that he had not 
gone quietly into exile but had joined the former centurion.  Cf. Cat. 2.14-15; Sal. Cat. 36.  Antony 
was not declared a public enemy until news of his defeat at Mutina reached Rome, on c. 26 April.  
Cicero also refers to both men as inimici, but only when reporting their own words or discussing their 
relationship with him personally.  Cf. e.g. Cat. 1.23; 2.11; Phil. 1.27; 2.1, 2, 34, 65, 90; 5.3.  One 
important exception is Phil. 12.19, where Cicero calls Antony mihi uni crudelissimus hostis; however, 
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unequivocal, particularly in the Philippics, where the cumulative effect of the 
fourteen speeches is an impressive campaign of vilification.  Antony is not only a 
hostis, but a hostis ac parricida (Phil. 14.4; cf. 4.5), a taeterrimus et crudelissimus 
hostis (Phil. 5.21), and a hostis by reputation if not yet by official decree (Phil. 4.1; 
7.9; 14.7).  His dereliction of consular duty is cited as proof of his enemy status (esp. 
Phil. 3.14; 4.5), and he is likened to historical enemy figures – including Catiline.
520
  
The picture of Catiline is not dissimilar, as he is portrayed as a hostis who admits that 
he is a hostis (Cat. 2.17), and one whose presence in Rome makes pax, otium, and 
silentium impossible (Cat. 3.17).  It is as a hostis that Catiline is ordered by Cicero to 
leave Rome (Cat. 1.13; cf. 2.4; 4.17), whereas the conspirators who were implicated 
by the evidence seized at the Mulvian bridge are branded as being in acerbissimorum 
hostium numero (Cat. 4.15).  Among Antony‘s associates, Dolabella is particularly 
singled out for vilification as a hostis, evidently because Cicero was exploiting a 
situation where the majority of the Senate agreed with him.
521
  Nevertheless, the 
proposal in the Eleventh Philippic  is unique for being the only proposal in the 
Philippics to condemn a person by name (§29).  Throughout the Catilinarians and 
Philippics, then, Cicero‘s use of hostis disguises the civil nature of the conflict by 
creating an other, non-Roman opponent who must be pursued with war as a matter of 
course. 
 Cicero‘s depiction of both men‘s activity as bellum is equally insistent.  
Immediately in the First Catilinarian and Second Philippic, he claims that both men 
                                                                                                                                          
Cicero identifies himself so strongly with the state in this speech that the term is justified.  Cf. Wooten 
1983, 160, who argues the opposite point of view.        
520
 Esp. Phil. 5.25: ergo Hannibal hostis, civis Antonius?  Cf. Phil. 4.14 (Catiline); 13.22 (Spartacus 
and Catiline); 14.9 (Carthaginians). 
521
 Cf. Phil. 11.15, 16, 27.  It was no doubt a welcome opportunity to vent his anger towards a man 
who had been a poor husband to his daughter Tullia and still had not repaid her dowry.   
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are waging or intend to wage war on the state (Cat. 1.23; Phil. 2.1).  The Catilinarian 
conspiracy is described as comprising the greatest and most savage war within 
human memory (Cat. 3.25; cf. 3.16), whereas Antony‘s war is a bellum inexpiabile 
(Phil. 14.8), and the eighth civil war in Cicero‘s lifetime (Phil. 8.8).  In the Eighth 
Philippic Cicero goes so far as to argue that the Senate‘s declaration of a state of 
tumultus is actually more serious than bellum (§§2-4), in a sort of reverse-
psychological argument.  A complaint at Phil. 14.22 reveals the controversy which 
statements such as these could incite: antea cum hostem ac bellum nominassem, 
semel et saepius sententiam meam de numero sententiarum sustulerunt.  
Nevertheless, Cicero‘s consistent application of the terms lends a compelling internal 
consistency to his rhetoric in both episodes (cf. Phil. 12.17), and establishes a 
militarized frame of reference whereby the only response to enemies waging war was 
war itself. 
 It was a small rhetorical leap from depicting both conflicts as war to depicting 
Cicero as their general.  This was achieved by the creation of two personae, each 
tailored to the exigencies – and especially the obstacles – of the respective situations.  
In 63 Cicero portrayed himself as the togatus dux et imperator, an amalgam of 
leadership in peace and war, in a joint civic and military capacity.
522
  In 44-43 he was 
the princeps sumendorum sagorum, a less formal role but one which expresses his 
leadership in initiating the preparations for war.
523
  The emphatic position of the 
civic elements in both constructions yields rather a questionable military persona, yet 
one which is consistent with Cicero‘s military leadership in a civilian capacity. 
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 The toga was the dress of peace (as in cedant arma togae) but also represented Romanness and 
citizenship.  For the latter symbolism, see e.g Rep. 1.36; Verg. Aen. 1.282 and Mommsen 1887.1, 408-
9. 
523
 On the significance of the sagum as the dress of war, see below, n. 532. 
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 Before examining the construction of the two personae, it will be instructive 
to explore briefly Cicero‘s references to his general leadership in both conflicts.  His 
personal presence in the writings pertaining to both episodes is strong, even 
overbearing in the Catilinarians and relevant sections of the Pro Murena.  First 
person verbs are frequently used to emphasize his role in events, especially when he 
is acting independently.  Many of these verbs in the Catilinarians concern 
foreknowledge, diligence, and protection, whereas in the Philippics and letters of 44-
43 they express reliability and determination.
524
  Only a few examples need be 
examined in detail here.  Perhaps the most important instance in the Catilinarians 
occurs at Cat. 2.4, where Cicero explains his lack of action against Catiline: 
 
Sed cum viderem, ne vobis quidem omnibus etiam tum re probata si 
illum, ut erat meritus, morte multassem, fore ut eius socios invidia 
oppressus persequi non possem, rem huc deduxi ut tum palam 
pugnare possetis cum hoste aperte videretis. 
 
 The strategy is described in almost identical terms at Cat. 3.4, despite an 
intervening description of the now-averted horrors in which the first person plural is 
used.
525
  In a similar vein in the Pro Murena, Cicero complains to the judges that his 
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 For 63, see esp. Cat. 1.24, 27; 2.6, 13, 19, 26; 3.2-13; 4.1-3; Mur. 52, 78; cf. Mur. 4: qua re si est 
boni consulis non solum videre quid agatur verum etiam providere quid futurum sit… Forms of the 
verb scio are much more common than comperio, despite Cicero‘s alleged fondness for saying 
comperi during the conflict (cf. Cat. 1.10; 3.4 and see discussion in Berry 1996, n. to Sul. 12.14).  For 
44-43, see esp. Phil. 1.37-8; 3.2, 33; 4.1, 16; 5.30; 6.2, 18; 7.20; 8.21, 29; 14.20; Fam. 11.5.2; 11.6a.2; 
10.28.1; 12.24.2.  MacKendrick 1995, 62-6, 97-8 enumerates and identifies types of ―ego clusters‖ in 
the Catilinarians; unfortunately his study does not include the Philippics.   
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 Cat. 3.2-3: Nam toti urbi, templis, delubris, tectis ac moenibus subiectos prope iam ignes 
circumdatosque restinximus, idemque gladios in rem publicam destrictos rettudimus mucronesque 




hard work will be wasted if Murena is convicted.
526
  His self-reference in the 
Philippics, on the other hand, is manifested most frequently in allusions to his role in 
―laying the foundations of the Republic.‖
527
  The lengthier references concern his 
established animosity towards Antony and self-preservation for the purpose of 
serving the Republic: 
 
Hunc ego diem exspectans M. Antoni scelerata arma vitavi…  Si enim 
tum illi caedis a me initium quaerenti respondere voluissem, nunc rei 
publicae consulere non possem. … nullum tempus, patres conscripti, 
dimittam neque diurnum neque nocturnum quin de libertate populi 
Romani et dignitate vestra quod cogitandum sit cogitem, quod 





It is against this backdrop of committment that we must read his personal guarantee 
of Octavian‘s loyalty (Phil. 5.51) and endorsements of Brutus and Cassius (esp. Phil. 
10.25-6; 11.30-1), as well as his attestations of intimate knowledge of Antony‘s 
character (e.g. Phil. 5.29; 6.9).  This type of omniscience is a critical part of Cicero‘s 
leadership against Catiline as well (esp. Cat. 1.5-10), and gives the impression of 
authority in both cases. 
 This authority is expressed by two unique and purpose-built personae which 
reinforce and further define Cicero‘s leadership.  The togatus dux et imperator first 
appears at the end of the Second Catilinarian (§28), following references to the 
military nature of Catiline‘s threat (esp. §§13-15), the superiority of the forces at 
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 Mur. 79: Magni interest, iudices, id quod ego multis repugnantibus egi atque perfeci, esse Kalendis 
Ianuariis in re publica duo consules. 
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 Ieci fundamenta rei publicae.  See Phil. 5.30; 6.2; Fam. 12.25.2; cf. Phil. 1.1; 4.1.  Variations on 
the theme include being the leader of the defence of peace or freedom: Phil. 4.1; 5.34; 6.17; 7.7; 
14.20; Fam. 10.28.1.   
528
 Phil. 3.33; cf. 2.118; 4.1; 5.20; 12.24. 
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Cicero‘s disposal (§§5, 24-25), and an intriguing offer of distinctly military 
leadership.  After mentioning Pompey‘s pacification of the east and characterizing 
the conspiracy‘s plans as domesticum bellum, Cicero appeals to the people to accept 
him as the dux in this last remaining war.
529
  At the end of the speech, however, 
Cicero pledges to wage a ―warless‖ war against Catiline and his associates as the 
togatus dux et imperator: 
 
Atque haec omnia sic agentur, Quirites, ut maximae res minimo motu, 
pericula summa nullo tumultu, bellum intestinum ac domesticum post 
hominum memoriam crudelissimum et maximum me uno togato duce 
et imperatore sedetur (Cat. 2.28). 
 
The other full reference to the togatus dux et imperator at Cat. 3.23 is phrased in 
identical terms.  Cicero‘s anxiety to avoid a state of tumultus sits oddly with the 
argument at Phil. 8.2-4 noted above, and will be discussed in more detail below.  For 
now it will suffice to note the way in which he exploits this incongruity in order to 
claim military credentials.  This is best seen in the references to the thanksgiving he 
was awarded after the conspirators were apprehended.  Cicero‘s pride as a togatus is 
unmistakeable, as are the military implications of the honour: 
 
…supplicatio dis immortalibus pro singulari eorum merito meo 
nomine decreta est, quod mihi primum post hanc urbem conditam 
togato contigit.... Quae supplicatio si cum ceteris supplicationibus 
conferatur, hoc interest quod ceterae bene gesta, haec una conservata 
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 Cat. 2.11: huic ego me bello ducem profiteor, Quirites.  Cf. Cat. 4.19. 
530
 Cat. 3.15; cf. 4.5, 20.  Cicero continued to emphasize his civilian status in subsequent references to 
the honour.  See Sul. 85; Phil. 2.13; 14.24; Fam. 5.2.8; 15.4.11; cf. Mur. 84.  For ancient secondary 
references, see Berry 1996, n. to Sul. 85.4. 
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The favourable contrast which Cicero constructs between his achievement and those 
of conventional military figures sets up claims of equality with – and ultimately 
superiority to – great generals such as Pompey.  At Cat. 3.26 Cicero allies himself 
with Pompey as a co-defender of the Republic.  However, there is a note of rivalry in 
his assertion that he has  preserved the domicilium sedesque of the empire which 
Pompey has extended.  This competitiveness reaches a climax in the Fourth 
Catilinarian, where Cicero recounts his gratification at being awarded a 
thanksgiving, and proceeds to contextualize the magnitude of his achievement with 
references to military heroes.  The victories of both Scipiones Africani are 
mentioned, as are those of Paullus, Marius, and finally Pompey.  Cicero then asserts 
that: 
 
Erit profecto inter horum laudes aliquid loci nostrae gloriae, nisi forte 
maius est patefacere nobis provincias quo exire possimus quam curare 
ut etiam illi qui absunt habeant quo victores revertantur. (Cat. 4.21) 
 
 Although the passage seems at first glance to be unduly offensive to Pompey, 
it nevertheless expresses a sense of relative place that corresponds entirely to the 
sentiments expressed four months later in Fam. 5.7.3, where Cicero asks to be 
Laelius to Pompey‘s Africanus.
531
  We saw in Chapter 3 that this alliance was one 
between saviours of the state, and this is precisely the company into which Cicero 
inserts himself with his self-representation as a military figure in 63.   
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 The sentiment of Cat. 4.21 is similar to that of a compliment from Pompey reported at Att. 2.1.6 
(June 60) and Off. 1.78, and may indicate a subtle anachronism on Cicero‘s part.  Cf. Berry 2006, n. to 
Cat. 4.21.  Dyck 2008, n. ad loc. calls the similarity ―such… that they can hardly be independent.‖  
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 Cicero‘s self-portrayal as the princeps sumendorum sagorum in 44-43 is both 
more straightforward and more complex than the togatus dux et imperator persona.  
On the one hand it refers to a specific action which heralds a state of war; on the 
other, it has a tenuous relationship to conventional generalship at best.
532
  It appears 
only once, at Phil. 12.17, and therefore rather late in the conflict.  That said, it is 
implied elsewhere in the Philippics (cf. Phil. 5.31; 6.2; 8.32) and the sagum itself 
represents a sort of visual shorthand for Cicero‘s pro-war policy against Antony.     
 In many ways the princeps sumendorum sagorum seems to be the end result 
of a series of more transient quasi-military identities: it is the persona which served 
Cicero‘s purpose best.  It is foreshadowed by references to his opposition to Catiline 
and his ―twenty years‘ war‖ against enemies of the state (Phil. 2.1, 119; 6.16; 12.24), 
which contextualize his antagonism toward Antony.  At Phil. 4.11 he compares the 
circumstances of his speech to the people to that of a general addressing his troops 
before battle: faciam igitur ut imperatores instructa acie solent, quamquam 
paratissimos milites ad proeliandum vident, ut eos tamen adhortentur.  The speech 
opens with a proclamation that he is the princeps vestrae libertatis defendendae (§1), 
followed by a reference to Antony as a hostis.  Monteleone compares Cicero‘s use of 
military themes and rhetoric in this speech to pre-battle speeches in the writings of 
Caesar, Sallust, and Livy, and concludes that Cicero not only presents himself like a 
general, but also casts his audience as soldiers.
533
  It is a fitting way to rally the 
―troops‖ for a domestic war, and the success of the speech (cf. Phil. 6.2) suggests 
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 Strictly speaking, the sagum is the dress of a soldier (i.e. not a general), even though it was 
evidently the official dress of wartime in the Senate.  See Mommsen 1887.1, 431-2; cf. Phil. 5.24 
where Antony is depicted wearing a paludamentum, the general‘s cloak. 
533
 Monteleone 2004, esp. 353-60. 
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that the strategy was not only considered appropriate but even appreciated by the 
people.  
 Significantly, the most explicit references to Cicero‘s leadership occur in the 
letters.  In Fam. 12.24.2 (late January 43), he tells Cornificius that me principem 
senatui populoque Romano professus sum (cf. Fam. 10.28.1; 12.25.2).  The most 
detailed description, however, occurs in Ad Brut. 2.1 (c. 1 April 43) and is framed by 
Cicero‘s sense of the duties of his position: 
 
Omnia, Brute, praestiti rei publicae… Ego autem ei qui sententiam 
dicat in principibus de re publica puto etiam prudentiam esse 
praestandam, nec me, cum mihi tantum sumpserim ut gubernacula rei 
publicae prehenderem, minus putarim reprehendendum si inutiliter 
aliquid senatui suaserim quam si infideliter. (§2) 
 
Clearly Cicero thought of himself as leading the state into war against Antony, even 
if he did not express this in distinctly military terms.  Just prior to this letter, in the 
Thirteenth Philippic (20 March 43), he happily accepted Antony‘s criticism of him as 
a ―loser general‖: eo libentius “ducem” audio quod certe ille dicit invitus.
534
  In the 
absence of an official role in the conflict, however, he could not credibly cultivate 
the persona of a dux.  Intriguingly, all but two instances of sagum in the Ciceronian 
corpus occur in the Philippics.
535
  As a persona, the princeps sumendorum sagorum 
expresses leadership by example, and derives authority from its consistency and the 
fact that Cicero‘s predictions about conflict were all borne out.  As in 63, militarized 
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 Phil. 13.30.  Hellegouarc‘h 1963, 324 notes the pejorative force of dux used in this way, drawing a 
parallel between this passage and Har. 58, where Clodius is reported to have called Pompey a dux 
senatus.  However, the fact that Pompey also had a reputation as a military dux may illuminate 
Antony‘s perception of Cicero as the prime mover of the war against him. 
535
 See Merguet 1877; 1886; 1894.  The other examples are Ver. 5.94 and Fam. 7.10.2.  
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rhetoric and observable leadership activity made his opinion of the conflict – and of 
his role within it – absolutely clear.   
 Less clear, however, is the significance of the military reference point of 
Cicero‘s assumed leadership.  This brings us to the effect of his quasi-military 
activity, which is remarkably uniform despite the different circumstances of the 
threats posed by Catiline and Antony, and the nearly twenty years that separated 
them.  The political basis of both conflicts dictates a political effect; but the effect on 
Cicero‘s ethos and self-perception must not be underestimated, either.  The overall 
effect is therefore two-fold, and perhaps best appreciated in terms of time. 
 The most immediate effect of Cicero‘s quasi-military leadership was that it 
polarized the respective conflicts into almost epic struggles between ―good‖ and 
―evil.‖  In addition to representing his general pro-war policy in miniature, the 
hostis/civis binary galvanized undecided opinion in his audience by presenting a 
choice that was no choice.
536
  This was in turn complemented by Cicero‘s strong 
leadership, which sought to assure his audience of the feasibility and rectitude of his 
policy while casting him in the role of a saviour-rector.  As he says in the Seventh 
Philippic: Cur igitur pacem nolo? Quia turpis est, quia periculosa, quia esse non 
potest.
537
  The unity achieved by these means in 63 inspired his dream of concordia 
ordinum – which he champions as the antidote for civil war:    
 
Omnes adsunt omnium ordinum homines, omnium generum, omnium 
denique aetatum…. si coniunctionem in consulatu confirmatam meo 
perpetuam in re publica tenuerimus, confirmo vobis nullum posthac 
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malum civile ac domesticum ad ullam rei publicae partem esse 
venturum.  (Cat. 4.14-15) 
 
In 43 he berates the Senate for being the sole obstacle to another such concordia, 
implicitly affirming his own commitment to the Republic.
538
   
 This polarization did not simply define Catiline and Antony‘s threats by 
contrast: the militarized frame of reference created by Cicero‘s rhetoric qualified the 
nature of both conflicts at a time when there was scope for debate.  There was 
nothing inherently warlike in either Catiline‘s or Antony‘s activity at the outset of 
either conflict.  The proper sphere for opposing them was judicial, especially because 
both men were high-ranking citizens.  It should be noted in this connection how 
much Cicero‘s insistence on the military nature of the conflicts resembles a forensic 
demand for a verdict: if Catiline and Antony are found ―guilty,‖ war will be waged 
against them.     
 Bearing this objective in mind, it is possible to read Cicero‘s quasi-military 
leadership as an inversion of his modus operandi for defending his military protégés, 
which was examined in Chapter 3.  Such a blending of political and forensic aims 
need not surprise us, since, as Wooten observes, ―experience must have made 
[Cicero] prone to look on every situation as an advocate views a case: to stake out a 
clear position and to defend it, with every means available, to the end.‖
539
  It is also 
fitting in light of the blending of civic and military roles that we have seen in his 
quasi-military personae.  Here Cicero assumes the role of the defendant, and by 
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acquitting himself condemns Catiline and Antony.  His recapitulations of his 
devotion and service to the state take the place of argumenta ex vita, demonstrating a 
record of patriotism in contrast to his opponents.  As in the case of the military 
protégés, subjectivity and weaknesses in Cicero‘s arguments are neatly concealed by 
constant reference to national security – specifically, the imminent danger to the 
Republic‘s very survival as posed by Catiline and Antony.  The stock invective 
charges of hostis and bellum, while critical to Cicero‘s policy and therefore not 
empty abuse, are nevertheless an important element of his campaign to discredit both 
men.
540
  Conversely, because he is cast in the role of the loyal servant of the 
Republic, Cicero is able to capitalize on traditional sympathy for military heroes.  
Hence the emphasis in both conflicts on the danger he has personally faced from 
Catiline and Antony – threats which he is nevertheless happy to face on behalf of the 
state.
541
  This is reinforced by the personae of the togatus dux and the princeps 
sumendorum sagorum, which explicitly identify Cicero as the military leader to lead 
Rome to safety. 
 The precise nature of this leadership – that is, its practical limitations – is also 
a product of the polarization of the conflict.  The depiction of Catiline‘s and 
Antony‘s threats as military ones provided a vital framework for Cicero‘s leadership 
aspirations.  His nearly unilateral direction against the Catilinarian conspirators 
exceeded the authority normally exercised by a consul, more closely resembling an 
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autonomous dux et imperator in the field.
542
  Similarly in 44-43, Cicero as princeps 
dominated the Senate in a way that accorded well with the idealized princeps in the 
De re publica.
543
  In both cases, the militarized frame of reference serves to initiate a 
militarized interchange between leader and led.  That the people were more receptive 
to this relationship than Cicero‘s battle-hardened senatorial colleagues may be 
surmised from the fact that the contional speeches (the Second and Third 
Catilinarians and Fourth and Sixth Philippics) contain the most military references.  
The togatus dux persona occurs exclusively in these speeches (Cat. 2.28; 3.23), as 
does the most military expression of leadership in the Philippics (Phil. 4.11); a 
nascent princeps sumendorum sagorum may also be detected here (Phil. 6.9; cf. §2; 
5.31).  The references to concordia ordinum further indicate the extent of popular 
support for Cicero‘s policy, which is corroborated in 44-43 by his mention of large 
supportive crowds at his contiones.
544
  The Senate required a softer touch, however, 
which accounts for the more rhetorical arguments in these speeches and the emphasis 
on established political influence rather than assumed military authority.   
 This assumed authority is the basis of the lasting effect of his quasi-military 
leadership, however.  This necessarily applies only to the aftermath of 63, since he 
was assassinated so soon after the Philippics and while the war which he had 
directed transformed into an even greater conflict.  Although he was no doubt 
mindful of posterity and tailored his self-representation to suit this purpose at the 
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 it was only after the conflict had been resolved that he could explore – and 
exploit – his assumed military credentials fully.  
 Arguably the greatest benefit was the military gloria he was able to claim as a 
result of the suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy.  In May‘s words, ―[Cicero] 
seems to have perceived his lack of a military reputation as a deficiency or liability to 
his ethos, particularly in comparison with Pompey.‖
546
  The convenience of the 
conspiracy for providing this status is a major point in the arguments of detractors 
such as Waters, who contends that Cicero fabricated the plot for the express purpose 
of giving himself an opportunity to rival more conventional military achievement.
547
  
As was alluded to earlier, the award of a thanksgiving gave Cicero the confidence to 
approach Pompey as an equal, and seek an alliance with him as a fellow saviour of 
the state.
548
  The prerequisite of a military award need not be attributed to insecurity 
on Cicero‘s part, but simply an awareness of how power politics worked in the late 
Republic: it was certainly more expedient for him to secure a military ally than to try 
to uphold his concordia ordinum as a lone civilian consular.        
 This attitude is supported by Cicero‘s studious self-reference as a togatus dux 
et imperator rather than a purely military figure.  Credibility will no doubt have been 
a concern, despite the bold proposition at Cat. 2.11 to be the dux in the last war 
threatening Rome.  More to the point, however, was Cicero‘s theatre of war: the 
capital, within the pomerium.  As Steel summarizes, ―Rome was, of course, an 
entirely demilitarised area and could only be saved by a togate protector.‖
549
  Thus 
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the significance of the warless victory that is repeatedly promised in the 
Catilinarians (Cat. 2.26, 28; 3.23, 24), which at the time allowed Cicero to distance 
himself from Sulla‘s precedent of a dux in the city.  More important was his 
subsequent development of the theme, which is intimately connected with his 
unprecedented civilian thanksgiving.  This award, along with the civic crown and 
acclamation as parens patriae, formed the foundation of his consular ethos and were 
cited ever afterward in a way that Graff calls ―eine magische Formel.‖
550
  The 
strength of the hybrid togatus dux persona is noted by Nicolet, who argues that it 
represents a re-ordering of the social hierarchy in Cicero‘s favour.
551
  The same ideas 
are present in the evaluation of military and civilian professions at Mur. 19-30, and 
in Cicero‘s ethical appropriation of military values throughout the conflict.
552
  
Because he was the leader, represented ―right‖ against the conspirators‘ ―wrong,‖ 
and was successful, he used the suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy to 
symbolize the triumph of civilian leadership over military force – cedant arma togae, 
concedat laurea laudi, as it was immortalized in the much maligned verse from his 
poem about his consulship.
553
   
 It is worth noting in this connection that Cicero abandons the dux et 
imperator aspect of his quasi-military persona as soon as the conspiracy had been 
neutralized.  Already in the Fourth Catilinarian he styles himself simply as a 
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conservator (Cat. 4.23).  Similar phrasing appears in a letter written in January 62 
(Fam. 5.2.1), followed by the infamous overture to Pompey in April of that year, 
where he offers himself as Laelius to Pompey‘s Scipio Africanus (Fam. 5.7.3).  In 
the Pro Sulla, which was probably delivered between May and October 62, he brags 
(somewhat disingenuously) that he freed the Republic sine tumultu, sine dilectu, sine 
armis, sine exercitu.
554
  This reputation was firmly entrenched by 44-43, allowing 
him to claim that he had always been a man of peace (esp. Phil. 7.7-9; 8.11).  The 
established ethos of the defensor conservatorque libertatis,
555
 complemented by the 
theme of the ―twenty years‘ war‖ against disloyal citizens (esp. Phil. 2.1, 119; 6.17; 
12.24), gave compelling internal consistency to the persona of the princeps 
sumendorum sagorum, and was therefore a critical element of Cicero‘s authority.  
We can only imagine what effect another ―civilian‖ victory would have had on his 
self-perception and political reputation.  
 Cicero‘s success as a quasi-military leader is a testament to the enduring 
relevance of military rhetoric during political crises in the late Republic and Cicero‘s 
skill in deploying it.  Although he took no active part in the combat in 63 and 44-43, 
he directed the wars from the Senate and the rostrum, convincing his audience of the 
necessity of warfare and of his own suitability as leader.  The strong military theme 
of his togatus dux et imperator persona in 63 reflects his position as consul, whereas 
the more reserved princeps sumendorum sagorum persona in 44-43 evokes his 
authority as a senior consular.  The civic elements in both of these personae 
acknowledge the domestic sphere of Cicero‘s activity, as well as his own primarily 
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civilian identity; but they in no way soften the military attributes.  The manner of his 
self-representation allowed him to enjoy the best of both worlds, as it were, 
exploiting the sympathy due to defenders of the realm while also championing the 
ability of civilians to contribute to the safety of the state. 
 
Conclusion: an alternative discourse? 
 In this chapter we have seen how Cicero navigated a pro-civic course in the 
militarized society of the late Republic.  His value judgements and self-
representation as a military leader in 63 and 44-43 bring to the fore issues which are 
only hinted at by general tension between civic and military interests in his writings.  
He never denies that military activity is valuable, but the persistent recurrence of the 
competitive view shows that he did not see military activity or achievements as the 
equal of civilian ones. 
 This is most clearly demonstrated by his value judgements, which pit civic 
activity against military activity in decisive terms.  The fact that even seemingly pro-
military statements exhibit a pro-civic bias confirms the importance of this message 
to him.  A striking concentration of passages in the years 46-43 betrays the 
conditioning influence – or psychological effect – of civil war.  Giving new urgency 
to his promotion of strong civic leadership, this proof of the danger posed by power-
hungry commanders focussed his ―anti-militarism‖ on warfare rather than 
generalship and military service generally.  The occurrence of a similar effect in 
contemporary and early Augustan literature corroborates this interpretation and 
makes it possible to construct a continuum of anti-militarism in the period.  This 
continuum provides crucial context to Cicero‘s prejudice, showing that he was 
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neither alone in his mistrust of the army nor challenging the value of military service 
for its own sake. 
 His leadership rhetoric in 63 and 44-43, on the other hand, shows how a 
civilian figure could manipulate contemporary regard for military credentials to his 
advantage.  There is no evidence that he thought he was a military leader during 
these episodes, but plenty that he expected a specific reaction from his audience if he 
presented himself as one: his militarized rhetoric served to qualify the threats posed 
by Catiline and Antony and contextualize his leadership aspirations.  Thus, although 
he embraced a military ethos, his clear exploitation of popular prejudices connected 
with it makes this a further example of his pro-civic bias. 
 It is unfortunate that the connotations of ―pro-civic‖ and ―anti-military‖ 
obscure the fact that, in the context of the late Republic, they are two sides of the 
same coin.  The either/or phrasing of Cicero‘s value judgements and the hybrid 
nature of his quasi-military persona made it impossible to champion civic activity 
without seeming to condemn military activity in turn.  We have seen that the label of 
anti-militarism creates confusion between inclination and principle, often giving too 
much weight to the former.  If we accept that Cicero was not insecure about his lack 
of military credentials and could criticize the army from motives other than spite, his 
value system becomes a remarkable and demonstrably innovative discourse about the 
place of the military in the state.  The observable influence of experience – 
particularly of civil war – confirms that his theory was flexible, and represents one 
man‘s solution to the problems of military despotism.  Cicero‘s failure to supplant  
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long-established pro-military prejudices must not be cited as evidence of 
insufficiency of thought; his contribution is that he recognized the source of the 




Cicero de re militari 
 
 Cicero often appears to be someone who had little to do with the army or 
military matters.  The domestic focus of his career, combined with his enduring 
reputation as an orator and philosopher, sets him apart from the generals whose 
names dominate the history of the period.  He is therefore an unlikely candidate for a 
military commentator; but to assume that his civilian identity insulated or excluded 
him from Rome‘s militarized culture would be to misread contemporary society and 
his place in it.  His writings bear eloquent witness to the ubiquity of military matters 
in public and private life, as well as to the myriad of ways in which even a civilian 
might engage with them.  The presence of this material in the corpus challenges the 
prevailing view of him as an exclusively civilian figure, and allows us to consider his 
works seriously as a source for information about military matters in the first 
century. 
 This is the view advanced in this thesis, which has surveyed military themes 
in his writings and assessed them for the first time as a type of military commentary.  
The quantity, and especially the quality, of the relevant material recommends such a 
study: the army is in fact a central theme in the corpus, and one which is handled 
thoughtfully, in a way that indicates a high level of awareness and interest on his 
part.  The range of topics that he discusses – from the exploits of historical generals 
to the attributes of contemporary ones, and from the theory of bellum iustum to the 
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implications of civil war and empire – provides ample raw material for the 
construction of a detailed narrative about the army, its activities, and related issues.   
 The factor which makes this narrative viable as commentary – in spite of its 
unconventional form – is Cicero‘s authority as a military commentator.  This derives 
from his experience of military service and his activities as a senator and advocate.  
His experience was reviewed in Chapter 1, where it was shown that it met the 
standards of the day, despite its comparative brevity.  He undertook a tirocinium 
militiae according to custom at the age of seventeen, led an army to victory as 
governor of Cilicia (earning the title of Imperator), and was given a command in the 
Civil War.  This service exposed him to the realities of front-line combat and 
suggests that his peers did not regard him as ill-suited for campaign – or command.  
The success of his deliberative and forensic speeches dealing with military issues 
provides additional, strong evidence that he understood his subject matter well.  He 
helped his colleagues to obtain (or keep) commands, urged the Senate to declare war, 
and secured the acquittal (and one famous conviction) of military men with reference 
to their service in the field.  Talent and strategy notwithstanding, the fact that he was 
able to persuade audiences who likely had more military experience than he did 
indicates a shared perspective and values.  It may be reiterated here that Cicero never 
denies the value of military service or challenges the merit of military commitments 
abroad.  He expresses pride in the prowess of the army, praises the achievements of 
its commanders, supports the necessity – even desirability – of war, and embraces 
empire.  Similar ideas in contemporary literature (especially the writings of Caesar 
and Sallust) provide perhaps the best measure of Cicero‘s integration into his society, 
and thus bolster his authority as a commentator who was in touch with his times. 
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 The value – and appeal – of his account lies in the features which distinguish 
it from contemporary literature, however.  On a basic level, his frame of reference, 
chronological coverage, and relationship to the events he describes yield a very 
different narrative from those of Caesar, Sallust, and Livy.  Whereas these authors 
describe military matters primarily from a front-line perspective, Cicero focuses on 
the home front, providing access to a point of view that is not represented elsewhere 
in this period.  The nearly forty-year span of his writings (from the 80s to 43) is 
similarly unrivalled, and, when combined with the sheer size of the surviving corpus, 
allows us to observe trends and developments in how military matters were managed 
and how the army was perceived.  This is particularly valuable in light of the 
historical importance of this period, when attitudes towards war and the place of the 
army in the state were changing amid the transition to Empire.  Finally, his status as 
a participant-witness means that his writings offer an insider‘s view of events as they 
unfolded.  He shares this trait with Caesar (Caesar‘s third-person narrative 
notwithstanding), but the surviving works of both Sallust and Livy are written from 
an external perspective and about events in the past.   
 Cicero‘s account is also exceptional for ideological reasons.  Although his 
attitude towards the army is broadly comparable to that of his contemporaries, 
important deviations can be detected in his conception of the nature of the 
relationship between the army and the state, specifically which part should be 
dominant.  Contrary to traditional priorities, he proposes a hierarchy whereby greater 
value is placed on civic activity than military activity.  For this reason I have 
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suggested that he offers an ―alternative discourse‖ which challenges Rome‘s 
militarism and the military ethos exemplified in this period by Caesar.
556
   
 His perspective is characterized by four persistent themes which invert the 
traditional military>civic hierarchy to varying degrees.  Each theme is firmly rooted 
in contemporary events – and in civilian priorities.  The least outwardly antagonistic 
of these is Cicero‘s conception of the army as a defensive force.  This ideal is 
significant for what it forbids rather than what it permits: as expected, civil war is 
excluded, but so are campaigns which he judges to be motivated by anything other 
than national interest.  Crassus‘ Parthian campaign is a prominent and unsurprising 
example of this, but his treatment of the Catilinarian conspiracy (bolstered by 
Manlius‘ army) and the war against Antony as full-blown bellum is less expected and 
reveals much about his definition of civil war.  Although we know that he was 
concerned about the rules of war, the issue at the heart of this conception of the army 
is the potential for harm posed by over-powerful generals with armies at their back.  
The military context allows him to depict ambition as a threat to national security, 
subtly substituting domestic concerns for strictly military ones.  
 A more noticeable substitution is the basis of two further themes which 
concern the value of military activity to the state.  To start with, Cicero frequently 
associates military service with patriotism and good citizenship, a connection which 
adds an ethical element that is distinctly civilian to his narrative.  This can be seen in 
his rhetoric vilifying instigators of civil war as morally wicked, as well as in the 
argumenta ex vita he constructs for his military protégés and against Verres.  Of 
course, his strategy here owes much to traditional attitudes and rhetorical theory, 
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respectively; but this does not invalidate the ideas expressed.  Valuable context is 
provided by his ideal of vera gloria, which he promotes as a patriotically superior 
alternative to military gloria, and his description of provincial commands as a trust 
between the magistrate and the Roman people, whereby the governor is duty-bound 
to defend his part of the empire without thought for personal gain.  The implications 
of this value system are best understood with reference to our third theme, which is 
Cicero‘s tendency to evaluate military activity by civic criteria.  More than just a 
rhetorical sleight of hand to move the discussion into his comfort zone, this practice 
seems to be based on personal conviction about the need for strong civic leadership 
to ensure security and order.  This can be seen in the special exemplary function of 
the military interlocutors in his treatises, all of whom are depicted as the embodiment 
of civic virtues; in his attention to the domestic implications of the campaigns of his 
peers; in the priority he gives to civic virtues in his early concept of the ideal 
commander; and in his manipulation of military prestige in his self-representation as 
a togatus dux et imperator in 63 and the princeps sumendorum sagorum in 44-43. 
 The competition between military and civic concerns culminates in the last 
and most extreme element of Cicero‘s perspective: the idea that civic activity is 
fundamentally superior to military activity.  This is a shocking and subversive 
concept to find in Republican literature, but one which must be assessed in light of 
his engagement with contemporary culture.  The relevant passages were analyzed in 
Chapter 6, where it was shown that the sentiment is a reaction to the army‘s role in 
the turmoil of the first century – that is, not anti-militarism for its own sake.  Cicero‘s 
rationale is essentially that civic activity is less able to harm the state than military 
activity, and is therefore to be preferred.  Although the argument is simplistic, it is 
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defensible in context and thus stands as important evidence that the destabilizing 
influence of power-hungry generals was recognized at the time.  
 It is impossible to know how representative Cicero‘s perception of military 
matters is.  Richardson suggests that ―most of the political class amongst whom he 
lived and to whom he spoke and wrote will have been more like [him] than 
Caesar.‖
557
  Because the orator‘s chief aim was to persuade, we may reasonably 
assume that his speeches reflect his audience‘s priorities at least as much as they 
represent his own views.  Similar arguments may be made for his public letters, 
which would have been calculated to appeal, and the treatises, which were not 
without political significance in their own right.  Nevertheless, his obvious distrust of 
the army raises important questions about the effect of his civilian perspective on his 
attitude towards military matters.  It would be easy, for instance, to construct an 
outwardly-consistent argument that his preference for civic activity was borne of 
self-interest.  That his talents suited him for a domestic career is undeniable; but, as 
was seen above, he was certainly not unacquainted with the world outwith the 
pomerium.  More to the point, the analysis of his criticism of the army demonstrates 
conclusively that it was not based on ignorance resulting from his civilian identity. 
 I would go so far as to argue that being a civilian troubled Cicero less than it 
does modern scholars.  There is no evidence that he regarded himself, or was 
regarded by his peers, as politically disadvantaged because he lacked a military 
reputation.
558
  Conversely, there is ample evidence that he was fully involved in 
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public life and always sought to be at the centre of events.  The practical effect of his 
civilian career was that he was rarely absent from Rome for any length of time.  He 
was thus ideally placed to observe the changing relationship between the Senate and 
the army, and to call attention to developments which he saw as threats to national 
security.  His commentary is significant and valuable precisely because he criticizes 
the army from within the culture.  It complements the more conventional narratives 
of Caesar and Sallust, and contributes to a much more nuanced understanding of his 
place in the late Republic. 
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